Lucas v. Moore Transport
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard D. Bennett on 8/24/2018. (c/m 8/24/18)(krs, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
SIGNOR LUCAS, Jr.
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Plaintiff,
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v.
MOORE TRANSPORT OF TULSA, LLC,
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Defendant.
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Civil Action No. RDB-18-0888
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Signor Lucas, Jr., proceeding pro se, initiated this action against his prior
employer, Defendant Moore Transport of Tulsa, LLC1 alleging wrongful termination and
defamation. Initially filed in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, this case was removed by
the Defendant to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, and 1446. (ECF No. 1.)
Defendant subsequently filed the now-pending Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13). The
parties’ submissions have been reviewed, and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6
(D. Md. 2016). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.
13) is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND2
Mr. Lucas worked as a driver for Moore Transport from September 2013 to March
31, 2015, when Moore Transport terminated his employment. (ECF No. 2 at 1.) Plaintiff
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Moore Transport of Tulsa, LLC is organized under the laws of Oklahoma and maintains its principal place of business
in Texas. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 9.)
2 At the motion to dismiss stage, the court must “accept as true all of the well-pleaded allegations and view the complaint
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” LeSueur–Richmond Slate Corp. v. Fehrer, 666 F.3d 261, 264 (4th Cir.
2012).
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filed suit on or about February 6, 2018. (Id.) His Complaint asserts two claims. First, he
claims that Moore Transport wrongfully terminated his employment when it told him he was
fired for driving “beyond the 14 hour limit,” despite the fact that the “log” showed he “had
only worked a little over 12 hours.” (Id. at 1.) Second, he alleges that Moore Transport has
defamed him by continuing to report “that [he] had an accident in which [he] rear ended
someone” even though Moore Transport has no evidence of such an accident “while [he]
was working for them.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff contends that this reporting has “cause[d]
permanent damage to [his] reputation.” (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff seeks to recover over
$80,000 in damages for back pay, vacation pay, unemployment, “down payment lost,” and
lost wages, plus $1,500,000 in punitive damages. (Id. at 1.)
The Defendant removed the action to this Court on March 27, 2018 (ECF No. 1),
and subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13). Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, has
filed a Response (ECF No. 16) and has – without leave – filed a Surreply (ECF No. 18).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As a general matter, when a litigant proceeds pro se, their filings should be “liberally
construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation omitted).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the dismissal of a
complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
To survive a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts sufficient
to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl., Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009).
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The sufficiency of a complaint is assessed by reference to the pleading requirements
of Rule 8(a)(2), which provides that a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Nevertheless, “Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of
entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A complaint therefore cannot rely upon “naked assertions devoid
of further factual enhancement,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and courts are “not bound to accept
as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555). The court also need not accept “unwarranted” or “unreasonable” inferences,
conclusions, or arguments. Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). “Where
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled
to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Furthermore, “[w]here a
complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short
of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Determining whether a plaintiff has stated a plausible
claim is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “generally cannot reach the merits of an
affirmative defense, such as the defense that the plaintiff’s claim is time-barred,” unless
“facts sufficient to rule on an affirmative defense are alleged in the complaint.” Goodman v.
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Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007); accord Pressley v. Tupperware Long Term Disability
Plan, 533 F.3d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 2009).
DISCUSSION
Sitting in diversity jurisdiction, this Court must look to the choice of law rules of the
forum state, Maryland, to identify the governing substantive law. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S. Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941); ITCO Corp. v. Michelin Tire
Corp., Commercial Div., 722 F.2d 42, 49 n. 11 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215, 105 S.
Ct. 1191, 84 L.Ed.2d 337 (1985). “For tort claims, Maryland generally adheres to the lex loci
delicti commissi, or place of harm, principle to determine the applicable state’s substantive law.”
Ground Zero Museum Workshop v. Wilson, 813 F. Supp. 2d 678, 696 (D. Md. 2011) (citing Hauch
v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 123–24, 453 A.2d 1207 (1983)). Where the events occur in multiple
states, Maryland courts “apply the law of the State where the injury – the last event required
to constitute the tort – occurred.” Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Hood, 395 Md. 608, 615, 911 A.2d 841
(2006) (citing cases). In this case, the parties do not dispute that Maryland law governs both
claims.
I.
Wrongful Termination
Under Maryland law, an employment relationship that is not governed by an
employment contract is “at-will,” which means that either the employer or employee may
terminate it at any time, for almost any reason or for no reason at all. Adler v. Am. Standard
Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 467 (Md. 1981); Page v. Carolina Coach Co., 667 F.2d 1156, 1158 (4th Cir.
1982) (applying Maryland law). Even when an employment contract does exist, the
relationship is presumptively at-will when the contract is silent as to the length of time the
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contract will exist. Adler, 432 A.2d at 467; see also Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc., 823 A.2d 590,
601–02 (Md. 2003).3 Maryland law recognizes wrongful termination, or wrongful discharge,
as a common law exception to the at-will doctrine. The Maryland Court of Appeals has held
that “to establish wrongful discharge, [1] the employee must be discharged, [2] the basis for
the employee’s discharge must violate some clear mandate of public policy, and [3] there
must be a nexus between the employee’s conduct and the employer’s decision to fire the
employee.” Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 370 Md. 38, 50–51, 803 A.2d 482, 489 (2002).
In terms of the second requirement, an employee “must demonstrate the policy in
question with clarity, specificity and authority.” Bagwell v. Peninsula Reg’l Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d
297, 309 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995). More specifically, Maryland courts have identified two
types of employer actions that constitute a wrongful discharge: “(1) [the] employee has been
fired for refusing to violate the law or the legal rights of a third party, and (2) where [the]
employee has been fired for exercising a specific legal right or duty.” Milton v. IIT Research
Inst., 138 F.3d 519, 522 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Thompson v. Memorial Hosp. at Easton, 925 F.
Supp. 400, 406 (D. Md. 1996)).
In this case, the Plaintiff makes no allegation that a contract existed. Rather, he
complains that the Defendant wrongfully terminated his at-will employment when it told
him he was fired for working beyond the 14-hour limit when the records reflected that he
only worked “a little over 12 hours.” (ECF No. 2 at 1.) Under the second element of
wrongful discharge, Plaintiff must show that the termination “violate[s] some clear mandate
of public policy.” Wholey, 370 Md. at 51. Mr. Lucas’ Complaint, even construed in the most
This presumption may be overcome if the contract requires that any termination by the employer be made for “just
cause.” E.g. Towson Univ. v. Conte, 384 Md. 68, 79-80, 862 A.2d 941, 947 (Md. 2004).
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favorable light, fails to “demonstrate the policy in question with clarity, specificity and
authority.” Bagwell, 665 A.2d at 309. Additionally, the work-hour limitation rationale does not
present a case where the Plaintiff was terminated for either “refusing to violate the law” or
“exercising a specific legal right.” Milton, 138 F.3d at 522. The same is true even if the
Defendant were mistaken as to whether the records reflected that Plaintiff exceeded 12,
rather than 14 hours of work. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not alleged the work-hour
limitation rationale was pretextual in any way.4 This Court simply cannot stretch the
allegations in Mr. Lucas’ pro se Complaint to make out a plausible claim to relief under the
wrongful discharge exception to at-will employment. Accordingly, this claim will be
DISMISSED.
II.
Defamation
This Court now turns to Plaintiff’s second claim, which he characterizes as his
“biggest complaint.” (ECF No. 2 at 2.) In order to make out a prima facie case of
defamation under Maryland law, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the defendant made a
defamatory statement to a third person (a requirement known as publication); (2) the
statement was false; (3) the defendant was legally at fault in making the statement; and (4)
the plaintiff thereby suffered harm.” Doe v. Johns Hopkins Health Sys. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 3d
355, 365 (D. Md. 2017) (citing Gohari v. Darvish, 363 Md. 42, 767 A.2d 321, 327 (2001)).
In his Response, Mr. Lucas adds a factual allegation that he has logs showing Defendant’s reasons for termination “are
not exactly accurate.” (ECF No. 16 at 1.) Even if the Court were to accept this additional allegation as an amendment to
the Complaint, this fact does not advance his claim of wrongful termination. In Plaintiff’s Surreply, which was filed
without leave, see Local Rule 105.2(a) (D. Md. 2016), Plaintiff asserts yet another allegation: that one of the Defendant’s
employees “illegally inserted information into [his] logs.” (ECF No. 18 at 1.) Even if the Court were to accept this tardy
allegation, the assertion leaves open to pure speculation what information was entered into the logs and it does not
change this Court’s conclusion that Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim of wrongful termination.
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Defamation claims in Maryland have a one-year statute of limitations. See Md. Code Ann.,
Cts. & Jud. Proc., § 5-105.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege “who, what, when, or where of this
alleged defamation.” (Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 17 at 2 (internal quotations omitted).) The
Defendant therefore contends that the claim is barred by the one-year statute of limitations.
The Defendant also argues that, without such facts, the company is “prejudiced from
investigating or raising statutory and common law privileges,” such as certain
communications between former and prospective employers. (ECF No. 13-1 at 6.)
A. Statute of Limitations
A court may resolve a statute of limitations defense at the motion to dismiss stage
only if “all facts necessary to the affirmative defense ‘clearly appear[ ] on the face of the
complaint.’” Goodman, 494 F.3d at 464 (quoting Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Forst, 4
F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1993)). The Complaint in this case alleges that the Defendant “w[as]
and still [is] reporting that [the Plaintiff] had an accident in which [he] rear ended someone.”
(ECF No. 2 at 2.) While this statement is admittedly vague as to the exact dates of the
statements, the pro se Complaint itself alleges that the statements are “still” being made to
this day. This Court therefore cannot say that facts sufficient to establish a statute of
limitations defense “clearly appear on the face of the complaint.” Goodman, 494 F.3d at 464.
B. Substantive Elements of Defamation
Under Rule 12(b)(6), it would be premature for this Court to consider the question of
“prejudice” to the Defendant’s ability to raise specific defenses, so this Court will focus on
Defendant’s arguments as a challenge to the sufficiency of the Complaint in alleging the first
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three elements of a defamation claim. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not even make it past the
first element.
Under the first element, known as “publication,” a plaintiff must establish that the
alleged defamatory words were “seen or heard by some person other than the plaintiff and
defendant.” Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643, 648, 261 A.2d 731, 734–35 (1970).
The Complaint merely states that the Defendant is “reporting that [the Plaintiff] had an
accident in which [he] rear ended someone.” (ECF No. 2 at 2.) The Complaint does not
identify who made the alleged statements, to whom the statements were made, or the
approximate dates on which the statements were communicated.5 Plaintiff appears to
suspect that someone in his “field of occupation” received such a report because he has had
trouble “finding jobs.” (Id.) At best, these vague allegations are merely “merely consistent
with” publication, which is insufficient to state a plausible claim to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Even the alleged conversation in which two employees
“told [Mr. Lucas] they would look into the situation and correct any false reporting” does
not give rise to an inference “any false reporting” existed to begin with. (ECF No. 2 at 2.)
Unlike in Doe v. Johns Hopkins Health System Corporation, in which Judge Theodore D. Chuang
of this Court excused a plaintiff’s failure to identify the exact employee making the statement
when the complaint “allege[d] to whom the statement was published, approximately when
the statement was made, the content of the statement . . . ,” and an apparent retaliatory
“effort to discredit [the plaintiff],” 274 F. Supp. 3d at 368-89, Mr. Lucas fails to allege similar
5 That Plaintiff’s broad allegation of continued defamatory statements forecloses Defendant’s facial statute of limitations
challenge does not automatically fulfill Plaintiff’s own obligation to affirmatively allege sufficient facts to state a plausible
claim of defamation. The Plaintiff’s level of specificity as to timing is but one factor relevant to analyzing whether
Plaintiff’s claim is plausible.
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additional circumstances such that it is not plausible to infer that Moore Transport ever
made the alleged statement. Plaintiff’s failure to plausibly fulfill this first element warrants
dismissal of the claim.6
Even if the Court were to consider the second and third elements, the Complaint
again fails to make out a plausible claim. Specifically, fulfillment of these two elements rests
on Plaintiff’s allegation that the report of an accident was “false,” a conclusory label this
Court need not accept as true – especially when the Plaintiff never once avers that the
accident did not occur. While this Court must credit the allegation that the Defendant did
not have “evidence or any kind of report” concerning the accident, the absence of
corroboration in the Defendant’s records is “merely consistent with” the alleged statements
being false. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). The Complaint therefore
fails to plausibly establish that the second and third elements of his defamation claim are
met. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s defamation claim is DISMISSED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13) is
GRANTED. This case will therefore be DISMISSED.
A separate Order follows.
DATE: August 24, 2018
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Richard D. Bennett
United States District Judge
Even if this Court were to treat Plaintiff’s Surreply (ECF No 18) as a second amendment to his Complaint, the
allegation that Defendant continues to report the accident “to prospective employers” (id. at 1) – without naming a
single entity or individual – retains the same conclusory, vague character of his earlier implied assertion and lacks
sufficient “factual enhancement” to cross the “line between possibility and plausibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
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