Layton v. Colvin

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 17 Motion of plaintiff for Summary Judgment; denying 18 Motion of defendant for Summary Judgment; Commissioners judgment is REVERSED IN PART; case is REMANDED for further proceedings. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 10/30/2017. (jnls, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

October 30, 2017
LETTER TO COUNSEL
RE:

Wayne Allen Layton v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-16-3753

Dear Counsel:
On November 20, 2016, Plaintiff Wayne Allen Layton petitioned this Court to review the
Social Security Administration’s final decision to deny his claims for benefits. [ECF No. 1]. I
have considered the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. [ECF Nos. 17, 18]. I find
that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). This Court must uphold the
decision of the Agency if it is supported by substantial evidence and if the Agency employed
proper legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589
(4th Cir. 1996). Under that standard, I will deny both motions, reverse the judgment of the
Commissioner, and remand the case to the Commissioner for further analysis pursuant to
sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This letter explains my rationale.
Mr. Layton protectively filed a claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) on June
13, 2010, alleging a disability onset date of August 5, 2009. (Tr. 62, 343-44). Mr. Layton later
filed a claim for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) on February 19, 2015, and amended his
alleged disability onset date to May 31, 2013. (Tr. 379-86). His claim was denied initially and
on reconsideration. (Tr. 144-59, 172-88). A hearing was held on March 1, 2013, before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 102-43). Following the hearing, the ALJ determined
that Mr. Layton was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act during the
relevant time frame. (Tr. 197-210). On August 26, 2014, the Appeals Council (“AC”) granted
Mr. Haiber’s request for review, vacated the ALJ’s decision, and remanded the case for further
proceedings. (Tr. 216-18). Another hearing was held on April 9, 2015. (Tr. 57-101). Following
the hearing, the ALJ again determined that Mr. Layton was not disabled within the meaning of
the Social Security Act during the relevant time frame. (Tr. 37-56). The AC denied Mr.
Layton’s request for further review, (Tr. 1-7), so the ALJ’s 2015 decision constitutes the final,
reviewable decision of the Agency.
The ALJ found that Mr. Layton suffered from the severe impairments of “mild lumbar
degenerative disc disease, mood disorder, anxiety disorder, and polysubstance
dependence/abuse.” (Tr. 41). Despite these impairments, the ALJ determined that Mr. Layton
would retain the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except he is
further limited as follows: occasionally climbing ramps or stairs (never ladders,

Wayne Allen Layton v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-16-3753
October 30, 2017
Page 2
ropes, or scaffolds), balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; and
avoiding concentrated exposure to respiratory irritants. In addition, the claimant
is limited to carrying out simple tasks in two-hour increments (which can be
accommodated by regularly scheduled breaks); having occasional interaction with
coworkers, supervisors, and the general public; and adapting to simple changes in
a routine work setting.
(Tr. 45). After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that
Mr. Layton could perform several jobs existing in the national economy and therefore was not
disabled. (Tr. 48-50).
On appeal, Mr. Layton argues that the ALJ’s holding runs afoul of the Fourth Circuit’s
decision in Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632 (4th Cir. 2015). I agree that the ALJ’s decision does
not comport with Mascio, and that remand is therefore required. In remanding for additional
explanation, I express no opinion as to whether the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion that Mr. Layton is
not entitled to benefits is correct or incorrect.
In Mascio, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined that
remand was appropriate for three distinct reasons, including, as pertinent to this case, the
inadequacy of the ALJ’s evaluation of “moderate difficulties” in concentration, persistence, or
pace. 780 F.3d at 638. At step three of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ determines whether a
claimant’s impairments meet or medically equal any of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Listings 12.00-12.15 pertain to mental impairments. 20 C.F.R. Pt.
404, Subpt. P, App. 1 §§ 12.00-12.15. The relevant listings therein consist of: (1) a brief
statement describing a subject disorder; (2) “paragraph A criteria,” which consists of a set of
medical findings; and (3) “paragraph B criteria,” which consists of a set of impairment-related
functional limitations. Id. at § 12.00(A). If both the paragraph A criteria and the paragraph B
criteria are satisfied, the ALJ will determine that the claimant meets the listed impairment. Id.
Paragraph B consists of four broad functional areas: (1) activities of daily living; (2)
social functioning; (3) concentration, persistence, or pace; and (4) episodes of decompensation.
The ALJ employs the “special technique” to rate a claimant’s degree of limitation in each area,
based on the extent to which the claimant’s impairment “interferes with [the claimant’s] ability
to function independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1620a(c)(2). The ALJ uses a five-point scale to rate a claimant’s degree of limitation in the
first three areas: none, mild, moderate, marked, or extreme. Id. at § 404.1620a(c)(4). To satisfy
paragraph B, a claimant must exhibit either “marked” limitations in two of the first three areas,
or “marked” limitation in one of the first three areas with repeated episodes of decompensation.
See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 §§ 12.04, 12.06. Marked limitations “may arise
when several activities or functions are impaired, or even when only one is impaired, as long as
the degree of limitation is such as to interfere seriously with [the claimant’s] ability to function.”
Id. at § 12.00(C).

Wayne Allen Layton v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-16-3753
October 30, 2017
Page 3
The functional area of “concentration, persistence, or pace refers to the ability to sustain
focused attention and concentration sufficiently long to permit the timely and appropriate
completion of tasks commonly found in work settings.” Id. at § 12.00(C)(3). Social Security
regulations do not define limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace “by a specific number
of tasks that [a claimant is] unable to complete.” Id. The regulations, however, offer little
guidance on the meaning of “moderate” limitations.
The Fourth Circuit remanded Mascio because the hypothetical the ALJ posed to the
VE—and the corresponding RFC assessment—did not include any mental limitations other than
unskilled work, despite the fact that, at step three of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ
determined that the claimant had moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence,
or pace. 780 F.3d at 637-38. The Fourth Circuit specifically held that it “agree[s] with other
circuits that an ALJ does not account for a claimant’s limitations in concentration, persistence,
and pace by restricting the hypothetical question to simple, routine tasks or unskilled work.” Id.
at 638 (quoting Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 2011)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In so holding, the Fourth Circuit emphasized the distinction between
the ability to perform simple tasks and the ability to stay on task, stating that “[o]nly the latter
limitation would account for a claimant’s limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace.” Id.
Although the Fourth Circuit noted that the ALJ’s error might have been cured by an explanation
as to why the claimant’s moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace did not
translate into a limitation in the claimant’s RFC, it held that, absent such an explanation, remand
was necessary. Id.
In the instant case, the ALJ found that Mr. Layton had “no more than moderate
difficulties [in concentration, persistence, or pace] if he stopped substance abuse and followed
his recommended treatment.” (Tr. 44). The ALJ noted that Mr. Layton’s “mental status
examinations and GAF scores significantly improve” with treatment and abstinence from drugs
and alcohol, and that, during both of his administrative hearings, Mr. Layton “was able to follow
along and answer questions without any lapse in attention.” Id. The ALJ also noted that Mr.
Layton is “able to read and write,” and “writes things down so he does not forget them.” Id.
Additionally, the ALJ observed that the evidence did not show that Mr. Layton had “any
significant thought disorder or cognitive deficit when sober.” Id. According to 20 CFR §
404.1520a(c)(2), the rating of “moderate difficulties” is supposed to represent the result of
application of the following technique:
We will rate the degree of your functional limitation based on the extent to which
your impairment(s) interferes with your ability to function independently,
appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis. Thus, we will consider such
factors as the quality and level of your overall functional performance, any
episodic limitations, the amount of supervision or assistance you require, and the
settings in which you are able to function.
20 CFR § 404.1520a(c)(2). Once the technique has been applied, the ALJ is supposed to include
the results in the opinion as follows:

Wayne Allen Layton v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-16-3753
October 30, 2017
Page 4

At the administrative law judge hearing and Appeals Council levels, the written
decision must incorporate the pertinent findings and conclusions based on the
technique. The decision must show the significant history, including examination
and laboratory findings, and the functional limitations that were considered in
reaching a conclusion about the severity of the mental impairment(s). The
decision must include a specific finding as to the degree of limitation in each of
the functional areas described in paragraph (c) of this section.
Id. at § 404.1520a(e)(4). The cursory analysis provided by the ALJ in Mr. Layton’s case fails to
fulfill these requirements. Without further explanation, I am unable to ascertain whether the ALJ
truly believed Mr. Layton to have moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, and pace
when he refrains from substance abuse, instead of mild or no difficulties, and how those
difficulties restrict his RFC to “simple tasks in two-hour increments (which can be
accommodated by regularly scheduled breaks).” (Tr. 45). Indeed, the ALJ’s analysis entirely
fails to address Mr. Layton’s pace or ability to sustain work over an eight-hour workday. In light
of this inadequacy, I must remand the case to the Commissioner for further analysis consistent
with the Fourth Circuit’s mandate in Mascio. On remand, the ALJ should consider the
appropriate level of limitation in the area of concentration, persistence, or pace and, if a moderate
limitation is again found, should explain the reasons for that finding in order to permit an
adequate evaluation of the moderate limitation under the dictates of Mascio.
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 17),
is DENIED, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 18), is DENIED.
Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Commissioner’s judgment is REVERSED
IN PART due to inadequate analysis. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion and docketed
as an order.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge