Jackson v. USA - 2255

Filing 2

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard D. Bennett on 6/1/2017. (kw2s, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
MARVIN A. JACKSON

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Petitioner,

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Civil Action No. RDB-16-2398

v.

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Criminal Action No. RDB-09-0179

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

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Respondent.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
The pro se Petitioner Marvin A. Jackson (“Petitioner” or “Jackson”) pled guilty before
this Court to one count of Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). J., p.1, ECF No. 22. At sentencing, this Court found that Jackson was an
“armed career criminal” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. §
924(e), on the basis of three prior “serious drug offenses.” This Court sentenced Jackson to
15 years (180 months) imprisonment, the mandatory minimum sentence under the ACCA.
Statement of Reasons (sealed), p. 1, ECF No. 23. Currently pending before this Court is
Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (ECF No. 24) pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Johnson v.
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2558 (2015). Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, this
Court finds that no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For the reasons
stated below, the Johnson decision has no bearing on Petitioner’s sentence. Accordingly,
Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate (ECF No. 24) is DENIED.

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ANALYSIS
Documents filed pro se are “liberally construed” and are “held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (citation omitted). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a prisoner in custody may seek to vacate,
set aside or correct his sentence where: (1) “the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States,” (2) the court lacked “jurisdiction to impose the
sentence, . . . [(3)] the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or [(4) the
sentence] is otherwise subject to a collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). “If the court finds
. . . that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral
attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the
prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and
set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial
or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).
An “armed career criminal” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18
U.S.C. § 924(e) is an individual who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and who has three prior
convictions for either a “violent felony” or a “serious drug offense,” or both. Pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), a person who qualifies as an armed career criminal under the ACCA is
subject to a mandatory period of imprisonment of not less than fifteen years. In Johnson v.
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), the United States Supreme Court held that the “Residual
Clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act’s definition of “violent felony” was
unconstitutionally

vague

because

its

application

was

too

“wide-ranging”

and

“indeterminate.” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557. After Johnson, an offense can only qualify as a
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“violent felony” under the ACCA if it falls within the ambit of the “Force Clause” or is one
of the ACCA’s enumerated offenses. The Johnson decision had no impact on “serious drug
offenses” under the ACCA.
Jackson contends that he “is no longer a [sic] Armed Career Criminal” because he
was convicted of a “non-violent offense” in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson
v. United States. Motion to Vacate, ECF No. 24 at 1-2. However, contrary to Jackson’s
assertion, his armed career criminal status was not predicated on one or more “violent
felonies” under the ACCA, but was instead supported by at least three prior “serious drug
offenses.” Prior to his 2009 arrest, Jackson was convicted of several “serious drug offenses”
under the ACCA, including: (1) a 1991 conviction for possession with intent to
manufacture/distribute a controlled dangerous substance; (2) a 1993 conviction for
possession with intent to distribute cocaine and conspiracy to distribute cocaine; (3) a 1996
conviction for controlled dangerous substance conspiracy; (4) convictions for possession
with intent to distribute heroin and drug trafficking in the year 2000, for which he was
sentenced to five years incarceration; and (5) a 2006 conviction for possession with intent to
distribute marijuana. Presentence Report, ¶¶ 29, 31, 32, 33, 36. Because Jackson’s enhanced
sentence under the ACCA was independently supported by at least three prior “serious drug
offenses,” Johnson is inapplicable. Accordingly, Petitioner has stated no grounds for postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct
Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (ECF No. 24) is DENIED.
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Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
the court is required to issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order
adverse to the applicant. A certificate of appealability is a “jurisdictional prerequisite” to an
appeal from the court’s earlier order. United States v. Hadden, 475 F.3d 652, 659 (4th Cir.
2007). A certificate of appealability may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Where the court
denies petitioner’s motion on its merits, a petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating
that reasonable jurists would find the court’s assessment of the constitutional claims
debatable or wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see also Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). Because reasonable jurists would not find Petitioner’s
claim debatable, a certificate of appealability is DENIED.
A separate Order follows.
Dated:

June 1, 2017
___ /s/
Richard D. Bennett
United States District Judge

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