Brown v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore et al

Filing 52

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING 47 Motion for Summary Judgment; DISMISSING all claims against all defendants. Signed by Judge Marvin J. Garbis on 5/1/2018. (c/m)(hmls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
INSHALLAH BROWN

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Plaintiff

vs.

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HOUSING AUTHORITY OF
BALTIMORE CITY, et al.

CIVIL ACTION NO. MJG-16-3616

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Defendants
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Court has before it Defendant Housing Authority of
Baltimore City’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 47] and
the materials submitted relating thereto.

The Court finds that

a hearing is not necessary.

I.

BACKGROUND
A. Asserted Claims
Plaintiff Inshallah Brown (“Brown” or “Plaintiff”) filed a

Complaint [ECF No. 1] asserting federal and state law claims1
against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, the Housing
Authority of Baltimore City (“HABC”), and two individual
Defendants, Dwayne and Alicia Johnson (“the Landlords”).
Claims against Defendants Mayor and City Council of
1

Racial discrimination (Counts I & II), retaliation (Count
III), violation of procedural due process rights under the
Maryland Constitution (Count IV), tortious interference (Count
V), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VI).

Baltimore have been dismissed, see ECF No. 15, and the majority
of Plaintiff’s claims against HABC were also dismissed in this
Court’s Memorandum and Order of July 26, 2017.

See Memorandum

and Order at 24-25, ECF No. 29 (dismissing Counts I, II, IV, and
VI).
Accordingly, there are only two remaining claims in this
case:

retaliation (Count III) asserted against HABC, and

tortious interference (Count VI) asserted against the Landlords.

B. Factual Background
Plaintiff was employed by HABC for nine years until she was
terminated on April 15, 2015.

Brown Aff. ¶¶ 2-3, ECF No. 48-3;

Def.’s Mot. Ex. 1A, ECF No. 47-4.

At the time of termination,

she was working as a “Program Specialist I” in the Housing
Choice Voucher Program (“HCVP”).

Brown Aff. ¶ 2.

i. Job Performance Prior to 2014
Plaintiff’s performance evaluations for years 2006, 2007,
2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 indicated that she “met
expectations” for her position.

Pl.’s Opp. Ex. 3, ECF No. 48-4.

Starting in April 2014, her supervisor was David Harper

2

(“Harper”).2

Pl.’s Opp. Ex. 10, ECF No. 48-5.

On August 8,

2014, Mr. Harper purportedly wrote a letter of recommendation to
an unspecified “Hiring Manager” stating his belief that
[Ms. Brown] has proven to be hard working,
reliable and fully committed to exceeding
customer expectations. She has a team
player mindset, as well as the ability to
work with minimal supervision. Ms. Brown
has consistently demonstrated all of these
qualities and more. I heartily endorse her
for any endeavor she pursues and she has my
highest recommendation.
Pl.’s Opp. Ex. 1, ECF No. 48-4.
Mr. Harper denies ever having written this letter, although
he admits that the signature on the letter “looks like” his
signature.

Pl.’s Opp. Ex. 8, ECF No. 48-5; Harper Dep. Tr. 115-

116, ECF No. 47-8.

He expressed concerns about the authenticity

of the letter because he cannot recall ever writing a letter for
Ms. Brown, because there is no formal heading on the letter, and
because he usually writes reference letters that are specific to
a position or company, not one that is addressed generally to a
“Hiring Manager.”

2

Harper Dep. Tr. 116-117, ECF No. 47-8.

During the relevant time, Mr. Harper was supervised by
Shannon Peterson (“Peterson”), the Administrator of Leasing and
Inspections. Alston Aff. ¶ 6, ECF No. 47-3.
3

ii. Charge of Race Discrimination
On September 18, 2014, Ms. Brown filed a charge of race
discrimination with the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights
(“MCCR”) against HABC.

Brown Aff. ¶ 4.

The charge related to

certain disputes with the Defendant Landlords, Dwayne London and
Alicia London, which threatened her employment position at HABC.3
On December 2, 2014, she was notified by letter that MCCR
had received her charge of discrimination (“MCCR Notice
Letter”).

Brown Aff. ¶ 5.

The MCCR Notice Letter contained a

Certificate of Service indicating that it had also been served
on HABC on December 2, 2014.

Pl.’s Opp. Ex. 2, ECF No. 48-4.

There is little to no evidence in the record indicating
when Ms. Brown’s supervisors learned of her charge of racial
discrimination.

The deputy chief for the Housing Choice Voucher

Program, Corliss Alston (“Alston”), cannot remember when she

3

In 2012, Ms. Brown received a voucher for subsidized
housing through the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program
(“HCVP”), the same Program that she works for at HABC. Compl. ¶
12. Allegedly, the Landlords sent emails to Ms. Brown’s
managers at HABC falsely alleging that Brown did not pay rent
and that she had unauthorized occupants and drug activity in her
home. Id. ¶ 19. These allegations put Ms. Brown in danger of
losing her job and housing voucher. Id. ¶¶ 20-21.
4

learned of the charge by Ms. Brown.4

Ms. Brown admits she does

not know when (or if) any of her supervisors actually learned of
her charge.

Brown Dep. Tr. 54-57, ECF No. 47-6.

iii. 2014 Evaluation and Subsequent Termination
Three weeks after the MCCR Notice Letter, on December 24,
2014, Ms. Brown received an unfavorable performance evaluation
(“2014 Evaluation”).5

Brown Aff. ¶ 7.

This was the first

evaluation she had received since 2006 indicating a score of
“improvement needed.”

Pl.’s Opp. Ex. 3, ECF No. 48-4.

The 2014

Evaluation, signed by Ms. Peterson, indicated that Ms. Brown
needed to improve in several areas, including file review and
completing the quality control checklist, completing tasks in a
timely manner and meeting various deadlines, ensuring her work
is accurate and supported by tools provided to her, managing
files consistently, and communication with colleagues by email.
Pl.’s Opp. Ex. 7, ECF No. 48-5.
She was also placed on a Performance Improvement Plan
(“PIP”) that day, constituting a disciplinary action.
4

Brown

Alston supervised Mr. Harper and Ms. Peterson. Alston Aff.
¶ 6. She oversaw the HCVP staff and had access to the staff
files, including evaluations, performance improvement plans,
voucher participation, and other records. Pl.’s Opp. Ex. 4, ECF
No. 48-4. She reports to Nick Calace (“Calace”), the Associate
Deputy Director. Alston Aff. ¶ 4.
5
For the year starting December 2013 through November 2014.
5

Aff. ¶ 8; Pl.’s Opp. Ex. 7, ECF No. 48-5.

She states she did

not know about her placement on a PIP until she was later
refused educational assistance by Ms. Alston for having been
disciplined.6

Brown Aff. ¶ 8.

Ms. Brown states her belief that despite having been put on
a PIP, her immediate supervisor “sabotaged [her] efforts” to
improve her performance, including by meeting with her only one
time, requiring her to conduct her own desk reviews, and
removing client files from her desk without notifying her.
¶ 12.

Id.

Other colleagues and supervisors, including Dawnay Green-

Chrisp (“Green-Chrisp”),7 would also remove files from her desk
without telling her.

Id. ¶ 13.

Ms. Brown was assigned a larger

work load, was refused assistance when she requested it, was
refused answers when she tried to find out where the missing
files had gone, and was given inconsistent information about how
many files she was responsible for processing.

Id. ¶¶ 13-19.

On March 16, 2015, Ms. Green-Chrisp wrote a memorandum to staff
entitled “NOTES NOTES NOTES,” advising that staff had to
document “‘the system’” with what they were doing with a

6

But her signature appears on the PIP Plan, dated December
24, 2014, the same day she received her evaluation. Pl.’s Opp.
Ex. 7, ECF No. 48-5.
7
Although the record is somewhat unclear, Ms. Green-Chrisp
appears to be an assistant supervisor for Ms. Brown. Pl.’s Opp.
Ex. 11, ECF No. 48-6.
6

client’s file.

Pl.’s Opp. Ex. 14, ECF No. 48-6.

Yet according

to Plaintiff, Ms. Green-Chrisp and Mr. Harper failed to follow
these instructions themselves.

Brown Aff. ¶ 21.

Ms. Brown states her belief that these actions amount to
retaliation against her for her racial discrimination charge,
but admits that aside from the MCCR Notice Letter, she does not
have evidence to support that any of her supervisors actually
knew of the charge:
Q. Okay. So you believe David Harper
retaliated against you for your complaint,
correct?
A. I believe that the agency retaliated
against me.
Q. Okay. So you believe somehow the agency
gave direction to its staff to retaliate
against you?
A. That is my belief.
Q. Okay. Who at the agency conveyed that
message? Because the agency can’t speak. The
agency has employees that speak for it. So
who at the agency conveyed that message?
A. My belief is Nicholas Calace.
Q. Okay. What do you have to show that?
A. I don’t have anything other than my
complaint to show that.
Q. Okay. Do you have anything to show when
Nicholas Calace learned that you charged the
Housing Authority with discrimination?
A. I have my original complaint, and I have
a copy of the correspondence from the
Maryland Commission on Human Relations
notifying the Housing Authority.
Brown Dep. Tr. 225-226, ECF No. 47-6.

7

Mr. Harper denies refusing to help Ms. Brown while she was
on the PIP plan.

He states that he and Ms. Green-Chrisp “met

with her consistently, almost daily, to provide assistance and
help to meet her expectations.”

Pl.’s Opp. Ex. 11, ECF No. 48-

6.
The record shows at least one instance in which he did not
provide help when Ms. Brown asked for his assistance in
“processing [her] accounts.”

Pl.’s Opp. Ex. 12, ECF No. 48-6.

The record also shows that Ms. Brown requested help from him on
several occasions, although it is unclear whether Mr. Harper or
any other supervisor responded to all these requests.8

Mr.

Harper admits that he was aware that files had been removed from
Ms. Brown’s desk without her notice.
48-6.

Pl.’s Opp. Ex. 15, ECF No.

The record indicates he addressed the missing file issue

on at least one occasion.

Def.’s Mot. Ex. 1A, ECF No. 47-4.

Plaintiff’s PIP was “extended” on February 10, 2015, giving
her more time to improve her work.
47-4.

Def.’s Mot. Ex. 1A, ECF No.

However, Defendant contends that her performance

continued to be dissatisfactory based on a Performance
Improvement Review conducted on March 24, 2015.

Alston Aff. ¶

10, ECF No. 47-3; Def.’s Mot. Ex. 1A, ECF No. 47-4.

8

See, e.g., Pl.’s Opp. Ex. 11, ECF No. 48-6.
8

Plaintiff was terminated from HABC on April 15, 2015.
Defendant contends that Ms. Brown was terminated for her
unsatisfactory work.

Alston Aff. ¶ 10.

As support, Defendant

attaches Ms. Brown’s 2013 performance review, which indicated
that although she “met expectations” that year, her performance
suffered from similar deficiencies as the ones discussed in her
2014 Evaluation (e.g., needing improvement on file review,
ensuring her work is accurate, needing to meet deadlines,
communicating more effectively, and improving management and
organization of files).

II.

Def.’s Mot. Ex. 1A, ECF No. 47-4.

LEGAL STANDARD
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the

pleadings and supporting documents “show[] that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a).
The well-established principles pertinent to summary
judgment motions can be distilled to a simple statement:

[t]he

Court may look at the evidence presented in regard to a motion
for summary judgment through the non-movant’s rose-colored
glasses, but must view it realistically.

After so doing, the

essential question is whether a reasonable fact finder could
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return a verdict for the non-movant or whether the movant would,
at trial, be entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

See,

e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);
Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1012 (4th Cir. 1991).

Thus,

in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, “the party
opposing the motion must present evidence of specific facts from
which the finder of fact could reasonably find for him or her.”
Mackey v. Shalala, 43 F. Supp. 2d 559, 564 (D. Md. 1999)
(emphasis added).
When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court
must bear in mind that the “[s]ummary judgment procedure is
properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but
rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole,
which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action.’”

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1).

III.

RETALIATION
Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful

employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any
of his employees . . . because he has made a charge [under Title
VII].”

42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a).

To establish a retaliation
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claim, Brown must establish (1) that she engaged in a protected
activity; (2) HABC acted adversely against her; and (3) the
protected activity was causally connected to the adverse action.
See Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 218 (4th
Cir. 2007).
It is undisputed that Ms. Brown engaged in a protected
activity by filing a charge of racial discrimination, and that
she suffered an adverse action (either by being placed on a PIP
or by termination of employment).

The parties dispute whether

the third element of causation has been satisfied.
To prove a causal connection, Plaintiff must be able to
show that HABC acted against her “‘because the plaintiff engaged
in a protected activity.’”
in original).

Holland, 487 F.3d at 218 (emphasis

Therefore, she needs to prove that the actors who

engaged in these adverse actions knew of her racial
discrimination charge.

Id.

See also Dowe v. Total Action

Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 657 (4th Cir.
1998) (“by definition, an employer cannot take action because of
a factor of which it is unaware, the employer’s knowledge that
the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity is absolutely
necessary to establish the third element of the prima facie
case.”).

To survive summary judgment, Plaintiff “must have

evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that
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a causal connection exists between the protected activity and
the adverse action.”

Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657.

Plaintiff survived the motion to dismiss because the Court
found that the short time between the December 2, 2014 MCCR
Notice Letter and the December 24, 2014 Evaluation and PIP
action was suspicious, especially in light of Plaintiff’s prior
positive reviews.

Memorandum and Order at 19, ECF No. 29.

The

Court permitted the parties to conduct discovery so that any
facts showing causation could be brought to light.
After months of discovery, however, Plaintiff has been
unable to present any evidence – yet alone sufficient evidence to show that any of her immediate or higher supervisors (i.e.,
Mr. Harper, Ms. Green-Chrisp, Ms. Peterson, Ms. Alston, or Mr.
Calace) knew of her racial discrimination charge prior to
engaging in the adverse actions.
Her deposition shows that her contentions rest on her own
personal belief:
Q Do you know if Corliss Austin ever learned
about it?
A No.
Q Do you know if Nicholas Calace ever
learned about it?
Q No.
Brown Dep. at 56, ECF No. 47-6.
Q When did Ms. Green learn about your
complaint of discrimination?
12

A I don’t know.
. . . .
Q Oh, how -- do you know if she ever learned
about it?
A I don't know.
Q Okay. So it's your perception she treated
you differently after you filed a complaint?
A Yes.
Brown Dep. at 61, ECF No. 47-6.
Q Okay. With respect to Shannon Peterson, do
you know if she ever received, or do you
know if she ever learned about your
complaint?
A I’m not sure.
Q Okay. Is it your perception she treated
you differently after you filed a complaint?
A Yes.
Brown Dep. at 63, ECF No. 47-6.
Q And you already said you don’t know when
David Harper learned about your
discrimination charge, correct?
A Correct.
Q And you already said you don’t know when
Shannon Peterson learned about your
discrimination charge, correct?
A Correct.
Q And you already said you don’t know when
Corliss Austin learned about your
discrimination charge?
A That’s true.
Q And we established that the signature on
the 2014 evaluation is not Nick Calace’s?
A Correct.
. . . .
Q So it’s your opinion and guess that it
must be connected?
A Yes.
Q Okay. But you have nothing to show why
it’s connected, just -- you -- you have
nothing to show that it’s connected?
A Not at this point.
13

Brown Dep. at 130-32, ECF No. 47-6.
She admits that she has a “belief” that Mr. Calace directed
her other supervisors to retaliate against her, but she admits
that she does not have anything to show how that occurred except
for her “complaint” and the MCCR Notice Letter.
225-226, ECF No. 47-6.

Brown Dep. Tr.

A complaint is not evidence.

Moreover,

the MCCR Notice Letter, by itself, is not evidence that any of
her supervisors knew of her racial discrimination charge. It
simply states:
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that this Notice of a
Charge of Discrimination was issued on this
2 [sic] day of December, 2014, and was
served on the Respondent on that date.
MCCR Notice Letter at 2, ECF No. 48-4.

At most, it shows that

HABC as an agency was put on notice of the charge.

However, the

adverse actions against Plaintiff were carried out by different
supervisors (e.g., Harper and Green-Chrisp for allegedly
refusing to help her with her files and daily work; Peterson for
signing her 2014 Evaluation and PIP plan).

There is no evidence

that any of these supervisors were aware of the charge or that
there was any reason that they should have been aware of the

14

charge (for example, through an internal protocol notifying HABC
managers of these types of complaints).9
Plaintiff asks this Court to find that, based solely on the
timing of the MCCR Notice Letter, her 2014 Evaluation, and her
prior performance reviews, a jury could make a finding of
retaliation.

However, without additional evidence, the Court is

unable to make the inferential leap that notice served on HABC
as an agency somehow proves that each individual within the
agency is likewise on notice.

To survive summary judgment,

Plaintiff “must have evidence from which a reasonable factfinder
could conclude that a causal connection exists between the
protected activity and the adverse action.”

Dowe, 145 F.3d at

657.
Plaintiff argues that there are disputed facts that
preclude summary judgment, specifically: (1) when the
supervisors carrying out the adverse actions were aware of the
charge of discrimination, and (2) that Mr. Harper disputes the
authenticity of his recommendation letter.
The first issue is not a genuine dispute of fact due to a
total lack of evidence from which a jury could infer knowledge
9

Plaintiff attached portions of Alston’s deposition
transcript showing that she had access to Ms. Brown’s personnel
files, but there is no indication that the file contained the
charge of discrimination. Pl.’s Opp. Exs 4-6, ECF Nos. 48-4 and
48-5.
15

by any individual.

There is no evidence linking any specific

supervisor with the allegedly retaliatory actions such that a
“dispute” of fact could even be raised on this record.
The second issue is indeed a dispute of fact, but it is not
material.

Taking the facts in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, even if Mr. Harper had written the positive
recommendation letter, there is no indication that his
perception of her changed because of the subsequent charge of
discrimination filed against HABC.

Holland, 487 F.3d at 218 (To

prove a causal connection, Plaintiff must be able to show that
HABC acted against her “‘because the plaintiff engaged in a
protected activity.’”) (emphasis in original).
Accordingly, the Court finds no genuine dispute of material
fact regarding a lack of causation between the racial
discrimination charge and the adverse actions taken against Ms.
Brown, and will grant summary judgment for Defendant HABC.10

10

Even if the facts could somehow show that Plaintiff’s
supervisors knew of her racial discrimination complaint prior to
the adverse actions, Plaintiff is still unable to carry the
“ultimate burden of showing pretext by proving that the filing
of the discrimination lawsuit was the ‘motivating part’ in the
decision to terminate [her].” McNairn v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d
974, 980 (4th Cir. 1991). The record, including a comparison of
the grounds for job improvement identified in Brown’s 2013 and
2014 evaluations, establishes legitimate nondiscriminatory
explanations for the PIP and termination. Plaintiff is unable
to present evidence sufficient to meet her burden to show that
the employer’s proffered reason is mere pretext. Id. at 978.
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IV.

TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
Because the Court shall grant summary judgment on the

federal claims, Plaintiff’s remaining claim against the
Landlords is no longer within the supplemental pendant and
ancillary jurisdiction of the Court.
Accordingly, the state law tortious interference claim
shall also be dismissed.

V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons:
1. Defendant Housing Authority of Baltimore City’s Motion
for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 47] is GRANTED.
2. All claims are dismissed against all Defendants.
3. Judgment shall be entered by separate Order.

SO ORDERED, this Tuesday, May 1, 2018.

/s/__________
Marvin J. Garbis
United States District Judge

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