Eveland et al v. The State of Maryland et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Chief Judge Catherine C. Blake on 3/23/2016. (c/m 3/23/16 bmhs, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
SHERRY RAY EVELAND, In the matter of
direct legal descendent of the Estate Legal
executor/personal representative of James
Ray Charles deceased father
JODY EVELAND, SR.
JODY EVELAND, JR.

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Plaintiffs
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v.

Civil Action No. CCB-16-762
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THE STATE OF MARYLAND, through its
legal representative Brian Frosh, Esq.
LEONARD E. WILSON LAW OFFICE
ANDRUIS D. ROGERS
WILLIAM RIDDLE LAW FIRM
LAW FIRM OF ROLLINS & DELLMYER,
P.A.
CHARLES BERNSTEIN, alleged judge
BELINDA K. CONAWAY, ESQ.

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Defendants
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MEMORANDUM
The above-entitled action was filed on March 15, 2016, together with the full civil filing
fee. In the complaint, as supplemented (ECF 1 and 2), and a second motion for emergency relief
(ECF 3) plaintiffs seek money damages and an injunction prohibiting further Orphans Court
proceedings concerning a family member’s estate.
Because plaintiffs are not proceeding in forma pauperis, no statutory screening is
authorized under the in forma pauperis statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Nevertheless, a
district court has inherent authority to dismiss a complaint sua sponte. See Mallard v. United
States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) (explaining that courts have authority to
dismiss a frivolous or malicious lawsuit even in absence of a specific statutory provision); Ross

v. Baron, 493 Fed. Appx. 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (noting that “frivolous
complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court, even when the
filing fee has been paid”); Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000)
(holding that district courts may dismiss frivolous complaints sua sponte, even when plaintiff has
paid the filing fee, noting that “district courts are in particular likely to be exposed to frivolous
actions, and thus have an even greater need for inherent authority to dismiss such actions quickly
in order to preserve scarce judicial resources”). For reasons noted below, the complaint must be
dismissed and injunctive relief denied.
Background
Plaintiffs claim to have interest in the estate of James Ray Charles. They invoke federal
question and civil rights jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) as well as
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and also raise state tort claims involving
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 1 They argue that defendants are engaging
in a conspiracy against the estate and against them as rightful heirs. (ECF 1 at pp. 1-3).
A matter involving the estate of James R. Charles is pending in the Circuit Court for
Cecil Court, Maryland. See Case No. 07C15000730 (Cir. Ct. Cecil Co.). Examination of the
docket suggests that one or more of the plaintiffs involved in the instant action has sought to
remove the matter to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (docket entry
38, January 12, 2016) and has filed a request for emergency injunctive relief to prevent
liquidation of the estate assets (docket entry 39, January 21, 2016). The case remains open in the
Circuit Court. Further, one or more of the plaintiffs has filed a separate civil action against
defendants in the Circuit Court for Cecil County. See Sherry Ray Eveland, et a. v. Leonard E.
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Additional allegations concerning antitrust regulations, honest services, falsification of court documents to cover
up theft, tax fraud, and use of the United States mail also are generally pleaded without specific factual detail. (ECF
1 at p. 3).

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Wilson, et al., Case No. 07C15000185 (Cir. Ct. Cecil Co.). A motion to remove proceedings to
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia remains pending in that case as well.
(See docket entries 6 and 7). 2
Legal Standards
As the federal court has limited jurisdiction, the facts showing the existence of subject
matter jurisdiction “must be affirmatively alleged in the complaint.” Pinkley, Inc. v. City of
Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir.1999) (citing McNutt v. Gen'l Motors Acceptance Corp.,
298 U.S. 178 (1936)). “A court is to presume, therefore, that a case lies outside its limited
jurisdiction unless and until jurisdiction has been shown to be proper.” United States v. Poole,
531 F.3d 263, 274 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377
(1994)). Moreover, the “burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction is on . . . the party
asserting jurisdiction.” Robb Evans & Assocs., LLC v. Holibaugh, 609 F.3d 359, 362 (4th Cir.
2010).
Although a complaint need not contain detailed allegations, the facts alleged must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level and require “more than labels and
conclusions,” as “‘courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007).
The complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Id. at 1974. Once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of
facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint. Id. at 1969.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an
original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain

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Indeed in this case the plaintiffs’ supplement suggests they may be attempting to remove the Cecil County matter
to this court.

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statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court already
has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for
judgment for the relief the pleader seeks. Moreover, each "averment of a pleading shall be
simple, concise, and direct." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Plaintiffs seek emergency injunctive relief preventing further proceedings in the state
court. To obtain a preliminary injunction, movants must demonstrate that: 1) they are likely to
succeed on the merits; 2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief; 3) the balance of equities tips in their favor; and 4) an injunction is in the public interest.
See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
Analysis
The precise factual basis for plaintiffs’ complaint is not readily apparent from the
pleadings, but appears based on their claim that they, not defendants, are entitled to appear on
behalf of the estate and that the defendants allegedly are committing thefts against the estate.
The Younger 3 abstention doctrine “requires a federal court to abstain from interfering in state
proceedings, even if jurisdiction exists,” if there is: “(1) an ongoing state judicial proceeding,
instituted prior to any substantial progress in the federal proceeding; that (2) implicates
important, substantial, or vital state interests; and (3) provides an adequate opportunity for the
plaintiff to raise the federal constitutional claim advanced in the federal lawsuit.” Laurel Sand &
Gravel, Inc. v. Wilson, 519 F. 3d 156, 165 (4th Cir. 2008). “Younger is not merely a principle of
abstention; rather, the case sets forth a mandatory rule of equitable restraint, requiring the
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Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

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dismissal of a federal action.” Williams v. Lubin, 516 F. Supp. 2d 535, 539 (D. Md. 2007)
(internal quotation omitted). Resolution of state probate matters is a vital state interest with
which this court will not interfere, absent unusual circumstances not shown by these plaintiffs.
Additionally, there are no facts alleged from which a reasonable conclusion may be
drawn that these defendants conspired to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. Indeed,
after thoroughly reviewing the complaint, it cannot be discerned what conduct or events occurred
that may have resulted in a plausible cause of action accruing on plaintiffs’ behalf.
In the instant case, the precise nature and jurisdictional basis of the complaint cannot be
determined even after affording the matter a generous construction. As such, the complaint fails
to provide defendants “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Further, plaintiffs fail to establish any of the grounds for obtaining injunctive relief.
Accordingly, for all the reasons stated above, the complaint, as supplemented, shall be
dismissed without prejudice and injunctive relief denied by separate order which follows.

____March 23, 2016____________
Date

/S/
Catherine C. Blake
United States District Judge

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