Spencer v. State of Maryland et al

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 6/25/2019. (c/m 6/25/19)(ds3, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
HARVEY C. SPENCER,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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PFC JESSIE GUESSFORD, et al.,

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Defendants.

Civil Action No. GLR-18-283

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court is Defendants PFC Jessie Guessford and Det. Edward
Howard’s (collectively, “the Officers”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7). The Motion is ripe
for disposition, and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2018). For the
reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the Motion.
I.

BACKGROUND1

The facts of this case are not entirely clear from Plaintiff Harvey C. Spencer’s
Complaint. (See Compl., ECF No. 1). The Complaint, which consists of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2018) form and a handwritten statement, names the Officers and Ray Klekotka as
Defendants2 but does not identify the right or rights they allegedly violated. (Id. at 1–2).3

Unless otherwise noted, the Court takes the following facts from Spencer’s
Complaint, (ECF No. 1), and accepts them as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
2
Spencer has not named the State of Maryland as a Defendant in this case. The
Court will, therefore, order the Clerk to terminate the State of Maryland as a Defendant.
3
Citations to the Complaint are to the page numbers the Court Management/
Electronic Case Files (“CM/ECF”) system assigned.
1

The Court takes judicial notice4 of the docket from Spencer’s criminal case in the Circuit
Court for Dorchester County, Maryland, which he cites in the Complaint. (Id. at 3).
According to the docket in that case, the incident that forms the basis of the Complaint
occurred on June 29, 2015. (No. 09-K-15-015654, Docket, Cir. Ct. Dorch. Cty.). After a
trial on February 11, 2016, a jury convicted Spencer of two misdemeanors—theft of under
$1,000.00 and resisting arrest—and acquitted him of several other charges, including
felony counts of assaulting a law enforcement officer and disarming a law officer. (Id.).
The state court sentenced him to four-and-a-half years in prison, (id.), which he is serving
at the Eastern Correctional Institution Annex in Westover, Maryland, (Compl. at 1). The
Complaint’s handwritten statement includes excerpts or summaries of testimony from
Spencer’s criminal trial. (Compl. at 2). As to Klekotka, the summary concerns the location
of certain pieces of evidence. (Id.).5 As to the Officers, the Complaint states:
PFC Jessie Guessford:
He said I mean, he made no threats. He wasn’t tr[y]ng to
fight[.] This man hit me in the face [sixteen] time[s] and was
on top of me[;] said I’ll kill you dead. [illegible]

4

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the Court is free to take judicial notice of a
matter of public record if it “is not subject to reasonable dispute because it can be accurately
and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”
Fed.R.Evid. 201(b)(2).
5
Klekotka has not yet been served, but the Court will not require him to be served
because Spencer has not stated a claim against him. The Complaint’s discussion of
Klekotka is limited to recounting Klekotka’s testimony that he did not possess certain
pieces of evidence. (See Compl. at 2). It is unclear what constitutional right Klekotka
allegedly violated based on this testimony. Spencer neither mentions Klekotka in his later
filings clarifying his excessive force claim, nor does he allege that Klekotka was involved
in the excessive force incident. The Court will, therefore, dismiss the Complaint as to
Klekotka.
2

Detective Edward Howard: was choking me and said he saw
my head hit the as[phalt] so many time[s] he lost count. And
my blood was on his shirt. Mr. Spencer[’s] blood. I was
acquitted of the most serious charges with them!
Id. (some capitalization altered).
On January 26, 2018, Spencer sued the Officers and Klekotka. (ECF No. 1). On
September 6, 2018, the Officers filed their Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 7). On Spencer
17, 2018, Spencer filed an Opposition. (ECF No. 10).6 On October 9, 2018, the Officers
filed a Reply. (ECF No. 11).
II.
A.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review
The purpose of a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is to “test[ ]

the sufficiency of a complaint,” not to “resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits
of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th
Cir. 2016) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). A
complaint fails to state a claim if it does not contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), or does not “state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially

The Court received Spencer’s Opposition on September 26, 2018, but it is deemed
filed as of the date Spencer submitted it for mailing. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266
(1988). Spencer also filed a Supplement on September 10, 2018, which the Court received
and docketed on September 14, 2018. (ECF No. 9). Because Spencer filed his Supplement
several months after his Complaint and after the Officers filed their Motion, the Court will
not consider its allegations in resolving the Motion. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), (d).
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plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555). Though the plaintiff is not required to forecast evidence to prove the elements of
the claim, the complaint must allege sufficient facts to establish each element. Goss v. Bank
of America, N.A., 917 F.Supp.2d 445, 449 (D.Md. 2013) (quoting Walters v. McMahen,
684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012)), aff’d sub nom. Goss v. Bank of America, NA, 546
F.App’x 165 (4th Cir. 2013).
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must examine the complaint as a
whole, consider the factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construe the factual
allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268
(1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). But, the court need not accept unsupported or
conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, United Black
Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979), or legal conclusions couched as
factual allegations, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than
pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); accord Brown v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 612 F.3d 720,
722 (4th Cir. 2010). Pro se complaints are entitled to special care to determine whether any
possible set of facts would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9–10
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(1980). But “even a pro se complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege ‘a plausible
claim for relief.’” Forquer v. Schlee, No. RDB–12–969, 2012 WL 6087491, at *3 (D.Md.
Dec. 4, 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). “While pro se complaints may ‘represent
the work of an untutored hand requiring special judicial solicitude,’ a district court is not
required to recognize ‘obscure or extravagant claims defying the most concerted efforts to
unravel them.’” Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting
Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985)).
B.

Analysis
The Officers argue that Spencer’s suit should be dismissed because “§ 1983 does

not authorize a convicted person to assert a claim for damages against a police officer for
giving perjured testimony at his criminal trial.” (Mot. Dismiss at 2–3, ECF No. 7). Spencer
counters that he cited the Officers’ testimony in support of a claim for excessive force, not
perjury. The Court agrees with Spencer that he has stated a claim for excessive force.
According to the Officers, the Complaint questions “the truthfulness and/or
accuracy of the alleged testimony,” (id. at 2), and raises a perjury claim, not one for
excessive force. Considering Spencer’s pro se status, the Court declines to read the
Complaint so narrowly. The Complaint does not expressly state that Spencer’s claim is for
excessive force, nor does it claim the Officers committed perjury. Rather, Spencer offers
specific facts from which the Court may infer a particularized excessive force claim. The
Complaint alleges that Guessford “hit [Spencer] in the face [sixteen] times” and that
Howard was “choking” him. (Compl. at 2). These facts form the basis of a claim for

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excessive force under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.7 To be sure,
Spencer’s Complaint is far from a model of clarity, and the Officers’ reading of it is not
unreasonable. Through the lens of liberal construction, however, and considering the facts
alleged, Spencer states a claim for excessive force under § 1983. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94.
Accordingly, the Court will deny the Officers’ Motion to Dismiss.
Because Spencer has stated a claim for excessive force but will face difficulty
pursuing it because he is incarcerated, the Court will appoint pro bono counsel to represent
him.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice
as to Klekotka and deny the Officers’ Motion to Dismiss. A separate Order follows.

_6/25/19_________
Date

____________/s/____________
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge

The U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that “all claims that law enforcement
officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory
stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment
and its ‘reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a ‘substantive due process’ approach.”
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
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