Luten v. R&M Performance, Inc. et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge J. Mark Coulson on 12/20/2017. (jnls, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
KEVIN LUTEN,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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R&M PERFORMANCE, INC. et al,
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Defendants.
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Civil Case No. 17–02723–JMC
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Kevin Luten (“Plaintiff”) brought suit against Defendants R&M Performance,
Inc., R&M Performance, LLC, and Russell Hutchins, Jr. (collectively, the “Defendants”) for
breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the Maryland Consumer
Protection Act. (ECF No. 1). The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge for all
proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rules 301 and 302. (ECF No. 18). Currently
pending before this Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for Immediate
Specific Performance. (ECF No. 6). In considering Plaintiff’s Motion, the Court has also
reviewed Defendants’ Opposition to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s
Reply thereto. (ECF Nos. 11, 13). No hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md.
2016).
For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for
Immediate Specific Performance is DENIED.
I.
BACKGROUND
In May of 2010, Plaintiff Kevin Luten entered into an agreement with Defendant R&M
Performance, owned by Defendants Russell Hutchins, Jr., for services related to the restoration
of his 1975 Ford F-150 Ranger pick-up truck. Over the next six years, Plaintiff returned to
Defendant for additional restorative work on the pick-up truck as he obtained the funds to pay for
the ongoing restoration. After some e-mail discussion between the parties in July and August of
2016, Plaintiff and Defendant agreed that Plaintiff would pay Defendant $15,000 for the
completion of all remaining work on the pick-up truck by September 23, 2016. However, the
remaining work was not completed by that deadline. Defendant attributes this failure to the loss
of a particularly skilled employee (Brian Romine) and Plaintiff’s own failure to provide
necessary parts for the restoration. Defendant also claims that Plaintiff was informed of the loss
of the employee and actually approved the extension of time necessary to complete the work.
Plaintiff and Defendant were apparently scheduled to have a status call on June 12, 2017 to
discuss progress in the truck restoration. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant did not call him as
scheduled and also failed to answer Plaintiff’s follow-up calls over the next three days.
Defendant asserts that he was unresponsive due to a hospitalization.
Plaintiff then posted
negative and allegedly derogatory reviews about Defendant on social media. Upon learning of
these reviews, Defendant requested that Plaintiff remove his vehicle and remaining
miscellaneous parts from Defendant’s premises.
II.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff seeks partial summary judgment on the grounds that a contract was formed
between Plaintiff and Defendant, Defendant breached that contract, and specific performance of
the contract is the appropriate remedy. Plaintiff asserts that the “Court should grant partial
summary judgment granting specific performance of the contract, because [he] and [Defendants]
agreed to a scope of work that was clearly defined and the work was to be completed on
[Defendants’] property in the interest of [Plaintiff].” (ECF No. 6, Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J.
at 4). The Court will first address whether the requirements for summary judgment have been
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met by Plaintiff, and will then proceed to address specific performance as the appropriate
remedy.
A.
Dispute of Material Fact Precludes Partial Summary Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the Court to “grant summary judgment if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The moving party bears the burden “to demonstrate the
absence of any genuine dispute of material fact.” Jones v. Hoffberger Moving Servs. LLC, 92
F.Supp.3d 405, 409 (D. Md. 2015) (internal citations omitted). A dispute as to a material fact “is
genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” J.E. Dunn Const. Co. v. S.R.P. Dev. Ltd. P’ship, 115 F.Supp.35 593, 600 (D. Md. 2015)
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A nonmoving party
“opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,’ but rather must ‘set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d
514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003). The court is “required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to” the nonmoving party, Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir.
2008) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007)), but must also “abide by the ‘affirmative
obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from
proceeding to trial.’” Heckman v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 962 F.Supp.2d 792, 799–800
(quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir. 1993)).
In his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for Immediate Specific Performance, Plaintiff
asserts that “[t]he undisputed evidence shows that R&M entered into a contract to complete the
work set forth in the August 1, 2016 agreement by September 23, 2016, but failed to do so.”
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(ECF No. 6, Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 4). Plaintiff further contends that “[t]hese facts
establish the existence of a contract and breach so the only question is remedy.” Id. The
evidence, however, is far from “undisputed.” A dispute of material fact exists in this case as to
the alleged breach of contract by Defendants. In its Response to Plaintiff’s motion, Defendants
seem to concede the existence of a contract between Plaintiff and Defendant, but claim that
Plaintiff is actually responsible and at fault for the delay in completing the restoration work on
the truck under the contract.
Specifically, part of the agreement between the parties made Plaintiff responsible for the
purchase and provision of certain parts for the pickup that Defendants were then to utilize and
install in the truck as part of the restoration. Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not provided
parts necessary for the completion of the restoration work: “Additional parts will be necessary to
complete the restoration. For example, wheels and tires have not been supplied by [Plaintiff],
even though [he] had indicated in his email of July 25, 2016 that he would buy these soon and
ship them. The vehicle cannot be completed, in part, as [Plaintiff] has not purchased and
supplied all of the parts that he has indicated he would be responsible for.” (ECF No. 11, Def.’s
Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. at 2).
This assertion is supported by testimony in Defendant Russell
Hutchins, Jr.’s affidavit, attached to Defendants’ Response. (ECF No. 11-1, Hutchins Aff.).
In addition, Defendants also claim that Plaintiff was advised of the loss of the especially
skilled employee whose work was necessary for the completion of the restoration of Plaintiff’s
truck, and that Plaintiff approved of the extension of time that the restoration would thus require.
Id. (“[Plaintiff] was advised of the loss of Mr. Romine and that the truck would take longer than
anticipated. In talking with [Plaintiff], he was okay with the job taking longer than expected
under the circumstances.”). Thus, a dispute of material fact exists as to whether a breach of
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contract occurred and, if the breach did occur, whether the contract breach is the fault of Plaintiff
or Defendants. These issues are to be left to the members of the jury to decide, and preclude a
grant of summary judgment in Plaintiff’s favor.
B.
Availability of Specific Performance of a Personal Service Contract as Remedy
Even assuming that there is no dispute of material fact that would preclude partial
summary judgment, specific performance is not an appropriate remedy in this case.
The
Maryland Court of Appeals has explained that “[s]pecific performance of a contract is a matter
of sound judicial discretion controlled by established principles of equity.” Data Consultants,
Inc. v. Traywick, 593 F.Supp. 447, 453 (D. Md. 1983) (citing Offutt v. Offutt, 106 Md. 236
(1907)). In considering whether to grant specific performance as relief, courts consider “all of
the circumstances of the particular case in the light of equitable principles.” Id.; see also Namleb
Corp. v. Garrett, 149 Md.App. 163, 174 (2002) (“Specific performance may be granted in an
appropriate case on the basis of the strength of the circumstances and equities of each party.”).
As an initial matter, however, “the plaintiff must [first] prove the existence of an agreement
between the parties and a breach of that agreement by the defendant” before specific
performance can be awarded as remedy. Traywick, 593 F.Supp at 453.
As discussed above, Plaintiff here has failed to prove that a breach of the agreement
between Plaintiff and Defendants occurred and that such a breach was the fault of Defendants.
Furthermore, the Court remains unconvinced that specific performance is the appropriate remedy
for breach of a contract to restore an automobile which, in the Court’s view, is analogous to a
personal service contract. Plaintiff cites to various Maryland Court of Appeals and Court of
Special Appeals decisions as support for his contention that specific performance of an
automobile restoration contract is available as an appropriate remedy when a contract breach
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occurs. See Yaffe v. Scarlett Place Residential Condominium, Inc., 205 Md. App. 429 (2012)
(finding “the [trial] court did not abuse its discretion because there is simply no reason given in
the record to require the equitable remedy of specific performance”); Chestnut Real Estate
P’ship v. Huber, 148 Md. App. 190 (2002) (examining specific performance as remedy only for
the purposes of rendering a decision on a requested injunction); Fran Realty, Inc. v. Thomas, 30
Md. App. 362 (1976) (allowing for specific performance when the home construction company
stopped work due to the difficulty of sub-surface conditions at the building sites); Brummel v.
Clifton Realty Co., 146 Md. 56 (1924) (remanding the case after determining that courts of
equity may compel specific performance as remedy for contract breach).
In doing so, Plaintiff attempts to draw a comparison between building contracts and
automobile restoration contracts to allow for the provision of specific performance as remedy in
this case, but even that comparison fails. Even if such an analogy were appropriate, Maryland’s
appellate courts have noted “the great difficulty and often impossibility attending a judicial
superintendence and execution of the performance.’” Yaffe, 205 Md.App. at 454 (quoting Fran
Realty, Inc. v. Thomas, 30 Md.App. 362, 366 (1976)). In the Court’s view, the more apt analogy
is to a personal services contract, where courts have explicitly stated that specific performance is
unavailable as a remedy. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 367 (1981) (“A promise to
render personal service will not be specifically enforced.”); UBA, LLC v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator
Corp., No. 5:15–cv–477–FL, 2017 WL 544586, *6 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 9, 2017) (citing the
“existence of a policy against specific enforcement of personal services contracts” in regards to a
dispute over repair of an elevator); Bromberg v. Eugenotto Const. Co., 158 Ala. 323, 325 (1908)
(“There is a class of special and exceptional contracts in which courts of equity refuse to exercise
jurisdiction by way of specific performance.
These are contracts having such terms and
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provisions that the court could not carry into effect its decree without some personal supervision
and oversight over the work to be done, extending over a considerable period of time, such as
agreements to repair or build.”) (internal citations omitted). Finally, even if the Court were to
find that specific performance was an available remedy, the balance of equities in this case
dictates that specific performance is inappropriate, considering the complete deterioration of and
the current tension in the relationship between the parties.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for
Immediate Specific Performance is DENIED. A separate Order shall follow.
Dated: December 20, 2017
/s/
J. Mark Coulson
United States Magistrate Judge
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