Davis v. Universal American Mortgage Co. LLC et al

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Denying 5 Motion to Stay State Court Proceedings; Granting 9 Motion to Dismiss Complaint. Signed by Judge Marvin J. Garbis on 1/30/2018. (bas, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
*
MARCUS DAVIS
*
Plaintiff,
*
vs.

CIV. ACTION NO. MJG-17-3110

UNIVERSAL AMERICAN MORTGAGE
COMPANY, LLC, ET AL,

*
*

*

*

Defendants
*
*

*

*

*

*

*

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The Court has before it Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay Court
Proceedings [ECF No. 5], Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No.
9], and the materials submitted relating thereto.

The Court

finds that a hearing is unnecessary.

I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Marcus Davis (“Davis” or “Plaintiff”) resides in

Waldorf, Maryland, and lost his home to a completed foreclosure
proceeding in state court.

He now sues Defendants in federal

court, alleging that his procedural due process rights were
violated in state court, that Defendants did not have the right
to foreclose the property, and that Defendants violated the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”).

He seeks a

declaratory judgment and quiet title to the property.
In February 2007, Davis purchased a home at 9464 Vess

Court, Waldorf, Maryland using a $407,650.00 loan, executed with
a promissory note (“Note”) which listed Defendant Universal
American Mortgage Company, LLC (“UAMC”) as the Lender.
Def.’s Mot. Ex. A, ECF No. 9-2.

See

The loan was secured by a

Purchase Money Deed of Trust (“Deed of Trust”) recorded against
the property.

Def.’s Mot. Ex. B, ECF No. 9-3.

The Deed of

Trust stated that Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems (“MERS”), acting as “nominee for Lender and Lender’s
successors and assigns,” is the “beneficiary” of “this Security
Instrument.”

Id. at 4.

The Deed of Trust further states that

“MERS . . . has the right . . . to foreclose and sell the
Property.”

Id.

On May 31, 2007, MERS assigned the Deed of Trust to
Defendant HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (“HSBC”).1
No. 9-4.

Def.’s Mot. Ex. C, ECF

Although the Complaint does not state why Ocwen Loan

Servicing, LLC (“Ocwen”) is part of the lawsuit, the record
shows that Ocwen was the “attorney in fact” for HSBC.

See

Def.’s Mot. Ex. D, ECF No. 9-5.
Plaintiff defaulted on the loan, and on October 15, 2015,
the substitute trustees appointed under the Deed of Trust filed
a Foreclosure Action on behalf of HSBC in state court.
1

Def.’s

Specifically, the assignment was made to “HSBC Bank USA, N.A.,
as Trustee on Behalf of Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan
Trust and for the Registered Holders of ACE Securities Corp.
Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-ASAP2, Asset Backed PassThrough Certificates.” Def.’s Mot. Ex. C, ECF No. 9-4.
2

Mot. Ex. E, ECF No. 9-6.

Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss

and a motion for summary judgment in the state action, both of
which were denied.

Id. at 7, 9.

During the litigation process,

the state court also denied one of Plaintiff’s requests to
compel discovery.

Compl. ¶¶ 31-32.

On March 14, 2017, the home was sold in a foreclosure sale
for $376,000.00, and the sale was ratified by the state court on
June 2, 2017.

Def.’s Mot. Ex. F, ECF No. 9-7; Def.’s Mot. Ex. E

at 11, ECF No. 9-6.

Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the order of

ratification was denied on August 10, 2017.
at 11, ECF No. 9-6.

Def.’s Mot. Ex. E

On November 15, 2017, the state court

issued a judgment awarding possession to the substitute
trustees.

Id. at 13.

Plaintiff did not appeal from the state court judgment, yet
he states that he “has exhausted all of his State Court remedies
in the Maryland State Trial Courts.”

Compl. ¶ 63.

He filed his

Complaint in federal court on October 24, 2017, followed by
motions to stay in both federal and state courts.
Ex. G, ECF No. 9-8; ECF No. 5.
motion to stay.2

Def.’s Mot.

The state court denied his

Def.’s Mot. Ex. E at 13, ECF No. 9-6.

2

The Complaint states that Davis has also filed for Chapter 7
and Chapter 13 bankruptcy on two separate occasions. Compl. ¶¶
25-26, 41, 61. Neither action appears to be currently active.
3

II.

LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.
A complaint need only contain “‘a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in
order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”

Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted).
When evaluating a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s
well-pleaded allegations are accepted as true and the complaint
is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
However, conclusory statements or “a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not [suffice].”

Id.

A

complaint must allege sufficient facts “to cross ‘the line
between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’”
Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Inquiry into whether a complaint states a plausible claim
is “‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court
to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’”
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Id.

Thus, if “the well-pleaded

facts [contained within a complaint] do not permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the

4

complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the
pleader is entitled to relief.’”

Id. (quoting Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (alteration in original)).

III.

DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims should be

dismissed because (1) the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this
case under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, (2) Plaintiff’s claims
are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and (3) Plaintiff’s
claims fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
The Court will address all of these arguments.

A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts
may not sit in appellate review of judicial determinations made
by state courts.

D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.

462, 487 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416
(1923) (“The jurisdiction possessed by the District Courts is
strictly original.”).

Rather, “[j]urisdiction to review such

decisions lies exclusively with superior state courts and,
ultimately, the United States Supreme Court.”

Brown & Root,

Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir. 2000).

This

doctrine also applies to claims that were not actually decided
by the state court but “inextricably intertwined” with issues

5

before the state court.

Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th

Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff did not appeal from the state court judgment, yet
he states that he “has exhausted all of his State Court remedies
in the Maryland State Trial Courts.”

Compl. ¶ 63.

The Court

finds that almost all of Plaintiff’s claims are inappropriate
attempts at appellate review of the state court’s determinations
in federal court.

Count I alleges that the state court erred in

a number of ways, including limiting Davis’s filings and denying
him discovery that he believed he was entitled to.

Counts II

and IV seek declaratory relief and quiet title, which amount to
a challenge of the state court’s judgment that the property was
foreclosed and properly sold in a judicial sale.

Count III is

an argument about MERS’s standing to bring a foreclosure action,
which was briefed in Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss in state
court and denied.

Def.’s Mot. Ex. I at 2, ECF No. 9-10.

Plaintiff improperly seeks appellate review of these state
court determinations in federal district court.

Counts I

through IV must be dismissed based on the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.3

3

The record is insufficient to determine whether Count V, the
RESPA claim, may be dismissed under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
However, for reasons stated below, Count V is dismissed under
res judicata and for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
6

B. Res Judicata
Defendants argue that all of the claims asserted by
Plaintiff are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
This Court must apply Maryland res judicata law to this
action.

Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S.

75, 81 (1984) (“a federal court must give to a state-court
judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that
judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was
rendered”).
Under Maryland law, “the elements of res judicata, or claim
preclusion, are: (1) that the parties in the present litigation
are the same or in privity with the parties to the earlier
dispute; (2) that the claim presented in the current action is
identical to the one determined in the prior adjudication; and,
(3) that there has been a final judgment on the merits.”

Anne

Arundel Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Norville, 390 Md. 93, 107 (2005).
Maryland applies the “transactional approach,” meaning that “if
[] two claims or theories are based upon the same set of facts
and one would expect them to be tried together ordinarily, then
a party must bring them simultaneously,” and “[a]ll matters
which were litigated or could have been litigated in the earlier
case ‘are conclusive in the subsequent proceeding.’”
(emphasis in original).

7

Id. at 109

There appears to be no dispute that the parties are the
same or in privity with the parties in the state court
foreclosure action, and that there was a final judgment on the
foreclosure action.

Plaintiff only challenges the second

element, i.e., whether the claim presented in the current action
is identical to the one determined in the prior adjudication.
Pl.’s Opp. at 2, ECF No. 11 (“this matter is not the same as the
state court foreclosure action as there are sufficiently plead
[sic] further causes of action outside of the previously
litigated foreclosure action”).
The Court finds that Counts II, III, IV, and V have been
brought or should have been brought in the state court action.
The Court is satisfied that Counts II and IV have been litigated
because they relate generally to Davis’s rights in the property
at issue, which is the subject of the entire state court
foreclosure proceeding.

Count III, regarding MERS’s lack of

authority to foreclose, was litigated in Davis’s motion to
dismiss in state court.
10.

See Def.’s Mot. Ex. I at 2, ECF No. 9-

Finally, Count V is a RESPA claim which alleges that

Defendants’ actions in entering into the loan agreement with
Plaintiff were “deceptive, fraudulent and self-serving,” Compl.
¶ 116.

This argument appears in Davis’s Affidavit of Additional

Facts in support of his motion for summary judgment, which was
considered and denied by the state court.

8

Def.’s Mot. Ex. I at

7-9, ECF No. 9-10 (Davis alleging “unclean hands,”
“misrepresentation,” and “deception”).

Even if his summary

judgment motion in state court does not specifically allege a
RESPA claim, under Maryland’s “transaction test,” the claim
arose from the same set of facts and allegations of deception
and should have been brought in state court.

Anne Arundel Cty.

Bd. of Educ., 390 Md. at 109.
Accordingly, Counts II through V of the Complaint are
barred by res judicata.4

C. Substantive Counts
Even if the Rooker-Feldman and res judicata doctrines do
not apply, Plaintiff’s substantive counts must still be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.

i. Count I: Due Process
Plaintiff alleges that he was denied his procedural due
process rights when (1) the state court ordered that he not file
any further proceedings in the case, (2) the Defendants did not
give him notice of the transfers of the underlying Deed of

4

On the current record, the Court is unable to make a
determination about whether all of the issues alleged in Count I
were actually litigated in state court. However, the Court will
dismiss Count I under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, supra, and
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
9

Trust, and (3) the state court denied his motion to compel
discovery.

Compl. ¶¶ 68-70.

The Court understands Plaintiff’s claims to be procedural
due process arguments under the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Maryland Constitution.

The standard for the process due to

litigants under the federal constitution and under Maryland law
are largely the same, i.e., notice and opportunity to be heard.
Griffin v. Bierman, 403 Md. 186, 197 (2008) (explaining that a
fundamental requirement of due process is “notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprize interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections”); Tri Cty. Paving, Inc.
v. Ashe Cty., 281 F.3d 430, 436 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Due process of
law generally requires that a deprivation of property ‘be
preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to
the nature of the case.’”).
The Fourteenth Amendment by itself does not create property
interests.

Rather, those interests “‘are created and their

dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that
stem from an independent source such as state law.’”
Paving, 281 F.3d at 436.

Tri Cty.

In foreclosure actions under Maryland

state law, litigants are provided with opportunities to
challenge the foreclosure at various stages of the process
(e.g., motions to dismiss or motions for post-sale exception to

10

the ratification of a sale).

MD R PROP SALES Rule 14-211, 14-

305, Kamara v. Shapiro Brown & ALT, LLP, No. 0471 SEPT. TERM
2015, 2016 WL 1064432, at *3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Mar. 17,
2016)).
The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff Davis took full
advantage of the opportunities to challenge his foreclosure
action in state court.

He received notice of the foreclosure

action and filed several dispositive motions.

See Def.’s Mot.

Ex. E at 7, 9, 11, ECF No. 9-6 (state court docket showing Davis
filing a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary judgment, and a
motion to vacate the order of ratification).

The fact that

these motions were denied by the state court on the merits does
not give rise to a claim that Plaintiff’s procedural due process
rights were violated.
Plaintiff’s other allegations also do not give rise to a
plausible procedural due process claim.

Plaintiff states that

the state court “ordered” that he not file any further
proceedings in the case, Compl. ¶¶ 43, 68, but does not state
the circumstances under which the court made such a
determination.

In fact, by that date (allegedly, April 19,

2016), the state court had already entertained and denied
several of Plaintiff’s dispositive motions.

Plaintiff also

argues that he was not given notice of the transfers of the
underlying Deed of Trust, but states no facts or legal authority

11

supporting a claim that this lack of notice was a denial of
procedural due process rights in a foreclosure action under
Maryland law.

Finally, Plaintiff contends that the state court

denied his motion to compel “without explanation or hearing,”
but states no facts supporting a plausible claim that this
denial was in violation of his procedural due process rights.
Compl. ¶ 32.

Indeed, Plaintiff elected not to appeal the state

court foreclosure determination, and may not use the federal
district court as a vehicle for appeal.

See supra Section

III.A.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has not stated a claim that his due
process rights in his foreclosure action were denied.

ii. Count II: Declaratory Relief
Plaintiff requests a declaratory judgment regarding the
rights in the property, including a declaration that Plaintiff
is entitled to exclusive possession and ownership in fee simple.
Compl. ¶¶ 80-81.

This request appears to be based upon

Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants “do not have authority to
foreclose upon and sell the Property.”

Id. ¶ 73.

Declaratory relief is not a substantive allegation by
itself, but a remedy that this Court may provide if a party
prevails on a substantive claim.

For this Count, Plaintiff

simply reiterates his own belief regarding his rights to the

12

property.

He has not stated any facts, let alone facts

sufficient to allege a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Accordingly, this Count is dismissed.

iii. Count III: Standing and Wrongful Foreclosure
Plaintiff argues that HSBC had no right to foreclose
because MERS lacked the authority to assign the Deed of Trust.
He argues that “the only individual[s] who ha[ve] standing to
foreclose [are] the holder[s] of the note” which Plaintiff
believes to be “the certificate holders of the securitized
trust.”

Compl. ¶ 85.

Plaintiff also alleges that “MERS has

failed to submit documents authorizing [it], as nominee for the
original lender, to assign the subject [the Deed of Trust] to
the foreclosing trustee” and thus “lacked authority . . . to
assign Plaintiff’s [Deed of Trust].”

Id. ¶ 96.

Plaintiff’s standing arguments are misplaced.

Under both

arguments, the Court understands Plaintiff to be arguing that
the wrong party exercised its rights to bring the foreclosure
action in state court.

Plaintiff’s claim must be denied to the

extent that he is attempting to assert the alleged rights of
third parties to challenge the foreclosure proceeding in state
court.

Wolf v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, 512 F. App’x 336, 342

(4th Cir. 2013) (“a party ‘generally must assert his own legal
rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the

13

legal rights or interests of third parties.’”); Bishop v.
Bartlett, 575 F.3d 419, 423 (4th Cir. 2009) (same).
Moreover, the applicable law forecloses Plaintiff’s
arguments.

This Court has held in the same or similar

situations that MERS had the authority to act on behalf of the
Lender.

See, e.g., Mabry v. MERS, No. CIV.A. WMN-13-1700, 2013

WL 5487858, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 1, 2013) (finding that a Deed of
Trust which expressly states that MERS is the “beneficiary in
its capacity as ‘nominee for Lender’” permitted MERS to assign
the mortgage); Wolf, 512 F. App’x at 342 (finding that a
plaintiff who argued that the deed of trust did not provide MERS
the right to assign the note “lacked standing to challenge the
propriety of the assignment”).
Moreover, courts have found that the MERS system of
recordation is proper and that assignments made through that
system are valid.

Mabry, 2013 WL 5487858, at *3 (“To the extent

that Plaintiff’s challenge to MERS’s authority to assign the
Note challenges the MERS recordation system entirely, the Court
finds it similarly without merit.”); Suss v. JP Morgan Chase
Bank, N.A., No. CIV.A-WMN-09-1627, 2010 WL 2733097, at *5 (D.
Md. July 9, 2010) (“As to Plaintiff's criticism of MERS, courts
that have considered the issue have found that the system of
recordation is proper and assignments made through that system
are valid.”); Parker v. Am. Brokers Conduit, 179 F. Supp. 3d

14

509, 516 (D. Md. 2016) (“Courts in this Circuit and elsewhere
have routinely rejected challenges to loan securitization and
assignments executed through the MERS system”).
The Deed of Trust is explicit in its language about MERS’s
authority to assign.

The Deed of Trust stated that Defendant

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (“MERS”), acting as
“nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns,” is the
“beneficiary” of “this Security Instrument.”
at 4, ECF No. 9-3.

Def.’s Mot. Ex. B

It also provides that “MERS . . . has the

right . . . to foreclose and sell the Property.”

Id.

Accordingly, the Court must dismiss Count III for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

iv. Count IV: Quiet Title
Plaintiff argues that “the claim of all Defendant [sic] are
without any right whatsoever, and defendants have no right . . .
to the property” and that the Defendants’ claims “constitute a
cloud on plaintiff’s title to the property.”

Compl. ¶¶ 107-08.

The Court understands Plaintiff to be requesting free and clear
title to the property.
Under Maryland law, “a quiet title action is a suit in
which a plaintiff seeks a decree that some allegedly adverse
interest in his property is actually defective, invalid or
ineffective prior to and at the time suit is brought either

15

because the lien was invalidly created, or has become invalid or
has been satisfied.”

Kasdon v. G. W. Zierden Landscaping, Inc.,

541 F. Supp. 991, 995 (D. Md. 1982), aff’d sub nom. Kasdon v.
United States, 707 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1983).

A quiet title

action “‘cannot, as a general rule, be maintained without clear
proof of both possession and legal title in the plaintiff.’”
Anand v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 754 F.3d 195, 198 (4th Cir.
2014) (internal citations omitted).

Under Maryland law, “the

plaintiff bears the burden of proving both possession and legal
title.”

Id.

Plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law because he has
not carried his burden of proving possession and legal title.
If, as here, the Plaintiff has conveyed the property “through
the medium of a deed of trust to trustees securing repayment of
a loan, [the Plaintiff] no longer [has] a claim to legal title
to the property and a quiet title action is not appropriate.”
Harris v. Household Fin. Corp., No. CIV. RWT 14-606, 2014 WL
3571981, at *2 (D. Md. July 18, 2014).

See also Anand, 754 F.3d

at 198 (“the Anands are not entitled to the benefits of a quiet
title action because they are not authorized by statute to
resolve clouds on a legal title which they do not own.”).
Plaintiff purchased his home on a loan, which was secured
by a Deed of Trust recorded against the property.
Ex. B, ECF No. 9-3.

Def.’s Mot.

Plaintiff then defaulted on the loan and

16

the property was sold in a judicial sale following a foreclosure
proceeding.

Def.’s Mot. Ex. E, ECF No. 9-6.

On November 15,

2017, the state court issued a judgment awarding possession to
the substitute trustees.

Id. at 13.

Because Plaintiff does not

have legal title in the property, he fails to state a quiet
title claim, and this Count must be dismissed.

v. Count V: RESPA
Finally, Plaintiff argues that Defendants “violated RESPA
due to the alleged payments, for transfer, between the
Defendants [which] were misleading and designed to create a
windfall.”

Compl. ¶ 116.

Plaintiff concludes–without any

factual support–that Defendants’ actions in entering into the
loan agreement with Plaintiff were “deceptive, fraudulent and
self-serving.”

Id.

Defendants argue that any claim under RESPA

is time-barred.
“RESPA creates a private right of action for only three
types of wrongful acts: (1) failure of a loan servicer to
provide proper notice about a transfer of servicing rights or to
respond to a qualified written request for loan information, 12
U.S.C. § 2605; (2) payment of a kickback or unearned fees for
real estate settlement services, 12 U.S.C. § 2607; and (3)
requiring a buyer to use a title insurer chosen by the seller,
12 U.S.C. § 2608.”

Grant v. Shapiro & Burson, LLP, 871 F. Supp.

17

2d 462, 470 (D. Md. 2012).

Violations of Section 2605 have a

three year statute of limitations, and violations of Sections
2607 and 2608 have a one year statute of limitations.

12 U.S.C.

§ 2614.
The Complaint does not clearly allege how Defendants
violated RESPA.

Plaintiff appears to argue that Defendants have

gained a disproportionate financial benefit from the interest
received on the loan made to Plaintiff, when compared to
Plaintiff’s current stressed financial state.

RESPA does not

provide a remedy for this kind of allegation.
Regardless, any claim under RESPA is barred by the statute
of limitations.

The limitations period begins to run “‘from the

date of the occurrence of the violation,’ which generally refers
to the date of closing for loan origination violations.”
871 F. Supp. 2d at 470.

Grant,

The closing of the property occurred in

February 2007, and the Complaint was filed more than 10 years
later.

Besides a single conclusory statement in his opposition,

see Pl.’s Opp. ¶ 17, ECF No. 11 (“the RESPA claims are not
barred by any applicable statute of limitations”), Plaintiff has
not offered a reason why a different tolling date would apply.5
Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed.

5

Even if Plaintiff attempted to offer an equitable tolling
theory under RESPA, he would not prevail because he has not
alleged with specificity “‘fraudulent concealment on the part of
the defendants’” and the “inability of the plaintiff, despite
18

IV.

MOTION TO STAY COURT PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff seeks a stay of any remaining state court

proceedings in Laura O’Sullivan v. Marcus Davis, No. 08-C-15002687 (in the Circuit Court for Charles County), during the
pendency of this federal case.
For the reasons stated above, the Court will grant
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and will enter a Judgment Order
for Defendants.

Once issued, there will be no active federal

court proceedings in this case.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion

to Stay State Court Proceedings is DENIED as moot.

due diligence, to discover the fraud.”
at 470 n. 10.
19

Grant, 871 F. Supp. 2d

V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons:
1. The Motion of Defendants, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC,
HSBC Bank USA, N.A., as Trustee on Behalf of Ace
Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust and for the
Registered Holders of ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity
Loan Trust, Series 2007-ASAP2, Asset Backed PassThrough Certificates, and Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. to Dismiss Complaint of
Plaintiff, Marcus Davis, Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) [ECF No. 9] is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff Marcus Davis’s Motion to Stay State Court
Proceedings [ECF No. 5] is DENIED.
3. All claims against all Defendants are hereby
dismissed.
4. Judgment for Defendants shall be entered by separate
Order.

SO ORDERED, this Tuesday, January 30, 2018.

/s/__________
Marvin J. Garbis
United States District Judge

20