Smith v. State of Maryland et al
Filing
29
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 18 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment; denying 21 Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 26 Defendants' Motion for Leave to Supplement Their Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment; and directing Plaintiff to arrange a case-planning telephone conference. Signed by Judge Marvin J. Garbis on 4/4/2018. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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ALTON W. SMITH,
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
CIV. ACTION NO. MJG-17-3051
*
STATE OF MARYLAND, ET AL,
*
Defendants
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*
*
*
*
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*
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The Court has before it Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or,
In the Alternative for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 18],
Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 21],
Defendants’ Motion for Leave to Supplement Their Motion To
Dismiss Or, In the Alternative, For Summary Judgment [ECF No.
26], and the materials submitted relating thereto.
The Court
has held a hearing and has had the benefit of arguments of
counsel.
Both sides have submitted materials in addition to the
Complaint regarding these motions.
The Court has not excluded
these materials from consideration.
When “matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
[12(b)(6)] motion shall be treated as one
for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56.”
Laughlin v. Metro. Washington Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260–
61 (4th Cir. 1998); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
Because the Court
has relied on supplemental affidavits and documents filed
outside of the pleadings, it will treat the pending motions as
motions for summary judgment.
I.
BACKGROUND
A. Asserted Claims
After his college teaching contract was not renewed in
2016, Plaintiff Alton W. Smith (“Smith” or “Plaintiff”) brought
an action against his former employer, Baltimore City Community
College (“BCCC”),1 the State of Maryland, and three Individual
Defendants:
Tonja L. Ringgold (“Ringgold”), Enyinnaya Iweha
(“Iweha”), and Cynthia Webb (“Webb”).2
Plaintiff asserts claims in Seven Counts:
Count
Title
I
Breach of Contract (All Defendants)
II
Interference with Economic Relationship (Iweha only)
III
Interference with Economic Relationship (Webb only)
IV
Interference with Economic Relationship (Ringgold only)
V
Conspiracy to Interfere with Economic Relationship
(Iweha, Webb, and Ringgold)
1
BCCC is a Maryland state entity.
During the relevant time period, Ringgold was BCCC’s Vice
President of Academic Affairs, and Iweha and Webb were the Dean
and Interim Associate Dean of the business school, respectively.
2
2
VI
Deprivation of Property Without Due Process under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (All Defendants)
VII
Deprivation of Property Without Due Process under
Maryland Declaration of Rights, Art. 24 (All Defendants)
B. Background
Plaintiff was an associate professor at BCCC who taught
electronics courses from 2005 to 2011 and business courses from
2011 until 2016.
Compl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 2.
In August 2015, Smith and BCCC entered into a 3-year
teaching contract (“Contract”) which required yearly renewal and
ran from August 15, 2015 to June 2, 2018.
Id. ¶ 6.
Under the
Contract, he must carry a semester teaching load of 15 Teaching
Assignment Units (“TAUs”).
Id. ¶ 7.
His rights and duties as a
faculty member were listed in his Contract and in the BCCC
Faculty Handbook (“Handbook”).3
1.
Academic Program and Course Changes at BCCC
From 2005 to 2013, Plaintiff taught classes in the
Electronic Technology and Telecommunications Program (“ETP”).
3
As examples, faculty with a multi-year contract who
received an overall evaluation of “Fair” or “Poor” would be put
on a one year improvement plan, and faculty terminated for poor
performance were to be given 30 days of pre-termination notice
and an opportunity to meet with the President of BCCC regarding
the termination. Id. ¶¶ 8-11.
3
Def.’s Mem. at 2, ECF No. 18-1.4
In 2009, BCCC notified faculty members that it will
eliminate some academic programs for the long term, and in 2011,
BCCC’s Board of Trustees approved the elimination of 14
programs, including ETP.
Def.’s Mem. at 2-3, ECF No. 18-1.
Faculty in the ETP program, including Smith, could teach other
classes for which they were qualified or could take graduate
courses paid for by BCCC to obtain necessary qualifications to
teach other programs.
Iweha Aff. ¶ 3, ECF No. 18-10.
When the ETP program was eliminated, Plaintiff was not
qualified to teach in other discipline-specific programs (except
for introductory business courses), and refused the offer to
pursue education that would have given him the necessary
qualifications.
Id. ¶¶ 4-5.
Nevertheless, BCCC allowed him to
teach-out the remaining ETP students and to teach introductory
(but not discipline-specific) courses in the business program.
Id. ¶ 5; Webb Aff. ¶ 12, ECF No. 18-12.
In 2013, BCCC created a new program in
“Robotics/Mechatronics,” and “paid for [] Smith to attend
training classes that introduced him to the equipment that would
be used in the program.”
Def.’s Mem. at 4, ECF No. 18-1.
Smith
took those equipment introduction courses but declined to obtain
4
During this period, Plaintiff received overall performance
evaluation ratings of “Good” or “Very Good.” Compl. ¶ 10; Smith
Aff. ¶ 7, ECF No. 22-2.
4
the requisite graduate degree that would qualify him to actually
teach robotics courses to students.
Id. at 5.
Ultimately, BCCC
rejected Smith’s application for a teaching position in the
program and hired an individual who had a PhD in Electronics and
Mechanical Engineering.
Id.; Iweha Aff. ¶ 6, ECF No. 18-10.
Following the denial of his application, Plaintiff filed an EEO
complaint against Iweha.
Smith Aff. ¶ 5, ECF No. 22-2.
On
April 11, 2014, the investigation was closed on the basis that
the discrimination allegations were unsubstantiated.5
Pl.’s
Cross Mot. Ex. 2d, ECF No. 22-6.
In July 2013, in response to state legislative action, BCCC
reduced the number of classes that were deemed “required” to
receive a degree for many of its programs, and downgraded
certain “required” courses to “electives.”6
Def.’s Mem. at 5,
ECF No. 18-1; Ringgold Aff. ¶¶ 6-7, ECF No. 18-11.
Some of
Plaintiff’s courses were eliminated due to these decisions and
subsequent declining enrollment.
Def.’s Mem. at 5, ECF No. 18-
1; Ringgold Aff. ¶ 8, ECF No. 18-11.
5
Iweha was allegedly warned by BCCC to not retaliate against
Smith. Compl. ¶ 28.
6
These reduction decisions were approved by Defendant
Ringgold after feedback from faculty, program coordinators, the
curriculum committee, and the faculty senate. Ringgold Aff. ¶
7, ECF No. 18-11. Elimination of remaining EFP courses required
approval by multiple levels of management at BCCC and the
Maryland Higher Education Commission. Webb Aff. ¶ 17, ECF No.
18-12.
5
2.
Events Leading Up to Termination
In November 2015, Smith was supervised by Defendants Webb
and Iweha.
Compl. ¶¶ 12-13.
As a result of the changes in
academic programs and courses, supra, Plaintiff was left with
teaching only 6 TAUs for the 2016 Spring Semester (i.e., two
sections of an introductory business course) instead of the
required 15 TAUs required by his contract.7
Iweha Aff. ¶ 9, ECF
No. 18-10; Def.’s Mot. Ex. 3, ECF No. 18-5.
In early 2016, Defendants Webb and Iweha met with Plaintiff
to discuss alternative options for qualifying TAUs, but
Plaintiff did not offer viable suggestions as to how he could
meet his required TAUs for the semester.8
Iweha Aff. ¶ 10, ECF
No. 18-10; Webb Aff. ¶¶ 22-23, ECF No. 18-12.
Defendant Webb gave Plaintiff a “Poor” performance
evaluation for the 2015-2016 academic school year, based on the
low TAUs and her evaluation of his work.
Webb Aff. ¶ 25, ECF
No. 18-12.
Webb and Smith met on March 10, 2016 to review his 2015-
7
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants purposefully manipulated
his TAUs to reduce them. Compl. ¶ 15. As support, Plaintiff
states that before registration was closed for the Spring 2016
semester, Defendant Webb told him that some of his courses had
been cancelled due to low enrollment. Smith Aff. ¶ 9, ECF No.
22-2. Plaintiff states he was not given prior notice of the
cancellations. Id. ¶ 10.
8
Plaintiff argues that he proposed a number of legitimate
solutions to his low TAUs, but that his proposals were denied by
the administration. Smith Aff. ¶¶ 10-13, ECF No. 22-2.
6
2016 evaluation.
The evaluation included a statement that his
“contract will not be renewed for the fall 2016 semester.”
Def.’s Mot. Ex. 1 at 9, ECF No. 18-3.9
Plaintiff saw the
evaluation, became angry, and was escorted out by security
because Webb felt threatened by his presence in her office.
Webb Aff. ¶ 26, ECF No. 18-12.
When security arrived, Smith
“signed the evaluation” and took it with him.
retrieved and “placed in his mailbox.”
It was later
Id.
On March 16, 2016, Smith wrote a follow-up letter to
challenge the 2015-2016 evaluation, to which Webb responded.
See Def.’s Mot. Exs. 6 and 7, ECF Nos. 18-8 and 18-9.
Webb
revised a portion of his 2015-2016 evaluation in response to his
letter “but the overall rating remained unchanged.”
Webb Aff. ¶
27, ECF No. 18-12.
On June 2, 2016, Defendant Ringgold sent Plaintiff a formal
termination letter stating that his teaching contract would not
be renewed because of poor performance, discontinuation of the
electronics program, and his failure to qualify to teach any
discipline-specific business courses.10
9
Def.’s Mot. Ex. 2, ECF
Plaintiff believes that the signature on this evaluation is
not his signature. Rather, he contends that the document’s
first few pages come from a separate, revised evaluation, and
that his signature was used from a previous version. Smith Aff.
¶ 17, ECF No. 22-2.
10
Iweha supported the termination decision because “Mr. Smith
did not qualify to teach courses in the Business School and
because his performance rating was ‘poor.’” Iweha Aff. ¶ 13.
7
No. 18-4.
The effective date of termination was stated to be
June 5, 2016.
Id.
However, due to an address change, Smith did
not receive this letter until September 7, 2016.
Smith Aff. ¶
23, ECF No. 22-2.
On June 9, 2016, Plaintiff received a letter from the
Maryland Department of Budget & Management advising him that his
health insurance was terminated and advising him about his right
to COBRA benefits.
Smith Aff. ¶ 21, ECF No. 22-2; Pl.’s Cross
Mot. Ex. 2m, ECF No. 22-15.
Although this June 9 letter is not
in the record, Plaintiff’s lawyer wrote a letter to the
President of BCCC on June 30, 2016, referring to the June 9
letter and stating that her client had not voluntarily been
terminated from his position:
“Mr. Smith has received a letter dated June
9, 2016 from the Maryland Department of
Budget & Management advising him of his
right to COBRA benefits due to loss of
health insurance effective June 16, 2016
resulting from his separation from the State
of Maryland employment. Mr. Smith has not
voluntarily separated from employment.”
Pl.’s Cross Mot. Ex. 2m, ECF No. 22-15.
Having received no reply to his attorney’s June 30 letter,
Smith contacted a human resources specialist at BCCC in early
July to confirm the dates of his employment at the College.
Rutah Aff. ¶ 2, ECF No. 18-14.
The human resources specialist
stated that Smith had been employed with BCCC from September
8
2005 to June 2016 and confirmed that Smith had health insurance
coverage during that period.
Rutah Aff. ¶ 2, ECF No. 18-14.
This conversation was memorialized in writing by human resources
on July 5, 2016.
Def.’s Mot. Ex. 4, ECF No. 18-6.
On September 8, 2016, a day after he received the June 2
formal termination letter, Plaintiff requested a grievance
hearing.
Def.’s Mot. Ex. 13, ECF No. 18-15.
On November 18,
2016, he presented a statement at a “Level 2” grievance hearing
conducted by Defendant Ringgold.11
18-11.
Ringgold Aff. ¶ 14, ECF No.
In this “hearing,” Smith’s attorney was not allowed to
participate and Smith was not allowed to call witnesses.
Smith
Aff. ¶ 24, ECF No. 22-2.
Instead, Smith simply read a pre-
prepared statement.
Defendant Ringgold considered the
Id.
statement and upheld the termination decision.
14, ECF No. 18-11.
Ringgold Aff. ¶
Plaintiff’s requests for a “Level 3” hearing
and a meeting with the BCCC president were denied.
Smith Aff. ¶
26, ECF No. 22-2.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Plaintiff and Defendants seek summary judgment by the
instant cross-motions.
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the
11
Plaintiff has also referred to the November 18, 2016 event
as a “meeting” and not a “hearing.” Pl.’s Reply at 12, ECF No.
25.
9
pleadings and supporting documents “show[] that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a).
The well-established principles pertinent to summary
judgment motions can be distilled to a simple statement:
[t]he
Court may look at the evidence presented in regard to a motion
for summary judgment through the non-movant’s rose-colored
glasses, but must view it realistically.
After so doing, the
essential question is whether a reasonable fact finder could
return a verdict for the non-movant or whether the movant would,
at trial, be entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See,
e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);
Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1012 (4th Cir. 1991).
Thus,
in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, “the party
opposing the motion must present evidence of specific facts from
which the finder of fact could reasonably find for him or her.”
Mackey v. Shalala, 43 F. Supp. 2d 559, 564 (D. Md. 1999)
(emphasis added).
When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court
must bear in mind that the “[s]ummary judgment procedure is
properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but
rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole,
10
which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action.’”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1).
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Breach of Contract (Count I)
Defendants argue that the breach of contract claim should
be dismissed as to the Individual Defendants because it does not
state a valid claim and that it is barred against all Defendants
by sovereign immunity.
1.
Individual Defendants
The employment contract at issue is between “the Board of
Trustees of the Baltimore City Community College” and Plaintiff.
Def.’s Mot. Ex. 3, ECF No. 18-5.
Thus, the Individual
Defendants, who are not parties to the contract, owed no
individual contractual obligation to Plaintiff.
Taylor v.
NationsBank, N.A., 365 Md. 166, 175, 776 A.2d 645, 651 (2001)
(“To prevail in an action for breach of contract, a plaintiff
must prove that the defendant owed the plaintiff a contractual
obligation . . .”).
11
2.
Timing and Sovereign Immunity
In Maryland, sovereign immunity against breach of contract
claims against the state government is waived only if the claims
are brought “within 1 year after the later of: (1) the date on
which the claim arose; or (2) the completion of the contract
that gives rise to the claim.”
202.
Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 12-
Section § 12-202 functions as a “condition precedent” for
bringing a contract claim against Maryland and/or its officers.
Magnetti v. Univ. of Maryland, 402 Md. 548, 564 (2007).
The Complaint was filed in state court on August 23, 2017.
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claim arose on June 5, 2016,
the date of his effective termination by the June 2 letter.
Def.’s Resp. at 3, ECF No. 24.
Plaintiff counters that any
breach did not occur until the June 2 termination letter was
received on September 7, 2016.
Pl.’s Mem. at 10, ECF No. 22.
The breach of contract claim is based upon the termination
of Plaintiff’s employment without proper notice and procedures.
Compl. ¶¶ 21-23.
The alleged breach – if there was one -
occurred on June 5, 2016, the date of effective termination.
Def.’s Mot. Ex. 2, ECF No. 18-4.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
breach of contract claim was filed outside the one-year period
for the limited waiver of immunity and is barred.
The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s arguments for a
later date for the alleged breach.
12
Plaintiff argues that the
one year limit does not begin to run until the “final action” of
the College, which was a letter from Defendant Ringgold denying
further internal review on February 22, 2017.
ECF No. 25.
Pl.’s Reply at 3,
He contends that “[a]rguably, a final
administrative decision has yet to be reached” because only the
College’s President can terminate him.
Id.
The Court does not accept Plaintiff’s theory that each
subsequent action (or inaction) by BCCC should be considered as
a separate breach for immunity waiver purposes, restarting the
one year limit.
The statute, Section § 12-202, is not a statute
of limitations, but a limited waiver of sovereign immunity.
See
State v. Sharafeldin, 382 Md. 129, 148 (2004) (“§ 12–202 is not
a mere statute of limitations but sets forth a condition to the
action itself.
The waiver of the State’s immunity vanishes at
the end of the one-year period.”).
Maryland courts have
intended this provision to be strictly construed.
Id. at 140
(“immunity from suit is ‘one of the highest attributes of
sovereignty,’” and “any waiver of that immunity must come from
the Legislature.”).
Plaintiff seeks to rely on Frankel v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Maryland Sys., 361 Md. 298, 308 (2000). In Frankel, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland found that a student’s claim for a
tuition refund was filed within the time limit because it was
filed “within a year from the final administrative decision
13
denying his request for in-state status and his claim for a
refund.”
Id.
However, Frankel did not involve a breach of
contract claim, but a claim for in-state tuition status and
tuition refund based on policies authorized by state
legislation.
Id. at 327-328.
The discussion in Frankel is
inapposite to case presented here, which involves a contract
claim for wrongful termination.12
The argument that there is still some administrative action
necessary to breach the contract is contradicted by the terms of
the contract itself.
The contract states at Section 5C: “[i]n
the event that the Faculty Member is dismissed, this contract
shall automatically terminate as of the effective date of the
termination and the College shall have no further obligation
under this contract.”
Def.’s Mot. Ex. 3, ECF No. 18-5.
Thus,
by the plain language of the contract, the contract terminated
on June 5, 2016 and any breach of the contract occurred on that
date.
12
Indeed, subsequent decisions have clarified that the Court
of Appeals did not address the merits of whether § 12-201 to §
12-204 would apply in Frankel. Stern v. Bd. of Regents, Univ.
Sys. of Maryland, 380 Md. 691, 705 (2004) (“Neither in this, nor
any other section of Frankel, did we address the merits of the
question of whether Md. Code §§ 12–201 through 12–204 of the
State Government Article waived the Board’s immunity in that
case . . . [t]he case provides no discussion in that regard.);
Magnetti v. Univ. of Maryland, 402 Md. 548, 571 n. 12 (2007)
(“It was not necessary for this Court, in Frankel, to determine
whether S.G. § 12–201 applied to Mr. Frankel’s claim against the
University.”).
14
Plaintiff, contending that he did not receive the notice
letter until September 7, 2016 due to an incorrect address,
argues that the one year period should not begin to run until he
was on notice of his termination.
The Court has neither been
provided with, nor has it found, legal authority supporting the
contention that a “notice rule” or “discovery rule” applies to
Section § 12-202,13 which is not a normal statute of limitations.
Even if there were a requirement that Smith was on notice
of his termination, that notice was obtained well before the
September 7, 2016 receipt of the June 2 letter.
Plaintiff signed an initial version of his 2015 evaluation
on March 10, 2016, which stated: “your contract will not be
renewed for the fall 2016 semester.”
ECF No. 22-9.
Pl.’s Cross Mot. Ex. 2g,
Smith responded to his 2015 Evaluation on May 16,
2016 by letter and discussed the Written Comments, showing that
he did read his evaluation.
22-10.
Pl.’s Cross Mot. Ex. 2h, ECF No.
Even though his evaluation was amended in part, his
overall rating remained the same.
Pl.’s Cross Mot. Ex. 2i, ECF
No. 22-11.
13
The dissent in Towson Univ. v. Conte, 384 Md. 68, 116
(2004) argued that statutory actions based on wrongful
terminations begin running when notice of termination is issued
by the employer and not when the termination becomes effective.
The majority found the analysis inapplicable to a breach of
contract claim.
15
Moreover, in June 2016, Mr. Smith received a notice from
the Maryland Department of Budget & Management advising him that
his health insurance coverage was being cancelled.
21, ECF No. 22-2.
Smith Aff. ¶
His attorney wrote a follow-up letter on June
30, 2016, stating:
“That notwithstanding, Mr. Smith has
received a letter dated June 9, 2016 from
the Maryland Department of Budget &
Management advising him of his right to
COBRA benefits due to loss of health
insurance effective June 16, 2016 resulting
from his separation from the State of
Maryland employment. Mr. Smith has not
voluntarily separated from employment.”
Pl.’s Cross Mot. Ex. 2m, ECF No. 22-15.
Additionally, in July 2016, Smith reached out to Human
Resources to confirm his dates of employment.
ECF No. 18-14.
Rutah Aff ¶ 2,
The Human Resources specialist explained that he
was employed with the College from September 2005 to June 2016
and that he and his wife had health insurance benefits during
that entire period.
Id.
This was later confirmed in a written
document sent to Plaintiff on July 5, 2016.
Def.’s Mot. Ex. 12,
ECF No. 18-14.
In summary, the Court finds that Plaintiff lacks evidence
adequate to permit a reasonable jury to find that his notice of
employment termination was as late as September 2016.
Accordingly, Plaintiff did not file his claim within the
one year immunity waiver period, and the Court will grant
16
summary judgment for all Defendants with regard to the breach of
contract claim.
B. Interference with Economic Relationship (Counts II, III,
and IV)
Maryland provides immunity to state employees for tort
actions that are performed within the scope of their employment
and done without malice or gross negligence.
Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522.
Md. Code Ann.,
Moreover, a claim for tortious
interference with an economic relationship in Maryland may only
prevail if the Defendant is a third party to the contract or
business relationship that was allegedly interfered with.
Bagwell v. Peninsula Reg’l Med. Ctr., 106 Md. App. 470, 503
(1995) (“As a matter of law, a party to a contract cannot
tortiously ‘interfere’ with his or her own contract . . . .
Neither can an agent of the party to a contract, acting within
the scope of the agency, ‘interfere’ with the contract.”).
Plaintiff states in Counts II - IV that the Individual
Defendants intentionally interfered with his TAUs and
performance evaluations in order to terminate his teaching
contract.
He argues that they were not acting within the scope
of their employment because they had no authority to make the
final determination to terminate Plaintiff’s contract; only the
President of BCCC had such authority.
17
Pl.’s Reply at 3, ECF No.
25.
He also states – without specific supporting factual
allegations - that the Individual Defendants, especially
Defendant Iweha, acted with malice and/or gross negligence.
Pl.’s Mem. at 12-18, ECF No. 22.
1.
Scope of Employment
The record does not present evidentiary support for the
arguments that Individual Defendants Iweha, Webb, and Ringgold
acted outside the scope of their employment with BCCC.
Their
actions related to course registrations, programs
administration, teacher evaluations, and hiring decisions, all
of which fall within the scope of their official duties as
agents of BCCC.
See, e.g., McReady v. O’Malley, 804 F. Supp. 2d
427, 445 (D. Md. 2011), aff’d, 468 F. App’x 391 (4th Cir. 2012)
(finding as a matter of law that “the actions of [the
University’s] agents . . . cannot form the basis of an
intentional interference with contractual relations claim.”).
Defendant Iweha was accused by Plaintiff of discrimination
when Iweha chose to hire another professor for the new
Robotics/Mechatronics position, but he made that hiring decision
as the Dean of the Business Administration.
Iweha Aff. ¶ 6, ECF No. 18-10.
Compl. ¶¶ 28-32;
Iweha is blamed for relying on
an incorrect 2013-2014 performance review to recommend not
18
renewing Plaintiff’s contract, but his recommendation was also
made in his official capacity as Dean.
Iweha Aff. ¶ 13.
Defendant Webb’s actions in evaluating Plaintiff’s business
courses (including classroom visits and review of his work) were
within her scope of duties as the Interim Associate Dean of the
Business Administration.
Webb Aff. ¶ 25, ECF No. 18-12.
And
Defendant Ringgold’s actions in overseeing Plaintiff’s TAUs and
issuing a formal decision not to renew Plaintiff’s contract were
undertaken in her capacity as Vice President of Academic
Affairs.
Ringgold Aff. ¶¶ 1-2, 12.
Plaintiff argues that the Individual Defendants’ actions
should be deemed outside the scope of their employment because
the Contract and the Faculty Handbook state that the BCCC
President has the authority to make termination decisions.
However, the Individual Defendants were high level
administrative officials at BCCC and were acting as agents of
BCCC and the President.
The record does not support the
contention that finding that they lacked authority to take the
actions that they did.
Indeed, the BCCC President was copied on
Smith’s termination letter.
Def.’s Mot. Ex. 2, ECF No. 18-4.
19
2. Allegations Regarding Personal Animus
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations
that the Individual Defendants acted with ill motive, malice, or
gross negligence in terminating his contract are not adequately
supported.
As for Defendant Iweha, the record does not support the
conclusory allegation that Iweha retaliated against Plaintiff
for the EEO complaint by “work[ing] with Defendant Webb to
manipulate Plaintiff’s TAUs.”14
Pl.’s Mem. at 12, ECF No. 22.
Plaintiff argues that Iweha also tried to “manipulate” his TAUs
in 2015 and was stopped from doing so by Dean Evans, but does
not offer factual support for this allegation.
Compl. ¶ 30.
Allegations that Iweha was “motivated by his personal goal to
remove Plaintiff from BCCC” are similarly unsupported by
specific facts.
Pl.’s Mem. at 13, ECF No. 22.
Defendant Webb was accused of “manipulating” Plaintiff’s
TAUs and recommending nonrenewal based on inaccurate
information, but the record does not support such a finding of
calculated manipulation.
Rather, based on the record, Plaintiff
had low TAUs for Spring 2016 due to several reasons, including
BCCC’s decision to cancel some ETP courses and change other
courses to electives in response to the a state legislative
14
The EEO complaint was dismissed more than two years before
the termination decision was made, weakening the allegation of
retaliatory motive. Pl.’s Cross Mot. Ex. 2d, ECF No. 22-6.
20
action (resulting in fewer courses that Plaintiff was qualified
to teach), and the inability of Plaintiff and his supervisors to
agree on other TAU-qualifying options.
Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Webb stated to him “I don’t need people like you”
shortly after she arrived at BCCC.
No. 22-10.
Pl.’s Cross Mot. Ex 2h, ECF
The record does not show the context of this alleged
statement, but Plaintiff proffered at the hearing that the
statement was made in a meeting at Defendant Webb’s office.
This statement does not – absent facts establishing an
appropriate context – suffice to support a valid fact finding of
personal animus.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s argument that Webb
showed personal animus in the way she evaluated Plaintiff is
unpersuasive.
Indeed, she did eventually amend her evaluation
in response to Plaintiff’s complaints.
Pl.’s Cross Mot. 2i, ECF
No. 22-11.
Finally, Defendant Ringgold’s actions were alleged to be
“intentional, willful and malicious,” but those accusations are
merely conclusory contentions.
Compl. ¶ 56.
Allegations that
she knowingly relied on the allegedly inaccurate ratings to
issue a decision of nonrenewal, failed to provide Plaintiff a
copy of the final evaluation on time, did not permit Plaintiff
to meet with the BCCC President, or failed to make a timely
decision on Plaintiff’s administrative complaint are not
adequate to support a finding of personal animus.
21
Id. ¶¶ 49-55.
Because Plaintiff cannot establish that these Individual
Defendants acted outside the scope of their employment or with
malice or gross negligence in terminating Plaintiff, they cannot
be held liable.
Accordingly, Defendants shall be granted
summary judgment on the claims in Counts II, III, and IV.
C. Conspiracy to Interfere with Economic Relationship
(Count V)
Because the Court will grant summary judgment for
Defendants on the tortious interference claim, there is no
pending tort claim.
The Court shall, therefore, also grant
summary judgment for Defendants on the dependent civil
conspiracy claim.
Lloyd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 397 Md. 108, 154,
916 A.2d 257, 284 (2007) (“‘conspiracy’ is not a separate tort
capable of independently sustaining an award of damages in the
absence of other tortious injury to the plaintiff.”).
Moreover, any civil conspiracy claim among the three
Individual Defendants would be barred by the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine.
Baltimore-Washington Tel. Co. v. Hot Leads
Co., LLC, 584 F. Supp. 2d 736, 744 (D. Md. 2008) (“a corporation
cannot conspire with its employees, and its employees, when
acting in the scope of their employment, cannot conspire among
themselves.”).
22
Neither of the two exceptions to this “intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine” exist.
Employees of a corporation may be
held liable as conspirators (1) when the agents have an
“independent legal stake in achieving the corporation’s legal
objective” and (2) where the “acts of the employees were
unauthorized by the corporate defendant.”
Id.
Plaintiff does
not even allege an independent legal stake for the Defendants in
carrying out the alleged conspiracy, and as discussed above, the
Court does not find persuasive the argument that the acts of the
Individual Defendants, including the decision to terminate
Plaintiff’s contract, were unauthorized.
See supra Section
III.B.
Accordingly, Defendants shall be granted summary judgment
on Count VI.
D. Deprivation of Property without Due Process (Count VI
and VII)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated a number of his
procedural due process rights, which he claims were guaranteed
to him under his contract and the College’s faculty handbook.
Pl.’s Cross Mot. Exs. 2, 3.
These violations allegedly include:
Failure of Iweha to assign courses to Plaintiff first
before assigning to adjunct professors. Pl.’s Mem. at
21-22, ECF No. 22.
Failure of Webb to “go over” Plaintiff’s evaluation with
him. Id.
23
Failure of Ringgold to give Plaintiff a copy of his final
evaluation. Id.
Failure of Defendants to put Plaintiff on an “improvement
plan” instead of terminating him. Id.
Failure to be notified of Ringgold’s recommendation of
nonrenewal. Id.
Failure to be notified 30 days before termination.
Failure to be terminated properly by the President and
not Ringgold. Id.
Failure of Ringgold to issue a decision regarding the
grievance proceeding within 5 working days. Id.
Denial of relief requested at the grievance proceeding,
and subsequent denial of a “Level 3” proceeding. Id.
The inability to have his attorney represent him at the
grievance hearing, and the inability to call or examine
witnesses at the grievance hearing. Id.
Id.
Defendants argue that due process was afforded and that the
claims against the individual Defendants are barred by qualified
immunity or state immunities laws.
1.
Fourteenth Amendment (Count VI)
a. Dismissal of State and College
Plaintiff does not oppose the dismissal of Count VI against
the State and the College.
Pl.’s Mem. at 18, ECF No. 22
(“Plaintiff acknowledges that Count 6 . . . was intended to be
filed against Defendants Webb, Iweha and Ringgold . . . in their
24
individual capacities.”).
Accordingly, summary judgment shall
be granted for the State and the College on Count VI.
b. Legal Standard for Due Process
When a party alleges procedural due process violations
based on a state agency’s policies or regulations, the court
must consider whether “minimal due process requirements of
notice and hearing have been met.”
Goodrich v. Newport News
Sch. Bd., 743 F.2d 225, 227 (4th Cir. 1984).
In the context of
a termination of a public school teacher, the Fourth Circuit
explained that “[m]inimal procedural due process required ...
adequate notice, a specification of the charges against her, an
opportunity to confront the witnesses against her and an
opportunity to be heard in her own defense.”
Id.
When the minimal due process requirements of notice and
hearing have been met, “a claim that an agency’s policies or
regulations have not been adhered to does not sustain an action
for redress of procedural due process violations.”
Id.
Thus,
the Fourth Circuit rejected the Goodrich plaintiff’s argument
that she was given only two interim conferences rather than the
three required by the School Board’s evaluation procedure.
See
also Echtenkamp v. Loudon Cty. Pub. Sch., 263 F. Supp. 2d 1043,
1055 (E.D. Va. 2003) (“a violation of grievance procedures
guaranteed under state law does not, by itself, constitute a
25
failure to provide adequate due process under the standards of
the federal Constitution”); Moore v. Bonner, 758 F.2d 648 (4th
Cir. 1985) (unpublished disposition) (“the failure of the School
District to afford Moore a conference prior to not renewing her
contract amounts to no more than a violation of the District's
own policies and does not implicate the protections of the due
process clause.”).
c. Alleged Due Process Violations
Here, the procedures for which Plaintiff alleges that he
wrongfully was not afforded were based upon Plaintiff’s
employment contract and BCCC’s Faculty Handbook.
Thus, the
issue is whether minimal due process requirements were met even
though not all of BCCC’s internal procedures were followed.
Considering all of the facts and circumstances, the Court
finds that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether Plaintiff was afforded minimal due process with regard
to the termination of his employment.
It is undisputed that what the Defendants refer to as the
“hearing” was held after Plaintiff had already been terminated.
However, though the notice and opportunity to be heard is
generally required before an alleged deprivation of property
rights occurs.
See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (“We have described ‘the root
26
requirement’ of the Due Process Clause as being ‘that an
individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is
deprived of any significant property interest.’”) (emphasis in
original).
There are material factual disputes about whether a
meaningful opportunity to be heard was provided before
termination.
The post-termination “hearing” conducted in
November 2016 may be found not adequate to meet due process
requirements.
On the other hand, a reasonable jury could find
that the meeting conducted with Webb on March 10, 2016, any
subsequent pre-termination meetings, and any subsequent letter
correspondences challenging the 2015 evaluation were sufficient
to meet minimal due process requirements.
Because the evidence now in the record could support a
finding for either side, summary judgment is not appropriate.
Accordingly, summary judgment on this claim shall now be denied.
d. Qualified Immunity
The Individual Defendants have asserted qualified immunity.
“Qualified immunity, when found to apply, bars § 1983 suits
against government officers in their individual capacity.”
Cloaninger ex rel. Estate of Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d
324, 330 (4th Cir. 2009).
The qualified immunity inquiry by the
court involves two steps: First, “whether a constitutional right
27
would have been violated on the facts alleged,” and second,
“whether the right was clearly established at the time such that
it would be clear to an objectively reasonable officer that his
conduct violated that right.”
Id.
The Court recognizes that the analysis of qualified
immunity is generally a legal one, id. at 331, but there is a
genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Plaintiff was
afforded minimal procedural due process.
Evidence regarding
this issue may well reveal whether a reasonable official in the
Individual Defendants’ positions would have realized that his or
her actions were unlawful at the time.
Raub v. Campbell, 785
F.3d 876, 882 (4th Cir. 2015) (“we look not to whether the right
allegedly violated was established ‘as a broad general
proposition’ but whether ‘it would be clear to a reasonable
official that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.’”).
At present, neither side is entitled to summary judgment
with regard to the Individual Defendants’ qualified immunity
claims.
28
2.
Maryland State Constitution Article 24
(Count VII)
a. Alleged Due Process Violations
The analyses under Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and under Article 24 of the Maryland State
Constitution are largely the same.
Pickett v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 365 Md. 67, 77 (2001) (“This Court has interpreted Article
24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Due Process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution to be in pari materia, such that the
interpretations of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provided by the United States Supreme Court serve as
persuasive authority for Article 24.”).
Accordingly, this claim
also remains pending.
b. State Immunities Laws
Under the Maryland Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”), “Maryland
officials are granted immunity . . . for state constitutional
violations committed within the scope of their duties when the
violations are made ‘without malice or gross negligence.’”
Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 536 (4th Cir. 2011).
immunity covers “constitutional torts.”
This
Lee v. Cline, 384 Md.
245, 266 (2004) (“[W]e hold that the immunity under the Maryland
Tort Claims Act, if otherwise applicable, encompasses
29
constitutional torts and intentional torts.”).
Unlike the
doctrine of qualified immunity, the question of MTCA immunity is
“subjective” under Maryland law and is generally a question for
the jury.
Henry, 652 F.3d at 536 (“Whether an officer’s actions
are grossly negligent, and therefore unprotected by statutory
immunity, is generally a question for the jury.”).
For the tortious interference and conspiracy claims, the
Court has granted summary judgment for the Individual Defendants
on Plaintiff’s contentions that they acted outside the scope of
their employment and with malice or gross negligence with regard
to terminating Smith.
See supra Section III.B.
The issue now
addressed is different, i.e., whether Plaintiff was afforded
minimal due process by the Individual Defendants.
A reasonable jury could find that the Individual
Defendants’ actions with regard to Plaintiff’s procedural due
process rights were grossly negligent.
The record reflects a
genuine dispute of material fact about whether the Defendants
recklessly failed to provide Plaintiff with proper notice and an
opportunity to be heard with regard to his termination prior to
termination.
Newell v. Runnels, 407 Md. 578, 638 (2009) (gross
negligence is “an intentional failure to perform a manifest duty
in reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the . . .
property of another, and also implies a thoughtless disregard of
30
the consequences without the exertion of any effort to avoid
them.”)(citations omitted).
Accordingly, the Court finds that it shall grant neither
side summary judgment on the state immunity law claims.
IV.
REQUEST REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ EXHIBIT 1
Plaintiff requests the Court to “exercise its authority
under Federal Rules of Evidence 102 and 104 to consider the
admissibility of . . . . Defendant’s Exhibit 1.”
7, ECF No. 22.
Pl.’s Mem. at
He claims that the document “is a creation of
Defendants” which was “drawn from two other documents, i.e.,
Plaintiff’s Ex. 2, Attachments G and J.”
Id.
Despite the fact
that his signature appears on Defendant’s Exhibit 1, Plaintiff
states that he did not actually sign the document in Defendant’s
Exhibit 1, and requests that it is stricken from the record.
There may be multiple versions of the 2015 evaluation.
The
Court recognizes the dispute regarding the genuineness and
admissibility of the document at issue.
It shall not grant
summary judgment on the issue but shall, in due course, decide
the matter appropriately at trial.
V.
Defendants’ Motion for Leave to Supplement Their Motion
Defendants filed a Motion for Leave to supplement their
motion with information about the BCCC President’s delegation of
31
hiring and firing authority to agents within the school.
Mem. at 1-2, ECF No. 26-1.
Def.’s
The requested supplement raises no
new arguments but seeks to clarify the basis for a prior
argument.
It is short and relevant, and Plaintiff has had an
opportunity to refute the statements contained therein.
Accordingly, the Court finds that allowing this amendment will
not prejudice Plaintiff and will grant this motion.
VI.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons:
1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, In the Alternative
for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 18] is hereby GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART, and Plaintiff’s Cross Motion
for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 21] is hereby DENIED.
a. All Defendants are hereby granted summary
judgment on Counts I, II, III, IV, and V.
b. Defendants State of Maryland and Baltimore City
Community College are hereby granted summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s Federal Due Process Claim
(Count VI).
c. Plaintiff’s Federal Due Process Claim (Count VI)
remains pending against the Individual
Defendants15 in their personal capacities.
d. Plaintiff’s State Due Process Claim (Count VII)
remains pending against all Defendants.
2. Defendants’ Motion for Leave to Supplement Their
Motion To Dismiss Or, In the Alternative, For Summary
Judgment [ECF No. 26] is GRANTED.
15
The Individual Defendants are Tonja L. Ringgold, Enyinnaya
Iweha, and Cynthia Webb.
32
3. Plaintiff shall arrange a case-planning telephone
conference to be held no later than April 25, 2018 to
address the scheduling of further proceedings.
SO ORDERED, this Wednesday, April 4, 2018.
/s/__________
Marvin J. Garbis
United States District Judge
33
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