Redmond v. Social Security Administration

Filing 24

ORDER DENYING 21 Motion for Summary Judgment; GRANTING 22 Motion for Summary Judgment; AFFIRMING the SSA's Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 4/4/2018. (hmls, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

April 4, 2018
LETTER TO COUNSEL
RE:

Glenn Redmond v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;1
Civil No. SAG-17-876

Dear Counsel:
On March 31, 2017, Plaintiff Glenn Redmond petitioned this Court to review the Social
Security Administration’s [“SSA”] final decision to deny his claims for Disability Insurance
Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. [ECF No. 2]. I have considered the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment, and Mr. Redmond’s reply. [ECF Nos. 21, 22, 23]. I find that
no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). This Court must uphold the decision
of the Agency if it is supported by substantial evidence and if the Agency employed proper legal
standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir.
1996). Under that standard, I will deny Mr. Redmond’s motion, grant the SSA’s motion, and
affirm the SSA’s judgment pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This letter explains
my rationale.
Mr. Redmond filed his claims for benefits on December 27, 2010, alleging a disability
onset date of May 7, 2009. (Tr. 200-10). His claims were denied initially and on
reconsideration. (Tr. 141-45, 151-54). A hearing was held on June 7, 2012, before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 29-90). Following the hearing, the ALJ determined
that Mr. Redmond was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act during the
relevant time frame. (Tr. 12-28). After the Appeals Council (“AC”) denied Mr. Redmond’s
request for review, (Tr. 1-7), this Court remanded the case to the SSA for further
consideration, (Tr. 737-38). A second hearing was held on May 12, 2015, and after that hearing,
the ALJ again determined that Mr. Redmond was not disabled. (Tr. 1030-44). The AC again
denied review, (Tr. 680-84), making the ALJ’s 2015 decision the final, reviewable decision of
the Agency.
The ALJ found that Mr. Redmond suffered from the severe impairments of
“Degenerative Disk Disease, Depression, Anxiety Disorder, Antisocial Personality Disorder,
Left Tibial Nonossifying Fibroma, Status-Post Left Ankle Wound, and Hepatitis C.” (Tr. 1032).
Despite these impairments, the ALJ determined that Mr. Redmond retained the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
1

Currently, the position of Commissioner of the Social Security Administration is vacant, and most duties are
fulfilled by Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, performing the duties and functions not
reserved to the Commissioner of Social Security.

Glenn Redmond v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-17-876
April 4, 2018
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except the
claimant can only frequently operate foot controls with the left lower extremity;
can only occasionally climb ramps, stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and
crawl; can never climb ladders, ropes and scaffolds; must avoid concentrated
exposure to extreme cold, excessive vibration, hazardous moving machinery and
unprotected heights; can only perform simple routine and repetitive tasks in a low
stress work environment (defined as no strict production quotas); and can only
occasionally interact with the public, co-workers and supervisors.
(Tr. 1036). After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined
that Mr. Redmond could perform light and sedentary jobs existing in significant numbers in the
national economy and that, therefore, he was not disabled. (Tr. 1043-44).
Mr. Redmond makes five primary arguments on appeal: (1) that the ALJ did not assign
sufficient weight to the opinion of his treating physician; (2) that the ALJ did not assign
sufficient weight to the opinion of his licensed clinical social worker [“LCSW”]; (3) that the ALJ
erred in assessing his mental limitations; (4) that the ALJ failed to assign weight to the opinions
of the State agency physicians; and (5) that the ALJ’s RFC assessment was not supported by
substantial evidence. Each argument lacks merit and is addressed below.
First, Mr. Redmond argues that the ALJ should have assigned more weight to the
opinion of his treating physician, Dr. Michael Gardyn. Pl. Mot. 7-10. Dr. Gardyn opined that
Mr. Redmond met Listing 1.04. (Tr. 579). Although the opinions of treating physicians can be
entitled to controlling weight, such an opinion is not entitled to controlling weight if it is
inconsistent with the other substantial evidence of record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2),
416.927(c)(2). The ALJ is not required to give controlling weight to a treating physician’s
opinion on the ultimate issue of disability. Id. § 404.1527(d)(1); SSR 96-5P, 1996 WL 374183,
at *1 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). Here, the ALJ provided a detailed explanation of his finding that
Listing 1.04 is not met. (Tr. 1033). The ALJ cited to the objective medical testing, the results
from physical examinations, the lack of any evidence of use of assistive devices for ambulation,
and the activities of daily living that were cited in the record. Id. Accordingly, the ALJ cited to
substantial evidence of record to support an assignment of less than controlling weight to
Dr. Gardyn’s opinion.
Second, Mr. Redmond argues that the ALJ assigned inadequate weight to the opinions of
Andrew McClure, his treating LCSW. Pl. Mot. 10-12. The Social Security regulations
distinguish between “acceptable medical sources” and “other healthcare providers who are not
acceptable medical sources,” including LCSWs, because, among other reasons, only acceptable
medical sources can offer “medical opinions.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513, 404.1527(a)(2), 416.913,
416.927(a)(2); SSR 06-03P, 2006 WL 2329939, at *1-2 (S.S.A. Aug. 9, 2006). Social Security
Ruling 06-03P explains that, “[a]lthough the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(d) and
416.927(d) explicitly apply only to the evaluation of opinions from ‘acceptable medical sources,’
these same factors can be applied to opinion evidence from ‘other sources.’” SSR 06-03P, 2006
WL 2329939, at *4. In this case, the ALJ did not cite to Mr. McClure’s job title as a reason for
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Glenn Redmond v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-17-876
April 4, 2018
discounting his opinions. Instead, the ALJ determined that Mr. McClure’s opinion regarding the
severity of Mr. Redmond’s impairments did not comport with his own examination notes. (Tr.
1042). The ALJ did assign “moderate weight” to the GAF score that Mr. McClure assigned on
December 2, 2010. Id. An ALJ need not parrot a single medical opinion, or even assign “great
weight” to any opinions, in determining an RFC. Instead, an ALJ is required to consider “all of
the relevant medical and other evidence.” See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(3), 416.945(a)(3); see
also Felton–Miller v. Astrue, 459 F. App’x 226, 230-31 (4th Cir. 2011) (determining that an ALJ
need not obtain an expert medical opinion to back a particular RFC, but should base an
individual’s RFC on all available evidence). The mere fact that there are no opposing opinions
to contradict Mr. McClure’s opinion, then, does not automatically require an assignment of more
weight to the opinion, given the ALJ’s proper evaluation of all of the evidence of record.
Third, Mr. Redmond suggests that the ALJ’s use of boilerplate language to assess his
mental impairment runs afoul of the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632
(4th Cir. 2015). In assessing Mr. Redmond’s RFC, the ALJ stated that Mr. Redmond’s
subjective complaints “concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these
symptoms are not entirely credible for the reasons explained in this decision.” (Tr. 1038). The
ALJ’s statement is similar to the problematic boilerplate language that the Fourth Circuit
determined warranted remand in Mascio. 780 F.3d at 639. It is, however, critically
distinguishable from the Mascio boilerplate, because it does not reference the ALJ’s RFC
assessment and thus does not imply that the ALJ first assessed Mr. Redmond’s RFC and then
used that assessment to determine his credibility. See id. Moreover, the ALJ cured any issue
created by his use of boilerplate credibility language by thereafter properly and thoroughly
analyzing Mr. Redmond’s credibility. (Tr. 1042-43).
Mr. Redmond also suggests that the ALJ’s reference to GAF scores undermines his
analysis. Pl. Mot. 15. Though it is well established that GAF scores are not determinative of
disability, nothing prohibits an ALJ from considering GAF scores as one component of a full
analysis of the evidence of record. See, e.g., Davis v. Astrue, Case No. JKS-09-2545, 2010 WL
5237850, at *3 (D. Md. Dec. 15, 2010); Kozel v. Astrue, No. JKS-10-2180, 2012 WL 2951554,
at *10 (D. Md. July 18, 2012) (citing Rios v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 444 F. App’x 532, 535 (3d
Cir. 2011) and Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 241 (6th Cir. 2002)). Here,
though the ALJ assigned weight to the various GAF scores in the record, he also weighed the
results of mental examinations, Mr. Redmond’s activities of daily living, and his credibility in
considering the extent of any mental limitations. (Tr. 1034-42). Accordingly, the mere inclusion
of the GAF scores as part of the comprehensive discussion does not warrant remand.
Fourth, Mr. Redmond correctly notes that the ALJ did not evaluate the opinions of the
non-examining State agency physicians. Pl. Mot. 15-17. However, those physicians rendered
opinions that comport precisely with, or are less restrictive than, the ALJ’s RFC assessment.
Compare (Tr. 1036) with (Tr. 98-99, 134-35) (physician opinions finding functional capacity to
perform a reduced range of light work). Accordingly, the ALJ owed no duty to explain any
difference between the State agency physicians’ opinions and the RFC, since no meaningful
differences existed, and any error in failing to make an express assignment of weight to those

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Glenn Redmond v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-17-876
April 4, 2018
opinions constitutes harmless error. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 407-10 (2009)
(holding that the party objecting to an agency’s ruling must prove that the error was harmful).
Finally, Mr. Redmond suggests that the ALJ’s RFC assessment is not supported by
substantial evidence, particularly as to the need for a sit/stand option and as to Mr. Redmond’s
mental limitations. Pl. Mot. 17-19. Ultimately, my review of the ALJ’s decision is confined to
whether substantial evidence, in the record as it was reviewed by the ALJ, supports the decision
and whether correct legal standards were applied. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 404
(1971). Even if there is other evidence that may support Mr. Redmond’s position, I am not
permitted to reweigh the evidence or to substitute my own judgment for that of the ALJ. Hays v.
Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Under that standard, I find that the ALJ
supported his conclusion with substantial evidence. With respect to Mr. Redmond’s physical
impairments, the ALJ cited to both activities of daily living, including shoveling snow, washing
the car, assisting his father with transfers to and from the bathroom, and packing boxes, and to
objective evidence, such as “mild to moderate” findings in imaging studies and normal
examination results. (Tr. 1038, 1041, 1042). As to the mental impairments, the ALJ cited to
evidence including Mr. Redmond’s ability to attend his children’s football games, meet his
girlfriend at a flea market, go shopping, and attend NA meetings; the documented improvement
of his symptoms with medication and normal mental status examinations while medicated; and
the reasons discussed above relating to the assignment of weight to treating medical sources.
(Tr. 1037, 1038, 1040-41, 1042). Given the detailed discussion provided by the ALJ and the
substantial evidence referenced therein, remand is not warranted.
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Redmond’s Motion for Summary Judgment, [ECF
No. 21], is DENIED, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, [ECF No. 22], is
GRANTED. The SSA’s judgment is AFFIRMED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §
405(g). The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion and docketed
as an order.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge

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