Boyce v. City Of Baltimore et al

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 8/9/2018. (bas, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
AMANDA BOYCE,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. ELH-17-3472

v.
CITY OF BALTIMORE, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This civil rights litigation arises from a traffic stop and arrest of plaintiff Amanda Boyce
on December 7, 2013. See ECF 5 (“Amended Complaint”). On November 22, 2017, Boyce
filed suit against Baltimore City Police Officer Steven Dorn, “John Doe Officers 1-5”, and “John
Doe Supervisors 1-10”,1 in their individual and official capacities. Id. Boyce alleges violations
of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. Id.
Count I is not at issue.2 In Count II, plaintiff alleges “supervisory violations” of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by the unnamed supervisors. Id. Count III is lodged against
the “Individual Defendant Officers.” There, Boyce alleges unlawful arrest, in violation of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. Count IV, which is lodged against the Individual
Defendant Officers, asserts use of excessive force. Count V, against the Individual Officers,
asserts “failure to intervene.” Id. In Count VI, plaintiff asserts a claim of conspiracy against all
defendants. Finally, Count VII, lodged against all defendants, alleges “abuse of process.” Id.
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1
Plaintiff refers both to “John Doe Supervisors 1-10” (see ECF 5 at 1) and the “John Doe
Supervisors 1-5.” Id. ¶ 9.
2

Plaintiff initially sued the City of Baltimore in Count I. See ECF 1; ECF 5. However,
by Order of February 12, 2018 (ECF 14), I approved the parties’ Joint Stipulation dismissing the
suit as to the City of Baltimore.

Defendant Dorn, the only named defendant, has moved to dismiss the Amended
Complaint (ECF 6), supported by a memorandum of law (ECF 6-1) (collectively, the “Motion”).
He argues that plaintiff’s suit is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Boyce opposes
the Motion (ECF 7), with a supporting memorandum of law. See ECF 7-1 (collectively, the
“Opposition”). Dorn has replied. See ECF 10 (“Reply”).3
No hearing is necessary to resolve the Motion. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons
that follow, I shall grant the Motion.
I.

Factual Background4

According to plaintiff, Dorn “was employed by the City of Baltimore as a safety officer.”
ECF 5, ¶ 7. The “John Doe Supervisors” are “the individuals tasked with supervising” Dorn, and
include the “Chief of Police and [other] related supervisors.” Id. Plaintiff fails to describe the
“John Doe Officers” (see, e.g., id. at 2-4), but it would appear that they are Dorn’s fellow
officers.
On December 7, 2013, Boyce, “a white woman”, was “driving her vehicle through a
predominantly African-American neighborhood” when “Dorn stopped her for no legal reason.”
Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff avers that she was “obeying all traffic laws” and that she was “given no reason
for the vehicle stop.” Id. ¶¶ 12-13. Yet, according to plaintiff, Dorn told plaintiff that her
“driver’s license was suspended and that she had a warrant for her arrest for an alleged ‘failure to
comply.’” Id. ¶ 15.
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3
The Motion is not a model of clarity. For example, although the Motion states, ECF 6
at 1: “Defendants request this Court grant their Motion to Dismiss”, the Motion was filed only on
behalf of “Defendant, Officer Steven Dorn[.]” Id. Yet, as to the “‘John Doe police officers and
supervisor”, the Motion asks for “dismissal of claims against them . . . .” ECF 6-1 at 1 n.1. I
shall construe the Motion on behalf of all defendants.
4

As explained, infra, given the posture of the Motion, I must assume the truth of
plaintiff’s allegations.
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At some point during the traffic stop, Dorn handcuffed plaintiff. Id. ¶ 17. According to
Boyce, the handcuffs were “secured . . . much too tightly.” Id. ¶ 18. And, when Boyce asked
Dorn to loosen the handcuffs, Dorn refused to do so. ECF 5, ¶ 19.
Additionally, Boyce contends that Dorn caused her “excruciating pain by . . . twisting
[her] arm behind her back in a manner and direction it could not naturally be moved.” Id. ¶ 17.
Plaintiff also avers that Dorn told her that “if she resisted . . . she would be ‘eating concrete.’”
Id. ¶ 20. Boyce insists that “at no time” did she resist Dorn or display “any threatening
behavior” to Dorn or “the individually named Defendant Officers.” Id. ¶¶ 25, 29. Further,
Boyce contends that she “did not have any . . . weapon, or display an object that appeared to be a
weapon.” Id. ¶ 28. And, she avers that she did not pose a “risk of flight.” Id. ¶ 31.
On December 7, 2013, Boyce was transported to the “Police Department” (id. ¶ 21) and
her vehicle was towed. Id. ¶ 23. After Dorn brought plaintiff to “the Police Department, it was
revealed that there was no warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest.” Id. ¶ 21. Nonetheless, plaintiff was
“forced to spend the night at the Police Department.” Id. ¶ 22. “All charges against Plaintiff
were subsequently dismissed.” Id. ¶ 24.
Plaintiff contends that she “was racially profiled by Defendant Dorn”, and that “none of
the individually named Defendant Officers observed Plaintiff commit any violent felony or
crime.” Id. ¶¶ 14, 27. Further, Boyce asserts that defendants lacked a reason to “deny [her]
medical care or to arrest her”, and lacked “probable cause to detain” her. Id. ¶ 32. Boyce also
claims that her vehicle was unlawfully towed (id. ¶ 23), and that “the individually named
Defendant Officers ignored [her] clear physical distress and denied her relief[.]” Id. ¶ 26.
Although Boyce refers frequently to the Defendant Officers, the facts asserted seem to
pertain only to Dorn. But, she alleges that the Defendant Supervisors failed to train, supervise,

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or discipline officers of the Baltimore City Police Department, despite receipt of complaint about
the conduct of officers in the police department. Id. ¶¶ 83, 85.
Additional facts are included in the Discussion.
II.

Standard of Review

A defendant may test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by way of a motion to dismiss,
under Rule 12(b)(6). In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Goines v. Valley Cmty.
Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016); McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408
(4th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013); Edwards v. City of
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion
by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter
of law “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). That rule provides that a complaint must contain a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The
purpose of the rule is to provide the defendants with “fair notice” of the claims and the
“grounds” for entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
To survive a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts
sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (citation omitted) (“Our decision in Twombly
expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions’ . . . .”); see also Willner v. Dimon, 849
F.3d 93, 112 (4th Cir. 2017). But, a plaintiff need not include “detailed factual allegations” in
order to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Moreover, federal pleading rules “do
not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting

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the claim asserted.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 346, 346 (2014)
(per curiam).
Nevertheless, the rule demands more than bald accusations or mere speculation.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Painter’s Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir.
2013). If a complaint provides no more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action,” it is insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, to
satisfy the minimal requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), the complaint must set forth “enough factual
matter (taken as true) to suggest” a cognizable cause of action, “even if . . . [the] actual proof of
those facts is improbable and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “must accept as true all of the factual
allegations contained in the complaint” and must “draw all reasonable inferences [from those
facts] in favor of the plaintiff.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d
435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see Semenova v. MTA, 845 F.3d 564, 567 (4th Cir.
2017); Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 2015); Kendall v.
Balcerzak, 650 F.3d 515, 522 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 943 (2011). But, a court is
not required to accept legal conclusions drawn from the facts. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.
265, 286 (1986). “A court decides whether [the pleading] standard is met by separating the legal
conclusions from the factual allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, and
then determining whether those allegations allow the court to reasonably infer” that the plaintiff
is entitled to the legal remedy sought. A Society Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346
(4th. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 937 (2012).

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Courts generally do not “‘resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or
the applicability of defenses’” through a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Edwards, 178 F.3d at 243
(quoting Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992)). However, “in the
relatively rare circumstances where facts sufficient to rule on an affirmative defense are alleged
in the complaint, the defense may be reached by a motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6).”
Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc); accord Pressley v.
Tupperware Long Term Disability Plan, 553 F.3d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 2009). Because Rule
12(b)(6) “is intended [only] to test the legal adequacy of the complaint,” Richmond,
Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1993), “[t]his principle
only applies . . . if all facts necessary to the affirmative defense ‘clearly appear[ ] on the face of
the complaint.’” Goodman, 494 F.3d at 464 (quoting Forst, 4 F.3d at 250) (emphasis added
in Goodman ).
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1), the statute of limitations constitutes an affirmative defense
to an action. “The raising of the statute of limitations as a bar to plaintiffs’ cause of action
constitutes an affirmative defense and may be raised by motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), if the time bar is apparent on the face of the complaint.” Dean v. Pilgrim’s Pride
Corp., 395 F.3d 471, 474 (4th Cir. 2005). Thus, “[a] district court may dismiss a [§ 1983] claim
as time barred under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . when the untimeliness of the claim is plain from the face
of the complaint.” Bailey-El v. Hous. Auth. of Balt. City, 686 F. App’x 228, 229 (4th Cir. 2017)
(citing Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 2006), and Dean, 395 F.3d at
474).
III.

Discussion

Defendant argues that Boyce’s suit is time-barred, pursuant to the applicable statute of

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limitations. See ECF 6-1 at 2-3. In her Opposition, Boyce argues that she is entitled to
“equitable tolling” of the limitations period. See ECF 7-1 at 4-6.
Section 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations. Thus, to determine whether a
§ 1983 claim was timely filed, courts look to the statute of limitations from the most analogous
state-law cause of action. Owens v. Balt. City State’s Attorney’s Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th
Cir. 2014); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (“[I]n all cases where [the laws of the United States] are
not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies
. . . the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State
wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil . . . cause is held, so far as the same is not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern
the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause . . . .”).
A suit filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 constitutes a personal injury action. Owens v.
Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989). Therefore, Maryland law affords a three-year limitations
period. See Md. Code (2013 Repl. Vol., 2017 Supp.), § 5-101 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article (“C.J.”); Owens, 767 F.3d at 388. Under C.J. § 5-101, “[a] civil action at
law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues unless another provision of the Code
provides a different period of time within which an action shall be commenced.” Because each
claim lodged by Boyce is made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (see ECF 5), each claim is “subject
to a three-year statute of limitations.” Bailey-El, 686 F. App’x at 229; see Owens, 767 F.3d at
388; C.J. § 5-101.
Boyce does not dispute that the three-year statute of limitations applies. Rather, she
requests equitable tolling of the limitations period. See ECF 7-1 at 4-7.
In certain circumstances, a limitations period may be extended pursuant to the doctrine of

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equitable tolling. See United States v. Wong, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1630 (2015)
(“[T]ime bars in suits between private parties are presumptively subject to equitable tolling”)
(emphasis in Wong); Cruz v. Maypa, 773 F. 3d 138, 146-47 (4th Cir. 2014). Equitable tolling “is
appropriate in two circumstances: first, when ‘the plaintiffs were prevented from asserting their
claims by some kind of wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant,’ and second, when
‘extraordinary circumstances beyond plaintiffs’ control made it impossible to file the claims on
time.’” Cruz, 773 F.3d at 146-47 (quoting Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir.
2000)); see Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, ___, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1231-32 (2014).
But, “[e]quitable tolling is a rare remedy available only where the plaintiff has
‘exercise[d] due diligence in preserving [her] legal rights.’” Cruz, 773 F. 3d at 147 (quoting
Chao v. Va. Dep't of Transp., 291 F.3d 276, 283 (4th Cir. 2002)); see Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans
Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990) (“Federal courts have typically extended equitable relief only
sparingly.”); Lucas v. United States, 664 F. App’x 333, 335 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Equitable tolling is
an extraordinary remedy limited to those occasions when ‘it would be unconscionable to enforce
the limitation period against the party and gross injustice would result.’”) (quoting Harris, 209
F.3d at 330). Moreover, “principles of equitable tolling do not extend to garden variety claims of
excusable neglect.” Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 247 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc); see Irwin, 498
U.S. at 96 (concluding that equitable tolling does not apply where petitioner’s lawyer was absent
from the office when the EEOC notice was received, and petitioner filed suit within 30 days of
the date he personally received notice).
An action typically accrues at the time of the wrong, unless a judicial or legislative
exception provides otherwise. Poole v. Coakley & Williams Const., Inc., 423 Md. 91, 131, 31
A.3d 212, 236 (2011). But, there are circumstances when a claim does not accrue until the

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plaintiff has (or should have) “possession of the critical facts that [she] has been hurt and who
has inflicted the injury.” United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122 (1979) (discussing the
discovery rule in the context of the Federal Tort Claims Act, which contains a statute of
limitations requiring notice to the government within two years after such claim accrues).
Plaintiff points out that federal law, not state law, governs the accrual analysis. ECF 7-1 at 4.
Yet, she cites a host of Maryland cases discussing accrual. Id. at 5. Regardless, the outcome is
the same.
“Recognizing the unfairness inherent in charging a plaintiff with slumbering on his rights
where it was not reasonably possible to have obtained notice of the nature and cause of an
injury,” Maryland has adopted the so-called discovery rule to determine the date of accrual. See
Bank of N.Y. v. Sheff, 382 Md. 235, 244, 854 A.2d 1269, 1275 (2004); Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship
v. Brown & Sturm, 360 Md. 76, 95, 756 A.2d 963, 973 (2000). “The discovery rule acts to
balance principles of fairness and judicial economy in those situations in which a diligent
plaintiff may be unaware of an injury or harm during the statutory period.”

Dual Inc. v.

Lockheed Martin Corp., 383 Md. 151, 167, 857 A.2d 1095, 1104 (2004).
Under the discovery rule, “a plaintiff’s cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows
or reasonably should have known of the wrong.” Brown v. Neuberger, Quinn, Gielen, Rubin &
Gibber, P.A., 731 F. Supp. 2d 443, 449 (D. Md. 2010) (citing Lumsden v. Design Tech Builders,
Inc., 358 Md. 435, 749 A.2d 796, 801 (2000)), aff’d, 495 F. App’x 350 (4th Cir. 2012). Notice
may be actual or constructive. Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 636-38, 431 A.2d 677, 68081 (1981). Thus, “[t]his standard . . . does not require actual knowledge on the part of the
plaintiff, but may be satisfied if the plaintiff is on ‘inquiry notice.’” Dual Inc., 383 Md. at 16768, 857 A.2d at 1104 (citing Am. Gen. Assurance Co. v. Pappano, 374 Md. 339, 351, 822 A.2d

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1212, 1219 (2003); Doe v. Archdiocese of Wash., 114 Md. App. 169, 188-89, 689 A.2d 634, 644
(1997)). A plaintiff is on inquiry notice when the plaintiff “possesses ‘facts sufficient to cause a
reasonable person to investigate further, and . . . a diligent investigation would have revealed that
the plaintiff[] [was a] victim[] of . . . the alleged tort.’” Dual Inc., 383 Md. at 168, 857 A.2d
1095 (quoting Pennwalt Corp. v. Nasios, 314 Md. 433, 448-49, 550 A.2d 1155, 1159 (1988))
(alterations in original).
Ordinarily, “‘the question of accrual in [C.J.] § 5-101 is left to judicial determination,’
unless the determination rests on the resolution of disputed facts regarding discovery of the
wrong.” Poole, 423 Md. at 131, 31 A.3d at 236 (citation omitted); see Sheff, 382 Md. at 244,
854 A.2d at 1275 (stating that summary judgment may be appropriate if there is no dispute of
material fact as to whether plaintiff was on inquiry notice more than three years before suit was
file); Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 95, 756 A.2d at 973 (explaining that the
determination of accrual “may be based solely on law, solely on fact, or on a combination of law
and fact, and is reached after careful consideration of the purpose of the statute and the facts to
which it is applied”).
Plaintiff presents a fine summary of the law of claim accrual, the discovery rule, and
equitable tolling. But, she fails to provide any factual basis for the application of the discovery
rule or equitable tolling to this case. Indeed, it is patently obvious that, as of the date of the
alleged incident on December 7, 2013, plaintiff had all the notice she needed.
On the face of the Amended Complaint (ECF 5), Boyce avers that the central events
occurred on December 7, 2013, when she “was driving her vehicle” and “Dorn stopped her for
no legal reason.” Id. ¶ 11. On that same date, Dorn allegedly twisted plaintiff’s arm behind her
back, handcuffed her, illegally towed her vehicle, and incorrectly told plaintiff that her license

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had been suspended and that she had a warrant for her arrest. Id. ¶¶ 15-18, 23. According to
Boyce, Dorn also threatened her, “telling her that if she resisted him, she would be ‘eating
concrete.’” Id. ¶ 20. Moreover, Boyce was “forced to spend the night at the Police Department”
during the night of December 7-8, 2013. Id. ¶ 22. Yet, for no apparent reason, she did not file
suit until almost four years later, on November 22, 2017.
Plaintiff contends that she is “entitled to limited discovery to more clearly determine
when Plaintiff discovered, or should have discovered, that Defendant violated her constitutional
rights.” ECF 7-1 at 3. She is grasping at straws. She was well aware of the alleged wrongful
conduct as of December 7, 2013. Boyce offers no reason as to why she did not file suit until
almost four years after the alleged wrongful conduct.
Boyce does not claim that defendants prevented her from filing suit or that extraordinary
circumstances beyond her control hindered her from knowing that she had been wronged.
Indeed, she fails to explain why the events pertaining to her arrest on December 7, 2013, failed to
provide notice as to her claims. She does not allege that any outside factors prevented her from
filing suit. There is no indication that a gross injustice would occur if the period of limitations
was enforced. Put another way, plaintiff provides no factual or legal basis for equitable tolling.
IV.

Conclusion

In my view, Boyce has failed to establish any ground for equitable tolling of the
limitations period.

On the face of the Complaint, suit is plainly barred by limitations.

Accordingly, the suit is subject to dismissal. See C.J. § 5-101; see also Owens, 767 F.3d at 388.
For the foregoing reasons, I shall grant the Motion (ECF 6). An Order follows.
Date: August 9, 2018

/s/
Ellen Lipton Hollander
United States District Judge

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