Rhodes et al v. MCIC, Inc et al

Filing 187

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying Plaintiff's 154 Motion to Remand; setting deadline for parties to file a proposed scheduling order. Signed by Judge James K. Bredar on 9/29/2016. (dass, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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ESTHER RHODES,
as Surviving Spouse and Personal
Representative of the Estate of
Earl J. Rhodes, deceased, et al.,

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Plaintiffs
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v.

CIVIL NO. JKB-16-2459
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MCIC, INC., et al.,
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Defendants
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I. Background
Plaintiffs, who are surviving family members of Earl J. Rhodes, deceased, filed their
complaint in this asbestos case against thirty-two Defendants in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City. (Compl., ECF No. 2.) The case has been removed to this Court by Crane Co. pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1442, which permits removal to federal court for cases involving the “federal officer
defense.” (Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.) Now pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion
to remand or, in the alternative, for severance of all claims other than Plaintiffs’ claims against
Crane Co. and to remand all other severed claims. (ECF No. 154.) The motion has been briefed
(ECF Nos. 185, 186), and no hearing is required, Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). The motion
will be denied.

II. Applicable Law
As pertinent to the instant case, the federal officer defense is set forth in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442(a), which provides,
A civil action or criminal prosecution that is commenced in a State court and that
is against or directed to any of the following may be removed by them to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place
wherein it is pending:
(1) The United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting
under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, in an official
or individual capacity, for or relating to any act under color of such office or
on account of any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress
for the apprehension or punishment of criminals or the collection of the
revenue.
When applied to contractors that supply goods to the federal government, the federal
officer defense is also referred to as the government contractor defense. That extension of the
federal officer defense was recognized in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500
(1988). There, the Supreme Court set forth the defense’s contours:
Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be imposed, pursuant to
state law, when (1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications;
(2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned
the United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known
to the supplier but not to the United States.
Id. at 512. “[W]hether the facts establish the conditions for the defense is a question for the
jury.” Id. at 514.
Although the Boyle case only dealt with design defects, the defense has also been applied
to failure-to-warn cases. See, e.g., Cuomo v. Crane Co., 771 F.3d 113, 116-17 (2d Cir. 2014);
Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1123 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 361 (2014); Citrano
v. John Crane-Houdaille, Inc., 1 F. Supp. 3d 459, 467 (D. Md. 2014). See also Emory v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 148 F.3d 347, 349-50 (4th Cir. 1998) (agreeing with soundness of

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reasoning in cases applying defense to failure-to-warn claims). To establish the defense in a
failure-to-warn case,
the defendant must show: “(1) the government exercised its discretion and
approved certain warnings for the products; (2) the warnings provided by the
contractor conformed to the federal specifications; and (3) the contractor warned
the government about dangers known to the contractor but not to the
government.”
Citrano, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 467 (quoting Joyner v. A.C. & R. Insulation Co., Civ. No. CCB-122294, 2013 WL 877125, at *7 (D. Md. Mar. 7, 2013), aff’d sub nom., Wood v. Crane Co., 764
F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1426 (2015)).
To justify removal to federal court, the defense must be “colorable,” see Mesa v.
California, 489 U.S. 121, 129 (1989), and the removing defendant must establish a causal
connection between the allegedly wrongful conduct and “asserted official authority,” Willingham
v. Morgan, 397 U.S. 402, 409 (1969). The Supreme Court has “rejected a ‘narrow, grudging
interpretation’ of the statute, recognizing that ‘one of the most important reasons for removal is
to have the validity of the defense of official immunity tried in a federal court.’” Jefferson Cty.,
Ala. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 428, 431 (1999) (quoting Willingham, 395 U.S. at 407). A defendant’s
theory of the case must be credited by the federal court for the purposes of determining the
existence of the elements of the jurisdictional inquiry. Id. at 432.
Consequently, evaluation of the defense’s viability at this early stage of the case, i.e.,
upon removal, is similar to evaluation of the adequacy of a complaint for relief when challenged
by a motion to dismiss. See Willingham, 395 U.S. at 408 (noting a removal petition must contain
“a short and plain statement of the facts”); Ellenburg v. Spartan Motors Chassis, Inc., 519 F.3d
192, 199 (4th Cir. 2008) (language in general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), “is
deliberately parallel to the requirements for notice pleading found in Rule 8(a) of the Federal

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Rules of Civil Procedure”); Joyner, 2013 WL 877125, at *5-6 (noting parallelism between
plausibility standard for asserting government contractor defense and plausibility standard for
pleading complaint). A defendant need not prove his entitlement to the defense in order to
remove the case to federal court; he need only make a plausible showing of it. Willingham, 395
U.S. at 407 (“The officer need not win his case before he can have it removed.”). Cases dwelling
on the exactness of “proof” or “evidence” to support the defense are not persuasive. See, e.g.,
Zeringue v. Allis-Chambers Corp., Civ. No. 15-4516, 2015 WL 9311967 (E.D. La. Dec. 23,
2015); Sroka v. Union Carbide Corp., Civ. No. WDQ-13-3281, 2015 WL 794942 (D. Md.
Feb. 24, 2015); Holdren v. Buffalo Pumps, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D. Mass. 2009).
III. Asserted Factual Basis for the Defense
According to the complaint, the decedent served in the U.S. Navy as a laborer and
boilermaker from 1952 to 1956 onboard ships, including the USS Tarawa CV40. (Compl. ¶ 1.)
After discharge from the U.S. Navy, Rhodes was employed as a laborer, welder, and boilermaker
at Bethlehem Steel Sparrows Point Shipyard from 1956 to 1959, and later, from 1959 to 1963, he
was employed as a laborer at Eastern Stainless Steel. (Id.) He also worked as a laborer,
mechanic, and salesman for several other businesses from 1963 to the late 1970s. (Id.) Prior to
his death, Rhodes suffered from mesothelioma and asbestos-related diseases. (Id.) Plaintiffs
claim damages “[a]s a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ negligence and strict liability in
causing” Rhodes’s death. (Id. Wrongful Death Count ¶ 4.) The complaint is noticeably bereft of
plausible allegations of fact allowing an inference of liability as to any Defendant. However, no
Defendant has moved for dismissal for failure to state a claim for relief.
According to the notice of removal, Rhodes allegedly was exposed to Crane Co. products
while working aboard a Navy vessel. (Notice ¶ 3.) Crane Co. then states,
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any product that Plaintiffs allege Crane Co. manufactured for or supplied to the
Navy (and any product literature, labeling, or warnings that accompanied that
product) would be subject to Navy specifications and requirements. Federal
officers exercised their discretion regarding whether (1) asbestos was used in the
product and (2) whether a warning would accompany the product (and if so, what
it would say). Without approval from a federal officer, Crane Co.’s products
could not have been used by the Navy.
(Id.) Crane Co. also filed an affidavit of Anthony D. Pantaleoni, who, at the time he made the
affidavit in 2011, was the Vice-President of Environment, Health, and Safety for Crane Co.
(Pantaleoni Aff. ¶ 1, June 7, 2011, ECF No. 2-2.) Pantaleoni stated therein,
Crane Co. made and supplied equipment, including valves, for Navy ships
under contracts between Crane Co. and the shipyards and/or the United States of
America, specifically the Navy Department.
The manufacture of equipment for use on Navy vessels was governed by
an extensive set of federal standards and specifications, chiefly military
specifications known as Navy Specifications and later “MilSpecs.” The MilSpecs
governed all aspects of a piece of equipment, such as a valve’s, design and
construction and specified the materials to be used, including materials such as
gaskets and packing used in equipment. . . .
All equipment supplied by Crane Co. to the Navy was built in accordance
with the Navy specifications.
(Id. ¶¶ 4, 5, 6.)
In addition, Crane Co. filed an affidavit of David P. Sargent, Jr., who retired as a Rear
Admiral of the United States Navy, having served from 1967 to 1999. (Sargent Aff. ¶ 1, May 7,
2012, ECF No. 2-4.) He stated,
As a Navy engineering officer and program manager, I was often called
upon to assist in determining conformance of shipbuilders and equipment vendors
to drawings and specifications prior to acceptance by the Navy. . . .
I am knowledgeable from my own Navy service, and also from my
education, training, research and experience with the historical practices and
procedures employed by the Navy in the design and construction of vessels and
the operation of its vessels and facilities.
...
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. . . During World War II and well into the 1960s, virtually all equipment
that was to be installed in warships was procured by the Navy and provided to the
building shipyard as government-furnished equipment.
...
. . . Specifications for any equipment intended for use aboard Navy ships
were drafted, approved and maintained by the Navy.
...
. . . [T]hroughout the World War II and post-World War II era, the vast
majority of thermal insulating materials used aboard Navy vessels contained
asbestos.
...
Due to the complexities of the ship design and construction process, and
the global nature of the Navy’s approach to selection and procurement of
insulation and lagging materials, manufacturers of components were not consulted
by the Navy with respect to insulation of their equipment. Moreover, they had no
control over the types and quantities of insulation products to be used in
conjunction with their equipment, nor could they even be certain whether or not
any insulation would, in fact, be applied to their equipment due to the variety of
circumstances and potential uses of the original equipment once aboard a Navy
vessel.
Above and beyond the tens or hundreds of tons of thermal insulation used,
other asbestos materials were ubiquitous aboard Navy vessels pursuant to Navy
specifications and requirements. These materials included electrical insulating
materials, flooring, refractories and sealing materials.
...
. . . [T]he Navy developed precise specifications as to the nature of any
markings, communication or directions affixed to or made a part of any
equipment supplied by [Original Equipment Manufacturers, “OEMs”] for
ultimate use aboard Navy ships. OEMs would not have been permitted, under the
specifications, associated regulations and procedures, nor under the actual
practice as it evolved in the field to vary or to deviate in any respect from the
Navy specifications in supplying equipment, including affixing any type of
warning or caution statement to equipment intended for installation in a Navy
ship, beyond those specifically required by the Navy without prior discussion and
express approval by the Navy.

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...
. . . Consistent with its objective to ensure that all documentation to which
its personnel were exposed be thoroughly consistent with its overall training and
procedures, the Navy would not have permitted equipment suppliers to place
asbestos-related warnings on packaging or containers for valves and pumps or
related parts or items supplied during the 1940s, 1950s, or 1960s.
(Id. ¶¶ 4, 5, 23, 27, 41, 44, 45, 58, 63.)
Finally, Crane Co. also filed an affidavit of Samuel A. Forman, M.D., who served in the
Navy from 1973 to 1983 and worked as a civilian employee of the Navy until 1986. (Forman
Aff. ¶¶ 2, 3, May 3, 2012, ECF No. 2-20.) He stated,
In 1983, a JAG officer for the Naval Medical Command requested that I
become part of a team to locate, digest and organize government documents for
production in asbestos litigation. Over the next year and a half, I investigated the
Navy’s historical handling and knowledge of various industrial hygiene issues,
including asbestos disease.
From my review of countless Navy documents and my studies while
employed by the Navy, I acquired extensive knowledge as to the state of Navy
knowledge and awareness regarding the hazards of asbestos.
...
. . . [R]egarding asbestos—as with many other health and safety issues—
there was extensive information regarding potential hazards and potential
protective measures that were consciously not shared with the vast majority of
Navy personnel who were deemed not to have a need to know.
...
. . .[A]t least by the early 1940s, the Navy had become a leader in the field
of occupational medicine relating to, among other things, asbestos dust inhalation
exposure.
As early as 1922, the Navy recognized, as exemplified by its instructions
to officers published in the Navy Medical Bulletin, the health hazards associated
with airborne asbestos dust and the appropriate protective measures to prevent
asbestos exposure. . . . The Navy’s knowledge of potential asbestos-related health
problems, and of the means to control against them, continued to expand
throughout the following decades . . . .

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...
The Minimum Requirements [for Safety and Industrial Health in Contract
Shipyards, issued jointly by the Navy and the United States Maritime
Commission in 1943] identified asbestos-related disease as a potential hazard of
shipyard work, explaining that exposure could result from handling, sawing,
cutting, molding and welding rod salvage around asbestos or asbestos mixtures.
… The Minimum Requirements also warn that jobs involving exposure to
asbestos require “respiratory protective equipment,” in particular a “dust
respirator.” . . .
The Minimum Requirements further called for employee safety training[.]
. . . The type of safety posters used in these worker educational campaigns
included materials reinforcing the use of masks for protection against
disease-causing dusts. . . .
(Id. ¶ 9, 11, 22, 26, 27, 36, 37, 38.) Dr. Forman provided many other examples over the
succeeding decades of the Navy’s extensive knowledge of disease caused by asbestos, methods
to prevent it, and the importance of requiring precautionary measures by Navy personnel dealing
with asbestos. (See id. ¶ 40 et seq.)
IV. Analysis
A. Motion to Remand
In their motion to remand, Plaintiffs argue the federal officer defense has not been
established. They fault Crane Co. because it
provides no evidence to support its allegation that Plaintiff [sic] Earl Rhodes was
exposed to Crane Co.’s asbestos-containing products while serving in the Navy at
a jobsite where the products were being used, installed and/or replaced and that
the products and its labeling/packaging were under the complete and direct
control of the federal government.
(Pls.’ Mot. Remand 2, ECF No. 154.)1 Given the dearth of specific allegations in Plaintiffs’
complaint regarding any specific product of any particular Defendant, the Court cannot fault
Crane Co. for not providing the kind of specificity desired by Plaintiffs. Crane Co. is clearly
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The reference to “Plaintiff Earl Rhodes” is in error. The instant suit was filed after his death, and he was
never a Plaintiff in the case.

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anticipating that the course of discovery may flesh out what are now, at best, Plaintiffs’
conclusional allegations.
Plaintiffs also assert, with no factual support, that “the Navy did not exercise any control
over warnings and exercised no discretion over warnings relating to Crane Co.’s products which
were supplied to the Navy.” (Id.) In fact, Crane Co. has provided ample support for the
proposition in its Notice of Removal and in the affidavits supplied therewith to the effect that the
Navy exercised strict control over the inclusion or affixing of warnings to any product of any
kind supplied to the Navy.
Plaintiffs also contend that Crane Co. made no assertion or provided proof that it warned
the Government about possible asbestos hazards from its products. (Id.) They further contend
that Crane Co. has not provided argument that the federal government had sufficient knowledge
about its knowledge of asbestos hazards, that the Navy prohibited or limited Crane Co. from
providing warnings about asbestos hazards, or that the Navy exercised any discretion on the
point. (Id. 3.) Under the governing standard, a warning from Crane Co. to the Navy about
asbestos hazards would only have been necessary if Crane Co. had more knowledge than the
Navy about those hazards. Dr. Forman’s affidavit provides a wealth of information indicating
the Navy was a leader in the field of occupational health, including that specifically relating to
asbestos hazards and the employment of various measures to prevent exposure to asbestos. And
the Notice of Removal states, “The Navy, as one of the leaders in industrial hygiene state of the
art, possessed knowledge regarding the hazards of asbestos equal to or superior to its equipment
suppliers, such as Crane Co.” (Notice 4-5.) Consequently, Crane Co. was not required to warn
the Navy about asbestos hazards. Additionally, the various affidavits establish the discretion
exercised by the Navy over its suppliers as to the placement and content of warnings on their

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products; moreover, according to what is before the Court, the Navy exercised that discretion in
a strict manner, requiring absolute adherence to MilSpecs.
Next, Plaintiffs argue Crane Co. has provided “no proof of a causal nexus between
[Rhodes’s] exposure claims and the responsibility for warnings on products manufactured by
Crane Co. that allegedly were being controlled and/or created under the direction of the federal
government.”

(Pls.’ Mot. Remand 3.)

As did Judge Blake in the Joyner decision, the

undersigned concludes that the “‘causal nexus’ requirement is ordinarily satisfied whenever the
removing defendant is able to establish a colorable government contractor defense.” 2013 WL
877125, at *9. Crane Co.’s established colorable defense in this case necessarily subsumes the
inquiry as to whether a causal nexus existed between Rhodes’s exposure to Crane Co.’s products
and the control and direction exercised by the federal government over the existence and content
of warnings on those products.
The Plaintiffs further mention their “disclaimer” in their complaint of “any cause of
action or claim for recovery that could give rise to federal subject matter jurisdiction under either
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) or 28 U.S.C. § 1442, subdivision (a)(1) (federal officer)”
(Compl. 9-10), implicitly suggesting no federal jurisdiction exists. (Pls.’ Mot. Remand Supp.
Mem. 1-2.) Specifically, Plaintiffs “disclaim[] any cause of action or claim for recovery based
on any exposure to asbestos caused by any person or entity acting under the authority of a federal
officer or agency,” but they also assert,
. . . to the extent that Plaintiff was exposed to asbestos aboard a vessel of the
United States Navy or in the construction, maintenance and/or repair of United
States military vessels, Plaintiff’s product liability claims against manufacturers,
sellers, and suppliers of asbestos-containing products installed on such vessels
and/or aircraft are based solely on the failure to warn, and not on any defects
in design.

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(Compl. 10 (emphasis added).) They have cited no authority that allows such language to bar the
assertion of the federal officer defense where it is otherwise applicable.

Moreover, the

“disclaimer” is qualified by the assertion that Plaintiffs are only suing suppliers of
asbestos-containing products to the Navy under a failure-to-warn theory. (Id.) Thus, they are
clearly keeping in play a claim against Defendants who could legitimately assert the federal
officer defense. See Despres v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp., 577 F. Supp. 2d 604, 607-08 (D. Conn.
2008) (plaintiffs’ purported disclaimer of any claims subject to federal officer defense ineffective
given their failure to waive all instances of asbestos exposure to defendant’s products while in
Navy service). Since the Court has already determined that the government contractor defense is
applicable to failure-to-warn cases, Plaintiffs’ purported distinction between design-defect cases
and failure-to-warn cases makes no difference in the Court’s analysis. Crane Co. has validly
claimed the defense and, consequently, properly removed the case to federal court. The motion
to remand will be denied.
B. Motion to Sever
Plaintiffs request, in the event the Court determines it has jurisdiction over the case, that
the Court sever all non-Crane Co. claims from the case and remand them to state court.

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request, with no supporting argument other than to make a passing reference to the Joyner
decision (Pls.’ Mot. Remand Supp. Mem. 7; Pls.’ Reply 5, ECF No. 186), is not well founded.
Having concluded the Court possesses jurisdiction over the case, the Court also
concludes the non-Crane Co. claims are properly within the jurisdiction of this Court by virtue of
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), which provides,
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise
by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all
other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original
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jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall
include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
(Emphasis added.)
It is beyond question that the non-Crane Co. claims are “so related to” the Plaintiffs’
claims against Crane Co. “that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III.”
Plaintiffs’ complaint, which sets forth only one count, is premised upon the notion of
Defendants’ joint and several liability for Rhodes’s asbestos disease.
However, even when the Court properly possesses supplemental jurisdiction over
nonfederal claims, it remains within the Court’s discretion to decide whether to retain
jurisdiction over those claims. The Court’s exercise of discretion is guided by § 1367(c) and
case law. Section 1367(c) provides,
The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim
under subsection (a) if(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which
the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.
Plainly, neither (1), (3), nor (4) applies to the instant case. The question arises as to
whether Plaintiffs’ suit against the Defendants other than Crane Co. “substantially predominates
over the claim over which the district court has original jurisdiction.” As earlier noted, the
complaint only contains one count against all Defendants. Plaintiffs suggest that count should be
subdivided by the Court in order to find that the portion of it against the non-Crane Co.
Defendants should be remanded, apparently on the theory that the part of their claim against the
other Defendants “predominates” over the part against Crane Co. The count is premised entirely

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upon Maryland state law, including their assertion of liability against Crane Co. It is only Crane
Co.’s assertion of the federal officer defense that distinguishes it from its fellow Defendants.
The undersigned is aware that Judge Blake concluded in Joyner that the claims against
the defendants who did not assert the federal officer defense predominated against the one
defendant who had asserted the defense, 2013 WL 877125, at *9-10,2 and does not necessarily
disagree with her conclusion.

However, even if the portion of Plaintiffs’ suit against the

non-Crane Co. Defendants can be said to predominate over the portion against Crane Co., that
would not be the only determinative factor in the Court’s exercise of discretion as to retention of
jurisdiction in the rest of the case.
When the exercise of discretion under § 1367(c) “involves the additional question of
whether to remand the case to State court, the federal court should consider ‘principles of
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity’ and whether the efforts of a party in seeking
remand amount to a ‘manipulative tactic.’” Hinson v. Norwest Fin. S. Carolina, Inc., 239 F.3d
611, 617 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988)).
Plaintiffs ignore this necessary part of the analysis and provide no argument whatsoever as to the
“economy, convenience, fairness, and comity” resulting from the severance and remand of the
Plaintiffs’ claim against the non-Crane Co. Defendants.
A distinguishing factor in this case that was not addressed in the Joyner opinion is the
presence of cross-claims by all Defendants against all other Defendants, including Crane Co.
The federal officer defense is necessarily implicated in each of these cross-claims for the same
reason it is implicated in Plaintiffs’ claim against Crane Co. The obvious result of severance and
remand is that two cases would be proceeding simultaneously in two different courts, which is

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The appellate opinion in Joyner by the United States Court of Appeals did not address the district court’s
severance and remand of similar claims. See Wood, 764 F.3d at 320.

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antithetical to economy, either as to judicial resources or the litigants’ resources. Nor is it fair to
Crane Co. to litigate its defense simultaneously in two fora. 3 The only just course is to retain all
cross-claims along with Plaintiffs’ claim against Crane Co. In that event, it makes no sense to
sever Plaintiffs’ claim against the remaining Defendants. For that reason, the motion in the
alternative for severance and remand of all non-Crane Co. claims will be denied.
V. Conclusion
The Court concludes this case was properly removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442. Further, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to remand any claims that do not
fall within the Court’s original jurisdiction. Plaintiffs’ motion (ECF No. 154) IS DENIED.
This case is now ready for a scheduling order. Counsel for the parties shall confer and
file by October 12, 2016, a proposed scheduling order for all further proceedings with the
exception of a trial, pretrial conference, and briefing schedule for motions in limine.
DATED this 29th day of September, 2016.

BY THE COURT:

______________/s/____________________
James K. Bredar
United States District Judge

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Indeed, the breadth of § 1442(a)’s term “civil action” that may be removed pursuant to the statute is
apparent from § 1442(d)’s definition, indicating the term “include[s] any proceeding (whether or not ancillary to
another proceeding) to the extent that in such proceeding a judicial order, including a subpoena for testimony or
documents, is sought or issued.” It follows, then, that a cross-claim could be considered within that definition.
Additionally, who can remove under § 1442 is not limited to a “defendant,” as it is in § 1441; rather, § 1442(a)
simply allows for removal of a civil action “that is against or directed to . . . any person acting under” a federal
officer. That broad statement would allow a cross-claim defendant to remove the cross-claim to federal court. The
logical conclusion is that all cross-claims against Crane Co. must stay in federal court.

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