Smith v. Berryhill

Filing 14

ORDER denying 12 Motion of plaintiff for Summary Judgment; granting 13 Motion of defendant for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge J. Mark Coulson on 5/9/2018. (jnls, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
J. MARK COULSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
Phone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]

May 9, 2018
LETTER TO ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD
Re:

Smith v. Social Security Administration1
Civil No. 17–cv–02273–JMC

Dear Counsel:
On August 9, 2017, Ms. Shannon Michelle Smith petitioned this Court to review the Social Security
Administration’s final decision to deny her claims for Supplemental Security Income. (ECF No. 1). I have
considered the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 12, 13). I find that no hearing is
necessary. Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). This Court must uphold the decision of the Agency if it is supported
by substantial evidence and correct legal standards were employed. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Craig v. Chater, 76
F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Under that standard, I will deny Ms. Smith’s motion, grant the Government’s
motion, and affirm the Social Security Administration’s judgment pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §
405(g). This letter explains my rationale.
Ms. Smith filed a claim for benefits on May 1, 2013. (Tr. 27). Her claim was denied initially and on
reconsideration following appeal. (Tr. 86–95). Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Tierney Carlos held a
hearing on March 23, 2016. (Tr. 42–85). Following that hearing, on July 7, 2016, the ALJ determined that Ms.
Smith was not disabled during the relevant time frame. (Tr. 24–37). The Appeals Council denied Ms. Smith’s
request for review on June 19, 2017, making the ALJ’s decision the final, reviewable decision of the Agency.
(Tr. 1–3).
In arriving at his decision to deny Ms. Smith’s claim, the ALJ followed the five-step sequential
evaluation of disability set forth in the Secretary’s regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. “To summarize, the ALJ
asks at step one whether the claimant has been working; at step two, whether the claimant’s medical
impairments meet the regulations’ severity and duration requirements; at step three, whether the medical
impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in the regulations; at step four, whether the claimant can
perform her past work given the limitations caused by her medical impairments; and at step five, whether the
claimant can perform other work.” Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634–35 (4th Cir. 2015). If the first three
steps do not yield a conclusive determination, the ALJ then assesses the claimant’s residual functional capacity
(“RFC”), “which is ‘the most’ the claimant ‘can still do despite’ physical and mental limitations that affect her
ability to work,” by considering all of the claimant’s medically determinable impairments regardless of severity.
Id. at 635 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1)). The claimant bears the burden of proof through the first four
steps of the sequential evaluation. If she makes the requisite showing, the burden shifts to the Social Security
Administration at step five to prove “that the claimant can perform other work that ‘exists in significant
1

Currently, the position of Commissioner of the Social Security Administration is vacant, and most duties are
fulfilled by Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner of Operations, performing the duties and functions not
reserved to the Commissioner of Social Security.

numbers in the national economy,’ considering the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and
work experience.” Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 862 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted).
In this case, at step one, the ALJ found that Ms. Smith had not engaged in “substantial gainful activity”
since May 1, 2013, the date of Ms. Smith’s application. (Tr. 29). At step two, the ALJ determined that Ms.
Smith’s anxiety disorder and pervasive developmental disorder constitute severe impairments under the relevant
regulations. (Tr. 29–30). At step three, the ALJ found that Ms. Smith does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meet or medically equal the severity of any of the listed impairments set forth
in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 30–32). Then, “[a]fter careful consideration of the entire
record,” the ALJ determined that Ms. Smith has the RFC to perform:
a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional
limitations: she can have no exposure to weather and is limited to work
environments with no more than moderate noise level, as defined in the selected
characteristics of occupations. She can be expected to respond appropriately with
supervisors unlimitedly, co-workers frequently and with the public occasionally.
(Tr. 32). At step four, the ALJ determined that Ms. Smith has no past relevant work. (Tr. 36). Finally, after
considering the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined that Ms. Smith can perform work existing
in significant numbers in the national economy and that she was therefore not disabled during the relevant time
frame. (Tr. 36–37).
The Court reviews an ALJ’s decision to ensure that the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence and were reached through application of correct legal standards. Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470,
472 (4th Cir. 2012). “Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion,” which “consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be less
than a preponderance.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). In accordance with this standard, the
Court does not “undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its]
judgment for that of the ALJ.” Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal citations and
quotations omitted). Instead, “[w]here conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a
claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ.” Id.
On appeal, Ms. Smith argues that the ALJ failed to: (1) consider the impact of her severe mental
impairment on her RFC; and (2) acknowledge Dr. Reichenbach’s neuropsychological evaluation and testing.
Ms. Smith’s two arguments lack merit, and both will be addressed in turn.
Ms. Smith’s Severe Mental Impairment & RFC
Ms. Smith first argues that the ALJ, after determining that she has a severe mental impairment, failed to
properly consider the impact of this impairment on her RFC. Ms. Smith cites Social Security Rulings 96-8p and
85-15 in support of her assertion as to the ALJ’s alleged failure to “make any findings regarding the claimant’s
ability to understand, carry out and remember simple instructions, to respond appropriately to usual work
situations, and to deal with changes in a routine work setting.” (ECF No. 12–1 at 7–8). Ms. Smith admits that
the vocational expert testified that the added limitations of “simple, routine, repetitive tasks” and “simple workrelated decisions” would not affect her ability to perform the provided jobs, but also argues that the vocational
expert was not asked about an individual with limitations as to “changes in a routine work setting” and
“responding appropriately to usual work situations.” Id. at 8.
Social Security regulations require an ALJ to “identify the [claimant’s] functional limitations or
restrictions and assess his or her work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis.” Mascio v. Colvin, 780
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F.3d 632, 636 (4th Cir. 2015). To satisfy the function-by-function analysis requirement, the ALJ must include a
“narrative discussion of the claimant’s symptoms and medical source opinions” to support the RFC
determination. White v. Commissioner, Civ. No. SAG–16–2428, 2017 WL 1373236, at *1 (D. Md. Apr. 13,
2017) (internal citation and quotations omitted); see also Taylor v. Astrue, Civ. No. BPG–11–0032, 2012 WL
294532, at *6 (D. Md. Jan. 31, 2012) (internal citation and quotations omitted) (finding that an ALJ’s “RFC
assessment is sufficient if it includes a narrative discussion of the claimant’s symptoms and medical source
opinions.”).
Here, at step three, the ALJ found that Ms. Smith has mild restrictions in activities of daily living,
moderate difficulties in social functioning, mild difficulties with regard to concentration, persistence, or pace,
and no episodes of decompensation that have been of extended duration. (Tr. 31). Even so, “a finding of
moderate impairment in a particular broad functioning area does not automatically indicate that a claimant’s
condition will significantly impact his or her ability to perform work-related functions.” Bell v. Astrue, Civ. No.
JKS–07–00924, slip op. at *8 (D. Md. Mar. 12, 2008). As Ms. Smith has admitted, the ALJ’s ultimate finding
that she was not disabled during the relevant time period would not have been affected even if the ALJ had
included limitations of “simple, routine, repetitive tasks” and “simple work-related decisions” within the RFC
assessment, as these added limitations did not change the available jobs listed by the vocational expert at the
hearing. Even if the ALJ erred by not including these limitations in the RFC assessment, such error was
harmless considering the vocational expert’s answers.
Ms. Smith also takes issue with the ALJ’s alleged failure to include relevant limitations with regard to
“changes in a routine work setting” and “responding appropriately to usual work situations.” However,
substantial evidence of record supports the ALJ’s decision not to include any limitations regarding Ms. Smith’s
ability to navigate changes in a routine work setting and respond appropriately to usual work situations in the
RFC determination. At step four, as described above, the ALJ found that Ms. Smith is capable of performing:
a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional
limitations: she can have no exposure to weather and is limited to work
environments with no more than moderate noise level, as defined in the selected
characteristics of occupations. She can be expected to respond appropriately with
supervisors unlimitedly, co-workers frequently and with the public occasionally.
(Tr. 32). In his analysis, the ALJ noted Dr. Taller’s consultative examination report, mental health treatment
notes from Baltimore Washington Counseling Center, and state agency medical consultants’ findings, as well as
Ms. Smith’s own testimony that she “can perform activities of daily living, can attend social events and can
concentrate enough to play on-line computer games and read science-fiction and non-fiction books.” (Tr. 33–
34). Ms. Smith’s first argument thus fails. These citations to the medical evidence of record demonstrate that
the ALJ set forth a sufficient narrative discussion of Ms. Smith’s symptoms and the medical source opinions in
determining her RFC, including which limitations were necessary according to the evidence of record. Thus,
Ms. Smith’s first argument is without merit.
Dr. Reichenbach’s Neuropsychological Evaluation & Testing
Second, Ms. Smith argues that the ALJ “failed to acknowledge or assign weight” to the
neuropsychological evaluation and testing completed by Dr. Reichenbach and thus the ALJ’s decision was not
supported by substantial evidence of record. (ECF No. 12–1 at 10). Ms. Smith correctly notes that the ALJ
must “explicitly indicate the weight given to all of the relevant evidence,” Perkins v. Apfel, 101 F.Supp.2d 365,
375 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal citation omitted), because the Court “cannot determine if findings are unsupported
by substantial evidence unless the [ALJ] explicitly indicates the weight given to all of the relevant evidence,”
Gordon v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984). However, Dr. Reichenbach’s evaluation from June 9,
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2005 predates the time period relevant to Ms. Smith’s disability application by eight years, as the Government
points out in its brief, (ECF No. 13–1 at 8). See Grimm v. Commissioner, Civ. No. SAG–15–3403, 2016 WL
6651300, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 10, 2016) (remanding the case where the ALJ supported his opinion with medical
evidence that predated the relevant time period for consideration of disability, rather than considering medical
evidence from the relevant time period). Although the Court cannot determine whether or not an ALJ’s opinion
is supported by substantial evidence of record unless the ALJ assigned weight to all relevant evidence, medical
testing conducted eight years before Ms. Smith’s disability application filing can hardly be considered relevant
to her application. See Baylor v. Commissioner, Civ. No. SAG–15–3520, 2016 WL 6085881, at *4 (D. Md.
Oct. 18, 2016) (noting that the ALJ properly discredited certain testing results because such testing took place
more than two years prior to the claimant’s application filing date). In his opinion, the ALJ addressed and
assigned weight to the relevant evidence of record and supported the RFC determination regarding Ms. Smith’s
mental impairments with substantial evidence of record. Ms. Smith’s second argument is therefore unavailing.
Because there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings and the findings were reached
through application of the correct legal standards, Ms. Smith’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 12) is
DENIED, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED, and the Social Security
Administration’s judgment is AFFIRMED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405. The Clerk is directed
to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it is an Order of the Court and the Clerk is directed to docket is
as such.

Sincerely yours,
/s/
J. Mark Coulson
United States Magistrate Judge

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