Brown, Jr. v. Commissioner Social Security

Filing 20

ORDER denying 16 Mr. Brown's Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 19 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; reversing in part the Commissioner's judgment; and remanding the case for further proceedings. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 1/20/2017. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

January 20, 2017
LETTER TO COUNSEL
RE:

David Lee Brown, Jr. v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-16-501

Dear Counsel:
On February 22, 2016, Plaintiff David Lee Brown, Jr. petitioned this Court to review the
Social Security Administration’s final decision to deny his claim for Supplemental Security
Income (“SSI”). (ECF No. 1). I have considered the parties’ cross-motions for summary
judgment. (ECF Nos. 16, 19). I find that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md.
2016). This Court must uphold the decision of the Agency if it is supported by substantial
evidence and if the Agency employed proper legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
1383(c)(3); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Under that standard, I will deny
both motions, reverse the judgment of the Commissioner, and remand the case to the
Commissioner for further analysis pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This letter
explains my rationale.
Mr. Brown filed his claim for benefits in May of 2012, alleging a disability onset date of
January 2, 2003. (Tr. 134-42). His claim was denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 6776, 78-88). A hearing was held on July 11, 2014, before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
(Tr. 24-65). Following the hearing, the ALJ determined that Mr. Brown was not disabled within
the meaning of the Social Security Act during the relevant time frame. (Tr. 6-22). The Appeals
Council denied Mr. Brown’s request for review, (Tr. 1-3), so the ALJ’s decision constitutes the
final, reviewable decision of the Agency.
The ALJ found that Mr. Brown suffered from the severe impairments of “borderline IQ,
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, bipolar disorder and depression.” (Tr. 11). Despite these
impairments, the ALJ determined that Mr. Brown retained the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to:
perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following
nonexertional limitations: he is able to perform routine, repetitive, simple tasks
with occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors and the public. He would
need to be in positions where he would not be required to set goals or make plans
independently.

David Lee Brown, Jr. v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-16-501
January 20, 2017
(Tr. 14). After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that
Mr. Brown could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy and that,
therefore, he was not disabled. (Tr. 17-18).
Mr. Brown raises several arguments on appeal. Although many of his arguments fail, I
find remand to be warranted on two grounds: the ALJ’s failure to address Mr. Brown’s visual
deficits and the ALJ’s failure to comply with the dictates of Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632 (4th
Cir. 2015). In so holding, I express no opinion as to whether the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion that
Mr. Brown was not entitled to benefits is correct or incorrect.
Turning briefly to some of the unsuccessful arguments, I am not persuaded that the ALJ
conducted an insufficient analysis of the mental health Listings. The ALJ engaged in the
required analysis of each functional area and cited to record evidence in support of his
conclusions. (Tr. 12). In addition, the ALJ provided a thorough explanation of his evaluation of
the evidence regarding Mr. Brown’s IQ. (Tr. 13-14). Mr. Brown’s arguments about the
inadequacy of the Listing analysis focus on the weight the ALJ assigned to certain pieces of
evidence over other pieces of evidence. That inquiry is not permissible, since this Court’s role is
not to reweigh the evidence or to substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ, but simply to
adjudicate whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. See Hays v.
Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990).
I am also not convinced that the ALJ erred in his evaluation of Mr. Brown’s seizures or
his alleged intellectual disability. As noted above, the ALJ provided an extensive analysis of Mr.
Brown’s IQ scores, citing to substantial evidence in support of his conclusions. As to the
seizures, the ALJ acknowledged Mr. Brown’s testimony that he suffered from seizures (Tr. 14),
but noted that he was receiving no treatment and that objective testing failed to demonstrate any
signs of seizure disorder. (Tr. 15). Accordingly, both alleged impairments were considered fully
by the ALJ.
I am equally unpersuaded that the ALJ erred by failing to consider a prior award of
Childhood SSI benefits to Mr. Brown. The record contains contradictory information as to
whether Mr. Brown ever received Children’s SSI – agency records seem to indicate that Mr.
Brown’s prior applications for benefits were denied, while Mr. Brown contends that they were
granted. Compare (Tr. 149) with (Tr. 109-111). Even if Mr. Brown were to produce evidence to
substantiate a previous award of benefits, because the standard for Children’s SSI is entirely
different from that applicable to adult SSI, it is unclear that a prior award of Children’s SSI
would have or should have any meaningful effect on the ALJ’s analysis in this case.
Finally, Mr. Brown’s arguments about the weight assigned to various medical sources
and to the propriety of the hypothetical posed to the VE all ask this Court to reweigh the
evidence of record and second guess the ALJ’s conclusions. As noted above, that type of
analysis is precluded.
However, Mr. Brown correctly contends that the ALJ failed to address his documented
visual deficits. See, e.g., (Tr. 236-37) (pediatrician report noting blindness in one eye and
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David Lee Brown, Jr. v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-16-501
January 20, 2017
amblyopia). Mr. Brown testified at the hearing about his visual difficulties, (Tr. 34-35), and his
inability to drive as a result of his visual issues, (Tr. 45-46). Despite the documented diagnosis
and the hearing testimony, the ALJ did not address Mr. Brown’s visual problems at all, either to
determine that the visual issues would have little to no impact on Mr. Brown’s ability to work or
to find limitations that might be appropriate for a person with visual/spatial issues, such as a
restriction on operating heavy machinery or working at significant heights. In the absence of any
mention of Mr. Brown’s visual impairments, I am unable to find the error harmless, and remand
is therefore warranted.
I also find that the ALJ’s analysis runs afoul of Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632 (4th Cir.
2015). The ALJ in this case made a finding of “moderate difficulties” in the area of
concentration, persistence, and pace, stating in relevant part that, “Dr. Gambles noted that the
claimant’s concentration problems are mild and can be managed but he has difficulty with
following complex instructions.” (Tr. 12) (citation omitted). The ALJ did not discuss any issues
with Mr. Brown’s ability to sustain work throughout an eight-hour workday. Later in the
opinion, the ALJ assigned “great weight” to the opinion of non-examining State agency
physician L. Payne, Ph.D., who opined that Mr. Brown would have moderate limitations in
“maintaining attention and concentration for extended periods[.]” (Tr. 16). In light of the lack
of any discussion of Mr. Brown’s ability to sustain work, and the lack of any limitations in the
RFC assessment to address Mr. Brown’s moderate difficulty in concentration, persistence, and
pace, remand is required. See Mascio, 780 F.3d at 638 (noting that the Fourth Circuit “agree[s]
with other circuits that an ALJ does not account for a claimant’s limitations in concentration,
persistence, and pace by restricting the hypothetical question to simple, routine tasks or unskilled
work.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Brown’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
16) is DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 19) is DENIED.
Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Commissioner’s judgment is REVERSED
IN PART due to inadequate analysis. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion and docketed
as an order.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge

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