London v. Loyola High School of Baltimore, Inc., t/a Loyola Blakefield
Filing
33
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 9/25/2019. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
DAVID LONDON
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 17-2219
:
LOYOLA HIGH SCHOOL OF BALTIMORE,
INC. t/a Loyola Blakefield
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this employment
discrimination case is the motion for summary judgment filed by
Defendant
Loyola
Blakefield.
High
School
(ECF No. 26).
of
Baltimore,
Inc.
granted
Loyola
The issues have been briefed, and the
court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.
105.6.
t/a
Local Rule
For the following reasons, Defendant’s motion will be
with
supplemental
respect
to
jurisdiction
Plaintiff’s
will
be
federal
declined
with
claims
respect
and
to
Plaintiff’s state claims.
I.
Background
A.
Factual Background
The following facts are presented in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff, the non-moving party.
In September 1988, Plaintiff began working as a Band Director
for Defendant.
In March 2016, Defendant notified Plaintiff that
his contract would not be renewed for the 2016-2017 school year.
At the time of the non-renewal, James Katchko was the Chair
of the Performing Arts Department, John McCaul was the Assistant
Principal, John Marinacci was the Principal, and Anthony Day was
the President.
Mary Thielen was the Middle School Band Director.
Beginning in 2007, Plaintiff demonstrated work performance
issues.
For example, in October 2007, Plaintiff forgot that he
had a class to teach on two occasions.
Defendant subsequently
placed him on probation and temporarily withheld a contract for
the 2008-2009 school year.
Plaintiff ultimately received the
contract. In 2013, Defendant instructed Plaintiff to cease contact
with the Business Office and, instead, to use Mr. Katchko as a
liaison following “disruptive and accusatory[]” behavior that
“monopoliz[ed] the time and resources of that office.”
26-5).
(ECF No.
In November 2013, Plaintiff fell asleep during class and
Mr. McCaul warned “that sleeping when [he was] expected to be
supervising students may lead to immediate termination.”
(ECF No.
26-6).
In June 2014, Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant to explain
that he recently learned that he had Lyme Disease and that “[t]he
only major symptom. . . was enormous fatigue[.]”
(ECF No. 26-19).
Plaintiff offered this as an explanation for falling asleep in the
November
2013
class,
but
explained
that
“since
beginning
treatment, the symptoms and fatigue are completely gone.”
2
(Id.)
Before the 2015-2016 school year, Mr. Marinacci reviewed
stipends
paid
to
faculty
Plaintiff’s stipend.
members
and
decided
(ECF No. 29-4, at 4–6).
to
eliminate
Plaintiff objected
to the reduction of his stipend and explained that he received the
stipend because his “duties were well beyond those of the ordinary
teacher.”
(ECF No. 29-7).
The parties dispute that point, and
Defendant maintains that Plaintiff’s schedule was not longer than
other teachers.
(ECF No. 29-4, at 5).
Nonetheless, the parties
agree that Plaintiff received half the expected stipend amount.
On August 28, 2015, Plaintiff met with Mr. Katchko to discuss
an increase in concerns regarding his course during the previous
school year.
(ECF No. 32-5).
On September 30, 2015, Plaintiff met with Messrs. Marinacci
and McCaul to discuss performance issues from the 2014-2015 school
year and the creation of a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”) to
assist Plaintiff in his efforts to address the identified issues.
(ECF No. 26-7; ECF No. 26-8).
On
October
2,
2015,
Plaintiff
e-mailed
Messrs.
Day
and
Marinacci to say that he “may need to go on medical leave at some
point”
because
functioning[.]”
he
was
“having
increasing
difficulty
(ECF No. 26-20).
During the fall, Plaintiff made an arithmetic error on a
purchase order for the business office.
Plaintiff asked his
coworker to double check his arithmetic to eliminate errors.
3
Defendant offered an Excel program with an addition formula to
assist Plaintiff with this task.
Defendant explained how to
“increase the size and change the contrast to help with vision.”
(ECF No. 29-4, at 10).
In October or November of 2015, Plaintiff assisted Ms. Thielen
with one of her classes and instructed the drum section separately.
When the students’ focus lagged, Plaintiff discussed locking them
in the music room until they got it right and discussed tasers
with the students. (ECF No. 29-2, at 22–25). The parties disagree
about the nature of this conversation.
Plaintiff maintains that
his comments were jokes, (ECF No. 29-13 at 2), and Defendant
characterizes them in a more serious manner.
Plaintiff received the PIP on December 3, 2015. (ECF No. 268).
On December 18, 2015, Plaintiff met with Allison Panowitz,
the Human Resources Manager for Defendant, and “expressed vague
claims of workplace harassment and discrimination.”
(ECF No. 26-
22).
The Human Resources Department completed its investigation in
January 2016 and informed Plaintiff that it found no evidence of
discrimination.
(ECF No. 26-22).
In January 2016, Ms. Thielen provided evaluations to her
students and asked how they thought she could improve the class.
Some of the evaluations referenced Plaintiff’s earlier comments
4
about locking the students in a room or tasing them.
(ECF No. 26-
11; ECF No. 26-12).
On
March
1,
2016,
Plaintiff’s
doctor
sent
a
letter
to
Defendant to explain that “[d]ue to [Plaintiff’s] medical issues,
he is having a difficult time doing detailed paperwork.”
26-21).
(ECF No.
On March 4, 2016, Mr. McCaul e-mailed Plaintiff regarding
the doctor’s note and asked whether the medical condition makes
completing accurate paperwork difficult such that he needs more
time or makes completing accurate paperwork impossible.
29-13).
negative
(ECF No.
Mr. McCaul also informed Plaintiff about the students’
evaluations,
described
“two
comments
of
particular
concern,” and asked Plaintiff to provide his availability to
discuss the evaluations.
(Id.)
This was the first that Plaintiff
learned of the evaluations, and he quickly sought to discuss them
with Ms. Thielen and the students.
(ECF No. 29-2, at 24).
Plaintiff
the
knew
which
students
wrote
evaluations
because
“[t]hose [were] the only ones in the middle school that [he] told
that joke to.”
(Id., at 26).
Ms. Thielen found Plaintiff’s
conduct “very disturbing” and described the students as “visibly
upset” by Plaintiff’s actions.1
1
(ECF No. 26-12).
Defendant
Plaintiff’s opposition notes that Ms. Thielen’s affidavit
describes this incident as occurring in January 2016 and attempts
to discredit it because all other accounts describe the incident
as occurring in March 2016. (ECF No. 29, at 12). Plaintiff admits
that the students submitted the evaluations in January 2016, that
he learned of them in March 2016, and that he spoke to the students
5
informed Plaintiff that his contract would not be renewed in late
March 2016.
B.
Procedural Background
Plaintiff
filed
a
complaint
with
the
Equal
Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on October 11, 2016.
Plaintiff
argued that Defendant discriminated against him based on age,
disability, and retaliation.
(ECF No. 26–14).
The EEOC dismissed
Plaintiff’s complaint on May 10, 2017. (ECF No. 26-15). Plaintiff
then filed a complaint in this court on August 7, 2017.
1).
(ECF No.
Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s decision not to renew his
contract constitutes employment discrimination on the basis of age
and disability in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. and the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
Following
discovery, Defendant filed the pending motion for summary judgment
on November 8, 2018.
(ECF No. 26).
Plaintiff filed an opposition
(ECF No. 29) and Defendant replied (ECF No. 32).
II.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment will be granted only if “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty
and Ms. Thielen in March 2016.
No. 29-2, at 24–25).
(ECF No. 26-13, at 2; see also ECF
6
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
A dispute about a material
fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
477 U.S. at 249.
Liberty Lobby,
In undertaking this inquiry, a court must view
the facts “in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S.
654, 655 (1962)); see also EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424
F.3d 397, 405 (4th Cir. 2005), but a “party cannot create a genuine
dispute of material fact through mere speculation or compilation
of inferences,” Shina v. Shalala, 166 F.Supp.2d 373, 375 (D.Md.
2001) (citation omitted).
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party
generally bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact.
No genuine dispute of material
fact exists, however, if the nonmoving party fails to make a
sufficient showing on an essential element of his case as to which
he would have the burden of proof.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23.
Therefore, on those issues on which the nonmoving party has the
burden of proof, it is his responsibility to confront the summary
judgment motion with an “affidavit or other evidentiary showing”
demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial.
See Ross
v. Early, 899 F.Supp.2d 415, 420 (D.Md. 2012), aff’d 746 F.3d 546
(4th Cir. 2014).
7
III. Age Discrimination
Plaintiff
alleges
that
Defendant’s
non-renewal
contract constitutes age discrimination under the ADEA.
of
his
The ADEA
makes it “unlawful for an employer. . . to discharge any individual
or otherwise discriminate against any individual. . . because of
such individual’s age[.]”
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
Plaintiff may
establish age discrimination under the ADEA in two ways: (1)
through direct evidence; or (2) through circumstantial evidence
under the three-step burden shifting framework set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973). Under the first step of the McDonnell
Douglas framework, Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of
discrimination.
See 411 U.S. at 802.
burden
to
shifts
nondiscriminatory
action.
Defendant
reason
for
to
the
At the second step, the
present
alleged
a
adverse
legitimate,
employment
See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.
133, 142 (2000).
At the third step, Plaintiff must prove that
Defendant’s proffered reasons “were not its true reasons, but were
a pretext for discrimination.”
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143.
Plaintiff has presented no direct evidence that the contract
non-renewal was based on his age and does not rely on this method
in his opposition brief.
He therefore must proceed under the
McDonnell Douglas pretext framework.
To meet the first step of
the McDonnell Douglas framework and establish a prima facie case
8
of age discrimination for termination, Plaintiff must show that:
(1) he is a member of a protected class, which for the ADEA is
individuals who are at least 40 years of age, 29 U.S.C. § 631(a);
(2) he suffered an adverse employment action; (3) he was performing
his job duties at a level that met his employer’s legitimate
expectations; and (4) the position remained open or was filled by
similarly qualified applicants outside the protected class.
See
Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., 354 F.3d 277, 285 (4th
Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 543 U.S. 1132 (2005).
The parties do not appear to dispute that Plaintiff satisfies
the first two requirements. They focus their briefing on the third
prong.
Plaintiff
asserts
that
he
was
meeting
Defendant’s
legitimate expectations because the “facts show that [he] was given
a renewed contract each year[.]”
(ECF No. 29, at 4–5).
Defendant
highlights Plaintiff’s “mixed” job performance over his tenure at
the school, (ECF No. 26-1, at 1–2) and emphasizes that Plaintiff
“was placed on a PIP, in November[] 2015 and by March[] 2016 he
still had deficiencies with his work.”
(Id., at 16).
The reasonable expectations analysis in this case is complex.
Defendant characterizes the incident with the student evaluations
as “the deciding factor” in its decision not to renew Plaintiff’s
contract.
(ECF No. 26-1, at 12; ECF No. 32, at 5).2
2
As Judge
Deposition testimony from Messrs. Marinacci and McCaul
supports this characterization.
(See ECF No. 26-16, at 4 (The
9
Chuang explained in Gordon v. Holy Cross Hosp. Germantown, Inc.,
385
F.Supp.3d
472,
479
(D.Md.
2019),
“a
single
instance
of
misconduct is more relevant to the question of the employer’s
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination[]” than the
employee’s
failure
expectations.
“maintained
Plaintiff’s
to
meet
the
employer’s
legitimate
job
The Gordon plaintiff is distinguishable because she
a
spotless
employment
employment
record,
record[.]”
in
Id.
contrast,
at
475.
includes
a
probationary period for lack of judgment and for failing to attend
two
classes
and
to
supervise
students,
(ECF
No.
placement on the PIP to address performance issues.
8).
26-3),
and
(ECF No. 26-
The distinction suggests Plaintiff may not have been meeting
Defendant’s
reasonable
expectations.
Id.
at
479
(When
“the
plaintiff had an ongoing history of poor job performance, courts
have analyzed that deficiency as a failure to satisfy the prima
facie
case
element
expectations.”);
of
meeting
the
employer’s
legitimate
see also Warch v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d
decision not to renew Plaintiff’s contract had been difficult for
Mr. Marinacci “until. . . the point about [Plaintiff] confronting
both a colleague and the sixth grade boys.”); ECF No. 26-17, at 3
(Mr. McCaul “thought it was probable that [Plaintiff] would come
back” until “[h]e pulled. . . kids out of a class that wasn’t his
and threatened them.”); ECF No. 32-2, at 4 (Mr. Marinacci
describing “[t]he single greatest factor” in the non-renewal
decision “was the feedback from the students and [Plaintiff’s]
reaction to it, his interaction with Ms. Thielen, his pulling
students out of another teacher’s class, him bringing them into
another room and confronting them on what was supposed to be an
honest feedback.”)).
10
510, 515–18 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that an employee failed to
show he was meeting his employer’s legitimate expectations when
his
performance
probation).
included
repeated
failures
and
placement
on
However, the people judging Plaintiff’s performance
were the same individuals that he accused of discrimination.
In
such
be
a
scenario,
“[a]ll
the
prima
facie
factors
may
unnecessary[]” because “even if an employee was not meeting his
employer’s legitimate expectations, he can still establish a prima
facie case if the company applied its expectations against him in
a discriminatory manner.”
Inc.,
255
F.Supp.3d
Santangelo v. Crown Cork & Seal USA,
791,
802
(N.D.Ill.
2017)
(internal
alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted).
The court
need not parse these complexities because, as discussed below,
Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence to create a dispute of
material fact regarding the final prong of the prima facie case:
the position remained open or was filled by similarly qualified
applicants outside the protected class.
In his opposition, Plaintiff misstates the fourth requirement
and contends he must show “damages.”
Plaintiff is incorrect.
(ECF No. 29, at 16).
Plaintiff has provided no evidence that
Defendant replaced him with a similarly qualified, substantially
younger individual.
Plaintiff contends that “no other younger. .
. faculty member with years of distinguished performance was ever
terminated
by
[Defendant]
for
11
such
manufactured
and/or
insignificant reasons.”
(ECF No. 1, at 22 ¶ 129).
not identified any comparator, as Defendant notes.
Plaintiff has
(ECF No. 26-
1, at 10) (Plaintiff “has not identified any other similarly
situated [Defendant] instructors under the age of 40 who engaged
in similar misconduct who [were] treated more favorably than he
was.”).
Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence necessary to
satisfy the final prong of the prima facie case.3
IV.
Disability Discrimination
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s actions also constituted
disability discrimination under the ADA.
He appears to raise two
challenges: (1) wrongful discharge and (2) failure to accommodate.
A.
Wrongful Discharge
The parties fail to articulate the correct standard for
assessing wrongful discharge claims under the ADA.4
To show
wrongful discharge under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove that:
3
Even if Plaintiff produced evidence sufficient to satisfy
the prima facie case for age discrimination (or, in fact,
sufficient to satisfy the prima facie case for disability
discrimination, see Section IV.A.), he nevertheless fails to
produce evidence to satisfy the third step of the McDonnell Douglas
framework.
As will be discussed in Section VI, Defendant
articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
contract non-renewal and Plaintiff failed to produce evidence
showing that the articulated reason was a pretext for
discrimination or retaliation.
4
Defendant conflates the prima facie tests for age and
disability discrimination. (ECF No. 26-1, at 16; ECF No. 32, at
14–15). Plaintiff misstates the fourth prong of the prima facie
test as damages. (ECF No. 29, at 16).
12
“(1) he is within the ADA’s protected class; (2) he was discharged;
(3) at the time of his discharge, he was performing the job at a
level that met his employer’s legitimate expectations; and (4) his
discharge occurred under circumstances that raise a reasonable
inference of unlawful discrimination.”
Haulbrook v. Michelin N.
Am., 252 F.3d 696, 702 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Ennis v. Nat’l
Ass’n of Bus. And Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995).
The fourth prong of an ADA wrongful discharge case is different
than those applied in other contexts for two reasons.
F.3d at 58.
Ennis, 53
“First, where disability, in contrast to race, age,
or gender, is at issue, the plaintiff in many, if not most, cases
will be unable to determine whether a replacement employee is
within or without the protected class, that is, whether or not
that person is disabled or associates with a disabled person.”
Id.
“Second, even if the plaintiff could obtain such information,
requiring a showing that the replacement was outside the protected
class would lead to the dismissal of many legitimate disability
discrimination claims, since most replacements would fall within
the broad scope of the ADA’s protected class[.]”
Id.
Plaintiff fails to produce any evidence to suggest that his
discharge occurred under circumstances that raise a reasonable
inference of unlawful discrimination.
13
B.
Failure to Accommodate
To establish a prima facie case for failure to accommodate,
Plaintiff must show: “(1) that he was an individual who had a
disability within the meaning of the statute; (2) that the employer
had
notice
of
his
disability;
(3)
that
with
reasonable
accommodation he could perform the essential functions of the
position;
and
accommodations.”
(4)
that
the
employer
refused
to
make
such
Wilson v. Dollar General Corp., 717 F.3d 337,
345 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal alterations and quotation marks
omitted).
Plaintiff’s
opposition
does
not
address
elements of a failure to accommodate claim.
the
prima
facie
Instead, Plaintiff
contends that he suggested that his coworker double check his math
on
purchase
orders
to
address
Defendant’s
concern
inaccurate purchase orders, and Defendant refused.
at
6).
Plaintiff
elaborates
that
Defendant’s
regarding
(ECF No. 29,
“preferred
accommodation did not work for [him,]” because the recommended
Excel program made his problem worse.
(ECF No. 29, at 7).
Defendant contends that Plaintiff failed to establish that he had
a disability covered by the ADA or that his medical conditions
prevented him from performing the essential functions of his job
with or without an accommodation.
14
(ECF No. 26-1, at 12–13).
Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff was an individual who had a
disability within the meaning of the statute and that Defendant
had
notice
of
his
disability,
Plaintiff
nonetheless
cannot
establish that he could perform the essential functions of his
position
with
reasonable
accommodation.
The
Fourth
Circuit
outlined the relevant framework in Jacobs v. N.C. Administrative
Office of the Courts:
This inquiry proceeds in two steps. First, was
the specific accommodation requested [by the employee]
reasonable?
Second, had [the employer] granted the
accommodation,
could
[the
employee]
perform
the
essential functions of the position?
A reasonable accommodation is one that enables a
qualified individual with a disability to perform the
essential functions of a position.
The statute
expressly contemplates that a reasonable accommodation
may require job restructuring. . . An employer is not
required to grant even a reasonable accommodation unless
it would enable the employee to perform all of the
essential functions of [his] position.”
780
F.3d
562,
580–81
(4th
Cir.
2015)
(internal
alterations,
citations, and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).
Here, Plaintiff’s proposed accommodation was to allow his coworker to double check his math for errors.
Defendant was not
required to grant this proposal because it did not enable Plaintiff
to perform all his essential functions.
Id. at 581.
Moreover,
while “[t]he ADA imposes upon employers a good-faith duty to engage
with their employees in an interactive process to identify a
reasonable accommodation[,]” “an employer will not be liable for
15
failure to engage in the interactive process if the employee
ultimately fails to demonstrate the existence of a reasonable
accommodation that would allow [him] to perform the essential
functions of the position.”
Id.
Finally, Plaintiff also failed to allege facts to satisfy the
final prong of the failure to accommodate claim.
Defendant did
not refuse to make any accommodation, it refused Plaintiff’s only
offered
accommodation
and
recommended
an
alternative.
An
accommodation can be reasonable even if it is not the employee’s
requested accommodation.
F.3d
407,
415
(4th
See Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cnty., 789
Cir.
2015)
(“An
employer
may
reasonably
accommodate an employee without providing the exact accommodation
that the employee requested.”);
see also Dones v. Brennan, 147
F.Supp.3d 364, 369 (D.Md. 2015) (“[A]n employer is not required to
provide
the
employee’s
preferred
accommodation.”);
Scott
v.
Montgomery Cnty. Gov’t, 164 F.Supp2d. 502, 508–09 (D.Md. 2001)
(“The ADA does not require an employer to provide the specific
accommodation
requested,
or
even
accommodation,
so
the
accommodation
long
as
to
provide
is
the
best
reasonable.”)
(quoting Walter v. United Airlines, Inc., 2000 WL 1587489, at *4
(4th Cir. 2000) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff has not produced evidence necessary to satisfy the prima
facie elements of a failure to accommodate claim.
16
V.
Retaliation
The ADEA and the ADA prohibit employers from discrimination
against employees who oppose actions that the respective statutes
outlaw.
29 U.S.C. § 623(d); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).
Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant’s decision not to renew his contract was
retaliation for his submission of a complaint to Defendant’s Human
Resources Department.
The elements for retaliation under both the ADA and the ADEA
are identical; to establish a prima facie case of retaliation,
Plaintiff must show: (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) an
adverse employment action was taken against him; and (3) there was
a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse
action.
See Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 432 (4th Cir. 2006); A
Soc’y Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2011).
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then the McDonnell
Douglas pretext framework applies.
See Haulbrook, 252 at 706.
The parties do not appear to dispute the first two elements
of the prima facie case.
Filing a complaint with Human Resources
is protected activity and the non-renewal of Plaintiff’s contract
is an adverse employment action. Defendant contends that Plaintiff
cannot satisfy the third requirement because the non-renewal of
his contract was not causally related to his complaint to Human
Resources and emphasizes that Plaintiff’s “performance became an
17
issue. . . well before he filed any complaint of harassment or
discrimination[.]”
(ECF No. 26-1, at 17–19).
“To establish a causal connection, plaintiffs must show that
the employer took action because they engaged in a protected
activity.”
See Davenport v. Anne Arundel Cnty. Bd. Of Educ., 998
F.Supp.2d 428, 439 (D.Md. 2014) (emphasis in original).
The
temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action may provide indirect proof of causation.
See
Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 457 (4th Cir. 1989);
Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 1994).
Here, Defendant informed Plaintiff that his performance was
at issue and that he would be placed on the PIP in September 2015
– months before Plaintiff lodged his complaint in December 2015
with the Human Resources department.
(ECF No. 26-7).
Defendant
notified Plaintiff that his contract would not be renewed in March
2016 – months after Plaintiff initiated his complaint and the
department investigated and resolved it.
No.
26-10).
Moreover,
although
(ECF No. 26-22); (ECF
Plaintiff
characterizes
his
comments to the sixth-grade students as jokes intended to motivate,
the record demonstrates that “[t]he single greatest factor [in
Defendant’s decision not to renew Plaintiff’s contract] was the
feedback from the students and [Plaintiff’s reaction] to it, his
interaction with Ms. Thielen, his pulling students out of another
teacher’s
class,
him
bringing
18
them
into
another
room
and
confronting them on what was supposed to be an honest feedback.”
(ECF No. 29-4, at 13).
Prior to the events surrounding the
evaluation, Defendant expected to renew Plaintiff’s contract.
(Id., at 12).
After the events, Defendant communicated its
decision not to renew Plaintiff’s contract within a month.
The
timing between Plaintiff’s conduct toward the students and his coworker regarding the evaluations and Defendant’s decision not to
renew
his
contract
supports
Defendant’s
performance deficiencies motivated the decision.
contention
that
Plaintiff failed
to establish his prima facie case of retaliation because he did
not present evidence of a causal link between his report to Human
Resources and the non-renewal of his contract.
VI.
The Second and Third Steps of the McDonnell Douglas Framework
Even if Plaintiff produced evidence sufficient to establish
a prima facie case for any of his termination or retaliation
claims, Defendant articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the contract non-renewal and Plaintiff failed to show
that the articulated reason was a pretext for discrimination or
retaliation. Defendant identified Plaintiff’s conduct surrounding
the student evaluations as “the deciding factor” in its decision
not to renew Plaintiff’s contract.
32, at 5).
(ECF No. 26-1, at 12; ECF No.
Plaintiff has not produced any facts to show that
Defendant’s articulated reason was pretext. “To do so, [Plaintiff]
must do more than simply show the articulated reason is false[.]”
19
Laber, 438 F.3d at 430.
“either
by
showing
Plaintiff can meet his pretextual burden
[Defendant’s]
explanation
is
unworthy
of
credence or by offering other forms of circumstantial evidence
sufficiently probative of. . . discrimination.”
F.Supp.2d. at 437.
Davenport, 998
Plaintiff contends that he was joking with the
students and that Defendant exaggerated its response.
conclusory allegations are insufficient.
These
Plaintiff may disagree
with Defendant’s response, but he failed to show that Defendant’s
decision not to renew his contract was pretext.
VII. Remaining State Law Claims
The
parties
do
not
address
Plaintiff’s
claims
alleging
violations of Maryland’s anti-discrimination statute, Md.Code.
Ann. State Gov’t § 20-606.
State law claims raised in a complaint
with
be
federal
claims
may
supplemental jurisdiction.
heard
by
this
court
under
its
This court may, however, decline to
exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims where
the federal claims are dismissed.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
When,
as here, the federal claims are eliminated early in the case, the
federal courts are inclined to dismiss the state law claims without
prejudice
rather
than
retain
supplemental
jurisdiction.
Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988).
20
See
VIII.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment
filed by Defendant Loyola High School of Baltimore, Inc. t/a Loyola
Blakefield will be granted with respect to Plaintiff’s federal
claims and supplemental jurisdiction will be declined with respect
to Plaintiff’s state claims.
A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
21
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