Lloyd v. Morgan

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge James K. Bredar on 8/24/2016. (c/m 8/25/16 bas, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
ANTHONY LLOYD,

*
Petitioner,

v.

*

J. PHILIP MORGAN,

CIVIL ACTION NO. JKB-16-2159

*
Respondent.
*****
MEMORANDUM

On June 16, 2016, the court received a petition for writ of habeas corpus from Anthony
Lloyd (hereinafter referred to as “Lloyd”), who is confined at the Maryland Correctional
Training Center in Hagerstown, Maryland. ECF 1. Lloyd claims that his state court criminal
conviction was overturned by the state post-conviction court, and he has remained in state
custody awaiting re-trial. ECF 1. Lloyd was directed to supplement his petition, which he has
done. ECF 2 & 3. Because he appears indigent, his motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (ECF 4) shall be granted. His cause of action, however, construed as a hybrid 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 petition and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, shall be summarily dismissed.
Lloyd states that on February 23, 2015, post-conviction relief was granted and his
conviction vacated. Thereafter, his attorney wrote to Assistant States Attorney Garrett Glennon
advising him to make arrangements for Lloyd to be transported from the state Division of
Correction facility to the Baltimore County Detention Center so a pretrial bail hearing could be
held. Lloyd states that he has not been transferred, nor has a bail hearing been held. He
complains that he should have been transferred to the detention center and provided a bail
hearing while awaiting his retrial. ECF 3, pp. 5 & 6. Lloyd alleges that Glennon has engaged in
prosecutorial misconduct and legal malpractice by not having him transferred. Id., p. 6.

The Maryland Judiciary Case Search website confirms that on April 13, 2009, Lloyd was
charged in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County with robbery. See State v. Lloyd, Criminal
No.

03K09001918

(Circuit

Court

for

Baltimore

County);

see

www.casesearch.courts.state.md.us/inquiry. On or about January 5, 2010, Lloyd pled guilty. He
was sentenced on March 26, 2010, to a 25-year term of incarceration to be served without parole.
As a result of post-conviction proceedings, the criminal judgment was vacated. Id. Lloyd’s trial
is currently scheduled for October 3, 2016. Id.
To the extent that Lloyd seeks federal court intervention in his pending state criminal retrial, his case is construed as a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for habeas corpus relief and dismissed.
In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, a federal court must not interfere with ongoing
state criminal proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971); Cinema Blue of
Charlotte, Inc., v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 50-53 (4th Cir. 1989) (district courts should abstain
from constitutional challenges to state judicial proceedings if the federal claims have been or
could have been presented in an ongoing state judicial proceeding). Abstention in favor of state
judicial proceedings is required if the proceedings are ongoing, implicate important state
interests, afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal questions, and the federal relief
sought would interfere in some manner with the state court litigation presented. Middlesex
County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); Brewsome v.
Broward County Pub. Defenders, 304 F. App’x 814, 816 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). In the
pre-trial context, federal courts must abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a claim that may

2

be resolved through trial on the merits or by other state procedures available for review of the
claim. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1973).
Further, pre-trial habeas relief is only available if a petitioner has exhausted state court
remedies and Aspecial circumstances@ justify federal review. See Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816
F.2d 220, 226-29 (5th Cir. 1987). While the phrase “special circumstances” lacks any definition,
courts have looked to whether procedures exist that would protect a petitioner’s constitutional
rights without pre-trial intervention. Moore v. De Young, 515 F.2d 437, 449 (3d Cir. 1975).
Where a threat to the petitioner’s rights may be remedied by an assertion of an appropriate
defense in state court, no special circumstances are shown. Id.; see also Drayton v. Hayes, 589
F.2d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 1979) (double jeopardy claim entitled to pre-trial habeas intervention
since “the very constitutional right claimed ... would be violated” if petitioner were forced to go
to trial). Where the right may be adequately preserved by orderly post-trial relief, special
circumstances are likewise nonexistent. Moore, 515 F.2d at 449.
Additionally, Lloyd’s claim regarding his bail status is subject to the exhaustion
requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).

The exhaustion requirement applies to petitions filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 538 (1976) (“This Court
has long recognized that in some circumstances considerations of comity and concerns for the
orderly administration of criminal justice require a federal court to forgo the exercise of its
habeas corpus power.”). Thus, before filing a federal habeas petition, a petitioner must exhaust
each claim presented by pursuing remedies available in state court. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.
509, 521 (1982). The claim must be fairly presented to the state courts; this means presenting

3

both the operative facts and controlling legal principles. See Baker v. Corcoran, 220 F.3d 276,
289 (4th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Exhaustion includes appellate review in the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals and the Maryland Court of Appeals.

See Granberry v. Greer, 481

U.S. 129, 134-35 (1987). Although federal courts can review state bail orders through habeas
corpus after exhaustion of state remedies, federal intervention in this discretionary determination
is rare, and federal courts cannot require that state courts give reasons for the denial of bail. See
Jenkins v. Harvey, 634 F.2d 130, 132 (4th Cir. 1980). Thus, while Lloyd has not yet exhausted
his bail claim, it appears unlikely that he would prevail on this issue even if entitled to adjudicate
the claim in this forum.
Because the habeas corpus claims presented here have not been exhausted in the state
courts, the instant action is premature. When a district court dismisses a petition for habeas
corpus solely on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability will not issue unless the
petitioner can demonstrate both “(1) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right’ and (2) ‘that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.’” Rose v.
Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 684 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)).
Lloyd has not made the required showing and no certificate of appealability shall issue. A
separate order follows.

Date: August 24, 2016

__________/s/_____________
James K. Bredar
United States District Judge
4