Huamani v. Colvin

Filing 22

ORDER denying 17 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 19 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; reversing in part the Commissioner's judgment; and remanding the case for further proceedings. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 8/9/2017. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

August 9, 2017
LETTER TO COUNSEL
RE:

Carmen Huamani v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-16-3622

Dear Counsel:
On November 3, 2016, Plaintiff Carmen Huamani petitioned this Court to review the
Social Security Administration’s final decision to deny her claims for Supplemental Security
Income and Disability Insurance Benefits. (ECF No. 1). I have considered the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment, and the related supplemental filings. (ECF Nos. 17, 19, 20, 21).
I find that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). The Court must uphold the
decision of the Agency if it is supported by substantial evidence and if the Agency employed
proper legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589
(4th Cir. 1996). Under that standard, I will deny both motions, reverse the judgment of the
Commissioner, and remand the case to the Commissioner for further analysis pursuant to
sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This letter explains my rationale.
Ms. Huamani filed claims for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”) on August 29, 2012, alleging a disability onset date of August 1, 2010.
(Tr. 253-65). Her claims were denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 71-82, 84-95, 97110). Hearings were held on October 27, 2014 and February 25, 2015, before an Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 39-69). Following those hearings, the ALJ determined that Ms.
Huamani was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act during the relevant time
frame. (Tr. 17-38). The Appeals Council (“AC”) denied Ms. Huamani’s request for further
review, (Tr. 1-8), so the ALJ’s decision constitutes the final, reviewable decision of the Agency.
The ALJ found that Ms. Huamani suffered from the severe impairments of epilepsy,
obesity, psychotic disorder NOS, depression, and anxiety. (Tr. 22). Despite these impairments,
the ALJ determined that Ms. Huamani retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following
nonexertional limitations: can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; should
avoid all exposure to hazards such as dangerous moving machinery and
unprotected heights; is limited to carrying out simple instructions and routine
repetitive tasks; can have only occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers,
and the public, in positions where there would be little to no change in the work
setting from day to day, and where the claimant would not have to set goals or
make plans independently; and the claimant is illiterate in English.

Carmen Huamani v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-16-3622
August 9, 2017
Page 2
(Tr. 25). The ALJ determined that Ms. Huamani could perform her past relevant work as a
hospital cleaner and laundry worker and that, therefore, she was not disabled. (Tr. 31-32).
Ms. Huamani makes several arguments on appeal, including: (1) that the ALJ’s holding
runs afoul of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 638 (4th Cir.
2015); (2) that the ALJ did not adequately consider her epilepsy in finding that she could
perform a full range of work at all exertional levels; (3) that the ALJ erred in evaluating the
opinions of her treating physicians; (4) that the ALJ failed to order the consultative examinations
recommended by the non-examining State agency physicians; (5) that the ALJ erred in
evaluating her credibility; and (6) that the ALJ’s opinion contradicts a subsequent award of SSI
benefits. Although some of Ms. Huamani’s arguments are less successful, I agree that Mascio
requires remand of her case for further explanation. In ordering remand, I express no opinion as
to whether the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion that Ms. Huamani is not entitled to benefits during the
period predating her subsequent award is correct or incorrect.
Beginning with the successful argument, in Mascio, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit determined that remand was appropriate for three distinct reasons,
including, as pertinent to this case, the inadequacy of the ALJ’s evaluation of “moderate
difficulties” in concentration, persistence, or pace. Mascio, 780 F.3d at 638. At step three of the
sequential evaluation, the ALJ determines whether a claimant’s impairments meet or medically
equal any of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Listings 12.00
et. seq., pertain to mental impairments. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00. The relevant
listings therein consist of: (1) a brief statement describing a subject disorder; (2) “paragraph A
criteria,” which consists of a set of medical findings; and (3) “paragraph B criteria,” which
consists of a set of impairment-related functional limitations. Id. at § 12.00(A). If both the
paragraph A criteria and the paragraph B criteria are satisfied, the ALJ will determine that the
claimant meets the listed impairment. Id.
Paragraph B consists of four broad functional areas: (1) activities of daily living; (2)
social functioning; (3) concentration, persistence, or pace; and (4) episodes of decompensation.
The ALJ employs the “special technique” to rate a claimant’s degree of limitation in each area,
based on the extent to which the claimant’s impairment “interferes with [the claimant’s] ability
to function independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1620a(c)(2). The ALJ uses a five-point scale to rate a claimant’s degree of limitation in the
first three areas: none, mild, moderate, marked, or extreme. Id. at § 404.1620a(c)(4). In order to
satisfy paragraph B, a claimant must exhibit either “marked” limitations in two of the first three
areas, or “marked” limitation in one of the first three areas with repeated episodes of
decompensation. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.02. Marked limitations “may
arise when several activities or functions are impaired, or even when only one is impaired, as
long as the degree of limitation is such as to interfere seriously with [the claimant’s] ability to
function.” Id. at § 12.00(C).
The functional area of “concentration, persistence, or pace refers to the ability to sustain
focused attention and concentration sufficiently long to permit the timely and appropriate

Carmen Huamani v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-16-3622
August 9, 2017
Page 3
completion of tasks commonly found in work settings.” Id. at § 12.00(C)(3). Social Security
regulations do not define limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace “by a specific number
of tasks that [a claimant is] unable to complete.” Id. The regulations, however, offer little
guidance on the meaning of “moderate” limitations.
The Fourth Circuit remanded Mascio because the hypothetical the ALJ posed to the VE –
and the corresponding RFC assessment – did not include any mental limitations other than
unskilled work, despite the fact that, at step three of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ
determined that the claimant had moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence,
or pace. Mascio, 780 F.3d at 637-38. The Fourth Circuit specifically held that it “agree[s] with
other circuits that an ALJ does not account for a claimant’s limitations in concentration,
persistence, and pace by restricting the hypothetical question to simple, routine tasks or unskilled
work.” Id. at 638 (quoting Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir.
2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In so holding, the Fourth Circuit emphasized the
distinction between the ability to perform simple tasks and the ability to stay on task, stating that
“[o]nly the latter limitation would account for a claimant’s limitation in concentration,
persistence, or pace.” Id. Although the Fourth Circuit noted that the ALJ’s error might have
been cured by an explanation as to why the claimant’s moderate difficulties in concentration,
persistence, or pace did not translate into a limitation in the claimant’s RFC, it held that absent
such an explanation, remand was necessary. Id.
In the instant case, the ALJ found that Ms. Huamani had moderate difficulties in
concentration, persistence, or pace. (Tr. 24). The entirety of the analysis states, “The claimant
reported that she needed to be reminded when following written instructions. On exam of
January 17, 2013, the claimant obtained a score of 30/30 on mini mental status examination.” Id.
(internal citations omitted). According to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(2), the rating of “moderate
difficulties” is supposed to represent the result of application of the following technique:
We will rate the degree of your functional limitation based on the extent to which
your impairment(s) interferes with your ability to function independently,
appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis. Thus, we will consider such
factors as the quality and level of your overall functional performance, any
episodic limitations, the amount of supervision or assistance you require, and the
settings in which you are able to function.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(2). Once the technique has been applied, the ALJ is supposed to
include the results in the opinion as follows:
At the administrative law judge hearing and Appeals Council levels, the written
decision must incorporate the pertinent findings and conclusions based on the
technique. The decision must show the significant history, including examination
and laboratory findings, and the functional limitations that were considered in
reaching a conclusion about the severity of the mental impairment(s). The

Carmen Huamani v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-16-3622
August 9, 2017
Page 4
decision must include a specific finding as to the degree of limitation in each of
the functional areas described in paragraph (c) of this section.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(e)(4). The cursory analysis provided by the ALJ in Ms. Huamani’s case
fails to fulfill these requirements. Without further explanation, I am unable to ascertain whether
the ALJ truly believed Ms. Huamani to have moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence,
and pace, instead of mild, or no difficulties, and how those difficulties restrict her RFC to
“simple instructions and routine repetitive tasks.” (Tr. 25). Indeed, the ALJ’s analysis entirely
fails to address Ms. Huamani’s ability to sustain work over an eight-hour workday. This is not a
case, like Williams v. Comm’r, Social Sec. Admin., No. Civ. SAG-14-2900 (D. Md. June 25,
2015), where the ALJ expressly used “concentration, persistence, or pace” to account for a
claimant’s intellectual difficulty in following complex instructions. Instead, here, the ALJ
offered no plausible explanation for finding “moderate difficulties,” and cited, but did not
address, a treatment note from October, 2012 suggesting that Ms. Huamani “was noted to have
poor concentration.” (Tr. 27). Particularly in light of that evidence, the ALJ is required to
provide sufficient explanation for his assessment. Accordingly, I must remand the case to the
Commissioner for further analysis consistent with the Fourth Circuit’s mandate in Mascio. On
remand, the ALJ should consider the appropriate level of limitation in the area of concentration,
persistence, or pace and, if a moderate limitation is again found, should explain the reasons for
that finding in order to permit an adequate evaluation of the moderate limitation under the
dictates of Mascio.
The remainder of Ms. Huamani’s arguments do not independently necessitate remand.
Although Ms. Huamani argues that her epilepsy would preclude her from a full range of work at
all exertional levels since she could possibly have a seizure while carrying 50-100 pounds, there
is no suggestion that her past relevant work required that level of exertion. Although the nonexamining State agency physicians suggested that Ms. Huamani undergo a consultative
examination, (Tr. 73, 86, 100), an ALJ need not order such an examination if other evidence
suffices to permit evaluation of the claim. Moreover, the ALJ provided substantial evidence to
support his evaluation of the opinions from each of Ms. Huamani’s treating physicians, (Tr. 2930), and premised his adverse credibility finding on both objective evidence and statements made
by Ms. Huamani herself. (Tr. 27-29). Finally, absent further information suggesting some
correlation, the timing of Ms. Huamani’s subsequent award of benefits, finding her disabled
more than one year after the ALJ’s opinion, does not constitute “new and material evidence.”
However, since the case is being remanded on other grounds, the ALJ can address any of these
matters more fully if appropriate.
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 17)
is DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 19) is DENIED.
Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Commissioner’s judgment is REVERSED
IN PART due to inadequate analysis. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.

Carmen Huamani v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-16-3622
August 9, 2017
Page 5
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion and docketed
as an order.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge