Callahan v. Commissioner, Social Security
Filing
15
ORDER denying 13 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 14 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; reversing in part the SSA's judgment; and remanding the case for further proceedings. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 12/12/2018. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
(410) 962-7780
Fax (410) 962-1812
December 12, 2018
LETTER TO COUNSEL
RE:
Angelina C. v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;1
Civil No. SAG-18-682
Dear Counsel:
On March 7, 2018, Plaintiff Angelina C. petitioned this Court to review the Social
Security Administration’s (“SSA’s”) final decision to deny her claim for Supplemental Security
Income. ECF 1. I have considered the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. ECF 13,
14. I find that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2018). This Court must
uphold the decision of the SSA if it is supported by substantial evidence and if the SSA
employed proper legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d
585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Under that standard, I will deny both motions, reverse the judgment of
the SSA, and remand the case to the SSA for further analysis pursuant to sentence four of 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). This letter explains my rationale.
Plaintiff filed her claim for benefits on May 28, 2014, alleging a disability onset date of
January 31, 2013. Tr. 214-22. Her claim was denied initially and on reconsideration. Tr. 140-52,
156-57. A hearing was held on January 25, 2017, before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
Tr. 33-78. Following the hearing, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled within the
meaning of the Social Security Act during the relevant time frame. Tr. 12-32. The Appeals
Council (“AC”) denied Plaintiff’s request for further review, Tr. 1-6, so the ALJ’s decision
constitutes the final, reviewable decision of the SSA.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of “headaches,
fibromyalgia, chronic pain, neck, back, and knee disorder, asthma/chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease, depression, substance abuse disorder (cocaine and marijuana), personality disorder,
generalized anxiety disorder, and bipolar affective disorder.” Tr. 17. Despite these impairments,
the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except she needs a sit/stand
option. By this I mean an ability to change from a sitting position to a standing
position every thirty minutes if desired, and vice-versa. That is, every thirty
1
Currently, the position of Commissioner of the Social Security Administration is vacant, and most duties
are fulfilled by Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, performing the duties and
functions not reserved to the Commissioner of Social Security.
Angelina C. v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-18-0682
December 12, 2018
Page 2
minutes, if the person is sitting and experiences back or other pain, they can stand
and stretch in place and continue working in the standing position if desired.
Similarly, every thirty minutes, if the person is standing and experiences back or
other pain, they can sit down to continue their work in a sitting position if desired,
in order to alleviate their pain. She is limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks;
she can no more than occasionally use ramps and stairs; no more than occasional
interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and the general public; no more than
occasional postural activities; no more than occasional exposure to atmospheric
irritants, such as dust, fumes, odors and gases; no exposure to more than a
“moderate” noise intensity level as described in the SCO; because of deficits in
concentration, persistence, and pace, the claimant can be expected to be off task
5% of the time; no more than occasional exposure to temperature extremes,
wetness, and high humidity; and no work around intoxicants, such as
pharmaceuticals and alcohol.
Tr. 19-20. After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined
that Plaintiff could not perform past relevant work, but could perform other jobs existing in
significant numbers in the national economy. Tr. 25-26. Therefore, the ALJ concluded that
Plaintiff was not disabled. Tr. 26-27.
Plaintiff makes several arguments in support of her appeal. I concur with several of her
arguments regarding the ALJ’s deficient assessment of her mental impairments, and I
accordingly remand the case for further analysis.
First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s analysis at Step Two of the five-step evaluation
process, see 20 C.F.R. § 416.920, is deficient. I concur. In this case, the ALJ found no fewer
than twelve impairments to be non-severe on the basis of a conclusory assertion that, “[t]here is
no evidence that these impairments impose any significant restrictions on the claimant’s ability
to perform basic work activities.” Tr. 17-18. As to some of the alleged impairments, additional
explanation is required. For example, the ALJ cited on several occasions that Plaintiff is prone
to falling as a result of her use of benzodiazepines, and it is difficult to understand how that
condition would not pose more than a minimal limitation on her ability to work. Tr. 21 (“It is
noted that her multiple narcotic medications may be causing her frequent falls.”); Tr. 23
(“Doctors have been concerned that the claimant is taking too many benzodiazepines, and these
have caused her to fall at times.”); Tr. 24 (“While the record indicates that she has fallen at
times, this seems to be because of excessive use of benzodiazepines, substance abuse, and/or
domestic violence.”). Moreover, Plaintiff correctly notes that the record substantiates her
diagnosis of attention deficit disorder, Tr. 706, 710, and the ALJ failed to address the severity of
that impairment in any respect. Particularly in light of the questions discussed below relating to
Plaintiff’s ability to sustain work at a competitive pace without excessive time off task, I cannot
deem the failure to consider her diagnosis of attention deficit disorder to be a harmless error.
Second, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “can be expected to be off task 5% of the time,” Tr.
19, without providing any explanation of how that percentage was determined. Social Security
Angelina C. v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-18-0682
December 12, 2018
Page 3
regulations provide that the RFC assessment “must include a narrative discussion describing how
the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings)
and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations).” Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176,
189 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996)). In doing so,
the ALJ must “build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.” Id.
(quoting Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000)). Here, the ALJ failed to provide an
accurate and logical bridge between Plaintiff’s limitations and the RFC and provided no
discussion of time off task in the RFC assessment at all. This is a case in which, as discussed
below, Plaintiff’s treating mental health providers opined that she would have “moderate” or
“marked” limitations in maintaining attention and concentration for extended periods. Tr. 446,
448. As a result of the lack of any discussion of Plaintiff’s time off task or ability to stay
focused, the ALJ has not cited to substantial evidence to support his conclusion that Plaintiff
would be off task 5% of the time.
Third, the ALJ’s assignment of weight to the opinions of Plaintiff’s mental health treating
sources is deficient. The Fourth Circuit has stated that:
[T]reating physicians are given “more weight ... since these sources are likely to
be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture
of your medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical
evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone[.]”
[20 C.F.R.] §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). “When the treating source has seen
you a number of times and long enough to have obtained a longitudinal picture of
your impairment, we will give the medical source’s medical opinion more weight
than we would give it if it were from a nontreating source.” Id. §§
404.1527(c)(2)(i), 416.927(c)(2)(i). Accordingly, the ALJ is required to give
“controlling weight” to opinions proffered by a claimant’s treating physicians so
long as the opinion is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence in [the claimant’s] case record[.]” Id. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2).
Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 867 (4th Cir. 2017). The ALJ assigned the opinions of
Plaintiff’s psychiatrist and therapist “little weight” for two reasons: (1) “[t]reatment records
document insufficient mental status abnormalities to support any marked limitations,” and (2)
“mental health notes do not reflect that the claimant discussed her ability to perform work
activities or likelihood of missing whole days of work.” Tr. 24-25. Neither of those reasons
provides substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s assignment of little weight. First, “marked
limitations” is the legal standard involved in the application of the special technique for
evaluating mental impairments at Steps Two and Three, 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a, but is not a
standard governing, in any way, a treating source’s evaluation of a claimant’s ability to perform
work tasks. Thus, the fact that Plaintiff’s treatment records may not establish “marked
limitations” does not invalidate the conclusions reached by her treating sources. Moreover, the
ALJ’s implication that less than marked limitations are necessarily compatible with a limitation
to “simple, routine, repetitive tasks,” Tr. 24, is incorrect. See Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632,
Angelina C. v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-18-0682
December 12, 2018
Page 4
638 (4th Cir. 2015). Second, reliance on whether or not Plaintiff discussed work activities with
her treating sources is illogical in this case. The record is clear Plaintiff stopped working in
2007, Tr. 17, and there would accordingly be no reason for her to discuss with her doctors
whether or not she could perform or sustain work.
Ultimately, in light of the above deficiencies in the ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiff’s mental
health impairments, I am unable to conclude that the ALJ applied the proper legal standards or
supported his determinations with substantial evidence. Remand is therefore warranted,
although I express no opinion as to whether the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion that Plaintiff was not
entitled to benefits is correct. Because remand is being ordered on the bases cited above, I need
not address the remainder of Plaintiff’s contentions.
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF 13, is
DENIED, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF 14, is DENIED. Pursuant to
sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the SSA’s judgment is REVERSED IN PART due to
inadequate analysis. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with this
opinion. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion and docketed
as an order.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge
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