Mekuria v. Adams et al
Filing
22
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 12/21/2018. (jb5, Deputy Clerk)(c/m-12-21-2018)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
MEKONNEN MEKURIA,
Plaintiff,
*
*
v.
*
J. ADAMS,
*
Defendants.
Civil Action No. GLR-18-1267
*
*****
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants CO II Justin Adams, Sgt.
William Thomas, and Lt. Thomas Sawyers’1 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint or,
in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment2 (ECF No. 15).3 The Motion is ripe for
disposition, and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2018). For the
reasons outlined below, the Court will grant the Motion.
1
Mekuria named “Sawyer” as a Defendant. It appears, however, that his last name
is “Sawyers.” (See Sawyers Decl., ECF No. 15-6). In addition, Mekuria only named
Defendants using their surnames. Accordingly, the Court will direct the Clerk to amend
the docket to reflect Adams’, Thomas’s, and Sawyers’ full and correct names.
2
The Motion lists CO II Jessica Custer as a Defendant. (Mot. Dismiss at 1, ECF
No. 15). Custer is not a Defendant in this action. CO II Bank is. Accordingly, the Court
applies the arguments in the Motion to the four Defendants in this case.
3
Also pending before the Court is Plaintiff Mekonnen Mekuria’s Motion for
Reconsideration (ECF No. 6). In his Motion, Mekuria states that he wants to “add some
more statement[s] to this case in order to avoid confusion.” (Mot. Reconsid. at 1, ECF
No. 6). Accordingly, the Court construes the Motion as a Supplement to the Complaint
and will grant it.
I.
BACKGROUND4
Plaintiff Mekonnen Mekuria is incarcerated in the Special Needs Unit (“SNU”) at
North Branch Correctional Institution (“NBCI”) in Cumberland, Maryland. (Compl. at 1,
5).5 Early in the morning on August 21, 2015, Defendants Adams, Thomas, and Sawyers
were conducting cell inspections. (Id. at 3). When Adams entered Mekuria’s his cell, cell
11, his cellmate, Jameel, complained about Mekuria and asked Adams to move Mekuria
to another cell. (Id.). After consulting with Thomas and Sawyers, Adams moved Mekuria
to cell 3, which Mekuria describes as an “isolation room” and a “punishment cell.” (Id.;
see also Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss Summ. J. [“Defs.’ Mot.”] Ex. 1 at 004–005, ECF No. 15-2).
The toilet and sink water were “cut off” and there was “[n]o hot water” in cell 3. (Compl.
Ex. 1 at 1, ECF No. 1-1). Cell 3’s window was “blocked” and it had no table or chair.
(Id.). Mekuria asserts that he should not have been placed in cell 3 because he had “not
violated any rule” and “no ticket [was] written” to document a rules violation. (Compl. at
3). In addition, when Adams moved Mekuria from cell 11 to cell 3, there were three other
cells open—1, 55, and 57. (Supp. at 1, ECF No. 6). At an unspecified point in time, when
4
Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are set forth in Mekuria’s
Complaint (ECF No. 1) and Supplement (ECF No. 6). To the extent the Court discusses
facts that Mekuria does not allege in his pleadings, they are uncontroverted and the Court
views them in the light most favorable to Mekuria. The Court will address additional
facts when discussing applicable law.
5
Citations to the Complaint and the Supplement refer to the pagination the Court’s
Case Management and Electronic Court Files (“CM/ECF”) system assigned.
2
Mekuria left his cell, Sawyers, Thomas, and Adams moved his property to his old cell,
cell 57. (Compl. at 3).6 Mekuria remained in cell 3 for nineteen days. (Supp. at 1).
Mekuria appears to assert that the only reason he was removed from cell 3 is that
he filed an administrative remedy procedure (“ARP”) complaint. (See id.). After
providing the complaint to Officer Cox, who was the tier officer, Mekuria went outside.
(Id.). When Mekuria returned, his property had been moved to cell 57. (Id.).
On April 30, 2018, Mekuria sued Defendants. (ECF No. 1).7 He alleges that
Defendants violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and Eighth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution. (Compl. at 5; Supp. at 1–2). He seeks monetary damages and
injunctive relief. (Compl. at 5).
II.
A.
DISCUSSION
Conversion of Defendants’ Motion
Defendants style their Motion as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or, in
the alternative, for summary judgment under Rule 56. A motion styled in this manner
implicates the Court’s discretion under Rule 12(d). See Kensington Vol. Fire Dep’t, Inc.
v. Montgomery Cty., 788 F.Supp.2d 431, 436–37 (D.Md. 2011), aff’d, 684 F.3d 462 (4th
6
Mekuria also alleges that Adams conspired with Sgt. Hite and COII Johnson, as
well as Mrs. Wilson from the psychology department to cause Mekuria to sustain an
erection by “electronic devices.” (Supp. at 1). Mekuria further alleges that they then
came to his cell door and asked him to “perform sex.” (Id.). Mekuria pleads that after he
refused, “they feel embarrassed and angry to revenge.” (Id.).
7
On April 30, 2018, the Court dismissed another case Mekuria filed in this Court,
Mekonnen Mekuria v. Justin Adams, No. GLR-17-3176 (D.Md. closed Apr. 30, 2018),
ECF No. 14. In the Order dismissing that case, the Court instructed the Clerk to docket
Mekuria’s amended complaint in that action as a new civil case. (Apr. 30, 2018
Order ¶ 8, No. GLR-17-3176, ECF No. 14). Accordingly, the Clerk docketed the
amended complaint as the Complaint in this action. (ECF No. 1).
3
Cir. 2012). This Rule provides that when “matters outside the pleadings are presented to
and not excluded by the court, the [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion must be treated as one for
summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). The Court has “complete
discretion to determine whether or not to accept the submission of any material beyond
the pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and rely on it,
thereby converting the motion, or to reject it or simply not consider it.” Wells-Bey v.
Kopp, No. ELH-12-2319, 2013 WL 1700927, at *5 (D.Md. Apr. 16, 2013) (quoting 5C
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1366, at 159 (3d ed. 2004, 2012
Supp.)).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has articulated two
requirements for proper conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a Rule 56 motion: notice
and a reasonable opportunity for discovery. See Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy
Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Balt., 721 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2013). When the movant
expressly captions its motion “in the alternative” as one for summary judgment and
submits matters outside the pleadings for the court’s consideration, the parties are
deemed to be on notice that conversion under Rule 12(d) may occur. See Moret v.
Harvey, 381 F.Supp.2d 458, 464 (D.Md. 2005). The Court “does not have an obligation
to notify parties of the obvious.” Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253,
261 (4th Cir. 1998).
Ordinarily, summary judgment is inappropriate when “the parties have not had an
opportunity for reasonable discovery.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus.,
Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 448 (4th Cir. 2011). Yet, “the party opposing summary judgment
4
‘cannot complain that summary judgment was granted without discovery unless that
party had made an attempt to oppose the motion on the grounds that more time was
needed for discovery.’” Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244
(4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 961 (4th
Cir. 1996)). To raise sufficiently the issue that more discovery is needed, the non-movant
must typically file an affidavit or declaration under Rule 56(d), explaining the “specified
reasons” why “it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(d). A Rule 56(d) affidavit is inadequate if it simply demands “discovery for the sake
of discovery.” Hamilton v. Mayor of Balt., 807 F.Supp.2d 331, 342 (D.Md. 2011)
(citation omitted). A Rule 56(d) request for discovery is properly denied when “the
additional evidence sought for discovery would not have by itself created a genuine issue
of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment.” Ingle ex rel. Estate of Ingle v.
Yelton, 439 F.3d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Strag v. Bd. of Trs., Craven Cmty.
Coll., 55 F.3d 943, 953 (4th Cir. 1995)).
The Fourth Circuit has warned that it “‘place[s] great weight on the Rule 56[d]
affidavit’ and that ‘a reference to Rule 56[d] and the need for additional discovery in a
memorandum of law in opposition to a motion for summary judgment is not an adequate
substitute for a Rule 56[d] affidavit.’” Harrods, 302 F.3d at 244 (quoting Evans, 80 F.3d
at 961). Failing to file a Rule 56(d) affidavit “is itself sufficient grounds to reject a claim
that the opportunity for discovery was inadequate.” Id. (quoting Evans, 80 F.3d at 961).
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit has indicated that there are some limited instances in
which summary judgment may be premature notwithstanding the non-movants’ failure to
5
file a Rule 56(d) affidavit. See id. A court may excuse the failure to file a Rule 56(d)
affidavit when “fact-intensive issues, such as intent, are involved” and the nonmovant’s
objections to deciding summary judgment without discovery “serve[ ] as the functional
equivalent of an affidavit.” Id. at 245 (quoting First Chicago Int’l v. United Exch. Co.,
836 F.2d 1375, 1380–81 (D.C.Cir. 1988)).
Here, both requirements for conversion have been satisfied. First, Defendants
captioned their motion in the alternative, putting Mekuria on notice that the Court may
convert the motion into one for summary judgment. Moret, 381 F.Supp.2d at 464.
Second, Mekuria did not file a Rule 56(d) affidavit or otherwise request discovery.
Harrods, 302 F.3d at 244 (quoting Evans, 80 F.3d at 961). Accordingly, the Court will
convert Defendants’ Motion into a motion for summary judgment.
B.
Standard of Review
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the facts in a light
most favorable to the nonmovant, drawing all justifiable inferences in that party’s favor.
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 255 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970)).
Summary judgment is proper when the movant demonstrates, through “particular parts of
materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers,
or other materials,” that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), (c)(1)(A).
Significantly, a party must be able to present the materials it cites in “a form that would
6
be admissible in evidence,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2), and supporting affidavits and
declarations “must be made on personal knowledge” and “set out facts that would be
admissible in evidence,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4).
Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the burden
shifts to the nonmovant to identify evidence showing there is genuine dispute of material
fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87
(1986). The nonmovant cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact “through mere
speculation or the building of one inference upon another.” Othentec Ltd. v. Phelan, 526
F.3d 135, 141 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir.
1985)).
A “material fact” is one that might affect the outcome of a party’s case. Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248; see also JKC Holding Co. v. Wash. Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459,
465 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 265 (4th Cir. 2001)).
Whether a fact is considered to be “material” is determined by the substantive law, and
“[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248;
accord Hooven-Lewis, 249 F.3d at 265. A “genuine” dispute concerning a “material” fact
arises when the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict in the
nonmoving party’s favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the nonmovant has failed to
make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case where she has the burden
of proof, “there can be ‘no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact,’ since a complete
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case
7
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322–23 (1986).
C.
Analysis
Defendants move for summary judgment on five principal grounds: (1) Mekuria
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; (2) Mekuria fails to allege sufficient facts
to state a claim; (3) sovereign immunity; (4) qualified immunity; and (5) there is no
genuine dispute of material fact and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. The Court agrees that Mekuria fails to state a claim for violations of his
constitutional rights.
1.
Eighth Amendment Claim
“The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment
on one convicted of a crime.” Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 165 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing
U.S. Const. amend. VIII). Conditions which “deprive inmates of the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities” may amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). To establish cruel and unusual punishment related
to the conditions of confinement, a prisoner must prove that: (1) “the deprivation of [a]
basic human need was objectively ‘sufficiently serious’”; and (2) “subjectively ‘the
officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Shakka, 71 F.3d 162 at 166
(quoting Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993)). “These requirements
spring from the text of the amendment itself; absent intentionality, a condition imposed
on an inmate cannot properly be called “punishment,” and absent severity, such
8
punishment cannot be called “cruel and unusual.” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th
Cir. 2008) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298–300 (1991)).
The objective prong of a conditions claim requires the prisoner to “‘produce
evidence of a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the
challenged conditions,’ or demonstrate a substantial risk of such serious harm resulting
from the prisoner’s unwilling exposure to the challenged conditions.” Shakka, 71 F.3d at
166 (quoting Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1381). “Only extreme deprivations are adequate to
satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim regarding conditions of
confinement.” De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003). As to the
subjective component, there must be evidence of deliberate indifference. Wilson, 501
U.S. at 303. “A prison official demonstrates deliberate indifference if he ‘knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.’” Brown v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr.,
612 F.3d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Case v. Ahitow, 301 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir.
2002)).
Here, Mekuria fails to demonstrate, let alone allege, “a serious or significant
physical or emotional injury” as a result of his time in cell 3. This alone is sufficient to
dismiss his claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (barring inmate lawsuits where there is no
“showing of physical injury”); Shakka, 71 F.3d at 166. Nor does Mekuria demonstrate a
substantial risk of serious harm as a result of being place in cell 3. He simply states that
the cell is one used for punishment and he did not do anything to warrant being punished.
(Compl. at 3). As to Mekuria’s assertions that cell 3 had no water, which appear in
Exhibit 1 to the Complaint, Defendants aver via a Declaration from Sawyers that cell 3
9
“has water access, and there is no report of water being turned off to the cell.” (Sawyers
Decl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 15-6). Sawyers further attests that corrections officials only turn off
the water to a cell if an inmate is “flooding the tier,” but “there is no report that [Mekuria]
did so[,] nor that water access was turned off.” (Id.). Mekuria does not produce any
evidence to rebut these assertions. Thus, he fails to establish a substantial risk of serious
harm. Because Mekuria has not satisfied the objective prong of an Eighth Amendment
conditions of confinement claim, his claim fails. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to
summary judgment on this claim.
2.
Fourth Amendment Claim
Mekuria contends that when his property was moved from cell 3 to cell 57 outside
of his presence, it constituted a Fourth Amendment violation.
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A
person invoking the Fourth Amendment’s protections must be able to allege “a
‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been invaded
by government action.” King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 (1984)). The law regarding the Fourth
Amendment’s application to prison cells and prisoners’ property is well established. An
inmate has no reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus no Fourth Amendment
protection, in his prison cell, given ‘the paramount interest in institutional security.’” Id.
(quoting Hudson, 468 U.S. at 528). “The recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in
their individual cells simply cannot be reconciled with the concept of incarceration and
10
the needs and objectives of penal institutions.” Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526. Further, an
intentional deprivation of an inmate’s property does not violate his procedural due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment as long as an adequate post-depravation
remedy is available. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. A negligent deprivation of an inmate’s
property does not even implicate the Due Process Clause. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327, 328 (1986).
Here, Mekuria does not even allege that he was deprived of his property—he
merely alleges that corrections officers moved his property when he was not there. (Supp.
at 1–2). Simply put, Mekuria’s allegations do not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation, whether brought under the Fourth or the Fourteenth Amendment.8 Thus, the
Court concludes that Mekuria fails to state a claim related to corrections officers moving
his property.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or,
in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 15). The Court will also grant
Mekuria’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 6). A separate order follows.
Entered this 21st day of December, 2018
/s/
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge
8
Mekuria also does not allege who moved his property. Absent a defendant or
defendants, Mekuria’s claim fails.
11
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?