Perry v. State of Maryland et al
Filing
16
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 10 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 11 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Marvin J. Garbis on 3/7/2018. (kw2s, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
SANDRA R. PERRY
*
Plaintiff
vs.
*
* CIVIL ACTION NO. MJG-17-3619
STATE OF MARYLAND, et al.
*
Defendants
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS
*
*
The Court has before it Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF
No. 10], Defendant Allen J. Perdue’s Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to State A Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted [ECF
No. 11], and the materials submitted relating thereto.
The
Court finds that a hearing is not necessary.
I.
BACKGROUND
A. Parties and Claims
Plaintiff Sandra R. Perry (“Plaintiff” or “Perry”) was an
Agent Procurement Specialist at Deer’s Head Hospital Center
(“DHHC”), and was terminated from employment in October 2017.
Compl. ¶¶ 1, 58.
Defendants are (1) the State of Maryland, (2)
Maryland Department of Health, (3) DHHC, (4) Mary Beth Waide,
(5) Kenneth Waller, (6) Elizabeth Perdue, (7) Allen John Perdue,
and (8) Luanne Dashield.1
Plaintiff brings the following claims
against each Defendant:
Count
Title
I
Title VII: Discrimination Based Upon Sex
II
Title VII: Sexual Harassment (Hostile Work Environment)
III
Title VII: Retaliation
IV
Civil Conspiracy
V
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
All Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint [ECF
Nos. 10 and 11], although Allen J. Perdue’s motion to dismiss is
contained in a separate filing [ECF No. 11].
B. Facts As Alleged by Perry
2
Plaintiff Perry was employed by DHHC from 2009 to 2017 as
an “Agency Procurement Specialist II,” meaning that she was
responsible for “procuring equipment, services, supplies, and
other needs” for DHHC through a competitive procurement process.
Compl. ¶¶ 12-13.
On October 1, 2015, Plaintiff received the
1
DHHS is a state-owned rehabilitation and long term care facility.
Defendant Waide, Waller, and Dashield are alleged to be the Executive
Director of DHHC, the CFO of DHHC, and the HR/Personnel Director of
DHHC, respectively. Compl. ¶¶ 5-6, 9. Defendant Elizabeth Perdue was
Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor, and Defendant Allen John Perdue is
Mrs. Perdue’s husband. Id. ¶¶ 7-8.
2
Defendants do not necessarily agree with these allegations.
2
following email message to her work email address, from
:
are you an exhibitionist? love those short
skirts and your long legs. when you bent
over your cheeks looked great. do you go
commando? my picture says so? need more
personal contact. you might agree by sending
me proof and if you shave. I know you don't
want this circulated.
Id. ¶¶ 16-17.
Plaintiff did not recognize the email address,
felt “extremely uncomfortable and threatened,” and reported the
email to her supervisor (Defendant Elizabeth Perdue) and her
department director (Defendant Waller), neither of whom took
action.
Id. ¶¶ 18-19.
Later that same day, she “determined, by performing a
Google search that the sexually harassing email message came
from Allen John Perdue, who is the husband of [her] immediate
supervisor, Mrs. Beth Perdue.”3
Id. ¶ 20.
Plaintiff explained
this finding to Defendant Waller and “members of the IT staff”
yet still received no response.
Id. ¶¶ 21-22.
Afterwards, a
member of the IT staff allegedly went onto her computer and
moved the email message from her inbox to the spam folder.
¶ 23.
Id.
Plaintiff retrieved the email from the spam folder,
shared it with the Human Resources Department, and requested
3
Plaintiff previously met Mr. Perdue when he visited his wife at work.
The interaction “was limited to polite conversation.” Id. ¶ 21 n. 2.
Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Perdue had gotten her email address from
“group emails” on which she and Mr. Perdue were both included. Id.
3
that Human Resources address this matter with Mrs. Perdue and
prelude Mr. Perdue from entering the premises.
Id. ¶ 24.
Following the incidents on October 1, 2015, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Elizabeth Perdue “initiated a pattern of
hazing, harassment, hostility, and isolation” directed at
Plaintiff, including giving her “the silent treatment” and
“bec[oming] critical” of her work performance.
Id. ¶ 25.
Plaintiff alleges that her complaints about Defendant Elizabeth
Perdue were ignored, that she was refused a request for a
different supervisor, that she began medical treatment for
stress, anxiety, and depression.
Id. ¶¶ 26-28.
In November 2015, Defendant Dashield informed Plaintiff
that she was assigned to a “clerical position of ‘timekeeping,’”
which was a lower level position than her procurement position
and was located in an “unoccupied area of the DHHC building.”
Id. ¶¶ 29-30, 33.
Upon hearing that this position would be
permanent, Plaintiff allegedly suffered a panic attack and had
to take 12 weeks of medical leave.
Id. ¶¶ 34-35.
On February 11, 2016, Plaintiff filed a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC, alleging sexual harassment and
retaliation.
Id. ¶ 37.
She returned to work soon thereafter
(in her original procurement position), and continued to be
supervised by Defendant Elizabeth Perdue.
4
Id. ¶ 36.
Ms. Perdue
allegedly began to remove responsibilities from Plaintiff,
including personally handling responsibilities for which
Plaintiff used to handle, not providing Plaintiff with access to
files that she believed she needed to effectively complete her
work, and changing the way contract review was assigned so that
Plaintiff had fewer independent responsibilities.
41-43.
Id. ¶¶ 36-39,
Ms. Perdue also “slamm[ed] office doors, slamm[ed]
filing drawers, and slamm[ed] restroom doors” whenever Plaintiff
was nearby.
Id. ¶ 40.
During this time, Plaintiff discovers a 6-month performance
review finalized during her medical leave that gave her work a
rating of “Satisfactory,” even though she had always received an
“Outstanding” performance review prior to her medical leave.
Id. ¶¶ 14, 44.
On April 10, 2017, Plaintiff was approved for, and took,
another three-month long medical leave as a result of “stress,
anxiety, and depression.”
Id. ¶¶ 47-48.
Although she was
scheduled to return to work on July 5, 2017, on that date she
stated that she was not medically cleared to return to work due
to stress, anxiety and depression.
Id. ¶ 50.
Defendants
requested a Task Analysis from Plaintiff’s medical provider, and
sent Plaintiff for a medical evaluation by a doctor at the State
Medical Director’s Office, who reported that Plaintiff “is not
5
likely psychologically fit to efficiently perform her job duties
at her current location at Deer’s Head Hospital Center” but that
Plaintiff “would be able to perform [her] duties . . . in a
different location.”
Id. ¶¶ 51-54.
Following this medical evaluation, Defendant Dashield wrote
a letter to Plaintiff on September 12, 2017, stating that
reassignment was not feasible due to a lack of vacancies and
that “a list of reasonable accommodations” could be provided but
not guaranteed.
Id. ¶ 55.
The letter “concluded by stating
that if accommodations cannot be granted,” then Plaintiff could
resign, apply for disability or service retirement, or be
terminated.
Id.
Plaintiff filed for disability retirement on September 25,
2017, and was formally terminated by letter on October 7, 2017.
Id. ¶¶ 57-58.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.
A complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in
order to give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests.”
6
Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted).
When
evaluating a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s wellpleaded allegations are accepted as true and the complaint is
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
However,
conclusory statements or a “formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action” will not suffice.
Id.
A complaint must
allege sufficient facts to “cross ‘the line between possibility
and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’”
Francis v.
Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 557).
Inquiry into whether a complaint states a plausible claim
is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Id.
Thus,
if the well-pleaded facts contained within a complaint “do not
permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not shown –
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Id. (quoting Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
III.
DISCUSSION
Many of the issues in this case have already been resolved
by the parties.
Plaintiff does not object to the dismissal of
7
Counts I, II, and III against all of the Individual Defendants
(i.e., Defendants Waide, Waller, Elizabeth Perdue, Allen J.
Perdue, and Dashield).
Resp. at 6, ECF No. 14.
Pl.’s Resp. at 6, ECF No. 13; Pl.’s
Plaintiff also does not object to the
dismissal of Count IV against all Defendants, and the dismissal
of Count V as to all Defendants except Allen John Perdue.
Pl.’s
Resp. at 6, ECF No. 13; Pl.’s Resp. at 6, ECF No. 14.
Accordingly, the remaining claims are:
(A) Counts I, II, and III against the State of
Maryland, the Maryland Department of Health, and DHHC,
and
(B)
Count V against Allen John Perdue.
A. Title VII Claims (Counts I, II, and III)
i. Count I: Discrimination Based Upon Sex
In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that she was discriminated
against on the basis of her sex because she was subjected to
sexual harassment, which conflates discrimination and sexual
harassment charges under Title VII.
The Court will first
address the discrimination charge, and then address the sexual
harassment charge as part of Count II (i.e. hostile work
environment).
8
“As a general matter, to make out a prima facie case for
employment discrimination, the Plaintiff must show that: (1)
[s]he is a member of a protected group; (2) [s]he earned
satisfactory performance marks, (3) [s]he suffered an adverse
employment action; and (4) other similarly situated employees
outside [her] protected class were treated more favorably.”
McCain v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 568, 573 (D. Md.
2000).
Even taking all of Plaintiff’s allegations as true,
Plaintiff has not stated sufficient facts to make a prima facie
case that she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex
(i.e., that other similarly situated employees were treated more
favorably than she was because of her sex).
Her allegation of
discrimination based on sex is based on an obscene email
allegedly sent by a non-employee to her work email address, and
the subsequent lack of action from the Defendants.
Her other
factual allegations about the changes in her work conditions
(including termination) appear to flow from this single
incident.
Importantly, she does not allege facts in the Complaint
showing that other similarly situated employees outside her
class (of women) were treated more favorably.
In fact, she does
not even mention any other agency procurement specialists who
9
worked at DHHC.
Although she does allege that a “storeroom
staff supply offer” performed some of her duties during medical
leave, she does not allege that he was treated more favorably
than she was on the basis of sex.
Compl. ¶ 41.
Accordingly, the Court shall grant Defendants’ motion to
dismiss Count I.
ii. Count II: Hostile Work Environment
To establish a hostile work environment sexual harassment
claim, a plaintiff must prove that:
(1)
the subject conduct was unwelcome;
(2)
it was based on the sex of the
plaintiff;
(3)
it was sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the plaintiff’s conditions of
employment and to create an abusive
work environment; and
(4)
it was imputable on some factual basis
to the employer.
Spicer v. Com. of Va., Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 705, 710 (4th
Cir. 1995).
In assessing whether a work environment is objectively
hostile, it is necessary to consider “‘all the circumstances,’
including ‘the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating,
10
or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee’s work performance.’”
G.D.C., Inc., 281 F.3d 452, 459 (4th Cir. 2002).
Anderson v.
Moreover,
“[o]n the fourth element for establishing employer liability,
[the Fourth Circuit has] repeatedly held that an employer cannot
be held liable for isolated remarks of its employees unless the
employer ‘knew or should have known of the harassment, and
took no effectual action to correct the situation.’”
Spicer, 66
F.3d at 710.
Plaintiff has not stated facts sufficient to support a
prima facie claim of sexual harassment based on a hostile work
environment.
The facts alleged do not show conditions
“sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiff’s
conditions of employment and to create an abusive work
environment[.]”
Id.
Although the contents of the email were
clearly obscene, the sexually offensive conduct happened only
once (i.e., the October 1, 2015 email) and does not rise to the
level of “sufficiently severe or pervasive” as to warrant relief
under the circumstances.
The other actions allegedly taken by
Defendants (e.g., reducing or changing her responsibilities,
slamming doors, giving her the cold shoulder, preventing her
from accessing certain files) were not sexually harassing
actions and could not be based upon Plaintiff’s sex.
11
Accordingly, the Court shall grant Defendants’ motion to
dismiss Count II.
iii. Count III: Retaliation
To state a prima facie claim for retaliatory
discrimination, the Plaintiff must show “(i) ‘that [she] engaged
in protected activity,’ (ii) ‘that [her employer] took adverse
action against [her],’ and (iii) ‘that a causal relationship
existed between the protected activity and the adverse
employment activity.’”
Foster v. Univ. of Maryland-E. Shore,
787 F.3d 243, 250 (4th Cir. 2015).
If the Plaintiff makes this
showing, the burden shifts back to the Defendants “to show that
[the] purportedly retaliatory action was in fact the result of a
legitimate non-retaliatory reason.”
Id.
Plaintiff argues that the “protected” activities include
(1) taking medical leave and (2) filing a Charge of
Discrimination with the EEOC alleging sexual harassment and
retaliation.
Pl.’s Resp. at 12, ECF No. 13.
She argues that as
a result of these two activities, she suffered adverse
employment consequences (e.g., limits to her access and
privileges, increased supervision and decreased
responsibilities, and termination).
12
Defendants argue that
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim must be dismissed because “no
protected activity took place.”
Defs.’ Reply at 6, ECF No. 15.
Section 704(a) of Title VII provides that an employee
engages in protected activity when she “oppose[s] any practice
made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter” or “has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a).
In sum, protected
activities “fall into two categories: participation and
opposition.”
Gibson v. Marjack Co., 718 F. Supp. 2d 649, 653–54
(D. Md. 2010).
To decide whether a plaintiff has engaged in a
protected activity, courts must first consider “whether the
employee ‘communicates to her employer a belief that the
employer has engaged in . . . a form of employment
discrimination.’”
Bowman v. Baltimore City Bd. of Sch.
Commissioners, 173 F. Supp. 3d 242, 248 (D. Md. 2016).
If this
question is answered in the affirmative, “then a court considers
whether this communicated belief concerns a practice that is
‘actually unlawful under Title VII’ or that the employee
‘reasonably believes to be unlawful.’”
Id.
Plaintiff’s act of taking medical leave is not a protected
activity in this case.
Her medical leave action was not taken
as a means of communicating to her employer that she believed
13
the employer’s action (or inaction) to be unlawful, but was
taken for her physical and psychological needs.
However, Plaintiff did engage in a protected activity when
she filed the Charge of Discrimination.
Filing a Charge with
the EEOC is a clear statement of opposition.
Moreover, at this
stage of the litigation, the Court is satisfied of her
reasonable belief that a hostile work environment was in
progress, even if the evidence does not ultimately rise to that
level.
Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has stated that a plaintiff’s
belief does not need to be supported by additional evidence that
such an environment is likely to occur.
See Boyer-Liberto v.
Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 284 (4th Cir. 2015) (“an
employee is protected from retaliation for opposing an isolated
incident of harassment when she reasonably believes that a
hostile work environment is in progress, with no requirement for
additional evidence that a plan is in motion to create such an
environment or that such an environment is likely to occur.”).
The Court finds that she had a reasonable belief that the
email incident and subsequent response, although insufficient on
its own to state a prima facie claim for hostile work
14
environment, was nonetheless “physically threatening or
humiliating” at the time.4
Id.
Moreover, the Court finds that the Plaintiff had engaged in
the protected activities of complaining about Ms. Perdue’s
behavior toward her even before she filed a formal EEOC Charge
of Discrimination.
See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 23 (Perry sharing the
obscene email with Human Resources); ¶ 24 (Perry requesting
Defendant Dashield address the matter with her supervisor and
preclude Mr. Perdue from being allowed on the premises); ¶ 26
(Perry complaining to Defendants Waller and Dashield about Ms.
Perdue’s hostility); ¶ 32 (Perry protesting her demotion to a
timekeeper).
Although “individual acts may be scrutinized to
ascertain their nature, purpose, and nexus to the alleged
objective, the touchstone is whether the plaintiff’s course of
conduct as a whole” meets the two step inquiry.
DeMasters v.
Carilion Clinic, 796 F.3d 409, 418 (4th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in
original).
Considering Plaintiff’s entire course of conduct
following the email, the Court is satisfied that has stated her
participation in an activity protected by Title VII.
4
The email could plausibly have been imputable to the employer
under a negligence standard. See E.E.O.C. v. Cromer Food
Servs., Inc., 414 F. App’x 602, 606 (4th Cir. 2011). The
Defendants were on notice of the email through Plaintiff’s
multiple complaints. Despite this notice, they took absolutely
no action when they could have at the least investigated the
origin of the email address or blocked the email address.
15
The Court also finds that a number of adverse employment
actions were taken against Plaintiff following her complaints
and EEOC charge.
For example, Plaintiff alleged that she was
demoted to a “timekeeper” in a different part of the building
and that she was told that this demotion would be permanent.
Id. ¶¶ 29-30, 33-35.
Ms. Perdue allegedly began to remove
responsibilities from Plaintiff, including personally handling
responsibilities for which Plaintiff used to handle, not
providing Plaintiff with access to files that she believed she
needed to effectively complete her work, and changing the way
contract review was assigned so that Plaintiff had fewer
independent responsibilities.
Compl. ¶¶ 36-39, 41-43.
Plaintiff receives two performance reviews with a lower rating,
even though she had always received an “Outstanding” performance
review prior to this time.
Id. ¶¶ 14, 44.
terminated from employment in October 2017.
Plaintiff was then
Id. ¶¶ 57-58.
Finally, the Court finds that the causation element has
been sufficiently pled.
Foster, 787 F.3d at 250.
The record
supports the plausible claim that actions taken by Defendants
were personally directed at Plaintiff because of her numerous
complaints about this obscene email.
There is no indication
that these actions (e.g., demotion and termination) would have
occurred prior to her complaints.
16
If the Plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of the three
retaliation elements, the burden shifts back to the Defendants
“to show that [the] purportedly retaliatory action was in fact
the result of a legitimate non-retaliatory reason.”
F.3d at 250 (4th Cir. 2015).
Foster, 787
Defendants have not made such a
showing, and indeed, have not addressed any non-retaliatory
reason for these subsequent actions.
Under the circumstances,
the Court finds it appropriate for the parties to proceed to
discovery and resolve the retaliation claim after a more fully
developed record.
Accordingly, the Court shall deny Defendants’ motion to
dismiss Count III.
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim
Against Defendant Allen J. Perdue
To establish a claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, a Plaintiff must prove (1) conduct that is intentional
or reckless, (2) conduct that is extreme and outrageous, (3) a
causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional
distress, and (4) severe emotional distress.
Shiflett, 325 Md. 684, 733 (1992).
Batson v.
This cause of action “is to
be used sparingly and only for opprobrious behavior that
includes truly outrageous conduct.”
17
Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat.
Mgmt. Co. v. Weathersby, 326 Md. 663, 670 (1992).
The conduct
must “exceed[] all bounds usually tolerated by decent society,
of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does
cause, mental distress of a very serious kind.
The requirements
of the rule are rigorous, and difficult to satisfy.”
Id.,
quoting W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts §
12, p. 60–61 (5th ed. 1984).
Notably, “recovery [for
intentional infliction of emotional distress] will be meted out
sparingly, its balm reserved for those wounds that are truly
severe and incapable of healing themselves.”
Figueiredo-Torres
v. Nickel, 321 Md. 642, 653 (1991) (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff’s pleadings fall short of meeting this standard.
There are only three factual allegations in the Complaint
regarding Defendant Allen Perdue.
First, he is alleged to have
sent the October 1, 2015 email, stating:
are you an exhibitionist? love those short
skirts and your long legs. when you bent
over your cheeks looked great. do you go
commando? my picture says so? need more
personal contact. you might agree by sending
me proof and if you shave. I know you don't
want this circulated.
Compl. ¶¶ 16-17.
Second, he had previously met Plaintiff when
he visited his wife at work, and their interaction “was limited
to polite conversation.”
Id. ¶ 21 n. 2.
Third, Plaintiff
alleges that Mr. Perdue had gotten her email address from “group
18
emails” on which she and Mr. Perdue were both included.
Id.
These allegations do not rise to the level of “extreme and
outrageous conduct” for which this Court can provide relief.
Batson, 325 Md. at 733.
The Court is mindful of the severity of
conduct required to state a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, which “is to be used sparingly,” Kentucky
Fried Chicken Nat. Mgmt., 326 Md. at 670, and its “balm [is to
be] reserved for those wounds that are truly severe and
incapable of healing themselves.”
653.
Figueiredo-Torres, 321 Md. at
A single obscene email, plus a single “polite” interaction
and allegations of being on an email chain, simply do not state
a claim for relief.
See, e.g., Figueiredo-Torres, 321 Md. at
654 (concluding a jury may find extreme and outrageous conduct
when a marriage counsel hired by Plaintiff engaged in sexual
intercourse with Plaintiff’s wife); B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135,
148 (1988) (finding a viable cause of action when defendant
engaged in sex with plaintiff even though he knew he had
transmittable herpes); Young v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 303
Md. 182, 198 (1985) (reversing dismissal when workers’
compensation insurer insisted plaintiff undergo psychiatric
evaluation for the “sole purpose” of harassing her to “abandon[]
her claim, or into committing suicide”).
The Court is also not
persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that this conduct should be
19
considered extreme and outrageous because it was sent by Mr.
Perdue to his wife’s subordinate employee.
Pl.’s Resp. at 7,
ECF No. 14.
Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendant Allen J.
Perdue’s Motion to Dismiss Count V.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons:
1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 10] is GRANTED
IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
a. The retaliation claim (Count III) remains pending
against the State of Maryland, the Maryland
Department of Health, and the Deer’s Head
Hospital Center.
b. All other claims are dismissed against the
following Defendants: the State of Maryland, the
Maryland Department of Health, the Deer’s Head
Hospital Center, Mary Beth Waide, Kenneth Waller,
Elizabeth Perdue, and Luanne Dashield.
2. Defendant Allen J. Perdue’s Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be
Granted [ECF No. 11] is GRANTED.
3. No claims remain pending against Mary Beth Waide,
Kenneth Waller, Elizabeth Perdue, Luanne Dashield, and
Allen J. Perdue.
20
4. Plaintiff shall arrange a case planning telephone
conference with the remaining parties and the Court to
be held by March 28, 2018.
SO ORDERED, this Wednesday, March 7, 2018.
/s/__________
Marvin J. Garbis
United States District Judge
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