In re Sanctuary Belize Litigation
Filing
771
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Peter J. Messitte on 1/3/2020. (ybs, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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IN re SANCTUARY BELIZE
LITIGATION
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Civil No. pJM 18-3309
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") has filed a Motion for Clerk's Entry of Default
against Defendants John Usher, Global Property Alliance Inc., Sittee River Wildlife Reserve, Buy
Belize LLC, Buy International Inc., Foundation Development Management Inc., Eco Futures
Development, Eco-Futures Belize Limited, Newport Land Group LLC, Power Haus Marketing,
Prodigy Management Group LLC, Belize Real Estate Affiliates LLC, Exotic Investor LLC,
Southern Belize Realty LLC, Sanctuary Belize Property Owners' Association, and The Estate of
John Pukke. ECF No. 741. Pro se Defendants Andris Pukke, Peter Baker, and Luke Chadwick
have responded, suggesting that they in fact represent one or more of these entities. 1 The FTC has
Replied. ECF Nos. 761 and 770.
I Pukke apparently did not serve the FTC with a copy of his response such that the Court has granted the FTC leave
to file a second Reply in order to respond to Pukke's filing. The Court, once again, advises Pukke that he must serve
the FTC with a copy of his filings and that he must do so at the same time he serves everyone else. From this point
forward, Pukke is cautioned: Failure to serve the FTC with copies of his filings as directed herein will result in the
disregard of his filings by the Court. The Court also notes that many ofPukke's recent filings have not been timely
received by the Clerk's Office and also forewarns Pukke that failure to mail a copy of his filings to the Clerk's Office
may also result in the disregard of the filings by the Court.
Chadwick argues that he, as an individual, should be able to represent certain corporate entities because the asset
freeze has made it difficult for him to hire counsel for these entities. This request comes very late in the day, just a
few short weeks before trial. Moreover, Chadwick has been represented by counsel during the better part of these
proceedings. When he had counsel, neither he nor they ever attempted to file a motion on behalf of the entities he now
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For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the
FTC's Motion.
The law is clear: It "permits corporations ... and other artificial entities ... to appear in federal
courts only through licensed counsel." Rowland v. California Men's Colony, Unit II Men's
Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 195 (1993); see also In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276,290 (4th
Cir. 2014) (citing Rowland); see also Ashley-Cooper
Sales Servs., Inc. v. Brentwood Mfg. Co.,
168 F.Supp. 742,745 (D. Md.l958) (stating "the Federal courts, including the Supreme Court and
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that a corporation cannot appear in court in proper
person, but must appear by attorney authorized to practice before the court."). Though there is a
right of individuals to appear pro se on behalf of themselves in civil cases, see 28 U.S.C.
S 1654,
and in criminal cases, see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), "[t]he right to litigate for
oneself, however, does not create a coordinate right to litigate for others," Myers v. Loudoun Cty.
Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395,400 (4th Cir. 2005). The rationale is that this "protects the rights of those
before the court ... and jealously guards the judiciary's authority to govern those who practice in
its courtrooms." Id. To expand on the first point, allowing a pro se individual-
a non-attorney no
less - to appear for a corporate or other entity may seriously compromise the interests of the
corporation or entity. See Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (stating "we
consider the competence of a layman representing himself to be clearly too limited to allow him
to risk the rights of others"). The Local Rules of this Court hammer home this point, reaffirming
that "Individuals who are parties in civil cases may only represent themselves." LAR 101.1(a).
seeks to represent to release funds on behalf of those entities so that they might engage counsel. Nor did they ever
seek to file dispositive motions on behalf of the entities.
In his response, Pukke also asks that the Court reconsider its decision denying him access to Receivership funds, ECF
No. 696. The Court DENIES Pukke's Motion for Reconsideration. The Court will separately consider the FTC's
proposed course of action in ECF No. 770.
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Accordingly, pro se Defendants may not appear in this proceeding on behalf of the nonresponding Corporate Defendants.2 The Court also notes that all three pro se Defendants were
represented by counsel at some point in the proceedings, but did not make any filings on this issue
or raise this issue with the Court previously.
The law is somewhat less clear as to whether Pukke is authorized to represent the Estate of
John Pukke as the Executor of the Estate. The Fourth Circuit has not directly addressed the issue
but other Circuits and District Courts within the Fourth Circuit have stated that an estate may be
represented by a pro se individual who is the executor or personal representative of the estate if
the individual is the sole beneficiary and the estate has no creditors. See Malone v. Nielson, 474
F.3d 934, 937 (7th Cir. 2007); Shepherd v. Wellman, 313 F.3d 963,970 (6th Cir. 2003); Pridgen
v. Andresen, 113 F.3d 391,393 (2nd Cir. 1997); McAdoo v. United States, 2014 WL 359043, at
*1 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 3, 2014). The Fourth Circuit has hinted that it agrees. See Witherspoon v.
Jeffords Agency, Inc., 88 F. App'x 659 (4th Cir. 2004). Thus, ifPukke can show the Court he is
the Executor of his father's Estate and the sole beneficiary of the Estate and that the Estate has no
creditors, the Court will permit him to represent the Estate.3 Pukke will need to file a copy of his
appointment as Executor.
With respect to the non-responding Corporate Defendants and John Usher, the Court notes
that these Defendants were duly served with process in this case and have not in any way
participated in the proceedings. Since the pro se Defendants may not represent the non-responding
Corporate Defendants, there is no reason why the Clerk should not enter Defaults against them.
2 In emails and filings, the pro se Defendants make several assertions that misconstrue the law and the meaning of a
Clerk's Entry of Default against these non-responding Corporate Defendants. The Court notes that a Clerk's Entry of
Default is not equivalent to a Default Judgment. It merely precludes them from contesting liability and may be set
aside for good cause. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55{b). The issue of damages remains to be proven. Id.
3 If, as the FTC claims, the Estate of John Pukke does have a creditor, Pukke will not be allowed to represent the
Estate.
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Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the FTC's Motion
for a Clerk's Entry of Default. The Court will direct the Clerk of the Court to ENTER
DEFAULTS against the non-responding Corporate Defendants and John Usher individually.
Pukke must submit to the Court within ten (l0) days an official document showing that he is the
Executor of the Estate of John Pukke and a sworn statement that he is the sole beneficiary of said
Estate and that the Estate does not have any creditors. For now, the Court directs the Clerk to not
enter default against the Estate of John Pukke, but it will be prepared to do so if Pukke fails to
comply with the Court's directives.
A separate Order will ISSUE.
January 3, 2020
lsi
U ITE
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PETER J. MESSITTE
STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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