Purvey v. Anne County Public School et al

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge James K. Bredar on 9/6/2016. (c/m 9/7/16 bas, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

JOSEPH PURVEY
Plaintiff,
v.

*

ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY PUBLIC
SCHOOL et al.
Defendants.

*

*

CIVIL NO. JKB-16-2850

*
*****

MEMORANDUM
Before the court for preliminary screening is Joseph Purvey’s (“Purvey”) self-represented
“petition” and motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF Nos. 1, 2 & 3. Although
filed on a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 form for filing a habeas corpus petition, Purvey raises no challenge
to custody, conviction, or sentence. Instead, he raises a complaint against a local public school
system, a public school, administrators, and a school board attorney, claiming that in October of
2014, he received a no-trespass letter from a school administrator, thus denying him access to his
daughter while she was in school.

He claims that subsequent school administrators have

continued to uphold the “no trespass requirement” and he asks that the no-trespass requirement
be removed.1 ECF No. 1, p. 4. His cause of action shall be construed as a civil rights action,
filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Purvey’s motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
shall be granted.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, an indigent litigant may commence an action in federal court
without prepaying the filing fee. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute
allows a district court to dismiss the case before service of process upon a finding that the action

1

On August 23 and 30, 2016, Purvey filed two letters, construed as complaints to
be raised in this action. He asserts vague claims that his contract, property, and visitation rights
have been violated. ECF Nos. 5 & 6.

has no factual or legal basis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Indeed, this Court must conduct
a preliminarily review of Complaint allegations before service of process and dismiss them if
satisfied that the Complaint has no factual or legal basis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
In Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), the United States Supreme Court held that a
district court may dismiss the complaint of a pro se litigant under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 when the
complaint includes only a “fanciful factual allegation” and lacks “an arguable basis either in law
or in fact.” Id. at 325; see Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992) (“[A] court may
dismiss a claim as factually frivolous only if the facts alleged are ‘clearly baseless,’ a category
encompassing allegations that are ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ and ‘delusional.’

As those words

suggest, a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level
of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts
available to contradict them. An in forma pauperis complaint may not be dismissed, however,
simply because the court finds the plaintiff’s allegations unlikely.”) (citations to Neitzke
omitted).
Neitzke explained that the statute “accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a
claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the
veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are
clearly baseless.” Id. at 327. Indeed, § 1915 was amended after Neitzke and Denton, such that
now the statute mandates that a district court “shall dismiss” a case upon a finding that the
Complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
The complaints of self-represented litigants are held to a less stringent standard than
those drafted by attorneys, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), and a federal
district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a self-represented litigant
to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89
2

(2007). When a federal court is evaluating a self-represented Complaint, the Plaintiff's
allegations are assumed to be true. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citing Bell Atlantic Corporation v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007)). Liberal construction does not mean that a Court can
ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim cognizable in a federal
district court. See Weller v. Department of Social Services, 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see
also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
As best as this court can discern, Purvey is challenging a public school’s notice that
operates to restrict his access to his daughter. The court finds the complaint raises no factual or
legal basis upon which to take review over such a dispute.

The matter shall be dismissed

without prejudice.2 A separate Order follows.

Date: September 6, 2016.

/s/
James K. Bredar
United States District Judge

2

On August 23, 2016, Purvey filed a motion for extension of time to “organize and
appropriately group the large quantity of public officials…” ECF No. 4. Given the ruling of this
court, the motion shall be denied as moot.
3