Al-Sabah v. Agbodjogbe et al

Filing 282

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Stephanie A. Gallagher on 3/9/2020. (bas, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
ALIA SALEM AL-SABAH,

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Plaintiff,
v.
JEAN AGBODJOGBE, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Case No. SAG-17-730

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MEMORANDUM OPINION
On November 22, 2017, Plaintiff Alia Salem Al-Sabah (“Al-Sabah”) filed a nine-count
Amended Complaint against Defendants Jean Agbodjogbe (“Agbodjogbe”), N&A Kitchen, LLC
(“N&A Kitchen”), N&A Kitchen II, LLC (“N&A Kitchen II”), 5722 York Road, LLC (“5722
York Road”), and 9 Jewels, LLC (“9 Jewels”) (collectively, “Defendants”). ECF 76. A nine-day
jury trial commenced on January 21, 2020. See ECF 236-240, 242-45, 249. The jury entered a
verdict in favor of Al-Sabah against each Defendant on each count submitted, and awarded her
$7,641,800 in compensatory damages, and an additional $1,000,000 in punitive damages. ECF
256; see also ECF 259 (Order of Judgment). On February 10, 2020, the parties submitted posttrial motions. Relevant to this Opinion, Defendants filed a Motion for Judgment as a Matter of
Law and Request for New Trial (“the Motion”). ECF 264. Al-Sabah opposed, ECF 270, and
Defendants replied, ECF 278. No hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2018). For the
reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion will be denied.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The instant lawsuit dates back to Al-Sabah’s initial filing of the Complaint on March 17,

2017, ECF 1, which she amended with Defendants’ consent on November 22, 2017, ECF 75, 76.

The Amended Complaint sought money damages from Agbodjogbe and his co-conspirators, the
corporate Defendants, under eight claims for relief: Fraudulent Misrepresentation (Count I);
Fraudulent Concealment (Count II); Conversion (Count III); Civil Conspiracy (Count IV);
Detrimental Reliance (Count V); Unjust Enrichment (Count VI); Breach of Contract (Count VII);
and Breach of Agency Duties (Count VIII). Id. ¶¶ 1, 46-89. Count IX of the Amended Complaint
sought various forms of declaratory relief against all Defendants. Id. ¶ 93. Al-Sabah tried five of
these claims to the jury: Fraudulent Misrepresentation, Fraudulent Concealment, Breach of
Agency Duties, Unjust Enrichment, and Civil Conspiracy. Prior to trial, Al-Sabah abandoned her
Detrimental Reliance claim, and all claims against Defendant ASA Foundation, Inc. ECF 232 at
16. During trial, Al-Sabah abandoned her Conversion claim, as well as all remaining claims
against Defendant Nandi Scott. ECF 241; ECF 248.
The jury trial in this case began on January 21, 2020, and concluded on January 31, 2020.
ECF 236-40, 242-45, 249. Over the span of those nine days, the jurors heard extensive testimony
from only two party-witnesses: Alia Salem Al-Sabah, and Jean Agbodjogbe. A brief summary of
the trial testimony follows.
Al-Sabah testified that she met Agbodjogbe in Baltimore in July, 2014, and shortly
thereafter, agreed to become a partner in Agbodjogbe’s restaurant, Nailah’s Kitchen. She invested
$150,000 in the business and, in return, received a fifty percent ownership stake in the restaurant.
Agbodjogbe and Al-Sabah thereby created a new company, N&A Kitchen, LLC.
A few months thereafter, according to Al-Sabah, Agbodjogbe convinced her to begin
investing in real estate as a means of generating more income that Al-Sabah could use to further
her charitable ventures.

Over the course of the next two years, from August, 2014, to

approximately April, 2016, Al-Sabah testified that she wired over $7.8 million dollars to

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Agbodjogbe so that he could purchase commercial properties in downtown Baltimore on her behalf
as “investment” properties. The monies sent were also intended to be used, in Al-Sabah’s view,
to rehabilitate those properties and “flip” them for resale as commercially viable locations.
Additionally, approximately $2.1 million of the money Al-Sabah sent was intended for the
purchase of a condominium apartment in New York City, New York, so that Al-Sabah’s daughter
could live in it while she attended school. According to Al-Sabah, Agbodjogbe offered to work to
find the apartment and acquire it. It was Al-Sabah’s understanding that all of the properties
purchased were her properties, and that Agbodjogbe would have no ownership stake in them.
By the spring of 2016, Al-Sabah testified that she began to grow suspicious of Agbodjogbe.
She testified that she began asking him for “papers,” or documents showing that she was the owner
of all of the relevant commercial properties that she had been sending money for, and showing that
repairs were ongoing at each. Al-Sabah testified that, while she received responses at first that the
“papers” were coming, eventually, she stopped hearing from Agbodjogbe.
Agbodjogbe, on the other hand, testified that all of the monies Al-Sabah sent to him were
gifts. He acknowledges that Al-Sabah sent the monies to him, and that the monies sent were used
to purchase each property, see ECF 232 at 17-19 (Stipulations of Fact), but he testified that the
reason she sent the money was to further his “dream” of rebuilding the Howard Street corridor in
Baltimore and making it a fruitful place for business. He denied Al-Sabah’s allegations that the
properties were supposed to be owned by her. During examination from Al-Sabah’s counsel,
Agbodjogbe admitted that he had purchased a personal residence (at 103 Mount Wilson Lane,
Pikesville, Maryland) for his family with money Al-Sabah gave him, but says that Al-Sabah gave
him permission to do so.

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At trial, Agbodjogbe further explained his efforts to renovate each of the commercial
properties. He testified that, while running Nailah’s Kitchen, he also contracted with architects
and general contractors to renovate the four properties – 306-10 North Howard Street, 5722 York
Road, 327 North Eutaw Street, and 400 North Howard Street.

However, because of his

inexperience with running commercial property rehabilitations, Agbodjogbe testified that he began
incurring debt to architects and subcontractors, and had to begin taking loans out to pay them. The
evidence at trial showed that Agbodjogbe took out loans, using the commercial properties and his
family home as collateral. Some of these loans, Agbodjogbe acknowledged, had interest rates over
fifty percent. He testified that he was simply in over his head, and had no intent to defraud AlSabah by taking out those loans.
After just hours of deliberation, the jury found Agbodjogbe liable on each claim for relief,
and further found that each corporate Defendant had conspired with Agbodjogbe to perpetrate the
fraud on Al-Sabah. ECF 256. The jury awarded Al-Sabah $7,641,800 in compensatory damages,
and an additional $1,000,000 in punitive damages, jointly and severally against each Defendant.
Id.; ECF 259 (Order of Judgment).
II.

LEGAL STANDARDS
A.

Rule 50(b) Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 provides for two types of motions for judgment as a
matter of law, in civil actions tried before a jury. The first, pursuant to Rule 50(a), provides
litigants with the opportunity to receive a judgment as a matter of law prior to an issue’s submission
to the jury. If, after a party “has been fully heard on an issue,” and the court determines “that a
reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that
issue,” the Court may enter judgment against that party. Id. R. 50(a)(1). The Rule further specifies

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that the motion “may be made at any time before the case is submitted to the jury,” and “must
specify the judgment sought and the law and facts that entitle the movant to the judgment.” Id. R.
50(a)(2). With regards to specificity, the moving party must, “either in written or oral argument,
provide[] sufficient notice to his opponent of the alleged deficiencies in the opponent’s case.”
Wallace v. Poulos, 861 F. Supp. 2d 587, 595 (D. Md. 2012) (citations omitted).
Rule 50(b) provides litigants the opportunity to renew their previous motion for judgment
as a matter of law made under Rule 50(a). Specifically, Rule 50(b) provides that if a party’s Rule
50(a) motion is denied, then, within twenty-eight days of the jury’s verdict, the party may renew
their motion for judgment as a matter of law. As is apparent from the Rule’s text, the Court can
entertain a Rule 50(b) motion only if the moving party made a Rule 50(a) motion before the Court
submitted the case to the jury. See, e.g., Price v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1248 (4th Cir.
1996). If properly presented to the Court, then the Court may “(1) allow judgment on the verdict,
if the jury returned a verdict, (2) order a new trial, or (3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter
of law.” Id. R. 50(b).
In considering a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50, the Court is
“compelled to accord the utmost respect to jury verdicts and tread gingerly in reviewing them.”
Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 255, 259 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Price, 93 F.3d at 1250).
The Court must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” id.,
“without weighing [its] credibility,” Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 405 (4th Cir. 1999).
The Court may only grant the motion if “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a
reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 149 (2000).

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B.

Rule 59 Motion for New Trial

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(1)(A) provides that either party may petition the trial
court for a new trial “on all or some of the issues” after a jury trial “for any reason for which a new
trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” This is an “extraordinary
remedy [that] should be used sparingly.” Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396,
403 (4th Cir. 1998). “On a Rule 59 motion, the district court must ‘set aside the verdict and grant
a new trial[] if . . . (1) the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, or (2) is based upon
evidence which is false, or (3) will result in a miscarriage of justice, even though there may be
substantial evidence which would prevent the direction of a verdict.’” Knussman v. Maryland,
272 F.2d 625, 639 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc. v. Crane Nat’l Vendors,
Inc., 99 F.3d 587, 594 (4th Cir. 1996)). These first two prongs require a “comparison of the factual
record and the verdict to determine their compatibility.” Atlas Food Sys., 99 F.3d at 594. In this
analysis, the Court’s review of the jury’s factual determinations is limited to “whether the jury’s
verdict is against the weight of the evidence or based on evidence which is false.” Id. Ultimately,
the decision of whether to grant a new trial “rests within the sound discretion of the trial court but
such discretion must not be arbitrarily exercised.” City of Richmond v. Atl. Co., 273 F.2d 902, 916
(4th Cir. 1960).
III.

ANALYSIS
Defendants seek a motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, a new trial, on

each count presented to the jury. ECF 264. As an initial matter, Al-Sabah argues that Defendants’
Motion should be denied on procedural grounds. She asserts that Defendants failed to properly
raise a Rule 50(a) motion prior to the case’s submission to the jury, and that Defendants’ instant
Motion lacks the requisite specificity under Rule 50. ECF 270 at 4-5, 8-9, 11. Defendants’ Motion

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begins by listing specific objections as to Counts I, II, and IV of Al-Sabah’s Complaint, but then
concludes by stating, “as to the remaining claims that went to the jury the Plaintiff failed to present
sufficient evidence upon which the verdict in this cause could be predicated.” ECF 264 at 2-3.
The Court agrees with Al-Sabah that this final argument lacks the requisite specificity, and
therefore Defendants’ request for a judgment as a matter of law as to Counts VI (Unjust
Enrichment) and VIII (Breach of Agency Duties) will be denied. As to Al-Sabah’s remaining
specificity arguments, and her Rule 50 procedural objections, the Court will assume arguendo that
both procedural attacks lack merit. Ultimately, the Court agrees with Al-Sabah that, on the merits
of Defendant’s arguments, Defendants are not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, or to a
new trial.
A.

Defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
1.

Count I: Fraudulent Misrepresentation

Defendants first assert that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to have rendered a
verdict in Al-Sabah’s favor on her Fraudulent Misrepresentation claim. ECF 264 at 2. In
Maryland,1 each element of fraud must be established “by clear and convincing evidence.” Md.
Envtl. Tr. v. Gaynor, 370 Md. 89, 97 (2002). As relevant here, a plaintiff seeking to recover for a
fraudulent misrepresentation must show:
(1) that the defendant made a false representation to the plaintiff, (2) that its falsity
was either known to the defendant or that the representation was made with reckless
indifference as to its truth, (3) that the misrepresentation was made for the purpose
of defrauding the plaintiff, (4) that the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation and
had the right to rely on it, and (5) that the plaintiff suffered compensable injury
resulting from the misrepresentation.’

While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the standard of review of Defendants’ Motion
in this diversity jurisdiction case, Maryland law applies to the substance of Al-Sabah’s claims for
relief. E.g., Rabinowitz v. Oates, 955 F. Supp. 485, 488 (D. Md. 1996).
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Nails v. S&R, Inc., 334 Md. 398, 415 (1994).
Defendants only contend that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that
Al-Sabah was justified in relying on Agbodjogbe’s representations. ECF 264 at 2. This argument
lacks merit. Under Maryland law, “[t]he recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation of fact is
justified in relying upon its truth, although [s]he might have ascertained the falsity of the
representation had [s]he made an investigation.” Rozen v. Greenberg, 165 Md. App. 665, 677
(2005). Maryland courts generally do not find justifiable reliance, however, when the true facts
“should be apparent to [a person of the plaintiff’s] knowledge and intelligence from a cursory
glance or [s]he has discovered something which should serve as a warning that [s]he is being
deceived.” Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON
ON TORTS §

108 (5th ed. 1984)).

Contrary to Defendants’ conclusory argument, there was a legally sufficient basis for a
reasonable juror to conclude that Al-Sabah was justified in relying on Agbodjogbe’s
representations, especially considering Maryland’s apparent presumption of justified reliance. AlSabah testified at trial that she came to trust Agbodjogbe, based upon his dedication to the Islamic
faith and to serving the underprivileged in Baltimore. Based upon that trust, she decided to take
Agbodjogbe’s offer to invest, on her behalf, in run-down commercial properties in Baltimore. She
testified that it was her understanding that these investments, and the corporate entities that owned
the investment properties, would be owned by her. Agbodjogbe made several representations
throughout 2015 to her that, setting credibility aside, a reasonable factfinder could have found were
reasonable to rely upon. See Pl.’s Tr. Ex. 18 (January 15, 2015 email to Al-Sabah, telling her that
the 400 North Howard Street property purchased “will double [in] price in a few years,” and that
he was “here for anything you need I will get it accomplish will the help of ALLAH”); Ex. 120

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(April 24, 2015 email to Al-Sabah, reiterating that he was “working very hard on all the 4 project
we have my priority is to get ASA Foundation done asap,” and attaching an architect’s rendering
of what the finished renovation would look like); Ex. 142 (August 3, 2015 email to Al-Sabah
congratulating her on the purchase of the New York City condominium); Ex. 21 (August 4, 2015
email to Al-Sabah updating her on the renovations of 306-10 North Howard Street and 5722 York
Road, and stating that renovating 5722 York Road “is very crucial to finish so we can start
generating money,” and that he was “100% sure” that Al-Sabah “will see the result” once
completed).
Further, once Al-Sabah did begin to grow suspicious, she testified that in April, 2016, she
began demanding that Agbodjogbe send her “papers,” or documents showing what she owned, and
“every penny” that had been spent on the properties. That month, Agbodjogbe made several efforts
to reassure her that he will get the accountant “to give me everything that you require for Nailah’s
and 9 Jewels and every property that we own the deed and everything so for your record,” so that
Al-Sabah would “know where every dime was spent” and could “sleep easy on that.” Ex. 93; Ex.
270. Agbodjogbe told Al-Sabah via voicemail, “[S]ister, one thing I want you to be reassured, for
you to have a peace of mind, never never in my life – I will never never never deceive you. Never.”
Ex. 95; Ex. 270.
Thus, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Al-Sabah, there was a legally
sufficient basis for a reasonable juror to conclude, by clear and convincing evidence, that Al-Sabah
was justified in relying on Agbodjogbe’s representations, especially considering Maryland’s
apparent presumption of justified reliance. See Rozen, 165 Md. App. at 677. A reasonable juror
could conclude that based on Agbodjogbe’s continued (false) reassurances that she owned the

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investment commercial properties, Al-Sabah testified that continued to send him money for repairs
additional purchases, causing her damages.
2.

Count II: Fraudulent Concealment

Defendants next argue that the jury had insufficient evidence to render a verdict in AlSabah’s favor on her Fraudulent Concealment claim. ECF 264 at 3. To establish a claim for
fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff must prove, by clear and convincing evidence,
(1) the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff to disclose a material fact; (2) the
defendant failed to disclose that fact; (3) the defendant intended to defraud or
deceive the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff took action in justifiable reliance on the
concealment; and (5) the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the defendant's
concealment.
My Nat’l Tax & Ins. Servs., Inc. v. H&R Block Tax Servs., Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 816, 820 (D. Md.
2012) (quoting Green v. H&R Block, Inc., 355 Md. 488, 525 (1999)). Maryland courts focus on
the requirement that there be some affirmative action: “To create a cause of action, [the]
concealment must have been intentional and effective – the hiding of a material fact with the
attained object of creating or continuing a false impression as to that fact.” Fegeas v. Sherrill,
218 Md. 472, 476-77 (1958).
Defendants only argue that Al-Sabah “failed to produced [sic] or elicit evidence that [she]
took action in justifiable reliance on the Defendants[’] alleged concealment.”2 ECF 264 at 3. This
argument similarly fails. Based on Agbodjogbe’s numerous representations, as outlined in the
Court’s earlier discussion of Al-Sabah’s Fraudulent Misrepresentation claim, Al-Sabah continued
to send Agbodjogbe money to further (what she testified she believed to be) her commercial real

The Court recognizes that Defendants’ argument mirrors the governing legal framework for
fraudulent concealment claims, but notes that Defendants’ cursory argument presents a linguistic
conundrum. It is unclear whether Defendants argue that Al-Sabah failed to take action at all, or
that Al-Sabah took action, but the action was taken in unjustifiable reliance.
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estate investment venture in downtown Baltimore. Al-Sabah testified that Agbodjogbe reassured
her that 9 Jewels, one of the corporations used to purchase commercial property and the New York
condominium, was formed in her name. Agbodjogbe also admitted on the stand that he, without
Al-Sabah’s permission, acquired Al-Sabah’s fifty percent ownership stake in N&A Kitchen, LLC
by creating the corporation N&A Kitchen II, LLC in his own name. Based on this evidence, and
the evidence noted in the Court’s discussion of Al-Sabah’s Fraudulent Misrepresentation claim,
and taking it all in a light most favorable to Al-Sabah, a reasonable juror could conclude that AlSabah continued to send money to Agbodjogbe because she justifiably relied on Agbodjogbe’s
false representations that she owned all of the assets at issue.
3.

Count IV: Civil Conspiracy

Defendants’ last specified challenge is to Al-Sabah’s Civil Conspiracy claim. ECF 264 at
3. “[C]onspiracy is not a separate tort capable of independently sustaining an award of damages
in the absence of other tortious injury to the plaintiff.” Alleco Inc. v. Harry & Jeanette Weinberg
Found., Inc., 340 Md. 176, 189 (1995) (quoting Alexander v. Evander, 336 Md. 635, 645 n.8
(1994)). Nearly 150 years ago, in the seminal case Kimball v. Harman, the Maryland Court of
Appeals made clear that liability for conspiracy may only flow if “the plaintiff can show that [s]he
has in fact been aggrieved, or has sustained actual legal damage by some overt act, done in
pursuance and execution of the conspiracy.” 34 Md. 407, 409 (1871). Moreover, the plaintiff
need not prove “that each member of the conspiracy” committed an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy; rather, the plaintiff need only prove “that one or more of them committed such an
act[,] and that harm ensued to the plaintiff as a result.” Alleco, Inc. v. Harry & Jeanette Weinberg

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Found., Inc., 99 Md. App. 696, 708 (1994), aff’d, 340 Md. 176 (1995).3 As relevant here,
corporations have “a separate existence as a distinct person” under Maryland law. E.g., Waller v.
Waller, 187 Md. 185, 194 (1946). Accordingly, a corporation can be held liable for conspiring
with a natural person, even if that person is the corporation’s sole member. Wasserman v. Kay,
197 Md. App. 586, 629 (2011) (making clear that a corporation has “the capacity of aiding and
abetting” its sole member, even while the sole member “was acting in his own interest”).
Defendants assert that there was no evidence provided “as to any overt act of conspiracy
that the parties engaged in nor was there any evidence presented to the jury as to any underlying
tort that the Defendants were engaged in.” ECF 264 at 3. This argument is unpersuasive. First,
for the reasons discussed above as to Counts I and II (Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Fraudulent
Concealment), a reasonable juror could have concluded that the underlying tort of fraud was
completed.
Second, a reasonable juror could have concluded, based on the evidence presented at trial,
that each corporate Defendant was engaged in the conspiracy. Though Al-Sabah need not have
shown that each corporate Defendant completed an overt act in furtherance of the fraud, see Alleco,
Inc., 99 Md. App. at 708, the evidence, drawn in a light most favorable to her, supports that
conclusion. Agbodjogbe, 9 Jewels, and 5722 York Road each engaged in the purchase of
properties using money Al-Sabah sent. In fact, the evidence showed that, many times, Al-Sabah
initially wired the money to an account held by N&A Kitchen that Agbodjogbe would then
withdraw. Further, the evidence showed that N&A Kitchen II, owned solely by Agbodjogbe,
received deposits for $117,038.77 and $343,012.56 in late March, 2017, which constituted the

The only regard in which the Court of Appeals disagreed with the Court of Special Appeals’s
statement of the law governing civil conspiracy is the lower court’s statement that civil conspiracy
constituted an “independent tort.” See 340 Md. at 189.
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proceeds from loans that were taken out on properties purchased with Al-Sabah’s money. Reading
all of this evidence, in addition to the evidence discussed above regarding Agbodjogbe’s actions
in furthering the fraud, in a light most favorable to Al-Sabah, the Court finds that a reasonable
juror could find that each Defendant, including the corporate Defendants, was actively engaged in
a civil conspiracy to defraud Al-Sabah. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a
Matter of law must be denied.
B.

Defendants’ Motion for New Trial

Nor can the Court conclude that Defendants are entitled to a new trial. As an initial matter,
nowhere in Defendants’ Motion, or Reply, do they explain why the jury’s verdict is against the
clear weight of evidence, is based upon false evidence, or works a manifest injustice (outside of
the arguments enumerated in support of their Rule 50 motion). See ECF 264; ECF 278. In fact,
the “Memorandum of Law” section Defendants’ Reply, ECF 278 at 3-4, is an exact replica of the
“Memorandum of Law” section in Defendants’ Motion for Remittitur, ECF 265 at 2-3.
Having conducted an independent review of the evidence submitted at trial, the Court
readily concludes that a new trial is not warranted. The parties stipulated to several of the most
crucial facts potentially at issue: the amounts of money Al-Sabah sent, when she sent them, and
what they were used for. See ECF 232 at 17-19 (Stipulations of Fact). Thus, United States
Magistrate Judge David Copperthite, to whom this case was referred for discovery disputes,
correctly forecasted the nature of this trial: “What is abundantly clear in this litigation is that
someone is not being truthful. . . . Credibility is crucial here, even more so than most cases because
the parties admit the lack of a “grey” area where the truth is somewhere in the middle.” ECF 114
at 1. Based on the jury’s verdict, it appears that they viewed Agbodjogbe as simply lacking in
credibility. The Court, having had the benefit of witnessing Agbodjogbe’s testimony in person,

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discerns no clear error in this conclusion. The only evidence Agbodjogbe furthered in support of
his theory that Al-Sabah’s wire transfers were gifts was his testimony that Al-Sabah told him so
over the phone. Weighing this against the myriad emails and voicemails from Agbodjogbe that
Al-Sabah produced, demonstrating that Agbodjogbe repeatedly represented to be furthering AlSabah’s interests, the jury’s verdict was reasonable and rested on evidentiary support. The Court
is satisfied that, based on the evidence discussed above as to each of Al-Sabah’s claims for relief,
the jury’s verdict accords with the clear weight of the evidence, and does not work any injustice.4
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and

Request for New Trial, ECF 264, is DENIED. A separate implementing Order is filed herewith.

Dated: March 9, 2019

/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States District Judge

This Opinion discusses the jury’s verdict in favor of Al-Sabah. Defendants’ Motion for
Remittitur, ECF 265, addressing the amount of punitive damages the jury awarded, will be
addressed separately.
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