Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING 15 Motion of Plaintiff for Summary Judgment; GRANTING 16 Motion of Commissioner for Summary Judgment; AFFIRMING the Commissioner's Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 2/15/2017. (hmls, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

February 15, 2017
LETTER TO COUNSEL
RE:

Sandra Kay Jones v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-16-936

Dear Counsel:
On March 30, 2016, Plaintiff Sandra Kay Jones petitioned this Court to review the Social
Security Administration’s final decision to deny her claims for Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”) and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). (ECF No. 1). I have considered the parties’
cross-motions for summary judgment, and Ms. Jones’s reply. (ECF Nos. 15, 16, 17). I find that
no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). This Court must uphold the decision
of the Agency if it is supported by substantial evidence and if the Agency employed proper legal
standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir.
1996). Under that standard, I will deny Ms. Jones’s motion, grant the Commissioner’s motion,
and affirm the Commissioner’s judgment pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This
letter explains my rationale.
Ms. Jones filed her claims for benefits in May of 2012, alleging a disability onset date of
June 1, 2011. (Tr. 164-67). She amended her onset date to May 21, 2012. (Tr. 41). Her claims
were denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 117-21, 124-27). A hearing was held on
August 18, 2014, before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 37-66). Following the
hearing, the ALJ determined that Ms. Jones was not disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act during the relevant time frame. (Tr. 19-36). The Appeals Council denied Ms.
Jones’s request for review, (Tr. 5-10), so the ALJ’s decision constitutes the final, reviewable
decision of the Agency.
The ALJ found that Ms. Jones suffered from the severe impairments of “degenerative
disc disease, rheumatoid arthritis, and depression.” (Tr. 24). Despite these impairments, the ALJ
determined that Ms. Jones retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b); however,
this individual is limited to standing and walking 2 hours and sitting 6 hours;
occasional climbing of ramps and stairs; occasional climbing of ladders, ropes or
scaffolds; occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling;
frequent exposure to extreme cold, vibration, hazards and no assembly line pace
or production quotas.

Sandra Kay Jones v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-16-936
February 15, 2017
(Tr. 26). After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that
Ms. Jones could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy and that,
therefore, she was not disabled. (Tr. 31-32).
Ms. Jones raises several arguments on appeal, which do not challenge the RFC
assessment made by the ALJ, but challenge the treatment of that RFC assessment under the
governing regulations and guidelines. First, Ms. Jones alleges that the ALJ’s RFC assessment
should have been classified as “sedentary work,” not “light work.” Second, following on that
argument, Ms. Jones contends that she was in a “borderline age range” such that she should have
been found to be disabled under the Medical Vocational Guidelines because she was limited to
sedentary work. Because I disagree with Ms. Jones’s argument regarding the exertional
classification of her RFC assessment, remand is unwarranted.
Ms. Jones contends that the ALJ’s RFC assessment suggested that she could perform
sedentary, not light, work. She is correct that her limited walking and standing capacity, as
found by the ALJ, do not match the traditional requirements for light work. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1567 (b) (noting that light work typically requires “a good deal of walking or standing.”).
However, light work also includes other types of physical exertion. See SSR 83-10, 1983 WL
31251, at *5 (“The regulations define light work as lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with
frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds.”). According to SSR 83-12,
where an “individual’s exertional limitations are somewhere ‘in the middle’ in terms of the
regulatory criteria for exertional ranges of work, more difficult judgements are involved as to the
sufficiency of the remaining occupational base to support a conclusion as to disability.
Accordingly, [VE] assistance is advisable for these types of cases.” See SSR 83-12, 1983 WL
31253, at *3. Here, the ALJ sought VE assistance, and obtained testimony that there were light
jobs allowing the worker to sit for six hours during an eight hour workday. (Tr. 62-63). The
restriction to approximately two hours of standing or walking rendered Ms. Jones capable not
only of sedentary work, but of a reduced range of light work that would permit her to sit for the
majority of the time. See, e.g., Hence v. Astrue, No. 4:12-cv-1, 2012 WL 6691573, at *8 (E.D.
Va. Nov. 30, 2012) (“[A]n RFC limiting standing or walking to about two hours does not
mandate a finding that [Plaintiff] could only perform sedentary work.”) (emphasis in original);
see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) (noting that a job can be light work “when it involves sitting
most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls.”).
In support of her interpretation, Ms. Jones cites an unpublished opinion from the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania in which the Court concluded that a limitation to two hours of standing
and walking places a claimant in the sedentary range. See Campbell v. Astrue, Civil No. 095356, 2010 WL 4689521 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2010). That authority is not binding, and the
Campbell court’s conclusion runs contrary not only to prior determinations I have made, but also
to the determinations of other district courts within the Fourth Circuit. See, e.g., Hence, 2012
WL 6691573, at *8; Stone v. Colvin, No. TMD-14-2338, 2015 WL 5315769 (Sept. 9, 2015)
(affirming an ALJ’s reliance upon VE testimony that a restricted range of light jobs allows a
worker to sit or stand at will); Hensley v. Colvin, No. 5:13-CV-27810, 2015 WL 566626
(S.D.W.Va. Feb. 10, 2015) (“To the extent that Claimant argues that his RFC as determined by
the ALJ requires a finding that he can only perform sedentary work, his argument is
2

Sandra Kay Jones v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-16-936
February 15, 2017
unpersuasive because he fails to understand the difference between the full range of light work
and a reduced range of light work.”); Willoughby v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec., No. RDB-13-0489, 2013
WL 5496834, at *1 (D. Md. Oct. 2, 2013) (report and recommendations determining that a
limitation to two hours of standing and walking fell within a reduced range of light work);
Moaney v. Astrue, No. PWG-09-1838, 2010 WL 3719297, at *3 (D. Md. Sept. 17, 2010) (finding
an RFC assessment limited to standing or walking for two hours “consistent with the ALJ’s
finding of a range of light work.”). Accordingly, while I acknowledge the Campbell decision, I
concur with the reasoning of the above-cited cases. The RFC determined by the ALJ in this case
fell between the criteria for a full range of light work and a full range of sedentary work. The
ALJ therefore properly obtained VE testimony and relied on the VE’s expertise to determine that
there were a significant number of light jobs that Ms. Jones could perform.
Finally, Ms. Jones suggests that even if the ALJ appropriately classified her RFC as a
reduced range of light work, the ALJ did not “consider the extent of any erosion of the
occupational base and assess its significance” as required by SSR 83-12. Under that SSR,
“[w]here the extent of erosion of the occupational base is not clear, the adjudicator will need to
consult a vocational resource.” See SSR 83-12, 1983 WL 31253, at *2. That is precisely the
course the ALJ followed in this case. Without using the term “erosion of the occupational base,”
the VE clearly testified, in response to questioning from the ALJ, that he had reduced the number
of available positions “approximately 75 percent and I reduced them based on my experience for
the limitation of a light position that only allows for two hours of standing in an eight hour day.”
(Tr. 63). The ALJ expressly credited that testimony in his opinion. (Tr. 31) (“The vocational
expert testified that he had reduced all job numbers noted above by 75% based on his experience
to reflect the limitation in standing and walking to 2 hours.”). The regulations do not require use
of the terms “erosion” or “significance,” so long as there is evidence that the ALJ considered the
effect of a claimant’s limitations on the relevant occupational base. Here, the ALJ’s actions fully
complied with the regulations and guidelines.
In light of my determination that the ALJ appropriately classified Ms. Jones’s RFC
assessment to include a reduced range of light work, I need not consider the issues relating to her
proposed “borderline age range.” Such findings would be relevant to the outcome of her claims
only if she were to be restricted to a sedentary RFC.
For the reasons set forth herein, Ms. Jones’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
15) is DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 16) is GRANTED.
The Commissioner’s judgment is AFFIRMED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion and docketed
as an order.

3

Sandra Kay Jones v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-16-936
February 15, 2017
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge

4