Grant v. Kodeck et al

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge James K. Bredar on 3/24/2017. (krs, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
ARNITA MARIA GRANT,
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Plaintiff
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v.

Civil Action No. JKB-17-728
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ARI KODECK,
CENTRAL COLLECTIONS UNIT,
Defendants

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Arnita Maria Grant, a resident of Baltimore, Maryland, filed a complaint with a
motion to proceed in forma pauperis on March 16, 2017. Grant asserts she is entitled to money
damages because Maryland Assistant Attorney General Ari Kodeck is pursuing a claim against
her through the State’s Central Collections Unit for payment of a false medical bill. ECF 1.
Because she appears to be indigent, Grant’s motion shall be granted. For the reasons stated
below, the complaint must be dismissed.
Grant filed her complaint under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), which permits an
indigent litigant to commence an action in this court without prepaying the filing fee. To guard
against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute requires dismissal of any claim that is
frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). This court is mindful, however, of its obligation to liberally construe
self-represented pleadings, such as Grant’s complaint. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007). In evaluating such a complaint, the factual allegations are assumed to be true. Id. at 93
(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007)). Nonetheless, liberal
construction does not mean that a district court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege

facts that set forth a cognizable claim. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.
1990); see also Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating a
district court may not “conjure up questions never squarely presented.”).

In making this

determination, A[t]he district court need not look beyond the complaint’s allegations . . . .

It

must hold the pro se complaint to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys and
must read the complaint liberally.@ White v. White, 886 F. 2d 721, 722-23 (4th Cir. 1989).
Even affording Grant’s claim the most liberal construction, the complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. First, this court does not have original subject-matter
jurisdiction over court collections proceedings initiated by the State government in State court.
Second, the relief sought in this case is in the nature of mandamus relief against an
Assistant Attorney General for the State of Maryland and Maryland’s Central Collections Unit.1
This court does not have jurisdiction over State employees in an action for writ of mandamus.
Gurley v. Superior Court of Mecklenburg County, 411 F.2d 586, 587 (4th Cir. 1969), see also 28
U.S.C. § 1361 (establishing federal court mandamus jurisdiction over officer or employees of the
United States).
Finally, Grant has two active cases against her filed by Kodeck on behalf of the Central
Collections Unit.

In State of Maryland Central Collection v. Grant, Case No.

0804000182892015 (D. Ct. Balt. Cty.), Kodeck, on behalf of the State, is seeking $19,095.74
against Grant. A request for order of dismissal filed on January 13, 2017, is pending. In State of
Maryland Central Collection v. Grant, Case No. 080400182902015 (D. Ct. Balt. Cty.), Kodeck,
on behalf of the State, is seeking $314. A request for order of dismissal also filed on January 17,
2017, is pending in that case. A third case filed by Kodeck against Grant in the District Court for
1

According to its website, the mission statement for the Central Collection Unit, part of Maryland’s Department of
Budget and Management, is to “collect delinquent debts owed to the State of Maryland…” See
http://dbm.maryland.gov/ccu/Pages/ccuHome.aspx

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Baltimore County, Case No. 080400189832015, resulted in a confessed judgment of $736.70 and
a writ of garnishment against Grant’s then-employer. Grant in turn sued the Central Collections
Unit of Maryland in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on February 6, 2017, in Case No.
24C17000542. Other than the filing of a Complaint, no further developments are noted on that
case docket.
Grant’s primary allegation here is that one or more of the lawsuits filed against her by the
State of Maryland is improper. Two of the three state court actions remain pending, and one has
resulted in the entry of judgment against her. The judgment has not been appealed. Appellate
review in the concluded case – or in any of the yet-unresolved state court matters - is not
available in this court. AUnder the Rooker-Feldman2 [abstention] doctrine, a >party losing in state
court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment
in a United States district court.=@ American Reliable Insurance v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316
(4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)). The RookerFeldman doctrine is jurisdictional and, as such, this court is free to raise it sua sponte. See
Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 197 n.5 (4th Cir. 1997).
To the extent that Grant wishes to raise a common-law tort claim in the federal court, she
may not do so, as this court has limited original jurisdiction and does not sit to review every
claim related to alleged tortious or fraudulent conduct involving non-federal parties. It only has
authority to review such claims filed by parties who establish diversity jurisdiction.
When a party seeks to invoke diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, she bears the
burden of demonstrating that the grounds for diversity exist and that diversity is complete. See
Advani Enterprises, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyds, 140 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1998). The
2

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413, 416 (1923).

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requirement of complete diversity of citizenship mandates that each plaintiff meet the diversity
requirements as to each defendant. See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826,
829 (1989). "It is well established that diversity jurisdiction attaches only when all parties on
one side of the litigation are of a different citizenship from all of those on the other." Stouffer
Corp. v. Breckenridge, 859 F.2d 75, 76 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 267, 2 L. Ed. 435 (1806)). According to the complaint, all parties reside in Maryland.
Thus, any vague allegation of tortious conduct cannot meet federal diversity requirements.
Accordingly, the complaint shall be dismissed by separate order, which follows.

Date: March 24, 2017

/s/
James K. Bredar
United States District Judge

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