Johnson v. Merchants Terminal Corp

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 6/16/2016. (c/m 6/17/16 nd2s, Deputy Clerk)

2016 JU:: 16 Pt1 6: l,7
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT C~Rt~',~~ :.;iJ~~[
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND,I L",~I L ,[1;,[

r:y.

[',;::P'JTY

MAURICE ANTHONY JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No.: ELH-I6-838

MERCHANTS TERMINAL
CORPORATION,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM
On March 21, 2016, plaintiff Maurice Anthony Johnson, who is self-represented, filed an
employment discrimination suit against his former employer.
defendant, Merchants Terminal Corporation.

ECF 1. The caption names one

However, in the body of the Complaint, plaintiff

identifies two additional defendants: Jeff Carden and Ken Johnson. Id. at 6-7. Plaintiff alleges
that he suffered discrimination

based on race, in the form of harassment

and wrongful

termination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
2000e, et seq. ("Title VII").

ECF I at 1-2.

SS

Plaintiff seeks" inter alia, punitive damages;

injunctive relief; back pay; reinstatement to his former position; costs; and attorney's fees.'

Id.

at 3-4, II.
On Apri127, 2016, defendant, MTC Logistics, Inc. ("MTC"),2 filed a "Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's

Title VII Individual-Capacity

'Notwithstanding

Claims against Defendants

Ken Johnson and Jeff

plaintiff's request for attorney's fees, plaintiff is not represented.

2 According to MTC (ECF 6 at I), it is "improperly named as Merchants Terminal
Corporation" in the Complaint.

Carden" (ECF 6), supported by a memorandum of law. ECF 6-1 (collectively, the "Motion").
As MTC notes, ECF 6-1 at I n.2: "Carden and Johnson are not identified as Defendants on the
Court's Civil Docket in this case, however, they are specifically named as Defendants by
Plaintiff." Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6), MTC seeks the dismissal of
plaintiffs "individual-capacity claims" against Johnson and Carden. ECF 6-1 at L
On April 28, 2016, the Clerk sent a notice to plaintiff advising him of his right to
respond. ECF 7.3 Plaintiff has not responded to the Motion, and the time to do so has expired.
See Local Rule 105.2.

No hearing is necessary to resolve the Motion. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons
that follow, I will grant the Motion.
I. Factual and Procedural Background4

Plaintiff, who is "Black" (ECF 1-2 at I), alleges that he was terminated by MTC on
March 11,2014. ECF I at 2. In relevant part, plaintiff contends, id. at 2-3 '\16:
6. The facts of my claim are: Was terminated unjustly and wrongfully
three different times before last and final termination. White employees created
and caused gross missconduct [sic] and is [sic] currently employed. Had been
. harassed, threatened, suspended, and terminated on numerous occasions.
Employer can[']t justifY or explain honestly why I was terminated.
Employer fabricated acts of gross misconduct to terminate. Employer did not
honor the union contract. Harassment initially started Sept 20 I0 until March II,
2014.
3 See Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975). Plaintiff was also advised
of the time by which to respond, and that failure to respond could result in the dismissal of the
case. See ECF 7.

Because plaintiff is self-represented, his submissions must be liberally construed.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Moreover, given the posture of the case, I shall
assume the truth of plaintiff s allegations.
4

-2-

In the Complaint, plaintiff also alleges that Jeff Carden, a "[p ]Iant manager," "fabricated
acts of conduct to discharge [plaintiff] without following union [sic] contract." Id. at 8. Plaintiff
also alleges that Carden "terminated and harassed, suspended, threaten [sic] [him] on a regular
basis."

Id. at 10. Further, plaintiff alleges that Ken Johnson, the "President," "allowed this

action." Id. at 8.
According to plaintiff, on June 20, 2014, he filed a Charge of Discrimination
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").

with the

ECF I at 3 ~ 9. Plaintiff

has also submitted a letter to plaintiff from the EEOC's Baltimore Field Office, dated December
18, 2015. ECF 1-2 at 1-2. It says, in relevant part, id. at I:
Having considered all the information provided by both you and [MTC], the
Commission is unable to conclude that the information obtained establishes a
violation of the statute as you've alleged. The evidence gathered shows [MTC]
discharged you from employment as a result of information and observances it
saw while you were working on March 11,2014.
The letter also said, id. at 2: "[Y]ou are being issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights
which affords you the opportunity to take this matter into Federal Court. You have the right to
file a lawsuit against the employer within 90 days from the date you receive the Dismissal and
Notice of Rights."
Plaintiff maintains that he received a right-to-sue letter on December 23, 2015. ECF 1 at
3 ~ 10. As noted, on March 21, 2016, plaintiff filed this action. ECF 1.
II.

Discussion

A. Standard of Review
The Motion is premised, in relevant part, on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). ECF 6 at 1. A
defendant may test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by way of a motion to dismiss under Rule

-3-

12(b)(6). McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 FJd

393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010); Edwards v. City of

Goldsboro, 178 FJd 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion
by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter
of law "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Whether a complaint states a claim
for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It
provides that a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief."

The purpose of the rule is to provide the defendant with "fair

notice" of the claim and the "grounds" for entitlement to relief. Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555-56, (2007).
To survive a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts
sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) ("Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for 'all
civil actions' ....

" (citation omitted»; see also Simmons v. United Mortg. & Loan Inv., LLC,

634 FJd 754, 768 (4th Cir. 2011). But, a plaintiff need not include "detailed factual allegations"
in order to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Moreover, federal pleading rules "do
not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting
the claim asserted." Johnson v. City of Shelby, _

U.S. _'

135 S. Ct. 346, 346 (2014) (per

curiam).
Nevertheless,

the rule demands

more than bald accusations

or mere speculation.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir.
2013). Therefore, a complaint that provides no more than "labels and conclusions,"
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," is insufficient.

-4-

or "a

Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555. Moreover, the court is not required to accept legal conclusions drawn from the facts. See
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).

To satisfy the minimal requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), the complaint must set forth
"enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest" a cognizable cause of action, "even if ... [the]
actual proof of those facts is improbable and ...

recovery is very remote and unlikely."

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal quotations omitted). Put another way, in reviewing a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, a court "'must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the
complaint,''' and must '''draw all reasonable inferences [from those facts] in favor of the
plaintiff.''' E.l du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir.
2011) (citations omitted); see Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir.
2015); Kendall v. Balcerzak, 650 F.3d 515, 522 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, __

132 S. Ct. 402 (2011); Monroe v. City a/Charlottesville,

U.S. __

'

579 F.3d 380, 385-86 (4th Cir. 2009),

cert. denied, 559 U.S. 992 (2010). "A court decides whether [the pleading] standard is met by

separating the legal conclusions from the factual allegations, assuming the truth of only the
factual allegations, and then determining whether those allegations allow the court to reasonably
infer" that the plaintiff is entitled to the legal remedy sought. A Society Without A Name v.
Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,

U.S. __

' 132 S. Ct. 1960

(2012).
A motion asserting failure to state a claim typically "does not resolve contests
surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Edwards, 178 F.3d
at 243 (quotation marks omitted); see Houck, 791 F. 3d at 484; Tobey v. James, 706 F.3d 379,
387 (4th Cir. 2013). But, "if all facts necessary to the affirmative defense 'clearly appear[ ] on

-5-

the face of the complaint, '" or in other material that is the proper subject of consideration under
Rule l2(b)( 6), such a defense can be resolved on the basis of the facts alleged in the complaint.
Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007) (en bane) (quoting Richmond,
Fredericksburg

& Potomac R.R. v. Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1993» (emphasis in

Goodman); see Houck, 791 F.3d at 484.
B.

Discussion

MTC submits, ECF 6-1 at 3: "To the extent Plaintiff's

attachment to his Complaint

asserts individual-capacity claims against Defendants Ken Johnson and Jeff Carden, those claims
must be dismissed because individual Defendants are not subject to suit under Title VII ....

" I

agree.
A person can only be liable under Title VII in his or her individual capacity if that person
qualifies as an "employer" within the meaning of the statute.
194, 203 (4th Cir. 2010) ("Title VII 'foreclose[s]

See Brooks v. Arthur, 626 F.3d

individual liability"')

Southern Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1998»; Lissau,
(concluding

that "supervisors

are not liable in their individual

(quoting Lissau v.
159 F.3d at 181

capacities

for Title VII

violations"); cf Luy v. Balt. Police Dept., 326 F. Supp. 2d 682, 688 (D. Md. 2004) (dismissing
Title VII claim against police commissioner), aff'd, 120 Fed. Appx. 465 (4th Cir. 2005); Erskine
v. Bd. of Educ., 197 F. Supp. 2d 399, 405 (D. Md. 2002) (concluding that plaintiff "cannot bring
a Title VII action against the individual supervisors").
Johnson as supervisors employed by MTC.

The Complaint identifies Carden and

Accordingly, plaintiffs

proceed against Carden or Johnson.

-6-

Title VII claim cannot

In light of the foregoing, I need not consider defendant's argument in favor of dismissal
under Fed. R. Civ. P. l2(b)(5).
III. Conclusion
As a matter of law, plaintiffs

Title VII claim as to Jeff Carden and Ken Johnson must be

dismissed. An Order follows.

lsi

Date: June 16,2016

Ellen Lipton Hollander
United States District Judge

-7-