Chamberlain v. Brown et al

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying as moot Chamberlain's 4 Motion to Dismiss Complaint; granting Chamberlain's 10 Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint; denying as moot Brown and Warren's 11 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a C laim, or in the alternative for Summary Judgment; granting Brown and Warren's 15 Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, or in the alternative for Summary Judgment; closing case. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 7/31/2018. (dass, Deputy Clerk) (c/m 8/1/18-das)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Chambers of
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge

101 West Lombard Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21201
410-962-4055

July 31, 2018
MEMORANDUM TO PARTIES RE:

Stephen D. Chamberlain v. Samuel J. Brown, et
al.
Civil Action No. GLR-17-2880

Dear Parties:
Pending before the Court are Defendant Judith C. Chamberlain’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim Upon Which
Relief Can Be Granted (ECF No. 10) and Defendants Samuel J. Brown and Marietta B. Warren’s
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
15).1 The Motions are ripe for disposition, and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md.
2016). For the reasons outlined below, the Court will grant the Motions.
On May 22, 2009, Plaintiff Stephen D. Chamberlain and Ms. Chamberlain (collectively, “the
Chamberlains”) divorced. (Am. Compl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 9).2 As part of the divorce, the Chamberlains
entered into a Marital Settlement Agreement (“MSA”). (Id. ¶ 6). The MSA contained a provision that
dictated how the Chamberlains’ three children would apply to and select a college to (the “College
Education Provision”). (Id. ¶ 7).
On September 19, 2013, Ms. Chamberlain filed a Petition for Contempt and Declaratory
Judgment Complaint to Enforce the MSA in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County (the
“Declaratory Judgment Action”). (Am. Compl. ¶ 13; Def.’s Mot. Dismiss [“Def.’s Mot.”] Ex. A at 14,
ECF No. 4-2).3 Ms. Chamberlain sought a declaration that the MSA’s College Education Provision
permitted the Chamberlains’ youngest son to apply to “the schools of his choice.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 13).
Brown and Warren represented Ms. Chamberlain in the Declaratory Judgment Action. (See id. ¶¶ 13,
Also pending before the Court are Ms. Chamberlain’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint
(ECF No. 4) and Brown and Warren’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim or, in the
Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 11) as to Mr. Chamberlain’s original Complaint.
An amended complaint typically moots any pending motions to dismiss because it supersedes the
original complaint. Venable v. Pritzker, No. GLR-13-1867, 2014 WL 2452705, at *5 (D.Md. May 30,
2014) aff’d, 610 F.App’x 341 (4th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, the Court will deny these Motions as moot.
2
Unless otherwise noted, the Court describes facts taken from the Amended Complaint and
accepts them as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted).
3
The Court may take judicial notice of “‘matters of public record’ and other information that,
under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, constitute ‘adjudicative facts.’” Goldfarb v. Mayor of Balt., 791
F.3d 500, 508 (4th Cir. 2015); see Fed.R.Evid. 201(b)(2). In particular, Rule 201 permits a court to take
judicial notice of an adjudicative fact if it: “(1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial
jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.” Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of the state court divorce case,
Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, Case No. 02-C-09-139690 (Anne Arundel Ct.Cir.Ct. 2008) (the “Divorce
Action”). (Def.’s Mot. Ex. A).
1

17). The parties entered into a consent order that resolved the Declaratory Judgment Action on June 5,
2014. (Def.’s Mot. Ex. B, ECF No. 4-3).
On September 28, 2017, Mr. Chamberlain, pro se, sued Ms. Chamberlain, Brown, and Warren.
(ECF No. 1). On November 27, 2017, Mr. Chamberlain filed an Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 9),
which brings seven counts: (1) abuse of process for wrongful use of discovery against Ms. Chamberlain,
Brown, and Warren (Count I);4 (2) abuse of process for filing known meritless litigation against Ms.
Chamberlain, Brown, and Warren (Count II); (3) abuse of process for concealing known information
from the court against Ms. Chamberlain and Warren (Count III); (4) abuse of process for sustaining
known moot litigation against Ms. Chamberlain, Brown, and Warren (Count IV); (5) abuse of process
for tampering with a sealed court record against Brown and Warren (Count V); (6) tortious interference
with contract against Brown and Warren (Count VI); and (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress
(“IIED”) against Ms. Chamberlain, Brown, and Warren. (Id. ¶¶ 41–79). Mr. Chamberlain seeks
compensatory and punitive damages. (See, e.g., id. ¶ 45).
On November 28, 2017, Ms. Chamberlain filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can
be Granted. (ECF No. 10). On December 11, 2017, Mr. Chamberlain filed an Opposition. (ECF No.
18). To date, the Court has no record that Ms. Chamberlain filed a Reply.
On November 30, 2017, Brown and Warren filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint or,
in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 15). Mr. Chamberlain filed an
Opposition on December 16, 2017. (ECF No. 21). To date, the Court has no record that Brown and
Warren filed a Reply.
Brown and Warren style their Motions as motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment under Rule 56. A motion styled in this manner implicates the
Court’s discretion under Rule 12(d). See Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep’t., Inc. v. Montgomery Cty.,
788 F.Supp.2d 431, 436–37 (D.Md. 2011), aff’d, 684 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 2012). This Rule provides that
when “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the [Rule 12(b)(6)]
motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). The Court
“has ‘complete discretion to determine whether or not to accept the submission of any material beyond
the pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and rely on it, thereby
converting the motion, or to reject it or simply not consider it.’” Wells-Bey v. Kopp, No. ELH-12-2319,
2013 WL 1700927, at *5 (D.Md. Apr. 16, 2013) (quoting 5C Wright & Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 1366, at 159 (3d ed. 2004, 2012 Supp.)).
In this case, because Brown and Warren did not attach any exhibits to their Motion, the Court
will not convert it into a motion for summary judgment.
“The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of a complaint,” not to “resolve
contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” King v.
Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231,
243–44 (4th Cir. 1999)). A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), or does not
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff
4

Mr. Chamberlain titles each Count a “Cause of Action.” (See, e.g., Am. Compl. at 13).

2

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Though the plaintiff is not required to forecast evidence to prove the
elements of the claim, the complaint must allege sufficient facts to establish each element. Goss v. Bank
of Am., N.A., 917 F.Supp.2d 445, 449 (D.Md. 2013) (quoting Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439
(4th Cir. 2012)), aff’d sub nom., Goss v. Bank of Am., NA, 546 F.App’x 165 (4th Cir. 2013).
Pro se pleadings, however, are liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than
pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976)); accord Brown v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 612 F.3d 720, 722 (4th Cir. 2010). Pro se complaints are
entitled to special care to determine whether any possible set of facts would entitle the plaintiff to relief.
Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9–10 (1980). Nonetheless, “[w]hile pro se complaints may ‘represent the
work of an untutored hand requiring special judicial solicitude,’ a district court is not required to
recognize ‘obscure or extravagant claims defying the most concerted efforts to unravel them.’” Weller
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. for Balt., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Beaudett v. City of
Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985)).
Defendants advance five arguments for dismissing the Amended Complaint:5 (1) the domestic
relations exception to diversity jurisdiction; (2) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine;6 (3) res judicata; (4)
statute of limitations; and (5) failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court agrees with
Defendants’ fifth argument and addresses Mr. Chamberlain’s claims in turn.
Abuse of Process
To state an abuse of process claim under Maryland law, 7 a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the
defendants “willfully used process after it has issued in a manner not contemplated by law”; (2) the
defendants acted with an “ulterior motive”; and (3) damages as a result of the defendants’ improper use
of process. Clark v. Choudry, No. DKC 16-0261, 2016 WL 3541248, at *4 (D.Md. June 29, 2016)
(quoting One Thousand Fleet Ltd. P’ship v. Guerriero, 694 A.2d 952, 956 (Md. 1997)). As to the
damages element, “an arrest of the person or a seizure of property” must result from the defendants’
abuse of process. Clark, 2016 WL 3541248, at *4 (One Thousand Fleet, 694 A.2d at 960).
Defendants assert that Mr. Chamberlain fails to plead legally cognizable damages, specifically
because he does not allege a seizure of real property.8 Although the Court is not persuaded that an abuse
of process claim requires the seizure of real property,9 the Court nevertheless agrees that Mr.
Chamberlain fails to plausibly allege damages.
Warren and Brown incorporate by reference Ms. Chamberlain’s Motion and accompanying
memorandum. (Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss Am. Compl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 15).
6
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts generally do not have jurisdiction to
review state-court decisions. Allstate Ins. Co. v. W. Va. State Bar, 233 F.3d 813, 816 (4th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997)).
7
The parties agree that Maryland law applies.
8
Brown and Warren also argue that Mr. Chamberlain fails to sufficiently allege the first and
second elements of abuse of process. Because the Court concludes that Mr. Chamberlain does not
adequately plead the third element, the Court does not address the first and second elements.
9
Mr. Chamberlain requests that the Court impose sanctions under Rules 11 and 56(h) on Brown
and Warren for misrepresenting that the seizure of property in an abuse of process claim must be real
5

3

Here, in each of Mr. Chamberlain’s five abuse of process Counts, he pleads that “[a]s a direct
and proximate result” of Defendants’ actions, he sustained “economic losses” and “emotional distress.”
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 45, 51, 56, 60, 65). These threadbare allegations fail to even parrot the damages
element for abuse of process, and, therefore, fail to sufficiently state a claim. To be sure, Mr.
Chamberlain also alleges, apropos of nothing, that Defendants “successfully seized property in the
amount of $2,357.43” from him. (Am. Compl. ¶ 37). He does not, however, provide any factual
allegations that would permit the Court to infer a causal connection between this seizure of property and
Defendants’ purported abuses of process. See Clark, 2016 WL 3541248, at *4 (One Thousand Fleet,
694 A.2d at 960). Thus, the Court concludes that Mr. Chamberlain fails to state claims for abuse of
process.
Tortious Interference with a Contract
Under Maryland law, to establish tortious interference with a contract, the plaintiff must allege:
(1) the “existence of a contract between plaintiff and a third party”; (2) defendants’ “knowledge of that
contract”; (3) defendants’ “intentional interference with that contract”; (4) “breach of that contract by
the third party”; and (5) “resulting damages to the plaintiff.” Sprint Nextel Corp. v. Simple Cell Inc.,
248 F.Supp.3d 663, 682 (D.Md. 2017) (quoting Fraidin v. Weitzman, 611 A.2d 1046, 1057
(Md.Ct.App.Spec. 1993)). “As a matter of law, a party to a contract cannot tortiously ‘interfere’ with
his or her own contract.” Goode v. Am. Veterans, Inc., 874 F.Supp.2d 430, 447 n.12 (D.Md. 2012)
(quoting Bagwell v. Peninsula Reg’l Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d 297, 313 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 1995)). Similarly,
an agent of a party to a contract, acting within the scope of the agency relationship, cannot interfere with
the contract. Id. (quoting Bagwell, 665 A.2d at 313). Attorneys are agents whose principals are their
clients. Martin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. MJG-12-2566, 2012 WL 13008385, at *7 (D.Md. Nov.
30, 2012) (citing Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Boney, 761 A.2d 985, 992 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 2000)).
Brown and Warren assert that, as Ms. Chamberlain’s attorneys, they were acting within the
scope of their agency when they litigated the Declaratory Judgment Action. As a result, Brown and
Warren contend, Mr. Chamberlain fails to state a tortious interference with a contract claim. The Court
agrees.
Here, the Amended Complaint lacks any allegations that Brown and Warren were acting outside
the scope of their agency. Mr. Chamberlain argues in his Opposition that Brown’s and Warren’s actions
were outside of the scope of their agency, but this allegation does not appear in the Amended
Complaint. Even if it did, Mr. Chamberlain does not provide any factual basis to support this naked
assertion. Indeed, Mr. Chamberlain states that “defendants” “interfered” with the MSA and “conspired
to resist performance of the [MSA].” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 69–71, 73). These statements contemplate that
Defendants, including Ms. Chamberlain, worked together to interfere with the MSA. This directly
contradicts any assertion that Brown and Warren were acting outside the scope of Ms. Chamberlain’s
authority. Thus, the Court concludes that Mr. Chamberlain fails to state a tortious interference with a
contract claim.

property. Rule 11 requires a party seeking sanctions file a motion “separately from any other
motion.” Rule 56(h) authorizes reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees incurred in responding to
affidavits on summary judgment that are submitted in bad faith. Here, Mr. Chamberlain submits his
request in his Opposition, not in a separate motion. In addition, no party submitted an affidavit in this
case. Accordingly, the Court denies Mr. Chamberlain’s request.

4

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In Maryland, to sufficiently state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”),
a plaintiff must allege: (1) conduct that is “intentional or reckless”; (2) conduct that is “extreme and
outrageous”; (3) “a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress”; and (4)
emotional distress that is “severe.” Takacs v. Fiore, 473 F.Supp.2d 647, 651–52 (D.Md. 2007) (quoting
Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 1977)). As to the second element, the standard
for “extreme and outrageous” conduct is “quite high.” Tyndall v. Berlin Fire Co., No. ELH-13-02496,
2015 WL 4396529, at *34 (D.Md. July 16, 2015). The conduct must be “so outrageous in character, and
so extreme in degree,” that it goes “beyond all possible bounds of decency.” Arsham v. Mayor of Balt.,
85 F.Supp.3d 841, 850 (D.Md. 2015) (quoting Harris, 380 A.2d at 614). Put differently, the conduct
must “completely violate human dignity” and “strike to the very core of one’s being, threatening to
shatter the frame upon which one’s emotional fabric is hung.” Interphase Garment Sols., LLC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 566 F.Supp.2d 460, 466 (D.Md. 2008) (quoting Hamilton v. Ford Motor Credit
Co., 502 A.2d 1057, 1064 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 1986)).
Defendants contend that Mr. Chamberlain fails to allege the second element—extreme and
outrageous conduct. Mr. Chamberlain counters that even though Defendants’ individual acts may not be
extreme and outrageous, their cumulative acts constitute an IIED claim. The Court agrees with
Defendants.
Here, Mr. Chamberlain alleges that Defendants forced him to “defend against frivolous legal
actions” that created “financial and emotional duress.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 77). He states that Defendants
“intentionally and systematically abused the legal process” and “willfully and deliberately interfered”
with the MSA to “extort money” from him under the guise of a settlement. (Id. ¶ 76). Taking these
allegations as true, they do not clear the high bar of extreme and outrageous conduct. See Tyndall, 2015
WL 4396529, at *34. Litigating frivolous legal actions—even bitter and protracted ones—does not
constitute conduct that “completely violate[s] human dignity.” Interphase Garment Sols., 566
F.Supp.2d at 466 (quoting Hamilton, 502 A.2d at 1064). Thus, the Court concludes that Mr.
Chamberlain fails to state an IIED claim.
In sum, Mr. Chamberlain fails to adequately allege abuse of process, tortious interference with a
contract, and IIED claims. Accordingly, the Court will grant the Motions.
For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Chamberlain’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can
Be Granted (ECF No. 10) and Brown and Warren’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint or, in the
Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 15) are GRANTED. Ms. Chamberlain’s Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 4) and Brown and Warren’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
State a Claim or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 11) are DENIED AS
MOOT. Despite the informal nature of this Memorandum, it shall constitute an Order of the Court, and
the Clerk is directed to docket it accordingly, CLOSE this case, and mail a copy to Mr. Chamberlain at
his address of record.
Very truly yours,
/s/
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge

5