Burton v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 22

ORDER denying 19 Motion of plaintiff for Summary Judgment; granting 20 Motion of defendant for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 2/9/2017. (jnls, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

February 9, 2017
LETTER TO COUNSEL
RE:

Kathryn Anne Burton v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-15-3947

Dear Counsel:
On December 24, 2015, Plaintiff Kathryn Anne Burton petitioned this Court to review
the Social Security Administration’s final decision to deny her claim for Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”). (ECF No. 1). I have considered the parties’ cross-motions for summary
judgment, and Ms. Burton’s reply. (ECF Nos. 19, 20, 21). I find that no hearing is necessary.
See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). This Court must uphold the decision of the Agency if it is
supported by substantial evidence and if the Agency employed proper legal standards. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Under that
standard, I will deny Ms. Burton’s motion, grant the Commissioner’s motion, and affirm the
ALJ’s decision. This letter explains my rationale.
Ms. Burton filed her claim for benefits on April 26, 2010, alleging a disability onset date
of January 15, 2010. (Tr. 166-72). Her claim was denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr.
88-91, 95-101). A hearing was held on July 17, 2014, before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”). (Tr. 30-72). Following the hearing, the ALJ determined that Ms. Burton was not
disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act during the relevant time frame. (Tr. 1229). The Appeals Council denied Ms. Burton’s request for review. (Tr. 1-6). Thus, the ALJ’s
decision constitutes the final, reviewable decision of the Agency.
The ALJ found that Ms. Burton suffered from the severe impairments of bipolar disorder,
anxiety disorder, and social anxiety disorder. (Tr. 17). Despite these impairments, the ALJ
determined that Ms. Burton retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following
nonexertional limitations:
-

She must work in a stable work environment where the work place and work
process remain generally the same from day to day; and,
She cannot travel as part of a job; and,
A supervisor must direct activities of the employee so that they do not need to
prioritize tasks; and,

Kathryn Anne Burton v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-15-3947
February 9, 2017
Page 2
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Instructions should be written as well as oral so that the claimant has
something to refer to; and,
She must perform goal-oriented work that is not production rate paced; and,
She can perform no more than occasional decision making using several
concrete variables in or from standardized situations; and,
She can have no public contact either face to face or by telephone; and,
She should work with things rather than people; and,
She cannot perform collaborative work or work that is part of a team; and,
She can work with little oversight where a supervisor may redirect or give
instructions and the claimant does not need to respond except to acknowledge
directives or seek clarification.

(Tr. 19). After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined
that Ms. Burton could perform work existing in significant numbers in the national economy and
that, therefore, she was not disabled. (Tr. 24).
Ms. Burton advances several arguments on appeal. Specifically, Ms. Burton contends
that: (1) the ALJ assigned too little weight to the opinions of her treating physician, Dr. Bogrov;
(2) that the ALJ did not properly consider her Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”)
scores; (3) that the ALJ should have found that she met or equaled the requirements of Listing
12.04; and (4) that the jobs identified by the VE involved production demands that were
inconsistent with the RFC assessment. Each argument lacks merit.
Ms. Burton’s first argument is that the ALJ assigned inadequate weight to the opinions
of her treating physician, Dr. Bogrov. Pl. Mot. 7-9. A treating physician’s opinion is given
controlling weight when two conditions are met: 1) it is well-supported by medically acceptable
clinical laboratory diagnostic techniques; and 2) it is consistent with other substantial evidence in
the record. See Craig, 76 F.3d 585 (4th Cir. 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).
However, where a treating source’s opinion is not supported by clinical evidence or is
inconsistent with other substantial evidence, it should be accorded significantly less weight.
Craig, 76 F.3d at 590. If the ALJ does not give a treating source’s opinion controlling weight,
the ALJ will assign weight after applying several factors, such as, the length and nature of the
treatment relationship, the degree to which the opinion is supported by the record as a whole, and
any other factors that support or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)-(6). The
ALJ must also consider, and is entitled to rely on, opinions from non-treating doctors. See SSR
96-6p, at *3 (“In appropriate circumstances, opinions from State agency medical and
psychological consultants and other program physicians and psychologists may be entitled to
greater weight than the opinions of treating or examining sources.”).
Here, the ALJ provided a detailed summary of Ms. Burton’s medical records during the
relevant 2010-2011 time frame. (Tr. 21). The ALJ acknowledged that there were times in 2010
when Ms. Burton was extremely anxious, but that at other times she had extensive activities of
daily living, reported being “back to normal” and “doing much better,” and had started looking
for a job. Id. The ALJ also provided an extensive analysis of the opinions rendered by Dr.

Kathryn Anne Burton v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-15-3947
February 9, 2017
Page 3
Bogrov, assigning the opinions “limited weight” because they were contradicted by the medical
evidence of record and by Ms. Burton’s activities of daily living. (Tr. 22). Additionally, the
ALJ assigned “great weight” to the opinions of the non-examining State agency physicians,
whose findings about Ms. Burton’s mental capacities comported with the ALJ’s RFC
assessment. (Tr. 21-22). Ultimately, my review of the ALJ’s decision is confined to whether
substantial evidence, in the record as it was reviewed by the ALJ, supports the decision and
whether correct legal standards were applied. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 404
(1971). Even, as here, if there is other evidence that may support Ms. Burton’s position, I am not
permitted to reweigh the evidence or to substitute my own judgment for that of the ALJ. See
Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). In considering the entire record, there
appears to be evidence that could be marshaled to support either side’s view of the case.
However, because the ALJ cited to substantial evidence to support his assignment of limited
weight to Dr. Bogrov’s opinions, I must uphold her determination.
Ms. Burton further contends that the ALJ’s conclusion contrasts with some of the GAF
scores determined by her treating and examining medical sources. Pl. Mot. at 8, 11. However,
GAF scores are not determinative of disability. See, e.g., Davis v. Astrue, Case No. JKS–09–
2545, 2010 WL 5237850, at *3 (D. Md. Dec. 15, 2010) (noting that the SSA does not endorse
the use of GAF scores, and, further, that GAF scores do not correlate to the severity requirements
in the mental disorder listings). Although they are not conclusive, nothing prohibits an ALJ from
considering GAF scores as one component of a full analysis of the evidence of record. See, e.g.,
Kozel v. Astrue, No. JKS–10–2180, 2012 WL 2951554, at *10 (D. Md. July 18, 2012) (“[E]ven
though a GAF score is not determinative of whether a person is disabled under SSA regulations,
it may inform the ALJ’s judgment.”). Here, the ALJ fully considered the GAF scores in Ms.
Burton’s record, but noted that they represent “subjective assessments of an individual’s mental
state at one moment in time” and that they were “inconsistent with the claimant’s broad
functioning and stable mental health status” and “not supported by Dr. Taghizadeh’s
examination of the claimant.” (Tr. 22). Thus, I find no error in the ALJ’s express consideration
of, and ultimate assignment of “little” or “limited” weight to Ms. Burton’s GAF scores.
Next, Ms. Burton argues that the ALJ did not adequately consider Listing 12.04. Pl. Mot.
9-11. However, she does not address the specific paragraph B findings made by the ALJ and
explain why those findings were inadequate. The ALJ adequately applied the special technique
applicable to medical impairments and made the requisite findings in each of the four “paragraph
B” criteria, citing to record evidence to support those findings. (Tr. 17-18). In particular, the
ALJ found that Ms. Burton had no restriction in activities of daily living, moderate difficulties in
social functioning and concentration, persistence, or pace, and no episodes of decompensation
during the relevant window between her alleged onset date of January 15, 2010 and her date last
insured of March 31, 2011. (Tr. 18). Accordingly, without further explanation as to the basis for
Ms. Burton’s argument, I discern no error in the ALJ’s Listing analysis.
Finally, Ms. Burton argues that the jobs identified by the VE have “production demands”
and are thus “production rate paced employment.” Pl. Reply at 2-3. However, while Ms. Burton
is correct that all jobs require some level of productivity from employees, “production rate paced
employment,” as described by the ALJ at the hearing, was defined as having “to pace that work

Kathryn Anne Burton v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-15-3947
February 9, 2017
Page 4
in a specified manner” and not perform it at “a variable pace.” (Tr. 65). It is clear from the
exchange at the hearing that the VE understood and defined “production rate paced employment”
as the ALJ intended it. Id. Accordingly, there is no conflict between the RFC assessment and
the jobs identified by the VE.
For the reasons set forth herein, Ms. Burton’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
19) is DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 20) is GRANTED.
The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion and docketed
as an order.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge