Zaman, Ph.D. v. Community College of Baltimore County

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Chief Judge James K. Bredar on 4/17/2018. (c/m 4/17/2018 aos, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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KAMRUZ ZAMAN, Ph.D.,

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Plaintiff

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v.

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COMMUNITY COLLEGE OF
BALTIMORE COUNTY,

CIVIL NO. JKB-17-3584

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Defendant.
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MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Kamruz Zaman, Ph.D, proceeding pro se, brought this action against his former
employer, Community College of Baltimore County (“CCBC” or “Defendant”) on December 1,
2017. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on January 26, 2018.
(Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff has responded in opposition (ECF No. 11) and Defendant
has replied (ECF No. 12). Therefore the motion is ripe for review. There is no need to hold a
hearing to resolve the matter. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). Plaintiff did not timely file
charges with an administrative agency, and for that reason the Court will grant Defendant’s
motion and dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint by accompanying order.
I.

Background
Plaintiff filed a form complaint (ECF No. 1), and attached a “Statement of Claim” (ECF

No. 1-1), as well as a document entitled “Case: Kamruz Zaman against the Community College
of Baltimore County,” (“Case”) (ECF No. 1-2). As this memorandum is evaluating a motion to
dismiss, the Court will recite the facts of the case as stated in Plaintiff’s complaint, see Ibarra v.

United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997) by which it means the form complaint,
Statement of the Claim, and Case.
Plaintiff is a “Bangladeshi Muslim with brown skin color.” (ECF No. 1-2 at 1.) Plaintiff
began working for CCBC as a Chemistry Professor in 2012. (Id. at 9-10.) On occasion, his
colleagues made racially insensitive remarks. For example, one colleague suggested that “Asian
people are not good drivers,” and another stated that they “do not socialize” with faculty of
Bangladeshi/Indian origin. (Id. at 10.) In addition to these statements, Plaintiff was also treated
unfairly in regards to disciplinary proceedings, disputes with students, and the review of his
teaching performance. He was not appointed to various positions in which he expressed interest.
Plaintiff complained to CCBC, but was not satisfied with the ensuing investigation.

On

December 6, 2014, a Dr. O’Neal told Plaintiff that he “could not offer [Plaintiff] a three-year
contract, [and] instead he was willing to offer [Plaintiff] a one-year contract.” (Id. at 3.) Dr.
O’Neal stated that this was in part due to Plaintiff’s unprofessional interactions with a “presenter
of a workshop.” (Id.) He was later offered a three-year position the following August, in 2015.
(Id. at 7.) But then, on December 11, 2015, Plaintiff was informed by letter and in person that
CCBC was terminating his contract. (Id. at 1, 9.) The “effective date of termination,” was
December of the following year (December 31, 2016). (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff believes that his
contract was terminated as a result of the discriminatory conduct of his colleagues.
On Plaintiff’s form complaint in response to the prompt “It is my best recollection that
the alleged discriminatory acts occurred on date(s) . . .” Plaintiff wrote “12/11/15 and before
(8/15/2012 - 12/11/2015).” (ECF No. 1 at 5.) In his Statement of the Claim he wrote that “A
group of faculty/staff of the Community College of Baltimore County (CCBC) . . . subjected me
to national origin, racial, and religion based harassment in the form of, but not limited to,

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derogatory comments regarding Asians and Muslims, work place bullying, fabricated
performance issues, exclusion from work related activities, blatant unprofessionalism, and
intentional efforts to undermine my professional credibility between August 15, 2012 and
December 11, 2015.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 1.) He further added that “The last action of the
defendant in the form of terminating my job contract vide [sic] a letter dated December 11, 2015
has almost destroyed my professional career, ruined my family and me financially, mentally, and
socially.” (Id.) On the final page of the Case he again asserts that “The last action of the
defendant in the form of terminating my job contract (vide [sic] a letter dated December 11,
2015) in the middle of the academic year violating the conditions set forth in the three-year
faculty contract has almost destroyed my professional career, ruined my family and me
financially, mentally, and socially.” (ECF No. 1-2 at 12.) He does not allege in his form
complaint, Statement of the Claim, or Case that he was discriminated against by Defendant in
any way after December 11, 2015, and states clearly and emphatically multiple times in these
documents that “The last action of the defendant” was on “December 11, 2015.”1
Plaintiff filed an administrative charge of discrimination with the Maryland Commission
on Civil Rights (“MCCR”) on March 10, 2017. (See ECF No. 1-2 at 11-12.) On May 26, 2017
the MCCR informed Plaintiff that his claims were not timely.

(Id. at 12.)

The Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) ultimately adopted the MCCR’s reasoning and
issued Plaintiff a notice of right to sue on September 4, 2017. (Id.) Plaintiff then filed this action
three months later. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on January 26, 2018, on the

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On page six of the Case, Plaintiff alleged that “[o]n April 17, 2017 the executive director of human resources asked
Mr. Stephen Kabrhel, the physical science department head, to convene a meeting to discuss my annual performance
statement (APS).” (ECF No. 1-2 at 6-7.) This is an obvious typographical error, and Plaintiff surely meant April
17, 2015, because the “Case” largely proceeds chronologically, and the prior events described were in March 2015
and Plaintiff does not allege in his complaint or argue in his opposition that he worked at CCBC on April 17, 2017,
and yet he asserts in his Case that he was at this meeting.

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grounds that Plaintiff did not timely present his claims to the state agency. That motion is now
ripe and the Court will turn to its merits.
II.

Standard
A complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Facial plausibility exists “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Although when

considering a motion to dismiss a court must accept as true all factual allegations in the
complaint, this principle does not apply to legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
The Court will construe all pleadings “so as to do justice,” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(e), and “as
the case law makes very clear, the district court is obligated to make a determined effort to
understand what the pleader is attempting to set forth.” 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1286 (3d ed.). Pleadings written by a pro se litigant are
especially liberally construed. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).
Still, the Court is not an advocate for a pro se litigant, and the Court cannot assume, or invent,
facts outside the record in order to patch together a viable claim for a pro se plaintiff.
III.

Analysis
Under Title VII, a Plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the appropriate state

agency (in a jurisdiction with an appropriate state agency) within 300 days of the unlawful
employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims are
untimely because the final alleged unlawful employment practice occurred on December 11,

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2015, and Plaintiff did not file a charge of discrimination until March 10, 2017, 455 days later.
Defendant is correct.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that even though he was informed that his contract would
be terminated on December 11, 2015, he was actually employed by CCBC through 2016, and
therefore his claim is timely. As an initial matter, Plaintiff cannot amend his complaint by way
of argument in opposition, or evidence attached to his opposition. See Zachair, Ltd. v. Driggs,
965 F. Supp. 741, 748 n.4 (D. Md. 1997). The Court will read a pro se plaintiff’s complaint
liberally, and will generally hold their advocacy to a lower standard. But that does not mean pro
se plaintiffs operate under a different set of laws or procedural rules. The purpose of a motion to
dismiss is to test the sufficiency of a complaint, not remind a plaintiff what additional arguments
and evidence to include in it. In his complaint, Plaintiff states, clearly, multiple times, that
December 11, 2015 was the final day of whatever discriminatory treatment he had suffered.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s charge of discrimination filed with the MCCR was roughly 155 days too
late, and Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed.2
Still, Plaintiff does suggest in his complaint that he worked at CCBC through 2016 (or at
least that his contract was not terminated until the end of 2016). The Court will therefore briefly
note two additional reasons why, even assuming that Plaintiff did work through 2016, and even
considering Plaintiff’s lengthy opposition and the numerous additional facts stated therein,
Plaintiff’s complaint is still untimely. First, Plaintiff appears to bring an unlawful termination
claim,3 and to the extent he has, December 11, 2015 is the operative date for his termination
regardless of whether he continued to work through 2016. See Delaware State College v. Ricks,
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As Plaintiff appears to argue that the EEOC’s notice of right to sue proves that his claim is timely, the Court will
briefly note that such letters from the EEOC are intended to inform a claimant of a right to bring a lawsuit; they are
not meant to suggest that the claim is meritorious.
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On his form complaint, under “The discriminatory conduct of which I complain in this action includes (check all
that apply): . . .” Plaintiff only checked the box for “Termination of my employment.” (ECF No. 1 at 5.)

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449 U.S. 250 (1980). The analysis of Plaintiff’s unlawful termination claim begins and ends
with Ricks. In that case, a college professor plaintiff signed a “terminal” contract on September
4, 1974. 449 U.S. at 253-54. The defendant college had informed him that it was denying him
tenure, but that in accordance with usual policy, he would have a “terminal” contract where he
would teach for one additional year. Id. The plaintiff therefore did not actually leave the
institution until the end of the school year in 1975. Id. at 257. The plaintiff believed that the
decision to deny him tenure and fire him was based on discriminatory animus and he filed a
complaint with the EEOC on April 28, 1975, 236 days after signing the contract. Id. at 254.
Under Title VII, the plaintiff in Ricks had to file a complaint within 180 days of the alleged
unlawful employment practice, and the district court therefore dismissed the complaint. Id. at
255-56. The Supreme Court affirmed that decision.
Even though the plaintiff had not actually left his position until much later, September 4,
1974 was the operative date of the unlawful employment practice because “termination of
employment at [defendant college] [was] a delayed, but inevitable, consequence of the denial of
tenure.” Id. at 257-58. The “proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon
the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful.” Id. at 258 (emphasis in the
original) ((quoting Abramson v. Univ. of Hawaii, 594 F.2d 202, 209 (9th Cir. 1979)). Plaintiff
was informed of the termination decision on December 11, 2015, as Plaintiff states repeatedly in
his complaint. As in Ricks, whether he continued to work for Defendant is irrelevant.
Finally, beyond the form complaint, the Court could construe the substance of Plaintiff’s
allegations as asserting a hostile work environment. Under such a construction, the date on
which he was informed of his termination would not necessarily be the latest date of the unlawful
employment practice. A hostile work environment is a single “unlawful employment practice”

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that can be comprised of a number of different actions, and if any of those actions occurred
within the filing period, then the entire hostile work environment claim is timely. See National
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116-17 (2002). Thus, even though Plaintiff was
informed of his impending termination on December 11, 2015, if he continued to work for
CCBC for a year and experienced harassment and discrimination, that harassment and
discrimination could possibly be part of a hostile work environment that could then be
considered an unlawful employment practice that was timely asserted before the agency.
However, even if the Court construes Plaintiff’s claim as a hostile work environment
claim, and even if the Court goes beyond the complaint and considers the additional allegations
in Plaintiff’s opposition, Plaintiff simply does not allege or argue that anything discriminatory
happened to him after December 11, 2015. He argues vehemently in his opposition that he
continued to work for CCBC during 2016. But he does not allege that he was discriminated
against during that year in any manner. Instead he argues that he “very clearly alleged that the
hostile acts of the different faculty were almost non-stop after they started in September 2014
and continued till early December 2015.” (Opp’n at 23 (emphasis added).) Regardless of how
liberally the Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint or what facts outside of it the Court considers,
Plaintiff simply does not allege or argue that an unlawful employment practice under Title VII
occurred after December 11, 2015, and as he did not complain of an unlawful employment
practice to an agency until 455 days after that date, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion and
dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint.

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IV.

Conclusion
Plaintiff did not timely file a charge of discrimination with an appropriate agency, as

required by Title VII.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Accordingly, the Court will grant

Defendant’s motion and dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint by accompanying order.

DATED this 17th day of April, 2018.

BY THE COURT:

____________/s/________________
James K. Bredar
Chief Judge

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