Smith v. Colvin

Filing 26

ORDER denying 22 Ranada Antoinette Smith's Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 24 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; reversing the Commissioner's judgment in part due to inadequate analysis; remanding the case for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion; directing Clerk to close this case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 9/18/2017. (krs, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

September 18, 2017
LETTER TO COUNSEL
RE:

Ranada Antoinette Smith v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-16-2538

Dear Counsel:
On July 11, 2016, Plaintiff Ranada Antoinette Smith petitioned this Court to review the
Social Security Administration’s final decision to deny her claim for Supplemental Security
Income. (ECF No. 1). I have considered the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, and
Ms. Smith’s reply. (ECF Nos. 22, 24, 25). I find that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6
(D. Md. 2016). This Court must uphold the decision of the Agency if it is supported by
substantial evidence and if the Agency employed proper legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§
405(g), 1383(c)(3); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Under that standard, I
will deny both motions, reverse the Commissioner’s decision in part, and remand the case to the
Commissioner for further consideration. This letter explains my rationale.
Ms. Smith filed a claim for Supplemental Security Income on April 18, 2012, alleging a
disability onset date of July 20, 2010. (Tr. 162-68). Her claim was denied initially and on
reconsideration. (Tr. 95-98, 99-100). A hearing was held on September 18, 2014, before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 29-76). Following the hearing, the ALJ determined
that Ms. Smith was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act during the
relevant time frame. (Tr. 9-27). The Appeals Council denied Ms. Smith’s request for review,
(Tr. 1-6), so the ALJ’s decision constitutes the final, reviewable decision of the Agency.
The ALJ found that Ms. Smith suffered from the severe impairments of “left parietal
arteriovenenous malformation (“AVM”); seizure disorder; migraine headaches; degenerative
disc disease of the cervical spine; and adjustment disorder.” (Tr. 14). Despite these
impairments, the ALJ determined that Ms. Smith retained the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to:
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except she can frequently
push and pull with her right upper extremity; frequently operate foot controls with
her right foot; and occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel,
crouch and crawl, but never climb ladders, ropes and scaffolds. The claimant can
also frequently; [sic] reach with her right upper extremity, reach overhead with
her right upper extremity, and handle, finger and feel with her right upper
extremity. She also needs to avoid concentrated exposure to extreme; [sic] heat

Ranada Smith v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-16-2538
September 18, 2017
Page 2
and cold, concentrated exposure to excessive vibration, and all exposure to
hazardous moving machinery and unprotected heights. In addition, she can only
perform simple, repetitive and routine tasks in a low stress work environment
defined as no strict production quotas and occasional interaction with the public,
coworkers and supervisors.
(Tr. 16). After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that
Ms. Smith could perform her past relevant work as a cleaner and, alternatively other jobs
existing in significant numbers in the national economy and that, therefore, she was not disabled.
(Tr. 21-23).
Ms. Smith raises several issues on appeal.1 First, she contends that the ALJ failed to
provide an adequate evaluation of the Listings. Second, she argues that the ALJ’s evaluation of
her RFC was flawed. Finally, Ms. Smith contends that the ALJ lacked substantial evidence to
conclude that she would be capable of substantial gainful employment. I concur that the ALJ’s
analysis is deficient. In remanding the case for additional explanation, I express no opinion as to
whether the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion that Ms. Smith is not entitled to benefits is correct or
incorrect.
Turning first to the physical listings, the ALJ identified three: Listing 1.04 (Disorders of
the spine); Listing 11.02 (Epilepsy – convulsive epilepsy); and Listing 11.03 (Epilepsy –
nonconvulsive epilepsy. (Tr. 14). Without further analysis, the ALJ stated that he had
“concluded that[] the objective evidence simply fails to indicate that the claimant has the level of
functional loss required by the Listings.” (Tr. 14-15). That conclusory statement does not
include any “specific application of the pertinent legal requirements to the record evidence.”
Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2013). That is, the ALJ did not apply any
findings or medical evidence to the disability listing and “does not indicate why the [medical]
opinions merit that weight.” Id. (emphasis in original). Although, ultimately, the ALJ’s
conclusion may be correct, the opinion defies review because, as the Fourth Circuit explained, it
is “not our province—nor the province of the district court—to engage in these [fact-finding]
exercises in the first instance.” Radford, 734 F.3d at 296; see also Cook v. Heckler, 783 F.2d
1168, 1173 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that, without an explanation from the ALJ, “it is simply
impossible to tell whether there was substantial evidence to support the determination”). Thus,
although Ms. Smith has not expressly argued that she meets any of the physical listings
referenced in the ALJ’s decision, because the ALJ found ample evidence to identify three
specific listings, he had to provide a fact-based analysis for this Court’s review. Because he did
not, remand is warranted.
Moreover, the ALJ’s RFC analysis suffers from similar deficiencies. Ms. Smith’s
primary contention is that she is disabled by regular headaches. (Tr. 45, 51). The ALJ
repeatedly referred to a single treatment note, from March 2, 2012, suggesting that Ms. Smith’s
1

Although Ms. Smith’s brief expressly challenges the determination of the Appeals Council, it is evident that she
intended to contest the ALJ’s findings and conclusions.

Ranada Smith v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-16-2538
September 18, 2017
Page 3
seizures and headaches had “become better controlled on Depakote therapy” or “responded to
Depakote.” See, e.g., (Tr. 17, 21, 320). However, the medical record clearly indicates that her
response to Depakote was temporary and incomplete. See, e.g., (Tr. 323) (note from September
21, 2012 stating, “Her main problem now is her headaches. For a while, they were better
controlled when Depakote was added, but over the past summer they have gotten worse again.”);
(Tr. 324-25) (note from November 14, 2012 indicating, “Since she was last seen in March, she
feels that her headaches have worsened. They occur 2-3 times per week, normally lasting only a
few hours. Her current headache started two days ago and is a 10/10.”); (Tr. 365) (note from
February 7, 2013 reflecting, “She has been on Depakote since December 2011 for headache
prophylaxis as well as seizures but the dose was recently increased to 1000mg bid d/t
uncontrolled spells.”). The ALJ does not address the medical evidence suggesting that Depakote
did not resolve or control Ms. Smith’s issues.
In addition, the ALJ made an adverse credibility determination without an appropriate
analysis of both objective and non-objective evidence, and allowed that unsupported assessment
to infect the assignment of weight to Ms. Smith’s treating physician. See (Tr. 20) (“The
undersigned notes that Dr. Patel’s disability finding was based entirely on the claimant’s reports
of her seizures, rather than direct observation by an objective medical source or actual seizure
activity.”). Although the ALJ correctly notes that EEG and other objective tests did not reflect
abnormalities, the medical professionals did not conclude that Ms. Smith did not experience
seizures, but instead attributed her seizures to other causes that would not be shown on EEG.
See, e.g., (Tr. 324-25) (“It was thought that these were likely simple partial seizures as they
correlated semiologically with her AVM.”); (Tr. 366) (“EEG did not capture any events
however, given her history, it is likely that these events are seizures although none were captured
for a definitive diagnosis.”). The ALJ does not cite to other significant evidence undermining
Ms. Smith’s testimony that her seizures and headaches are frequent and disabling. Finally,
although the ALJ relies upon evidence that Ms. Smith “moved to her own place with her children
in the Summer of 2013” and “moved to Richmond” in April 2014, (Tr. 17), he does not reference
the evidence suggesting that, on both occasions, she quickly moved back in with her mother
because she was unable to live independently. (Tr. 38-39, 50, 58-61). In light of those
deficiencies, and the unwarranted reliance on the Depakote treatment addressed above, the ALJ’s
RFC assessment does not adequately consider whether Ms. Smith’s seizures and headaches
impact her ability to engage in substantial gainful employment.
Because the ALJ’s hypothetical to the VE was premised on the RFC assessment, which
may change on remand, I need not address whether the ALJ properly relied on the VE testimony
to establish that Ms. Smith would be capable of work.
For the reasons set forth herein, Ms. Smith’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
22) is DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 24) is DENIED.
Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Commissioner’s judgment is REVERSED
IN PART due to inadequate analysis. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.

Ranada Smith v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-16-2538
September 18, 2017
Page 4
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion and docketed
as an order.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge