Coates v. Commissioner, Social Security

Filing 33

ORDER granting 26 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 3/10/2017. (kw2s, Deputy Clerk)(c/m 3.10.17)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

March 10, 2017
Zechariah L. Coates
7840 Levy Court
Apt. 622
Pasadena, Maryland 21122
Stacey Winakur Harris
Social Security Administration
6401 Security Boulevard Room 617
Baltimore, MD 21235
RE:

Zechariah L. Coates v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-16-1389

Dear Mr. Coates and Counsel:
On May 9, 2016, Plaintiff Zechariah L. Coates petitioned this Court to review the Social
Security Administration’s final decision to deny his claims for Disability Insurance Benefits and
Supplemental Security Income. (ECF No. 1). I have considered the Commissioner’s Motion for
Summary Judgment and the documents Mr. Coates filed in response. (ECF Nos. 26, 31, 32). I
find that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). This Court must uphold the
decision of the Agency if it is supported by substantial evidence and if the Agency employed
proper legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589
(4th Cir. 1996). Under that standard, I will grant the Commissioner’s motion and affirm the
Commissioner’s judgment pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This letter explains
my rationale.
Mr. Coates filed claims for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”) on February 6, 2012. (Tr. 235-45). His claims were denied initially
and on reconsideration. (Tr. 90-94, 96-100, 102-09, 111-18). Hearings were held on April 17,
2014 and September 18, 2014, before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).1 (Tr. 30-88).
Following the hearings, the ALJ determined that Mr. Coates was not disabled within the meaning
of the Social Security Act during the relevant time frame. (Tr. 12-29). The Appeals Council

1

The second hearing was held for the purposes of (1) allowing Mr. Coates an opportunity to address
records from a consultative examination ordered after the first hearing, and (2) giving Mr. Coates an
additional opportunity to submit medical records. (Tr. 67-88). Mr. Coates was not represented by
counsel at either hearing.

Zechariah L. Coates v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-16-1389
March 10, 2017
Page 2
(“AC”) denied Mr. Coates’s request for review, (Tr. 5-8), so the ALJ’s decision constitutes the
final, reviewable decision of the Agency.
The ALJ found that Mr. Coates suffered from the severe impairments of degenerative
disc disease, spondylosis, vision loss (left eye), and obesity. (Tr. 17). Despite these
impairments, the ALJ determined that Mr. Coates retained the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to:
perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) with
the additional limitation that he can do work that occasionally requires balancing,
stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, and climbing, and that has a sit/stand
option that allows him to sit or stand alternately at 45-minute intervals, provided
this person remains on task while in either position during the work period. He
can perform jobs that require frequent handling and fingering with his right hand.
He can perform jobs that do not require depth perception.
(Tr. 19). After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that
Mr. Coates could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy and that,
therefore, he was not disabled. (Tr. 23-24).
I have carefully reviewed the ALJ’s opinion and the entire record. See Elam v. Barnhart,
386 F. Supp. 2d 746, 753 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (mapping an analytical framework for judicial review
of a pro se action challenging an adverse administrative decision, including: (1) examining
whether the Commissioner’s decision generally comports with regulations, (2) reviewing the
ALJ’s critical findings for compliance with the law, and (3) determining from the evidentiary
record whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings). For the reasons described
below, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.
The ALJ proceeded in accordance with applicable law at all five steps of the sequential
evaluation. The ALJ ruled in Mr. Coates’s favor at step one and determined that he has not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date. (Tr. 17); see 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). At step two, the ALJ then considered the severity of each of
the impairments that Mr. Coates claimed prevented him from working. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). After finding at least one of Mr. Coates’s impairments
severe, (Tr. 17), the ALJ continued with the sequential evaluation and considered, in assessing
Mr. Coates’s RFC, the extent to which his impairments limited his ability to work. Specifically,
in considering Mr. Coates’s allegation of “stress” as a mental health impairment, the ALJ applied
the special technique for evaluation of mental impairments, but found no limitation in the
relevant functional areas. (Tr. 17-18).
At step three, the ALJ determined that Mr. Coates’s impairments did not meet the
specific requirements of, or medically equal the criteria of, any listings. (Tr. 19-24). In
particular, the ALJ considered the specific requirements of Listings 1.04 (disorders of the spine)
and 2.04 (loss of visual efficiency). See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, §§ 1.04, 2.04. (Tr.

Zechariah L. Coates v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-16-1389
March 10, 2017
Page 3
19). The ALJ identified the precise elements of each listing that had not been satisfied. Id. I
have carefully reviewed the record, and I agree that no listings are met.
In considering Mr. Coates’s RFC, the ALJ summarized his subjective complaints from
his hearing testimony. (Tr. 20). The ALJ then engaged in a detailed review of his medical
records and objective testing. (Tr. 20-21). The ALJ relied heavily on the results of a 2014
consultative examination, in which the doctor reported that Mr. Coates “sat comfortably
throughout the evaluation, handled objects freely, and hears and speaks without difficulty”
despite issues with ambulation and movement. (Tr. 21). Based on this evidence, and Mr.
Coates’s testimony that he thought he could perform sedentary work but had been unable to
procure such employment, the ALJ determined that Mr. Coates was capable of sustaining
sedentary work. The ALJ also evaluated the opinions of the State agency consultants, and
assigned “little weight” to their conclusions that Mr. Coates could perform light work, given the
evidence from the consultative examination and the examination from Mr. Coates’s treating
physician, Dr. Kozachuk. (Tr. 22).
Ultimately, my review of the ALJ’s decision is confined to whether substantial
evidence, in the record as it was reviewed by the ALJ, supports the decision and whether correct
legal standards were applied. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 404 (1971). Even if
there is other evidence that may support Mr. Coates’s position, I am not permitted to reweigh the
evidence or to substitute my own judgment for that of the ALJ. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453,
1456 (4th Cir. 1990). In considering the entire record, and the evidence outlined above, I find
the ALJ’s RFC determination that Mr. Coates could perform sedentary work was supported by
substantial evidence.
Next, the ALJ determined that, pursuant to his RFC assessment, Mr. Coates was unable
to perform his past relevant work as a stock clerk and security guard. (Tr. 22-23). Accordingly,
the ALJ proceeded to step five and considered the impact of Mr. Coates’s age and level of
education on his ability to adjust to new work. Id. In doing so, the ALJ cited the VE’s testimony
that a person with Mr. Coates’s RFC would be capable of performing the jobs of “charge account
clerk,” “order clerk,” and “security surveillance monitor.” (Tr. 24). Based on the VE’s
testimony, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Coates was capable of successfully adjusting to other
work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. Accordingly, I find that the
ALJ’s determination was supported by substantial evidence.
In support of his request for remand, Mr. Coates has filed two separate reports from his
treating neurologist, Dr. Kozachuk. [ECF Nos. 31, 32]. Because those reports were not
provided to the Commissioner in the underlying proceedings, they can only be considered under
sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which provides:
The court may ... at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the
Commissioner of Social Security, but only upon a showing that there is new
evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to
incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding.

Zechariah L. Coates v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-16-1389
March 10, 2017
Page 4

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). When invoking sentence six, a court does not either affirm or reverse the
Commissioner’s decision. See Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 98 (1991). “Rather, the court
remands because new evidence has come to light that was not available to the claimant at the
time of the administrative proceeding and that evidence might have changed the outcome of the
prior proceeding.” Id.
Importantly, a reviewing court must find that four prerequisites are met before a case can
be remanded to the Commissioner on the basis of new evidence: “(1) the evidence is relevant to
the determination of disability at the time the application was first filed; (2) the evidence is
material to the extent that the Commissioner’s decision might reasonably have been different had
the new evidence been before him; (3) there is good cause for the claimant’s failure to submit the
evidence when the claim was before the Commissioner; and (4) the claimant made at least a
general showing of the nature of the new evidence to the reviewing court.” See Blair ex rel.
J.D.S. v. Astrue, Civil No. 1–10cv–1476–RMG–JDA, 2012 WL 1016633, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 29,
2012) (citing Borders v. Heckler, 777 F.2d 954, 955 (4th Cir. 1985)); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Mitchell v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 185, 188 (4th Cir. 1983). In this case, Dr. Kozachuk’s
November 21, 2016 opinion pertains only to the period between November 21, 2016 and
December 31, 2017. [ECF No. 31]. That opinion, then, is not material to the Commissioner’s
decision two years earlier on October 3, 2014, and could only be relevant to considering a
subsequent application for benefits. Dr. Kozachuk’s earlier opinion, dated April 3, 2016,
discusses Mr. Coates’s impairment dating from March 6, 2011 through December 31, 2016, and
therefore is arguably relevant. [ECF No. 32]. However, as to that report, Mr. Coates has not
established “good cause” for his failure to submit the evidence when the claim was before the
Commissioner. Although there were some minimal records from Dr. Kozachuk contained in the
original record, no opinion evidence was proffered. Accordingly, in the absence of a showing of
good cause for the failure to submit the evidence to the ALJ or the AC, remand under sentence
six is inappropriate.
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
26) is GRANTED. The Commissioner’s judgment is AFFIRMED pursuant to sentence four of
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion and docketed
as an order.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge