Anderson v. USA - 2255

Filing 2

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard D. Bennett on 1/13/2017. (c/m 1/13/17 jnls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CRAIG OKEIDO
ANDERSON,

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Petitioner,

Criminal No. RDB-14-0042
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v.

Civil Action No. RDB-16-1468
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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Respondent.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
The pro se Petitioner Craig Okeido Anderson (“Petitioner” or “Anderson”) pled guilty
before this Court to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), pursuant to a Plea Agreement with the Government. J., p. 1, ECF No.
59. Judge Quarles1 of this Court sentenced Petitioner to 84 months imprisonment, followed
by three years of supervised release. Id. at 2-3. Currently pending before this Court is
Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(ECF No. 76).2 Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, this Court finds that no hearing is
necessary.

See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016).

For the reasons discussed herein,

Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate (ECF No. 76) is DENIED.
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Judge Quarles of this Court both accepted Petitioner’s guilty plea and sentenced Petitioner. This case was
subsequently reassigned to the undersigned Judge Richard D. Bennett upon Judge Quarles’ retirement from
this Court.
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Also pending before this Court is Petitioner’s Motion to Amend his pending Motion to Vacate (ECF No.
78), in which he requests that his sentence be reduced in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision
in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Petitioner’s Motion to Amend (ECF No. 78) is GRANTED.
Accordingly, all arguments raised by Petitioner in both his initial Motion to Vacate (ECF No. 76) and
subsequent filings, including Petitioner’s Johnson argument, will be addressed herein.

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BACKGROUND
On August 27, 2014, Petitioner Craig Okeido Anderson (“Petitioner” or “Anderson”)
pled guilty before this court to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), pursuant to a Plea Agreement with the Government. J., p.
1, ECF No. 59. At a Rearraignment hearing before Judge Quarles of this Court, Anderson
verified on the record that he had read and discussed the Plea Agreement with his courtappointed counsel, understood the charges against him, and was satisfied with his counsel’s
services. Rearraignment Tr., pp. 5-9, ECF No. 70.3 Judge Quarles accepted Anderson’s guilty
plea, finding that he had knowingly and voluntarily entered into that guilty plea with the
assistance of counsel. J., p. 1, ECF No. 59. Subsequently, in a November 14, 2014 letter to
this Court (ECF No. 48), and at a January 13, 2015 hearing, Anderson moved to withdraw
his plea. This Court denied that request, finding that Anderson had not established any of
the six factors required for a criminal defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. See Mem. Op., p.
6, ECF No. 56 (citing United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991). This Court
sentenced Anderson to 84 months imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised
release. J., p. 1, ECF No. 59.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Anderson’s
conviction and upheld this Court’s denial of Anderson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

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At his Rearraignment hearing, Anderson stated that he was a citizen of the United States. Rearraignment Tr.,
p. 9, ECF No. 70. The Presentence Report subsequently indicated that Anderson was, in fact, a citizen of
Jamaica. Presentence Report, p. 21, ECF No. 42. In the pending Motion, Anderson contends that he was
unaware of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea and, had he known of his immigration status at
the time of his Rearraignment, would not have pled guilty. Mot. to Vacate, p. 13, ECF No. 76. As discussed
infra, Anderson specifically accepted the immigration consequences of his guilty plea in signing the Plea
Agreement. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed herein, his argument fails.

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United States v. Anderson, 624 F. App’x 106 (4th Cir. Dec. 14, 2015). In his pending Motion to
Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (ECF No. 76),
Anderson argues that his court-appointed counsel rendered ineffective assistance, in
violation of his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See
Mot., ECF No. 76; Reply, ECF No. 82. Additionally, Anderson contends that he is entitled
to a sentence reduction in light of the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson v
United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), which declared the “residual clause” of the Armed
Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), unconstitutionally vague. See Mot. to
Amend, ECF No. 78.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pro se filings are “liberally construed” and are “held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)(citation
omitted). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a prisoner in custody may seek to vacate, set aside or
correct his sentence where: (1) “the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States,” (2) the court lacked “jurisdiction to impose the sentence, . . . [(3)]
the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or [(4) the sentence] is
otherwise subject to a collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. “[A]n error of law does not
provide a basis for collateral attack unless the claimed error constituted ‘a fundamental
defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.’ ” United States v.
Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)).
DISCUSSION
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must satisfy the two3

pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 671 (1984). First, Petitioner
must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient such that it fell below an “objective
standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. In assessing whether counsel’s performance was
deficient, courts adopt a “strong presumption” that an attorney’s actions fall within the
“wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. Second, Petitioner must
show that his counsel’s performance was prejudicial, meaning the defendant was “depriv[ed]
. . . of a fair trial.” Id. at 687. To demonstrate such prejudice, Petitioner must show there
was a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s [alleged] unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding[s] would have been different.” Id. at 694. Both of these prongs
must be satisfied for the Petitioner to obtain the relief he is seeking. Id. at 687.
In the plea bargaining context, “claims of ineffective assistance of counsel . . . are
governed by the two-part test set forth in Strickland.” Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405
(2012) (citing Hill, 474 U.S. at 57). However, the “prejudice prong of the test is slightly
modified” in that Petitioner must show “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”
Hooper v. Garraghty, 845 F.2d 471, 475 (4th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also id. (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59).
I.

Petitioner Has Failed to Demonstrate Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Petitioner argues his “trial counsel failed to advise him before pleading guilty to 18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) that . . . this was a deportable offense under the Immigration and
Naturalization Act (8 U.S.C. § 1227).” Mot., p. 8, ECF No. 76. He specifically contends that

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his attorney “did not confer with [Petitioner] and explain the adverse consequence of
deportation by entering a plea of guilty.” Id. at 10.
In this case, Petitioner is incapable of demonstrating ineffective assistance because he
explicitly indicated on the record at his Rearraignment proceedings that he was satisfied with
his counsel’s representation and that he was voluntarily pleading guilty to being a felon in
possession of a firearm and ammunition. The record reads as follows:
THE COURT:

DEFENDANT ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

DEFENDANT ANDERSON:
THE COURT:
DEFENDANT ANDERSON:
THE COURT:
DEFENDANT ANDERSON:
THE COURT:
DEFENDANT ANDERSON:
THE COURT:
DEFENDANT ANDERSON:

Mr. Anderson, you’ve just taken an oath to tell
the truth. That means that any statement you
make this afternoon has to be true . . . Do you
understand that, sir?
Yes, sir.
You’re pleading guilty to being a felon in
possession of a firearm and ammunition...
Do you understand what you’re pleading
guilty to and what the penalties are?
Yes, sir, absolutely.
Are you a citizen of the United States?
Yes, sir.
Have you read and discussed the . . . criminal
charges—with your lawyers?
Yes, sir.
Have they answered all of your questions?
Yes, sir.
Are you satisfied with their services?
Yes, sir.

Rearraignment Tr., pp. 6-9, ECF No. 70.

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Regarding Petitioner’s claim that counsel failed to warn him of the potential
immigration consequences of pleading guilty, Petitioner has not shown that but for his
counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty. Additionally, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has explicitly rejected his argument. As the Fourth Circuit
explained in its judgment affirming this Court, “Anderson had actual notice of these possible
immigration consequences because they were included in the plea agreement.” J., p. 3, ECF
No. 74. Pursuant to the Plea Agreement with the Government, Petitioner “surrender[ed]
certain rights as outlined below: . . .
By pleading guilty, the Defendant will also be giving up certain valuable civil
rights and may be subject to deportation or other loss of immigration status.
The Defendant recognizes that if the Defendant is not a citizen of the United
States, pleading guilty may have consequences with respect to the Defendant’s
immigration status. Under federal law, conviction for a broad range of crimes
can lead to adverse immigration consequences, including automatic removal
from the United States . . . .[T]he Defendant understands that no one,
including defense counsel or the Court, can predict with certainty the effect of
conviction on immigration status. The Defendant nevertheless affirms that the
Defendant wants to plead guilty regardless of any potential immigration
consequences.
Plea Agreement, pp. 2-3, ECF No. 37.
As discussed supra, Petitioner has entered a valid guilty plea to the offense of being a
Felon in Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition, and has stipulated to the facts the
Government would be able to prove at trial with respect to that offense. Petitioner entered
his guilty plea voluntarily and the Fourth Circuit affirmed this Court’s order denying
Petitioner’s motion to withdraw that guilty plea. See J., p. 3, ECF No. 46. For these reasons,
Petitioner’s first argument fails.
II.

Petitioner is Not Entitled to Relief under Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct.
2551 (2015)
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Petitioner has subsequently filed a Motion to Amend his pending Motion to vacate
(ECF No. 78), in which requests that his sentence be reduced in light of the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Petitioner’s
Motion to Amend (ECF No. 78) is GRANTED. Accordingly, this Court will consider
Petitioner’s Johnson argument herein. However, as discussed infra, the Johnson decision has no
bearing on Petitioner’s sentence, and Petitioner has raised no grounds for relief in light of
Johnson. Accordingly, Petitioner’s additional argument fails.
Possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1) ordinarily carries a maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment. However, “[t]he
Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (“ACCA”) increases that sentence to a mandatory 15
years to life if the offender has three or more prior convictions for a ‘serious drug offense’ or
a ‘violent felony.’” Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1259 (2016) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
924(e)(1)). “The definition of ‘violent felony’ includes the so-called residual clause, covering
any felony that ‘otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.’” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). In Johnson v. United States, 135 S.
Ct. 2551 (2015), the United States Supreme Court held that the “residual clause” of the
ACCA was unconstitutional because it failed to provide sufficient notice of the types of
violent felonies covered under the ACCA.
The Johnson case has absolutely no applicability to this case because Petitioner was not
sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Based on Petitioner’s total offense level of
23 and his criminal history category of VI, the sentencing guideline range for imprisonment
was 92 to 115 months. Presentence Report, p. 20, ECF No. 42. This Court adopted the
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factual findings and advisory guideline application in the Presentence Report without
change, and imposed a sentence below the advisory guideline range. Statement of Reasons,
pp. 1-3, ECF No. 60 [SEALED]. Accordingly, Petitioner has not stated a basis for relief
under the Johnson case. Petitioner’s additional argument, raised in his Motion to Amend
(ECF No. 78), is without merit. For these reasons, Petitioner’s pending Motion to Vacate
(ECF No. 76) is DENIED.4

Also pending before this Court is Petitioner’s Motion for Judicial Action (ECF No. 68), in which he
“request[s] this Court to Order [Petitioner] to continue his detention at the Chesapeake Detention Facility
(“CDF”) during the pending motion and appeal of this matter.” As discussed herein, Petitioner’s direct appeal
has concluded. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has affirmed this Court’s
judgment. See Anderson, 624 F. App’x 106. Additionally, for the reasons discussed supra, Petitioner’s Motion to
Vacate (ECF No. 76) is now DENIED. Accordingly, Petitioner’s pending Motion for Judicial Action (ECF
No. 68) is now MOOT.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct
Sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (ECF No. 76) is DENIED.
Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
this Court is required to issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final
order adverse to the applicant. A certificate of appealability is a “jurisdictional prerequisite”
to an appeal from the court’s earlier order. United States v. Hadden, 475 F.3d 652, 659 (4th Cir.
2007). A certificate of appealability may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Where the court
denies a petitioner’s motion on its merits, a petitioner satisfies this standard by
demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find the court’s assessment of the constitutional
claims debatable or wrong. See Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336–38 (2003); Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Because reasonable jurists would not find Petitioner’s
claims debatable, a certificate of appealability is DENIED.
A separate Order follows.
Dated:

January 13, 2017
/s/
Richard D. Bennett
United States District Judge

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