Jones v. Jordan et al
Filing
116
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 9/13/2019. (hmls, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
ERIC JONES,
:
Plaintiff,
:
v.
:
JOSHUA JORDAN, et al.,
:
Defendants.
Civil Action No. GLR-16-2662
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants Joshua Jordan (“Ofc. Jordan”)
and Russell J. Tonks’s (“Ofc. Tonks”) (collectively, “Officer Defendants”) Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 94) and Plaintiff Eric Jones’s Opposition to Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (“Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment”) (ECF No. 104). The Motions
are ripe for disposition, and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2018).
For the reasons outlined below, the Court will deny both Motions.
I.
BACKGROUND1
On August 17, 2014, the Baltimore Police Department (“BPD”) received two 911
calls regarding drug trafficking on Paton Avenue in Baltimore, Maryland. (Defs.’ Mot. Ex.
A [“911 Calls”] at Aud. 389920–21, ECF No. 94-3). One of the callers reported that
Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are set forth in Jones’s Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 21). To the extent the Court discusses facts that Jones does not allege
in his Amended Complaint, they are uncontroverted and the Court views them in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. The Court will address additional facts when
discussing applicable law.
1
approximately forty individuals were engaged in drug transactions near the intersection of
Paton and Denmore Avenues. (Id. at Aud. 389920). Both callers identified a man dressed
in all black, wearing a black hat, as the dealer. (Id. at Aud. 389920–21). At 3:17 p.m.,
responding to a dispatch, Officer Defendants arrived at the scene. (Defs.’ Mot. Ex. F
[“Radio”] at Aud. 389925, ECF No. 94-8).
Upon arrival, Ofc. Tonks confirmed via BPD radio transmission (“radioed”) that
there were thirty to forty people on the 5200 block of Denmore Avenue, near Paton
Avenue. (Id.; Jordan Dep. at 197:1–3, Apr. 23, 2018, ECF No. 104-7).2 Ofc. Jordan
appeared to identify the dealer, radioing, “Curbie, he’s running right now.” (Radio at Aud.
389925; Jordan Dep. 198:15–20, ECF No. 104-7). Ofc. Tonks responded, “Which way is
he running?” (Radio at Aud. 389925). Ofc. Jordan radioed that the suspect, dressed in all
black, with a slim build, had disappeared up an alley and that he “can’t find him.” (Radio
at Aud. 389926; Jordan Dep. 202:1–7, ECF No. 104-7). One of the Officer Defendants then
radioed that he was going towards “Wilton Heights,”3 presumably to search for the fleeing
suspect. (Radio at Aud. 389926). That Officer Defendant then radioed, confirming his own
location as “Florence [Avenue],” which is at least two blocks away from the dispatch site.
(Id.). A few seconds later, Ofc. Tonks asked Ofc. Jordan, “Still got eyes on him?” (Radio
at Aud. 389927; Jordan Dep. 203:3–8, ECF No. 104-7). Ofc. Jordan stated he was still
The parties’ Exhibits include different selections of pages from the same April 23,
2018 deposition of Ofc. Jordan. (Compare ECF No. 104-7, with ECF No. 94-10). For ease
of reference, the Court will specify the source Exhibit in each citation.
3
Wilton Heights is a church located three blocks west of the intersection of Paton
and Denmore Avenues.
2
2
looking for him. (Radio at Aud. 389927). At 3:18:40 p.m., Ofc. Jordan reported that he was
“going up Elmer [Avenue].” (Radio at Aud. 389928; Jordan Dep. 207:4–8, ECF No. 1047). Elmer Avenue is at least two blocks away from the dispatch site and does not intersect
with Paton Avenue.
Much of what happened next is hotly disputed. What is not disputed is that, at some
point, Officer Defendants stopped Jones and another unidentified individual near the corner
of Denmore and Hayward Avenues.4 (Jordan Dep. 48:3–10, ECF No. 104-7; Jones Dep.
185:8–12, Sept. 13, 2018. ECF No. 94-5). At that time, Jones was fifty-two years old, was
working part-time as a plumber, and had spent “maybe a couple days” at an apartment
complex several blocks southeast of the corner of Denmore and Hayward Avenues, though
his permanent address was in a different neighborhood of North Baltimore. (Pl.’s Mot. Ex.
O [“Criminal Case Docket”], ECF No. 104-18; Jones Dep. 156:1–12, 163:1–164:11). All
parties agree that Jones was not free to leave, though it is disputed whether Officer
Defendants ordered Jones to sit on the curb or to lie face-down on the ground. (Compare
Jordan Dep. 51:5–14, ECF No. 104-7, with Jones Aff. ¶¶ 12–13, ECF No. 104-5, and Jones
Dep. 223:5–11, ECF No. 104-6). It is undisputed that Jones tried to leave at some point
thereafter. Officer Defendants allege they asked Jones if he had anything illegal on his
person, at which point he left without answering. (Jordan Dep. 75:2–6, Apr. 23, 2018, ECF
4
To get to this corner via car, the most direct route Ofc. Jordan could have taken
would have been to drive down Florence Avenue and then turn onto Hayward Avenue to
reach Denmore Avenue, the opposite end of the block from the site of the drug activity that
prompted the 911 calls.
3
No. 94-10; Tonks Dep. 79:6–80:2, Apr. 17, 2018, ECF No. 94-9).5 Jones states Officer
Defendants “started asking about my identification and were rude to me” but “[a]s I did
nothing wrong, I got up and started walking away.” (Jones Aff. ¶ 14). Officer Defendants
argue Jones ran away; Jones denies running. (Jordan Dep. 75:5–6, 17–18, ECF No. 94–10;
Jones Aff. ¶¶ 14–19). It is undisputed that Ofc. Jordan tackled Jones to the ground shortly
thereafter. (Jordan Dep. 75:9–13, ECF No. 94–10; Tonks Dep. at 50:15–19, ECF No. 949; Jones Aff. ¶ 16).
Officer Defendants’ radio calls punctuate these disputed events and provide a rough
timeline of what occurred. At 3:20:22 p.m., Ofc. Jordan radioed, “He’s on the run.” (Radio
at Aud. 389929; Jordan Dep. 208:15, ECF No. 104-7). One of the Officer Defendants
radioed, “Heading down to Florence [Avenue].” (Radio at Aud. 389929). Ofc. Tonks then
radioed, “We got him.” (Radio at Aud. 389929; Jordan Dep. 208:16–17, ECF No. 104-7).
Officer Defendants at that point reported their location as the 5200 block of Florence
Avenue. (Radio at Aud. 389929).
At 3:25:20 p.m., one of the Officer Defendants reported a “1014”6 at Hayward and
Florence. (Radio at Aud. 389930). At 3:34:49 p.m., Officer Defendants called in a “1038”7
for an approximately fifty-year-old male with facial abrasions, presumably Jones. (Radio
at Aud. 389931). Officer Defendants then transported Jones to Sinai Hospital. (Pl.’s Mot.
The parties’ Exhibits include different selections of pages from the same April 17,
2018 deposition of Ofc. Tonks. (Compare ECF No. 104-8, with ECF No. 94-9). For ease
of reference, the Court will specify the source Exhibit in each citation.
6
A 1014 is a call for a “wagon.” (Jordan Dep. 232:1–3, ECF No. 104-7).
7
A 1038 is a request for a medic. (Jordan Dep. 235:14–18, ECF No. 104-7).
5
4
Summ. J. Ex. M [“Hospital Records”], ECF No. 104-15; Radio at Aud. 389933; Jordan
Dep. 246:7–8, ECF No. 104-7). Jones suffered bilateral subdural hematomas, traumatic
subarachnoid hemorrhage along the left cerebral convexity, and small right anterior frontal
lobe hemorrhagic contusions. (Hospital Records at 3, 5). As a result of these injuries, Jones
underwent brain surgery. (Id. at 5).
Jones’s Hospital Records indicate that he tested positive for cocaine use. (Hospital
Records at 8). Bags of suspected cocaine and marijuana were found in Jones’s sock, (Defs.’
Mot. Ex. E [“Incident Report”] at 3, ECF No. 94-7), though Jones asserts that no chemical
analyses were performed to verify the identity of the substances. (Jones Aff. ¶ 33). After
being discharged, Jones was charged with: (1) Controlled Dangerous Substance (“CDS”)
possession of marijuana; (2) CDS possession of marijuana L/T 10 G; (3) second degree
assault; (4) resisting arrest; (5) CDS possession of paraphernalia; (6) CDS possession with
intent to distribute; and (7) CDS possession, not marijuana. (Criminal Case Docket). Jones
was acquitted of all counts except for CDS possession with intent to distribute, for which
the prosecutor entered a nolle prosequi. (Id.).
On July 22, 2016, Jones sued Officer Defendants, as well as BPD and former BPD
Police Chief Anthony W. Batts (collectively, the “BPD Defendants”) and Unknown
Individual Officers and Unknown Supervisors of the BPD. (ECF No. 1). On October 25,
2016, Jones filed an Amended Complaint, alleging: a violation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution for unlawful search and seizure brought
under § 1983 (Count I); two supervisory liability claims for violation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments brought under § 1983 (Counts II and III); a violation of the Fourth
5
and Fourteenth Amendments for fabrication of evidence brought under § 1983 (Count IV);
violation of Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Count V); malicious
prosecution (Count VI); assault and battery (Count VII); false imprisonment (Count VIII);
and false arrest (Count IX). (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 95–149). Jones seeks monetary damages.
(Id. at 38).
On December 4, 2017, the Court bifurcated the claims against Officer Defendants
from the claims brought against BPD Defendants, essentially staying the case with respect
to BPD Defendants until after the resolution of Jones’s claims against Officer Defendants.
(Dec. 4, 2017 Order, ECF No. 42).
On December 14, 2018, Officer Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
(ECF No. 94). Jones filed an Opposition and Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
on January 11, 2019. (ECF No. 104). On January 31, 2019, Officer Defendants filed an
Opposition and Reply. (ECF No. 111). On February 13, 2019, Jones filed a Reply. (ECF
No. 112).
II.
A.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the facts in a light
most favorable to the nonmovant, drawing all justifiable inferences in that party’s favor.
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 255 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970)).
Summary judgment is proper when the movant demonstrates, through “particular parts of
materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored
6
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers,
or other materials,” that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), (c)(1)(A). Significantly, a
party must be able to present the materials it cites in “a form that would be admissible in
evidence,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2), and supporting affidavits and declarations “must be
made on personal knowledge” and “set out facts that would be admissible in evidence,”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4).
Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the burden
shifts to the nonmovant to identify evidence showing there is genuine dispute of material
fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986).
The nonmovant cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact “through mere speculation
or the building of one inference upon another.” Othentec Ltd. v. Phelan, 526 F.3d 135, 141
(4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985)).
A “material fact” is one that might affect the outcome of a party’s case. Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248; see also JKC Holding Co. v. Wash. Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459,
465 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 265 (4th Cir. 2001)).
Whether a fact is considered to be “material” is determined by the substantive law, and
“[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248;
accord Hooven-Lewis, 249 F.3d at 265. A “genuine” dispute concerning a “material” fact
arises when the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict in the
nonmoving party’s favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the nonmovant has failed to make
7
a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case where she has the burden of proof,
“there can be ‘no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of
proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders
all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).
When the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must
“review each motion separately on its own merits to ‘determine whether either of the
parties deserves judgment as a matter of law.’” Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523
(4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Philip Morris Inc. v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58, 62 n.4 (1st Cir.
1997)). Moreover, “[w]hen considering each individual motion, the court must take care to
‘resolve all factual disputes and any competing, rational inferences in the light most
favorable’ to the party opposing that motion.” Id. (quoting Wightman v. Springfield
Terminal Ry. Co., 100 F.3d 228, 230 (1st Cir. 1996)). This Court, however, must also abide
by its affirmative obligation to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from
going to trial. Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir. 1993). If the evidence
presented by the nonmovant is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary
judgment must be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50.
B.
Analysis
Officer Defendants move for summary judgment on Jones’s claim for punitive
damages and as to all counts except Counts II and III, which Jones directs at the other
Defendants.8 Jones counters that summary judgment cannot be granted in Officer
8
Officer Defendants argue that Count III should be dismissed because a claim
cannot proceed against an unidentified person. See Owens-El v. Kapfhammer, No. L-108
Defendants’ favor on any count because there are genuine disputes of material fact with
respect to each claim. Jones also moves for summary judgment in his favor as to Counts I,
IV, V, VII, VIII, and IX. The Court considers each claim in turn.
1.
Unlawful Search & Seizure & Excessive Force (Count I)
a.
Unlawful Search & Seizure
Seizure occurs when “in view of all [of] the circumstances surrounding the incident,
a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” United States v.
Gray, 883 F.2d 320, 322 (4th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544, 554 (1980)). “[I]n some circumstances a person may be detained briefly, without
probable cause to arrest him,” but “any curtailment of a person’s liberty by the police must
be supported by at least a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person seized is
engaged in criminal activity.” Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980). An investigatory
detention of a citizen, known as a Terry stop, curtails liberty and, therefore, “must be
supported by reasonable articulable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal
activity.” United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 537 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). The officer must have a “particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Griffin, 589
F.3d 148, 152 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–418
(1981)). “[T]he officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
3213, 2011 WL 1869594, at *1 (D.Md. May 13, 2011). Because Count III is not brought
against Officer Defendants and the Court has bifurcated claims against Officer Defendants
from the claims against the BPD Defendants, the Court will not consider Count III at this
time.
9
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
Here, it is undisputed that when Officer Defendants stopped Jones, Jones was not
free to leave. (Jordan Dep. 49:6–10, 51:9–17, ECF No. 104-7).9 There are, however,
genuine disputes of material fact as to why Officer Defendants stopped Jones and whether
Officer Defendants had a reasonable articulable suspicion that Jones was engaged in
criminal activity before stopping him. Officer Defendants maintain that Jones “was a
member of the group that scattered upon seeing marked police vehicles in an open-air drug
market.”10 (Id. at 52:8–11; 219:21–220:1; Tonks Dep. at 72:11–21, ECF No. 104-8). But
Officer Defendants testify that they did not see Jones engage in a drug transaction. (See
Tonks Dep. 77:16–19, ECF No. 94-9). Ofc. Jordan states in passing that “we observed
[Jones] in a group believed to be involved in a [drug] transaction,” (Jordan Dep. 75:3–4,
ECF No. 94-10), but in their report, Officer Defendants state their reason for stopping Jones
was that they saw him “walking out of the 5200 block of Denmore Avenue in a hurried
manner.” (Incident Report at 3). Jones admitted that Officer Defendants approached him
on the corner of Hayward and Denmore, but denied being part of, or seeing, a group of
individuals at the other end of the 5200 block of Denmore Avenue. (Jones Dep. 185:8–12,
9
Officer Defendants maintain that they asked Jones to sit on the curb, but Jones
testified that he was ordered to lay face down on the asphalt. (Compare Jordan Dep. 51:7–
8, ECF No. 104-7, with Jones Aff. ¶¶ 12–13, and Jones Dep. 223:5–11, ECF No. 104-6)
10
While Officer Defendants testified to this in their depositions, Jordan’s initial
police report stated Jones was leaving Denmore Avenue in a “hurried manner,” but not that
he was part of the group of individuals that dispersed. (Jordan Dep. 171:5–15, ECF No.
104-7; Incident Report at 3).
10
ECF No. 94-5; Jones Aff. ¶¶ 7–8). Instead, Jones alleges that he had just left a convenience
store on Park Heights Avenue when Officer Defendants stopped him. (Jones Aff. ¶¶ 7–8).
There are also inconsistencies between Officer Defendants’ testimony and their
radio calls from the day of the arrest. First, Ofc. Tonks testified that he and Ofc. Jordan
were in the same police car on August 17, 2014. (Tonks Dep. 39:13–14, 18–19, ECF No.
104-8). But Ofc. Jordan testified, and radio calls between Officer Defendants corroborate,
that they were in separate vehicles. (Jordan Dep. 37:13–14, 196:1–3, ECF No. 104-7).
Second, Ofc. Jordan testified that he stopped Jones immediately as he arrived at the scene,
(Jordan Dep. 62:9–16, ECF No. 104-7), but Ofc. Tonks testified that Jones was walking
away from a group of people and toward their police car. (Tonks Dep. 75:13, ECF No. 1048). However, the radio calls between Officer Defendants indicate that the group of
individuals dispersed as soon as they saw police cars, (Jordan Dep. 37:2, ECF No. 94-10),
and that Officer Defendants then spent approximately three minutes canvassing the area
for the suspected dealer before they stopped Jones. (Jordan Dep. 218:15–20, ECF No. 1047). During this interval, Ofc. Jordan drove around the block to Elmer Avenue before
returning to the intersection of Hayward and Denmore Avenues. (Radio at Aud. 389928).
Further, based on the questions Ofc. Tonks asked Ofc. Jordan over the radio during this
time—including which way the dealer was running, (Radio Aud. at 389925), and whether
Ofc. Jordan still had eyes on the dealer, (Radio Aud. at 389926)—it seems that Officer
Defendants were not with each other during this interval.
The passage of time, Officer Defendants’ apparent physical separation, and the radio
transmissions that suggest Ofc. Jordan spotted and pursued the suspected dealer before
11
returning to the 5200 block of Denmore Avenue and stopping Jones all cast doubt on
Officer Defendants’ assertions that they identified Jones as part of the group of individuals
on Paton Avenue. These inconsistencies also prevent a conclusion at this stage that Officer
Defendants had a reasonable articulable suspicion that Jones was engaged in illegal drug
activity when they detained him. See Black, 707 F.3d at 537; Griffin, 589 F.3d at 152.
b.
Excessive Force
To analyze an excessive force claim, the Court considers whether a reasonable
officer would have determined that the degree of force used was justified by the threat
presented. Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 527 (4th Cir. 2003). This is an objective
inquiry that requires “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular
case,” including “the severity of the crime at issue,” whether the “suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,” and whether the suspect “is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).
Here, there are genuine disputes of material fact regarding Officer Defendants’ use
of force in arresting Jones. Specifically, Jones alleges that he did not run from Officer
Defendants. (Jones Aff. ¶¶ 14–15). Nevertheless, according to Jones, Ofc. Jordan tackled
him and struck him with either a baton or his fist after he was on the ground, rendering
Jones unconscious. (Id. ¶¶ 16–19). Conversely, Ofc. Jordan alleges that Jones ran away
from Officer Defendants, and that after he tackled Jones, a physical altercation ensued, at
12
which point Jones attempted to strike him. (Jordan Dep. 75:5–6, 12–18, ECF No. 94-10).11
Further, while Ofc. Jordan testified that he tackled Jones on a patch of grass, Jones testified
that his head hit the road. (Incident Report at 3; Jordan Dep. 140:5–6, ECF No. 104-7;
Jones Aff. ¶ 17). These factual disputes must be resolved before it can be determined
whether Officer Defendants used appropriately proportionate force in arresting Jones. See
Buchanan, 325 F.3d at 527.
In sum, genuine disputes of material fact exist as to whether: (1) Officer Defendants
had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Jones; and (2) as to whether Officer Defendants
used excessive force in detaining Jones. Accordingly, the Court will deny both Officer
Defendants’ and Jones’s Motions as to Count I.
2.
Fabrication of Evidence (Count IV)
“The Fourteenth Amendment protects ‘against deprivations of liberty accomplished
without due process of law.’” Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 354 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979)). Individuals have a due process “right not
to be deprived of liberty as a result of the fabrication of evidence by a government officer
acting in an investigating capacity.” Washington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d 274, 282 (4th Cir.
2005) (quoting Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Officer Defendants argue that Jones’s hospital records confirm their version of
events. The hospital records state “[t]his is a 52-year-old man who was running from the
police after a failed interview, and he was tackled by the police landing on his side.”
(Hospital Records at 2). But the hospital records state that the doctor received this
information from “a police officer.” (Id.).
11
13
Here, Officer Defendants allege that Jones tossed a cigarette package that contained
contraband while he was fleeing and that he had more drugs in his sock. (Tonks Dep. 82:2–
4, 94-9; Jordan Dep. 75:11–13, ECF No. 94-10). Jones denies this and testified that he did
not have any drugs in his possession. (Jones Aff. ¶¶ 21, 34). Because a genuine dispute of
material fact exists as to whether Jones had contraband on his person at the time of his
arrest, the Court cannot decide as a matter of law whether Jones’s Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights were violated.
Accordingly, the Court will deny both Officer Defendants’ and Jones’s Motions as
to Count IV.
3.
Violations of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Count V)
Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights are the state constitutional
analogs to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and are interpreted in pari materia with
their federal counterparts. Doe v. Dep’t. of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 971 A.2d 975, 982
(Md.Ct.Spec.App. 2009); Padilla v. State, 949 A.2d 68, 78 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 2008).
Consistent with its analysis of Counts I and IV, the Court concludes that genuine
disputes of material fact exist as to the reason for Jones’s detention, the use of force, and
Jones’s possession of contraband. The Court therefore cannot render judgment at this time
regarding Jones’s state constitutional claims. Accordingly, the Court will deny Officer
Defendants’ Motion as to Count V.
4.
False Imprisonment & False Arrest (Counts VIII & IX)
In Maryland, the elements of false arrest and false imprisonment are the same: (1)
“the deprivation of the liberty of another”; (2) “without consent”; and (3) “without legal
14
justification.” Pegues v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 63 F.Supp.3d 539, 542 (D.Md. 2014)
(quoting Heron v. Strader, 761 A.2d 56, 59 (Md. 2000)). Legal justification, in this context,
is “judged by the principles applicable to the law of arrest.” Heron, 761 A.2d at 59 (quoting
Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 664 A.2d 916, 926 (Md. 1995)). Therefore, “the liability of
the police officer for false imprisonment will ordinarily depend upon whether or not the
officer acted within his legal authority to arrest.” Id. (quoting Montgomery Ward, 664 A.2d
at 926).
As discussed above, genuine disputes of material fact exist as to whether Officer
Defendants had legal justification to detain Jones. Thus, the Court cannot yet render
judgment regarding Jones’s false arrest and false imprisonment claims. Accordingly, the
Court will deny both Officer Defendants’ and Jones’s Motions as to Counts VIII and IX.
5.
Assault & Battery (Count VII)
Battery is “a harmful or offensive contact with a person resulting from an act
intended to cause the person such contact.” Saba v. Darling, 575 A.2d 1240, 1242 (Md.
1990) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 13 (Am. Law. Inst. 1965)). Assault is either
“(1) an attempt to commit a battery or (2) an intentional placing of another in apprehension
of receiving an immediate battery.” Dixon v. State, 488 A.2d 962, 966 (Md. 1985) (quoting
Rollin M. Perkins, Perkins on Criminal Law 114 (2d ed. 1969)). Under Maryland law, “[a]n
officer is not liable for battery for using a reasonable amount of force when effectuating a
lawful detention or arrest.” Stutzman v. Krenik, 350 F.Supp.3d 366, 383 (D.Md. 2018)
(citing Ashton v. Brown, 660 A.2d 447, 471 n.24 (Md. 1995)). But an officer may be held
liable for battery if the officer “uses excessive force, or force greater than is reasonably
15
necessary under the circumstances.” French v. Hines, 957 A.2d 1000, 1037
(Md.Ct.Spec.App. 2008) (quoting 6A C.J.S. Assault § 35 (2008 Supp.)).
As the Court concluded in Part 1a of its analysis, genuine disputes of material fact
exist as to whether Officer Defendants used excessive force in tackling, controlling, and
handcuffing Jones. The Court, therefore, cannot render judgment at this point regarding
Jones’s assault and battery claims. Accordingly, the Court will deny both Officer
Defendants’ and Jones’s Motions as to Count VII.
6.
Malicious Prosecution (Count VI)
Under Maryland law, a plaintiff establishes his malicious prosecution claim by
showing that: “(1) the defendant instituted a criminal proceeding against the plaintiff; (2)
the criminal proceeding was resolved in the plaintiff’s favor; (3) the defendant did not have
probable cause to institute the proceeding; and (4) the defendant acted with malice or a
primary purpose other then [sic] bringing the plaintiff to justice.” Okwa v. Harper, 757
A.2d 118, 130 (Md. 2000) (first citing DiPino v. Davis, 729 A.2d 354, 373 (Md. 1999);
then citing One Thousand Fleet Ltd. P’ship v. Guerriero, 694 A.2d 952, 956 (Md. 1997);
and then citing Krashes v. White, 341 A.2d 798, 801 (Md. 1975)).
Here, a jury acquitted Jones of six out of seven charges, and the prosecutor declined
to pursue the seventh count. (Criminal Case Docket). Further, as detailed in the preceding
discussion, genuine disputes of material fact exist as to what justification Officer
Defendants had for detaining Jones and as to Jones’s possession of illegal substances, both
of which inform the determination of whether Officer Defendants had probable cause to
charge Jones. The Court, therefore, cannot render judgment at this point regarding Jones’s
16
malicious prosecution claim. Accordingly, the Court will deny Officer Defendants’ Motion
as to Count VI.
7.
Punitive Damages
Because Jones’s claims remain live and any award of punitive damages would
depend on the resolution of the facts underlying those claims, the Court will deny Officer
Defendants’ Motion with regard to the derivative issue of punitive damages. See In re
Smith & Nephew Birmingham Hip Resurfacing (BHR) Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig.,
300 F.Supp.3d 732, 736 n.3 (D.Md. 2018) (“A claim for punitive damages is derivative
and therefore survives if the plaintiff[’s] underlying claims that support it survive.”).
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Officer Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 94) and Jones’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 104). A separate Order follows.
Entered this 13th day of September, 2019.
________/s/_____________
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge
17
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