Crosen v. Colvin

Filing 17

ORDER granting 16 Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 13 Crosen's Motion for Summary Judgment; directing Clerk to close this case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 4/28/2017. (krs, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

April 28, 2017
LETTER TO ALL COUNSEL
Re: Ruth Crosen o/b/o C.A.C. v. Commissioner of Social Security,
Civil No. SAG-16-2727
Dear Counsel:
On July 30, 2016, Ruth Crosen petitioned this Court to review the Social Security
Administration’s denial of her claim for Children’s Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) on
behalf of her minor son, C.A.C. (ECF No. 1). I have considered the parties’ cross-motions for
summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 13, 16). This Court must uphold the Commissioner’s decision if
it is supported by substantial evidence and if proper legal standards were employed. 42 U.S.C. §
405(g); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996) (superseded by statute on other
grounds); Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). I find that no hearing is
necessary. See Local R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). I will grant the Commissioner’s motion and deny
Ms. Crosen’s motion. This letter explains my rationale.
Ms. Crosen applied for Children’s SSI on behalf of C.A.C. on March 8, 2012, alleging a
disability onset date of June 15, 2007. (Tr. 152-56). Her claim was denied initially and on
reconsideration. (Tr. 107-10, 114-15). A hearing was held on January 8, 2015, before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).1 (Tr. 57-95). Following the hearing, on February 6, 2015,
the ALJ issued an opinion denying benefits. (Tr. 34-56). Because the Appeals Council denied
Ms. Crosen’s request for review, (Tr. 1-6), the ALJ’s decision is the final, reviewable decision of
the Agency.
The ALJ evaluated Ms. Crosen’s claim using the three-step sequential process for claims
involving childhood SSI, as set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 416.924. The ALJ’s findings at steps one
and two favored Ms. Crosen’s claim. At step one, the ALJ found that C.A.C. had not engaged in
any substantial gainful activity since the application date. (Tr. 40). At step two, the ALJ found
that C.A.C. suffered from the severe impairments of “Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD), Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD), Borderline Intellectual Functioning (BIF),
status post language delay.” Id. At step three, however, the ALJ found that C.A.C. did not have
an impairment or combination of impairments that met any listing. (Tr. 40-50). Additionally,
the ALJ determined that C.A.C. did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
1

Oddly, the hearing transcript is dated repeatedly as October 8, 2015. (Tr. 57, 59, 95). However, the ALJ’s opinion
reflects that the hearing was held on January 8, 2015, (Tr. 37), which appears correct since the opinion was dated
February 6, 2015, and the hearing had to have been held before the opinion issued. The hearing notice also indicates
January 8, 2015. (Tr. 133).

Ruth Crosen o/b/o C.A.C. v. Commissioner of Social Security
Civil No. SAG-16-2727
April 28, 2017
Page 2
would be functionally equivalent to any listing. Id. Therefore, the ALJ determined that C.A.C.
was not disabled for purposes of Children’s SSI benefits. (Tr. 50).
Ms. Crosen asserts two primary arguments in support of her appeal: (1) that the ALJ
should have ruled that C.A.C.’s autism spectrum disorder was a severe impairment; and (2) that
the ALJ should have given greater weight to the opinions and medical records of the treating
physicians. Although I agree that the ALJ committed error in considering C.A.C.’s autism
spectrum disorder, I conclude that the error was harmless, and therefore, that the ALJ’s
conclusion should be affirmed.
First, Ms. Crosen argues that the ALJ erred by failing to classify C.A.C.’s placement on
the autism spectrum disorder as a severe impairment at step two of the sequential evaluation.
Step two involves a threshold determination of whether a claimant is suffering from a severe
impairment or combination of impairments. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 138 (1987)
(upholding the severity threshold because, “if a claimant is unable to show that he has a
medically severe impairment…there is no reason for the Secretary to consider [the claimant’s]
age, education, and work experience”). If a claimant is not suffering from any severe
impairment(s), he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If a claimant is found to be
suffering from a severe impairment(s), the analysis simply proceeds to the next step. Id.
Here, the ALJ found C.A.C. to suffer from several severe impairments. However, the
ALJ also stated:
All other impairments alleged or found in the record including Autistic Spectrum
Disorder are nonsevere impairments because they have not lasted for a period of
12 months, are responsive to medication, do not require any significant medical
treatment, or do not result in any continuous exertional, or nonexertional
limitations.
(Tr. 40). That analysis is patently erroneous because it is conclusory and contains no actual
evaluation of the ALJ’s reasons for finding Autistic Spectrum Disorder nonsevere. A simple
recitation of all of the potential reasons an impairment might be nonsevere does not fulfill the
ALJ’s duty of explanation as to a particular impairment. However, despite the error, Ms. Crosen
has failed to show how she was prejudiced by the ALJ’s failure. As noted above, the ALJ
determined that C.A.C. suffered from other severe impairments, and continued through the entire
sequential evaluation of the allegation of disability. Moreover, in assessing whether C.A.C.’s
impairments were equivalent to a listing, the ALJ discussed the diagnosis of autism and
considered all of C.A.C.’s limitations in each relevant functional area, whether due to autism or
another diagnosis. (Tr. 43, 44-50). Thus, the ALJ properly considered all of C.A.C.’s
impairments, whether severe or non-severe, at the relevant stages of the evaluation. Any error is
therefore harmless.
Ms. Crosen’s second argument cites the ALJ’s failure to make express assignments of
weight to the opinions of two of C.A.C.’s treating physicians, Drs. Heffner and Peay. Pl. Mot. 6-

Ruth Crosen o/b/o C.A.C. v. Commissioner of Social Security
Civil No. SAG-16-2727
April 28, 2017
Page 3
9. The relevant regulation provides, “Medical opinions are statements from physicians and
psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and
severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can
still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(a).
A treating physician’s opinion merits controlling weight when two conditions are met: 1) it is
well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques; and 2) it is
not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2);
Craig, 76 F.3d at 585 (refined by 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2) (1999)); SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL
374188.
Here, there are records from two physicians that Ms. Crosen argues constitute “opinions.”
First, the record contains a report from an evaluating physician, Dr. Heffner; and, second, it
contains two letters from C.A.C.’s psychiatrist, Dr. Peay. (Tr. 462-67, 334, 337). Dr. Heffner’s
report diagnosed C.A.C. with “Autistic Spectrum Disorder” and ADHD, and made
recommendations regarding medication and therapy. (Tr. 465-467). Dr. Heffner noted
“significant interactional and behavioral problems which are over and above that of [ADHD] and
do not truly meet the criteria for Mood Disorder.” (Tr. 465). Similarly, Dr. Peay’s letters
summarize C.A.C.’s diagnoses and the services he receives at school. (Tr. 334, 337). Dr. Peay
states that C.A.C. has “significant impairment in his social development” and that he will
“continue to require some higher level of clinical and educational services throughout his life.”
(Tr. 337). Dr. Peay also noted a need for “increased supervision given safety concerns with his
hyperactivity and impulsivity.” (Tr. 334). Neither the report from Dr. Heffner nor the letters
from Dr. Peay address the issues relevant to an evaluation of C.A.C.’s disability under the
relevant standards. For example, the physicians’ reports do not address the six relevant
functional areas to assist the ALJ’s determination of the appropriate level of limitation in each
area. In addition, the ALJ reviewed, summarized, and discussed the findings by both physicians.
(Tr. 42, 43). Given that the physicians’ reports do not contain actual “opinions” regarding the
functional requirements for disability, the fact that the ALJ did not make express assignments of
weight to those documents is not fatal to the ALJ’s conclusions.
Ultimately, my review of the ALJ’s decision is confined to whether substantial
evidence, in the record as it was reviewed by the ALJ, supports the decision and whether correct
legal standards were applied. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 404 (1971). Even if
there is other evidence that may support Ms. Crosen’s position, I am not permitted to reweigh the
evidence or to substitute my own judgment for that of the ALJ. See Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d
1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). In considering the entire record, I find that the ALJ’s RFC
determination was supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ cited to C.A.C.’s improvement
with medication and therapy, his scoring on standardized testing, and his ability to complete
academic goals in a small group setting with adult assistance. (Tr. 43-44). The ALJ further
relied upon the opinions of the State agency consultant, who had found less than marked
limitations or no limitations in all functional areas, except that the ALJ determined that C.A.C.
had a less than marked limitation (instead of no limitation) in “Moving about and Manipulating
Objects.” (Tr. 44). Ms. Crosen cites to a list of excerpts from records that she believes support a
finding of disability. Pl. Mot. 7-9. However, in light of the substantial evidence cited by the

Ruth Crosen o/b/o C.A.C. v. Commissioner of Social Security
Civil No. SAG-16-2727
April 28, 2017
Page 4
ALJ, remand is unwarranted even if other evidence exists that could be marshaled in support of a
finding of disability.
Thus, for the reasons given, this Court GRANTS the Commissioner’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 16) and DENIES Ms. Crosen’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 13). The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion and docketed
as an order.
Sincerely yours,

/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge