Overman v. Berryhill
Filing
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LETTER OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Timothy J. Sullivan on 9/11/2018. (kns, Deputy Clerk)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
TIMOTHY J. SULLIVAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
6500 Cherrywood Lane
Greenbelt, Maryland 20770
Telephone: (301) 344-3593
September 11, 2018
LETTER TO COUNSEL:
RE:
Jennifer Overman v. Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of Social Security1
Civil No. TJS-17-2446
Dear Counsel:
On August 25, 2017, Plaintiff Jennifer Lynn Overman (“Ms. Overman”) petitioned this
Court to review the Social Security Administration’s final decision to deny her claims for
disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”). (ECF No. 1.)
The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 17 & 18.) These motions
have been referred to the undersigned with the parties’ consent pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and
Local Rule 301.2 I find that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6. This Court must uphold
the decision of the agency if it is supported by substantial evidence and if the agency employed
the proper legal standards. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634
(4th Cir. 2015). Following its review, this Court may affirm, modify, or reverse the Acting
Commissioner, with or without a remand. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501
U.S. 89 (1991). Under that standard, I will deny both motions and remand the case for further
proceedings. This letter explains my rationale.
In her applications for disability benefits, Ms. Overman alleged disability beginning on
February 1, 2011, for her SSI claim (Tr. 216) and on October 10, 2013, for her DIB claim (Tr.
209, 240, 245). Her applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 139-56.) A
hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on July 20, 2016, (Tr. 41-86), and
the ALJ found that Ms. Overman was not disabled under the Social Security Act (Tr. 20-35). The
Appeals Council denied Ms. Overman’s request for review (Tr. 1-6), making the ALJ’s decision
the final, reviewable decision of the agency.
The ALJ evaluated Ms. Overman’s claim for benefits using the five-step sequential
evaluation process set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. At step one, the ALJ found that
Ms. Overman was not engaged in substantial gainful activity, and had not been engaged in
substantial gainful activity since October 10, 2013. (Tr. 22.) At step two, the ALJ found that Ms.
Overman suffered from the severe impairments of bipolar disorder and anxiety disorder. (Tr. 231
Currently, the position of Commissioner of the Social Security Administration is vacant,
and most duties are fulfilled by Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations,
performing the duties and functions not reserved to the Commissioner of Social Security.
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This case was originally assigned to Magistrate Judge Stephanie A. Gallagher. On July
31, 2018, the case was reassigned to me.
24.) At step three, the ALJ found that Ms. Overman’s impairments, separately and in
combination, failed to meet or equal in severity any listed impairment as set forth in 20 C.F.R.,
Chapter III, Pt. 404, Subpart P, App. 1 (“Listings”). (Tr. 24-26.) The ALJ determined that Ms.
Overman retained the RFC
to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following
nonexertional limitations: simple, routine tasks not at a production pace. Simple
work-related decisions in a “low stress” environment. Limited to communicating
simple information. Occasional contact with supervisors and co-workers. She can
never interact with the public. She would be off-task 10 percent of the workday.
(Tr. 27.)
At step four, the ALJ determined that Ms. Overman was unable to perform any past
relevant work. (Tr. 32-33.) At step five, relying on the testimony of a vocational expert and
considering Ms. Overman’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ found that there
are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that she can perform, including
janitor, housekeeper, and inspector. (Tr. 34.) Therefore, the ALJ found that Ms. Overman was
not disabled under the Social Security Act. (Tr. 35.)
Ms. Overman raises two arguments in this appeal. First, she argues that the ALJ’s RFC
determination is not supported by substantial evidence. (ECF No. 17-1 at 9-11.) Second, she
argues that the ALJ posed an inadequate hypothetical to the vocational expert. (Id. at 12-16.)
After a careful review of the ALJ’s decision and the evidence in the record, I find that the ALJ
did not provide an adequate explanation for the RFC finding that Ms. Overman would be “offtask 10 percent of the workday.” (Tr. 27.) Because the ALJ did not adequately explain this very
specific conclusion, the findings made in reliance on the RFC cannot be said to be based on
substantial evidence. I decline to address Ms. Overman’s second argument.
Ms. Overman argues that the ALJ “erroneously assessed [her] RFC contrary to Social
Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p (July 2, 1996) by failing to conduct a function-by-function
assessment of her ability to perform the physical and mental demands of work.” (ECF No. 17-1
at 9.) Specifically, Ms. Overman argues that the ALJ “did not explain his finding that [she]
would be ‘off-task 10 percent of the workday.’” (Id.) The Acting Commissioner argues that there
is substantial evidence “support[ing] the ALJ’s overall assessment that limitations in [her] ability
to stay on task would not prevent her from working.” (ECF No. 18-1 at 5.)
Social Security Ruling 96-8p instructs that an “RFC assessment must first identify the
individual’s functional limitations or restrictions and assess his or her work-related abilities on a
function-by-function basis, including the functions” listed in the regulations. SSR 96-8p, 1996
WL 374184, at *1 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). Further, the “RFC assessment must include a narrative
discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts
(e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations).” Id. at
*7. An ALJ must “both identify evidence that supports his conclusion and build an accurate and
logical bridge from [that] evidence to his conclusion.” Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686, 694
(4th Cir. 2018) (emphasis omitted).
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Here, the ALJ failed to provide an “accurate and logical bridge” between Ms. Overman’s
mental limitations and the RFC determination. As part of the RFC assessment, the ALJ found
that Ms. Overman would be “off-task 10 percent of the workday.” (Tr. 27.) The ALJ did not
explain the basis for this conclusion. While the ALJ detailed a number of findings related to Ms.
Overman’s moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, and pace, the ALJ did not explain
why or how the percentage of time off-task was calculated. This is important because the
vocational expert testified that if a hypothetical individual with abilities matching those of Ms.
Overman was off-task 15 percent of the time or more, they would be “incapable of maintaining
the job.” (Tr. 83.) “An explanation of how the percentage of time off-task was calculated is
significant, since a relatively small increase could preclude competitive employment.” Fisher v.
Comm’r, Soc. Sec., No. RDB-17-3165, 2018 WL 3348858, at *3 (D. Md. July 9, 2018). Here, the
difference between Ms. Overman being off-task 15 percent of the workday (instead of 10
percent) would have been dispositive to a finding of disability, at least to the extent that the ALJ
relied on the vocational expert’s testimony. Because the ALJ did not adequately explain the
reason for the finding that Ms. Overman would be “off-task 10 percent of the workday,” this
Court is unable to meaningfully review the ALJ’s decision. For this reason, remand is
appropriate. The Court makes no finding as to the merits of the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion that
Ms. Overman is not disabled.
For the reasons set forth herein, both parties’ motions for summary judgment (ECF Nos.
17 & 18) are DENIED. Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Acting
Commissioner’s judgment is REVERSED IN PART due to inadequate analysis. The case is
REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. The Clerk is directed to
CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion. An
implementing Order follows.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Timothy J. Sullivan
United States Magistrate Judge
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