Stokes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., et al.

Filing 35

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING 32 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Beth P. Gesner on 3/24/2017. (hmls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

RONALD L. STOKES, Sr.,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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WAL-MART STORES, Inc., et al.

Civil No.: BPG-16-836

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Defendants.

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Ronald L. Stokes, Sr. (“plaintiff,” or “Mr. Stokes”) filed this negligence action
against defendants Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Sam’s West, Inc., and Sam’s East, Inc. (collectively,
“defendants”) after Mr. Stokes slipped and fell attempting to dismount a motorized shopping cart
inside a Sam’s Club store in Annapolis, Maryland. With the parties’ consent, Judge Bredar
referred the case to the undersigned for all proceedings, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Local
Rule 301.4. (ECF No. 14.) Currently pending before the court are: (1) Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (“Defendants’ Motion”) (ECF No. 32); (2) Plaintiff’s Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion (“Plaintiff’s Opposition”) (ECF No. 33); and (3) Defendants’ Reply to
Plaintiff’s Opposition (“Defendants’ Reply”) (ECF No. 34). The issues are fully briefed, and no
hearing is necessary. Loc. R. 105.6. For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ Motion is
DENIED.

I.

BACKGROUND
Shortly before eleven thirty in the morning on April 22, 2012, plaintiff entered a Sam’s

Club retail store (“Sam’s Club,” or the “store”) in Annapolis, Maryland to do some shopping.
(Compl. ¶ 6; ECF No. 32-3 at 3.) At the time he entered the store, plaintiff observed that it was
“pouring down raining.” (ECF No. 34-1 at 4.) Plaintiff, who uses a cane, obtained a motorized
shopping cart near the entrance and proceeded into the store. (Compl. ¶¶ 7, 12.) Once inside,
plaintiff drove the cart to the restrooms located approximately 100–150 feet to the right of the
store entrance. (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff stopped a short distance from the restroom and attempted to
dismount the cart. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff did not observe any moisture on the ground near the cart
or any caution signs indicating a wet floor. (Id. ¶ 11.) As plaintiff stepped off the cart, his cane
and foot slid out from underneath him and he fell to the ground. (Id. ¶ 12.) While on the ground,
plaintiff noticed that the floor beneath him was “very wet,” but due to intense pain and
disorientation, he could not identify the source of the wet substance. (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff was
transported to Anne Arundel Medical Center where he received emergency care for his injuries,
which included multiple fractures to his left leg, heel, and ankle. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 15.) On April 9,
2015, plaintiff commenced this lawsuit in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, alleging
negligence against defendants. (ECF No. 2.) Defendants removed the case to this court on
March 21, 2016. (ECF No. 1.)
The court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court views all facts and makes all

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reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The nonmoving party,
however, may not rest on its pleadings, but must show that specific, material facts exist to create
a genuine, triable issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Summary judgment
should be denied only where a court concludes that a reasonable jury could find in favor of the
nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

II.

DISCUSSION
To assert a claim of negligence in Maryland, the plaintiff must prove that: (1) the

defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) the defendant breached that
duty, (3) the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and (4) the injury or loss proximately resulted
from the defendant’s breach of duty. 1 100 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Columbia Town Ctr. Title Co., 430
Md. 197, 212–13, 60 A.3d 1, 10 (2013). “An occupier of land has a duty to use reasonable and
ordinary care to keep the premises safe for an invitee and to protect him from injury caused by an
unreasonable risk that the invitee, by exercising ordinary care for his own safety, will not
discover.” Henley v. Prince George’s Cnty., 305 Md. 320, 339, 503 A.2d 1333, 1343 (1986).
Reasonable and ordinary care includes warning invitees of known hidden dangers, inspecting the
premises, and taking reasonable precautions against foreseeable dangers. Tennant v. Shoppers
Food Warehouse Md. Corp., 115 Md. App. 381, 388, 693 A.2d 370, 374 (1997). To prove that a
business inviter breached his duty, the invitee must show “not only that a dangerous condition
existed, but also that the proprietor had actual or constructive knowledge of it, and that that
knowledge was gained in sufficient time to give the owner the opportunity to remove it or to
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A federal court sitting in diversity must apply the law of the state in which the court is located, including the forum
state’s choice of law. Colgan Air, Inc. v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 507 F.3d 270, 275 (4th Cir. 2007). Because the
alleged events took place in Maryland, the substantive tort law of Maryland governs plaintiff’s negligence claim.

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warn the invitee.” Rehn v. Westfield Am., 153 Md. App. 586, 593, 837 A.2d 981, 984 (2003)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
In their Motion, defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence that
defendants had actual or constructive notice of the alleged wet substance prior to plaintiff’s fall.
(ECF No. 32-1 at 6.) Specifically, defendants argue that, in the premises liability context, the
plaintiff has the burden to produce “some admissible evidence to establish that the specific
hazardous condition remained on the floor for a substantial length of time before the incident,”
and that Mr. Stokes has offered no such evidence. (Id. at 7, 9.) To support their contention,
defendants point to deposition statements in which plaintiff acknowledged that he did not know
how long the substance had been on the floor or if any employees had seen it. (Id. at 3.) In his
Opposition, plaintiff offers still images from a surveillance video taken at the time of the incident
that appear to show Sam’s Club employees entering the restroom just minutes before plaintiff’s
fall. (ECF No. 33-2–33-4.) According to plaintiff, these images create a genuine dispute as to
whether defendants knew, or should have known, of slippery conditions near the restroom with
sufficient time to remove the hazard or warn of its existence. (ECF No. 32-1 at 4–6.)
After reviewing the pleadings and attached exhibits, the court finds that plaintiff has
produced enough evidence to create a triable issue as to whether defendants had constructive, if
not actual, notice of an allegedly wet substance on the ground where plaintiff fell. In particular,
plaintiff has offered surveillance footage that shows at least two Sam’s Club employees passing
through the restroom area just before plaintiff’s fall, one of whom is carrying a mop and appears
to look directly at the spot where plaintiff is seen, only minutes later, splayed out on the ground.
(See ECF Nos. 33-2–33-4). The same footage also appears to show an employee actually
mopping the floor around plaintiff after he falls. (See ECF No. 33-5.) Although it is certainly

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conceivable that plaintiff slipped on moisture that was present on the bottom of his shoes or
cane, there is no dispute that it was raining on the day in question. Thus, a reasonable jury could
conclude that, at the very least, defendants should have warned patrons about potentially slippery
conditions in areas, like a public restroom, that incur heavy foot traffic. See Konka v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 133 F.3d 915 (Table), 1998 WL 24378, at *4 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished per
curiam opinion) (“Both employees were aware that it was raining heavily outside . . . . Based on
these facts, it appears that there was sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact of whether
Wal-Mart employees should have been deemed to be on constructive notice of the wet and
hazardous condition.”).
In their Reply, defendants cite two Maryland state cases in which the court of appeals
held that the mere proximity of an employee to a slippery foreign substance does not, on its own,
create an inference of constructive notice. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Hairston, 196 Md.
595, 598, 78 A.2d 190, 191 (1951); Lusby v. Baltimore Transit Co., 195 Md. 118, 122–23, 72
A.2d 754, 756 (1950). In this case, however, plaintiff alleges more than mere proximity, and has
produced evidence that the alleged wet substance was within the mop-wielding employee’s
direct line of sight. Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could infer that, even if the
employee did not actually see any moisture, she should have seen it given that she was
presumably there to mop a wet floor. See Konka, 1998 WL 24378, at *3 (“Whether [the
defendant] was reasonable in failing to discover a hazardous condition is a question of fact,
which requires a consideration of the nature of the condition, its foreseeable consequences, the
means and opportunities of discovering it, the diligence required to discover and correct it, and
the foresight which a person of ordinary prudence would have exercised under similar

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circumstances.”). At this stage, it would be improper for the court to supplant the role of the jury
in resolving these disputed factual issues.

III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion (ECF No. 32) is DENIED, as set forth

above.

Date: March 24, 2017

_________________/ s /_________________
Beth P. Gesner
United States Magistrate Judge

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