Owens v. Social Security

Filing 17

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 16 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Social Security, 15 MOTION for Summary Judgment Or Alternatively for Remand filed by Trina Schacon Owens Signed by: Judge Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 12/28/2017. (kw2s, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
TRINA SCHACON OWENS

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v.

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Civil Case No. MJG-17-829

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COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Pursuant to Standing Order 2014-01, the above-captioned case has been referred to me to
review the parties’ dispositive motions and to make recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 301.5(b)(ix). [ECF No. 6]. I have considered the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment. [ECF Nos. 15, 16]. I find that no hearing is necessary. See
Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). This Court must uphold the decision of the Agency if it is
supported by substantial evidence and if the Agency employed proper legal standards. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); Coffman v. Bowen, 829
F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). For the reasons set forth below, I recommend that Ms. Owens’s
motion be denied, that the Commissioner’s motion be granted, and that the Commissioner’s
judgment be affirmed pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Ms. Owens filed her applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) on December 18, 2012, originally alleging disability
beginning November 30, 2009.1 (Tr. 250-53, 254-59); see Pl. Mot. 1. Her applications were

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At her hearing in 2015, Ms. Owens amended her alleged onset date to August 1, 2012. (Tr. 41-42).

denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 153-84, 196-99). An Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) held a hearing on August 12, 2015, at which Ms. Owens testified and had a
representative. (Tr. 37-112). Following the hearing and review of the representative’s posthearing brief, the ALJ determined that Ms. Owens was not disabled within the meaning of the
Social Security Act during the relevant time frame. (Tr. 8-36). The Appeals Council denied Ms.
Owens’s request for review, (Tr. 1-6), so the ALJ’s 2015 decision constitutes the final,
reviewable decision of the Agency.
The ALJ found that Ms. Owens suffered from the severe impairments of “bipolar
disorder; alcohol dependence; anxiety disorder; osteoarthritis of the bilateral knees, lumbar
spine, and hands; and obesity.” (Tr. 14). Despite these impairments, the ALJ determined that
Ms. Owens retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except she
can only occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She is
further limited to unskilled, routine, and repetitive tasks. She can have no
interaction with the public and only occasional interaction with co-workers.
(Tr. 20). After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that
Ms. Owens could perform her past relevant work as a housekeeper and other jobs existing in
significant numbers in the national economy and that, therefore, she was not disabled. (Tr. 2931).
Ms. Owens raises two arguments on appeal: (1) that the ALJ assigned insufficient weight
to the opinions of her treating therapist, Tracey Middleton, LCSW-C; and (2) that the ALJ
attributed too much weight to the opinions of “one- time [sic] consultative examining physicians
and non-examining State Agency physicians.” Pl. Mot. 9-13. Both arguments lack merit.
First, Ms. Owens argues that the ALJ assigned insufficient weight to the opinions
rendered by her treating therapist, Ms. Middleton. Id. at 8-12. Social Security regulations
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distinguish between “acceptable medical sources” and “other healthcare providers who are not
acceptable medical sources,” including LCSWs, because, among other reasons, only acceptable
medical sources can offer “medical opinions.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513, 404.1527(a)(2), 416.913,
416.927(a)(2); SSR 06–03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *1–2 (S.S.A. Aug. 9, 2006). SSR 06–03p,
which was in effect at the time Ms. Owens’s claims were filed, explains that, “[a]lthough the
factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d) explicitly apply only to the evaluation
of opinions from ‘acceptable medical sources,’ these same factors can be applied to opinion
evidence from ‘other sources.’” SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *4. Those factors generally
include the length and nature of the treatment relationship, the degree to which the opinion is
supported by the record as a whole, and any other factors that support or contradict the opinion.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)-(6). Here, the ALJ considered those factors in evaluating Ms.
Middleton’s opinions. First, the ALJ noted that Ms. Middleton had treated Ms. Owens since
early 2014.2 (Tr. 16-17). The ALJ also noted that Ms. Middleton is not an acceptable medical
source. (Tr. 29). More importantly, however, the ALJ correctly noted that Ms. Middleton’s
opinions were not only inconsistent with other evidence of record, but with her own treatment
notes. Id. During the total of six appointments evidenced in the record with Ms. Middleton prior
to her March 20, 2015 opinion, Ms. Owens either appeared under the influence of alcohol (on
December 23, 2014, and January 20, 2015), (Tr. 919-24), or exhibited relatively minor
symptoms (on February 18, 2015, March 4, 2015, and March 18, 2015), (Tr. 910-18), with the
exception of the single appointment on March 30, 2015, at which Ms. Middleton filled out the

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Although Ms. Middleton’s opinions make reference to an appointment in January, 2014, I was unable to locate any
treatment notes from such an appointment in the record. In fact, Ms. Middleton’s notes from the December, 23,
2014 appointment state: “This is the first time Thx has met with this Ct. Ct. presented intoxicated with blood shot
eyes.” (Tr. 923). At the very next appointment on January 20, 2015, Ms. Owens asked Ms. Middleton to fill out
paperwork for her disability application. (Tr. 920). Ms. Middleton declined to do so until two months later, on
March 30, 2015. (Tr. 644).

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disability form and Ms. Owens demonstrated more significant impairment, (Tr. 908-09). The
few subsequent appointments continued the pattern of Ms. Owens demonstrating mild or no
symptoms. See, e.g., (Tr. 898-900) (June 17, 2015 appointment, at which Ms. Owens “denied
depressive symptoms,” had intact insight, judgment, and thought processes, and a pleasant,
happy affect”); (Tr. 901-03) (May 20, 2015 appointment, at which Ms. Owens reported mood
swings but “denied any anxiety or depressive symptoms” and presented with intact insight,
judgment, and thought processes and euthymic mood).
Ultimately, my review of the ALJ’s decision is confined to whether substantial evidence,
in the record as it was reviewed by the ALJ, supports the decision and whether correct legal
standards were applied. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 404 (1971). Even if
there is other evidence that may support Ms. Owens’s position, I am not permitted to reweigh the
evidence or to substitute my own judgment for that of the ALJ§. See Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d
1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Applying those standards, because the ALJ expressly cited the
“contemporaneous treatment notes” outlined above, I conclude that the ALJ’s assignment of
little weight was supported by substantial evidence.
Second, Ms. Owens contends that the Commissioner assigned too much weight to the
opinions of consultative examiners and State Agency non-examining physicians. Pl. Mot. 11-13.
In reaching a decision, the Commissioner must consider, and is entitled to rely on, opinions from
non-treating doctors. See SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *3 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996) (“In
appropriate circumstances, opinions from State agency medical and psychological consultants
and other program physicians and psychologists may be entitled to greater weight than the
opinions of treating or examining sources.”). Ms. Owens correctly notes an inconsistency in the
ALJ’s evaluation, where at one point the ALJ indicates that he is giving the opinions “great

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weight” and then subsequently assigns two of the opinions only “partial weight.” (Tr. 28). The
ALJ, however, provided an explanation for the assessment of “partial weight,” citing to Ms.
Owens’s testimony and other evidence, and generally accepted the opinions of each of those
physicians. Id. Ms. Owens also contends that the consultative evaluation by Dr. Rossello
“supports a finding that Ms. Owens is unable to meet the mental demands of unskilled work.”
Pl. Mot. 12. While it is correct that Ms. Owens exhibited some manic symptoms in her
consultative appointment, Dr. Rossello’s overall opinion indicated that the symptoms could be
“secondary to alcohol” and that her mental health “could improve with abstinence.” (Tr. 50304). Dr. Rossello’s opinion therefore supported the ALJ’s conclusion that Ms. Owens’s frequent
alcohol intoxication had a significant effect on her mental health symptoms. See (Tr. 29). Thus,
the ALJ properly evaluated the opinions of the consultative examiners and the non-examining
physicians, and supported his findings with substantial evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully recommend that:
1. the Court GRANT Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 16];
2. the Court DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 15];
3. the Court AFFIRM the Commissioner’s judgment pursuant to sentence four of 42
U.S.C. § 405(g); and
4. the Court close this case.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendations must be served and filed within
fourteen (14) days, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and Local Rule 301.5(b).

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NOTICE TO PARTIES
Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Magistrate Judge contained in the foregoing report within fourteen (14)
days after being served with a copy of this report may result in the waiver of any right to a de
novo review of the determinations contained in the report and such failure shall bar you from
challenging on appeal the findings and conclusions accepted and adopted by the District Judge,
except upon grounds of plain error.

Dated: December 28, 2017

/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge

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