Webb v. Berryhill
Filing
30
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Deborah L. Boardman on 5/26/2020. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk)
Case 1:18-cv-01812-DLB Document 30 Filed 05/26/20 Page 1 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
DEBORAH L. BOARDMAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
(410) 962-7810
Fax: (410) 962-2577
MDD_DLBChambers@mdd.uscourts.gov
May 26, 2020
LETTER TO COUNSEL
RE:
Geneva W. v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. DLB-18-1812
Dear Counsel:
Arjun K. Murahari, Esq. has filed a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to the Social
Security Act (“Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), in conjunction with his representation of Plaintiff before
the Court. ECF No. 28. In response, the Commissioner asked the Court to consider whether Mr.
Murahari’s requested amount constitutes a reasonable fee. ECF No. 29. No hearing is necessary.
See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2018). For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Murahari’s motion for
attorney’s fees is GRANTED.
On September 11, 2019, this Court awarded Mr. Murahari $4,325.58 for 21.00 hours
worked on Plaintiff’s case in federal court, pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”),
28 U.S.C. § 2412. ECF Nos. 25-7, 27. Plaintiff subsequently received an Award Notice, in which
she was awarded $52,781.00 in past due benefits. ECF No. 28-2. On April 6, 2020, Mr. Murahari
filed a Line seeking $13,195.25 in attorney’s fees. ECF No. 28. Mr. Murahari has agreed to
reimburse Plaintiff for EAJA fees previously received. Id.; see Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S.
789, 796 (2002); Stephens ex rel. R.E. v. Astrue, 565 F.3d 131, 135 (4th Cir. 2009).
The Act authorizes a reasonable fee for successful representation before this Court, not to
exceed twenty-five percent of a claimant’s total past-due benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Although
contingent fee agreements are the “primary means by which fees are set” in Social Security cases,
a court must nevertheless perform an “independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable
results in particular cases.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. In determining whether a request for
attorney’s fees under section 406(b) is reasonable, the Supreme Court has explained that a
reviewing court may properly consider the “character of the representation and the results the
representative achieved.” Id. at 808. The Supreme Court acknowledged that a contingent fee
agreement would not result in a reasonable fee if the fee constituted a “windfall” to the attorney.
Id. (quoting Rodriquez v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 739, 746-47 (6th Cir. 1989)). Courts may require the
attorney to provide a record of hours spent working on the case and the attorney’s typical hourly
billing charge. Id.
Here, Mr. Murahari and Plaintiff entered into a contingent fee agreement, by which
Plaintiff agreed to pay Mr. Murahari twenty-five percent of all retroactive benefits to which she
Case 1:18-cv-01812-DLB Document 30 Filed 05/26/20 Page 2 of 2
Geneva W. v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. DLB-18-1812
May 26, 2020
Page 2
might become entitled. ECF No. 25-5. In his previous motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to the
EAJA, Mr. Murahari submitted an itemized report documenting 21.00 chargeable hours he worked
on Plaintiff’s case in this court. See ECF No. 25-7 (listing a total of 25.15 hours, 4.15 of which
were spent on clerical and administrative tasks marked “NO CHARGE”). If Mr. Murahari receives
the full amount of fees he requests, his fee for representation will effectively be $422.36 per hour.
Mr. Murahari must therefore show that an effective rate of $422.36 per hour is reasonable for the
services he rendered. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807.
Mr. Murahari’s typical hourly billing rate is $350.00. ECF No. 25-6 ¶ 6. This is the top
hourly rate that is presumptively reasonable for attorneys of his experience level pursuant to the
fee guidelines appended to the Local Rules of this Court.1 Courts in the Fourth Circuit have
approved contingency fee agreements that produce much higher hourly rates in successful Social
Security appeals. See, e.g., Melvin v. Colvin, No. 5:10-CV-160-FL, 2013 WL 3340490 (E.D.N.C.
July 2, 2013) (approving contingency fee agreement with hourly rate of $1,043.92); Claypool v.
Barnhart, 294 F. Supp. 2d 829, 833 (S.D. W. Va. 2003) (approving contingency fee agreement
with hourly rate of $1,433.12); Lehman v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., Civil No. SAG-10-2160 (D.
Md. July 7, 2016) (unpublished) (approving contingency fee agreement with hourly rate of
$1,028.14). This Court has routinely approved a higher hourly rate for Mr. Murahari. See Janette
G. v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. DLB-18-757 (D. Md. Feb. 5, 2020); Arvie W. v. Comm’r,
Soc. Sec. Admin., No. SAG-17-1148 (D. Md. Aug. 22, 2019); Barbara F. v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec.
Admin., No. SAG-17-2090 (D. Md. July 25, 2019). Thus, the requested fee in this case is
reasonable and should be approved.
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court GRANTS Mr. Murahari’s motion seeking
attorney’s fees, ECF No. 28. This Court will award Mr. Murahari attorney’s fees totaling
$13,195.25.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion.
implementing order follows.
An
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Deborah L. Boardman
United States Magistrate Judge
1
Although they do not govern Social Security cases, the Local Rules prescribe guid elines for determining
attorney’s fees in certain cases, which are instructive in evaluating the reasonableness of the effective hourly
rate in this case. See Loc. R. App’x B (D. Md. 2018). Currently, Mr. Murahari has over eight years of
experience. ECF No. 22-6. The presumptively reasonable hourly rate for attorneys admitted to the bar for
five to eight years is between $165.00 and $300.00, and the presumptively reasonable hourly rate for
attorneys admitted to the bar for nine to fourteen years is $225.00 and $350.00. Loc. R. App’x B.
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