Santos v. Crowell

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting Deputy Crowells 7 Motion to Dismiss; denying as moot Deputy Crowells 7 Motion to Bifurcate; dismissing count I against Deputy Crowell in his official capacity and dismissing count II in its entirety; setting deadline for Deputy Crowell to file his answer. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 3/17/2016. (dass, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Chambers of
GEORGE L. RUSSELL, III
United States District Judge

101 West Lombard Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21201
410-962-4055

March 17, 2016
MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL RE:

Miguel Santos v. Deputy David Crowell
Civil Action No. GLR-15-3907

Dear Counsel:
Pending before the Court is Defendant’s, Deputy David Crowell (“Deputy Crowell”), Motion to
Dismiss or to Bifurcate (ECF No. 7). The Court, having reviewed the Motion and the parties’ briefs, finds no
hearing necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2014). For the reasons that follow, the Motion to Dismiss
will be granted and the Motion to Bifurcate will be denied as moot.
On January 3, 3015, Deputy Crowell, a deputy of the Wicomico County, Maryland Sheriff’s
Department, performed a routine traffic stop of Plaintiff Miguel Santos in Salisbury, Maryland. Shortly after
the stop, Deputy Crowell suspected that Santos might be driving under the influence of alcohol. After Santos
exited his vehicle, Deputy Crowell asked Santos to submit to a breath test, but Santos declined and stepped
away. Deputy Crowell then grabbed Santos and pinned him against Deputy Crowell’s police vehicle. A
brief struggle ensued in which Santos did not submit to being handcuffed. The struggle concluded when
Deputy Crowell slammed Santos to the ground and discharged his taser. Santos suffered fractures in his
back and wrist. Later that year, a jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County found Santos guilty
of resisting arrest, failure to obey a lawful order, and a number of traffic offenses, including driving under the
influence of alcohol. The jury found Santos not guilty of second degree assault and disorderly conduct.
Santos initiated this suit on December 22, 2015, bringing three claims against Deputy Crowell in his
individual and official capacities: (1) violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) for unreasonable seizure, excessive use of force,
and denial of due process (Count I); (2) violation of the Eighth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
excessive use of force (Count II); and (3) assault (Count III). On January 26, 2016, Deputy Crowell filed a
Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 1 or to Bifurcate pursuant to Rule 42
(ECF No. 7). Santos filed his Response and Opposition on February 2, 2016 (ECF No. 12), and Deputy
Crowell submitted his Reply on February 3, 2016 (ECF No. 13). The Motion is ripe for disposition.
A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), or does not “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 555 U.S. at 556). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In considering a Rule
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Deputy Crowell moves to dismiss only Counts I and II. He argues that Count III should not be
dismissed, but rather should be reclassified as a battery claim. Santos, however, has not moved for leave to
amend his assault claim.

12(b)(6) motion, a court must examine the complaint as a whole, consider the factual allegations in the
complaint as true, and construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Albright v.
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Davidson Cty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir.
2005) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
Deputy Crowell argues that the Court must dismiss Count I against Deputy Crowell in his official
capacity. The Court agrees. To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a deprivation of
rights guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States and that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a “person” acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)). “[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their
official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
Deputy sheriffs are state officials. Rucker v. Harford Cty., 558 A.2d 399, 407 (Md. 1989). Accordingly,
because Deputy Crowell is a deputy sheriff, the Court will dismiss Count I against him in his official
capacity.
Deputy Crowell next argues that the Court must dismiss Count II in its entirety because Santos does
not allege that Deputy Crowell is a policymaker for Wicomico County. The Court agrees. Although states
are not “persons” under § 1983, local governments are. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436
U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Local governments, however, are only liable under § 1983 if they cause a deprivation
through an official policy or custom. Id. at 694. It appears that Santos attempts to bring a Monell claim
against Deputy Crowell. He alleges that “Crowell has adopted and used policies, procedures, practices and
customs within their [sic] jurisdiction that has [sic] allowed, among other things, the use of excessive force or
threat of force.” (Compl. ¶ 21, ECF No. 1). A Monell claim is inappropriate against Deputy Crowell,
however, because he is not a local government entity. The appropriate manner in which to sue Deputy
Crowell is through a § 1983 individual capacity suit, which is precisely what Santos does in Count I. Thus,
the Court will grant Deputy Crowell’s Motion to Dismiss as to Count II.2
Based on the foregoing reasons, Deputy Crowell’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7) is GRANTED
and his Motion to Bifurcate (ECF No. 7) is DENIED AS MOOT. Count I is DISMISSED against Deputy
Crowell in his official capacity and Count II is DISMISSED in its entirety. Deputy Crowell shall file his
Answer within fourteen days of the date of this memorandum. Despite the informal nature of this
memorandum, it shall constitute an Order of this Court, and the Clerk is directed to docket it accordingly.
Very truly yours,
/s/
_______________________
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge

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Deputy Crowell argues that if the Court denies his Motion to Dismiss as to Count II, the Court
should bifurcate Count II from the other claims. Because the Court will dismiss Count II, however, it will
deny Deputy Crowell’s Motion to Bifurcate (ECF No. 7) as moot.

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