Roberts v. Morgan et al

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 4/29/2016. (c/m 4/29/2016)(ko, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
AARON B. ROBERTS,

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Petitioner,

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v.

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WARDEN J. PHILLIP MORGAN, et al.,

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Respondents.

Civil Action No. GLR-15-4011

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner Aaron B. Roberts’ Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012). (ECF No. 1). Roberts challenges his 2009
judgment of conviction in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland for first-degree assault
and related offenses. Having reviewed the Petition and Respondents’, Warden J. Phillip Morgan
and the Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General of the State of Maryland, Limited Answer (ECF No.
6), the Court finds an evidentiary hearing is not necessary. See Rule 8(a), Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). For the
reasons that follow, the Court will dismiss the Petition.
I.

BACKGROUND

In September 2009, a jury in the Circuit Court convicted Roberts of first-degree assault
and related firearm offenses. (ECF No. 6-1). On October 29, 2009, the Circuit Court judge
sentenced Roberts to twenty-five years of imprisonment. (Id.). In an unreported opinion filed on
April 22, 2011, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the judgment of conviction.
(ECF No. 6-2). On August 11, 2011, the Court of Appeals of Maryland denied Roberts’ request
for further direct review. See Roberts v. State, 421 Md. 193 (2011). Roberts did not seek direct
review in the Supreme Court of the United States.

On November 18, 2010, while his direct appeal was still pending, Roberts filed a petition
for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court. (ECF No. 6-1). On May 16, 2013, Roberts
withdrew his post-conviction petition. (Id.). On January 7, 2014, Roberts filed a second petition
for post-conviction relief. (Id.). The Circuit Court denied the petition on May 6, 2015. (Id.).
Roberts filed an application for leave to appeal this adverse ruling on June 11, 2015. (Id.). On
December 24, 2015, the Court of Special Appeals found the application for leave to appeal
untimely and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. (ECF No. 6-3).
Roberts signed his Petition with this Court on December 28, 2015, and it was received for
docketing by the Clerk of Court on December 31, 2015. (ECF No. 1). Roberts argues his 2009
conviction violates federal law based on ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.
Respondents filed a Limited Answer on February 16, 2016 (ECF No. 6), and Roberts filed a
Reply, as amended, on March 8 and March 11, 2016 (ECF Nos. 8, 9).
II.

DISCUSSION

Respondents argue that Robert’s Petition is time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
Roberts argues that the “prison mailbox rule” enunciated in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266
(1988), should be applied with regard to the key filing dates of his state post-judgment pleadings.
Roberts states that he (1) submitted his post-conviction petition for refiling on December 9,
2013, but it was not docketed in the Circuit Court until January 7, 2014—a difference of 25
days— and (2) submitted his application for leave to appeal the denial of post-conviction relief
on May 29, 2015, but it was not docketed in the Circuit Court until June 11, 2015—a difference
of 13 days. He also argues that the time during which his leave to appeal the denial of postconviction relief was pending in the Court of Special Appeals should serve to toll the limitations
period.

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), “[a] 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court.”

This one-year limitations period begins to run from the latest of:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion
of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such
review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from
filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
The one-year limitations period is tolled during the pendency of a “properly filed
application for State post-conviction or other collateral review.”

Id. §

2244 (d)(2).

Equitable tolling may also apply. See Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 329–30 (4th Cir.
2000). Because 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) provides a statute of limitations, however, equitable
tolling “must be reserved for those rare instances where—due to circumstances external to
the party’s own conduct—it would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation period against
the party and gross injustice would result.”

Harris, 209 F.3d at 330; see id. (“[A]ny

invocation of equity to relieve the strict application of a statute of limitations must be guarded
and infrequent, lest circumstances of individualized hardship supplant the rules of clearly
drafted statutes.”).
The petitioner carries the burden of showing he is entitled to equitable tolling. Id.
The petitioner must demonstrate two elements: (1) that “extraordinary circumstances
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beyond [his] control prevented him from complying with the statutory time limit,”
Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Spencer v. Sutton, 239 F.3d 626,
630 (4th Cir. 2001)); and (2) that he exercised reasonable diligence in pursuing his
rights, Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 653 (2010).

The following do not constitute

extraordinary circumstances justifying the equitable tolling of a federal statute of limitations: a
lawyer’s mistake, Rouse, 339 F.3d at 248; a petitioner’s unfamiliarity with

the

legal

process or his lack of legal representation, see Barrow v. New Orleans S.S. Ass’n, 932 F.2d
473, 478 (5th Cir. 1991); and ignorance of legal rights, whether that ignorance is due to
illiteracy or otherwise, see Barrow, 932 F.2d at 478.
Roberts urges this Court to accept his statement that state court pleadings were timely
filed, but the clerk’s office personnel failed to timely docket them. To the extent this argument
is construed under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B), the argument fails, as no documentation has
been presented to support a finding of impediment.
Thus, Roberts must rely on equitable tolling to defeat the one-year statute of
limitations. He urges this Court to extend the “prison mailbox rule” announced in Houston v.
Lack, to encompass state court filings. In Lack, the Supreme Court held that under the federal
appellate rule requiring habeas corpus appeals to be filed within 30 days, a self-represented
prisoner’s notice of appeal was filed at the moment of delivery to prison authorities for
forwarding to the district court. Lack, 487 U.S. at 270. Pursuant to Lack, Roberts’ Petition,
received in this Court on December 31, 2015 and docketed on January 4, 2016, was filed as of
the date it was delivered to prison authorities, December 28, 2015. This Court will not impose
similar the prison mailbox rule on the State courts and, for the purpose of assessing the
limitations period, will accept the state court docket dates as the dates the petitions were

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received. Similarly, this Court declines to adopt and expand a Maryland notice rule applicable
to defendants eligible for enhanced sentencing as enunciated in Lee v. Maryland, 332 Md. 654
(Md. 1993).
The time for Roberts to seek direct review of his state-court conviction concluded on
November 14, 2011—when the period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court expired. See Sup.Ct. Rule 13.1 (“[A] petition for a writ of certiorari to review a judgment
in any case, civil or criminal, entered by a state court of last resort . . . is timely when it is filed
with the Clerk of [the Supreme] Court within 90 days after entry of the judgment.”). Roberts
withdrew his post-conviction petition in the Circuit Court, pending during his direct appeal, on
May 16, 2013, and the one-year period for seeking federal habeas corpus review began to run.
Roberts waited 236 days before Roberts refiling his post-conviction petition in the Circuit Court
on January 7, 2014. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2), the limitations period was tolled while
post-conviction proceedings were underway in the Circuit Court.
Post-conviction relief was denied on May 6, 2015. Roberts’ application for leave to
appeal this ruling was received by the Circuit Court on June 11, 2015, four days outside the 30day limitations period for noting an appeal. See Md. Rule 8-204(b) (stating application for leave
to appeal must be filed within thirty days after entry of judgment or order from which appeal is
sought). Because the application for leave to appeal was not “properly filed,” the one-year
deadline for seeking habeas corpus relief was not tolled as the Court of Special Appeals
considered the application.
Though Roberts promptly submitted his Petition to this Court on December 28, 2015
after the Court of Special Appeals denied his application for leave to appeal on December 24,
2015, the one-year period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) was only tolled from January 7, 2014 to

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May 6, 2015. The one-year period, however, was not tolled from May 16, 2013—when he
withdrew his first post-conviction petition in the Circuit Court—to January 7, 2014—when he
filed his second post-conviction petition. Roberts was required to file his federal Petition by
September 14, 2015. Because the Petition was filed in December 2015, the Court, therefore,
finds that Roberts’ Petition is time-barred and will dismiss it.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss Roberts’ Petition (ECF No. 1). A
Certificate of Appealability will not issue because Roberts does not state a valid claim for the
denial of a constitutional right. 1 A separate Order follows.
Entered this 29th day of April, 2016
/s /
________________________________
George L, Russell, III
United States District Judge

1

When a district court dismisses a habeas petition solely on procedural grounds, a
Certificate of Appealability will not issue unless the petitioner can demonstrate both “(1) ‘that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of
a constitutional right’ and (2) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district
court was correct in its procedural ruling.’” Rouse, 252 F.3d at 684–85 (quoting Slack v. Daniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)).
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