J&J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Ivela Lounge Inc. et al

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Kaleb Wondmu Tadele, individually and as resident agent for Ivela Lounge, Inc., c/o 3735 Clarenell Road, Baltimore, MD 21229 on 6/6/19 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 6/6/2019. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
J&J SPORTS PRODUCTIONS, INC.
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 18-0904

:
IVELA LOUNGE INC., et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution are Plaintiff’s
motions for entry of consent judgment.

(ECF Nos. 20 & 22).

court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.
105.6.

The

Local Rule

For the following reasons, the motions will be denied

without prejudice.
The two-count complaint, filed on March 28, 2018, alleges
that

Defendants

Ivela

Lounge,

Inc.

and

Kaleb

Wondmu

Tadele,

improperly intercepted and broadcasted “Floyd Mayweather, Jr. v.
Andre Berto WBA/WBC Welterweight Championship Fight Program” (“the
Program”) in violation of 47 U.S.C. §§  605 & 553.
Plaintiff,

J&J

Sports

Productions,

Inc.,

owns

(ECF No. 1).
the

“exclusive

nationwide commercial distribution (closed-circuit) rights to” the
Program.
attorneys’

(Id.).
fees.

Plaintiff seeks statutory damages, costs, and
(Id.).

Summonses

were

delivered

to

both

Defendants, but neither Defendant filed a response.1
& 8).

(ECF Nos. 7

Accordingly, the court issued an order directing Plaintiff

to “serve by mail on . . . [D]efendant[s] a motion for entry of
default by the Clerk and a motion for default judgment, or provide
a report as to why such motions would be inappropriate[.]”
Nos. 9 & 10).

(ECF

Plaintiff filed a status report, indicating that,

on August 15, 2018, “Plaintiff’s counsel was contacted by an
attorney on behalf of Defendants” and that the parties were in
settlement negotiations.

(ECF No. 11).

No counsel entered an

appearance on Defendants’ behalf.
Plaintiff’s counsel notified the court on October 24, 2018,
that the parties reached a settlement on October 9, 2018.
No. 13).

The court entered an order pursuant to Local Rule 111

dismissing the case without prejudice on October 24, 2018.
No. 14).

(ECF

(ECF

Local Rule 111 provides:
When the Court has been notified by counsel
that a case has been settled, the Court may
enter an order dismissing the case and
providing for the payment of costs. Such an
order of dismissal shall be without prejudice
to the right of a party to move for good cause
to reopen the case within a time set by the

1

The order reopening this case mailed to Defendant Kaleb
Wondmu Tadele (ECF No. 18) was returned as undeliverable (ECF No.
19). The notice requiring Plaintiff to supplement the motion for
entry of consent judgment mailed to Defendant Ivela Lounge Inc.
(ECF No. 21) was similarly returned as undeliverable (ECF No. 23).
2

Court if the settlement is not consummated.
Alternatively, the Court, upon being notified
by counsel that a case has been settled, may
require counsel to submit within sixty (60)
days
a
proposed
order
providing
for
settlement, in default of which the Court may
enter such judgment or other order as may be
deemed appropriate. An order entered pursuant
to this Rule means that the entire case,
including all claims, counter-claims, crossclaims, third-party claims, and claims for
attorneys’ fees and costs has been settled,
unless otherwise stated in the order.
The order recited:

“the dismissal will become a dismissal with

prejudice on December 30, 2018, unless Plaintiff files a motion to
reopen on or before December 30, 2018.”

(ECF No. 16).

On December

27, 2018, Plaintiff notified the court that the settlement was not
consummated and requested to reopen the case.

(ECF No. 17).

Under these circumstances the case resumes the procedural
posture it was in immediately prior to the entry of the settlement
order, namely awaiting a motion for entry of default.

Instead of

proceeding that way, Plaintiff filed a motion for entry of consent
judgment on February 26, 2019.

(ECF No. 20).

Plaintiff’s motion

is, in reality, a motion to enforce settlement agreement.2

2

A

Because Defendants have not entered a valid appearance, it
follows that they cannot yet offer consent to the motion for
judgment filed by Plaintiff. And, of course, a court may not enter
a consent judgment against a party that has not agreed. Cf. Local
Number 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478
U.S. 501, 529 (1986) (“[A] court may not enter a consent decree
3

notice was entered on April 11, 2019, directing Plaintiff to “brief
. . . why you believe that a consent judgment — never before filed
with the court or pursuant to court order — should be entered under
the circumstances.”

(ECF No. 21).

Plaintiff filed a supplemental

motion, without legal support, on April 17, 2019.

(ECF No. 22).

Attached to that motion is the purported settlement agreement,
signed by Plaintiff’s counsel, Richard Kind, Plaintiff J&J Sports
Productions, Inc.’s president Joseph Gagliardi, and Defendant
Kaleb Wondmu Tadele, individually and on behalf of Defendant Ivela
Lounge, Inc.
judgment

is

(ECF No. 22-3, at 3).
proper

because

“all

Plaintiff argues that consent
Defendants

were

properly

served[,]” “Defendants entered into a settlement agreement with
Plaintiff[,]” and “Defendants defaulted under the terms of the
settlement agreement[.]”

(ECF No. 22, at 1-2).

This court does not have the authority to enforce a settlement
agreement that has not been incorporated into a court order, absent
some independent basis for federal jurisdiction:
As the United States Supreme Court has
recognized, the enforcement of a contractual
that imposes obligations on a party that did not consent to the
decree.”).
Consequently, the court has no power to grant the
motion to approve the “consent” judgment. See, e.g., Trustees of
Plumbers & Gasfitters Local 5 Ret. Sav. Fund v. Conditioned Air
Sys., Inc., No. 10-cv-2356-DKC, 2011 WL 221776, at *1 (D.Md. Jan.
21, 2011) (listing cases).
4

settlement agreement “is more than just a
continuation or renewal of the dismissed
suit.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 511 U.S. 375, 378 (1994).
“If the
obligation to comply with the terms of the
agreement is not made part of an order of the
court, jurisdiction to enforce the settlement
agreement
will
not
exist
absent
some
independent basis of jurisdiction.” Smyth ex.
rel. Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 281 (4th
Cir. 2002).
This Court neither expressly
maintained
jurisdiction
to
enforce
the
parties’
settlement
agreement
nor
incorporated the terms of the settlement
agreement in its July 9, 2002 Order.
In
addition, there appears to be no independent
basis for federal jurisdiction over this
contract dispute. Enforcement of a settlement
agreement is essentially an action for breach
of contract, which is governed by state and
not federal law.
Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Ashleigh Heights LLC, 261
F.Supp.2d 332, 333 (D.Md. 2002).

“The judge’s mere awareness and

approval of the terms of the settlement agreement do not suffice
to make them part of his order.”

Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381 (1994).

The record clearly shows that the settlement agreement was not
incorporated

into

the

Rule

111

dismissal

order

because

the

settlement agreement was not placed in the record until the case
was

reopened.

Moreover,

no

independent

basis

for

federal

jurisdiction to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement exists.
Consequently,

the

court

has

no

agreement.
5

jurisdiction

to

enforce

the

On the other hand, in an ongoing case:
District courts “have inherent authority,
deriving from their equity power, to enforce
settlement agreements.”
Hensley v. Alcon
Labs., Inc., 277 F.3d 535, 540 (4th Cir. 2002).
To enforce an agreement, a court must first
conclude “that a complete agreement has been
reached
and
determine[]
the
terms
and
conditions of that agreement.”
Id.
If the
court finds those preconditions satisfied, it
may reach the merits and “draw[] upon standard
contract
principles”
in
enforcing
the
agreement.
Id. at 540–41; Bradley v. Am.
Household, Inc., 378 F.3d 373, 380 (4th Cir.
2004).
Scott v. Clarke, 355 F.Supp.3d 472, 477 (W.D.Va. 2019).
Here, Defendants have not appeared in the underlying action,
and the attorney purportedly representing the corporation during
settlement negotiations did not sign the purported settlement
agreement.

Plaintiff has options as to how to proceed.

Plaintiff

may attempt to establish Defendants’ default, and then seek to
enforce the settlement agreement by filing a properly supported
motion. Alternatively, Plaintiff may file an action in state court
for breach of contract.

See Fairfax Countywide Citizens Ass’n v.

Fairfax Cnty., Va., 571 F.2d 1299, 1303 n.9, 1305 (4th Cir. 1978)
(claim of breach of settlement agreement “is factually and legally
distinct from the claim giving rise to the original litigation”).
Accordingly,

the

motion

for

entry
6

of

consent

judgment

and

supplemental motion for entry of consent judgment will be denied
without prejudice.

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

7