Barreto v. Edu et al

Filing 2

MEMORANDUM OPINION Signed by Chief Judge James K. Bredar on 10/8/2019. (cags, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
MATTHEW A. BARRETO,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No.: JKB-19-2845

AFFLUENCE EDU,
WELLS FARGO & COMPANY,

(Related Case: GLR-19-1440)

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Matthew A. Barreto filed the above-entitled complaint on September 27, 2019,
and paid the full filing fee. The complaint concerns identical allegations raised in Civil Action
GLR-19-1440, which was dismissed on May 28, 2019, for failure to state a claim. See Barreto v.
Affluence Edu, et al., Civil Action GLR-19-1440 (D. Md. 2019) (hereinafter Barreto I) at ECF 5.
In dismissing the complaint this Court observed in pertinent part that
Barreto alleges that in April 2019, he enrolled in a seminar on how to invest in
real estate and earn personal profits that Defendants Affluence Edu
(“Affluence”) and Interactive Trader sponsored. (See Compl. at 2, ECF No. 1;
Am. Compl. at 2, ECF No. 3). Although the advertisement he saw on television
for the seminar stated that neither experience or money would be required from
attendees, when he went to the May 3, 2019 seminar in Linthicum, Maryland,
he was required to pay a total of $1194.00 to “participate in a [three]-day
workshop for the training on real estate investment . . . and for training on
stocks,” which would be held on May 17–19, 2019. (Compl. at 2–3). Barreto
admits he was aware that additional training would require payment of fees and
agreed to pay the fees by transferring funds from his savings account to his
checking account. (Id. at 3). Because he paid the fees with his debit card, Barreto
assumed the funds would be withdrawn from his account immediately. (Id.).
On May 11, 2019, Barreto attempted to withdraw cash from his checking
account and discovered that his account balance was unexpectedly low. (Id.).
He states that instead of debiting his account on the date of the transaction,

May 3, 2019, Defendants delayed the withdrawal until May 10, 2019. (Id. at 4).
Barreto alleges that he had to transfer funds from his savings account to avoid
incurring fees. (Id.). Barreto states that the $1,194.00 was returned to him on
May 13, 2019, after he disputed the transaction with his bank. (Id.). The delay
in processing the transaction forms the basis of Barreto’s fraud claim against
Defendants, which he considers an “unfair business practice.” (Id.). As relief
he suggests that Defendants either: (1) allow him to attend the seminar free of
charge and the seminar fees can later be deducted from “the first profit made”;
or (2) Defendants pay him $200,000.00 in damages for the mental anguish he
suffered as a result of their delay in withdrawing funds from his account. (Id. at
4–5; see also Am. Compl. at 2–4). The Amended Complaint simply adds
Interactive Trader, which Barreto faults for a portion of the seminar fee
withdrawal, as a Defendant. (Am. Compl. at 2).
To state a fraud claim under Maryland law, the plaintiff must allege that: (1) “the
defendant made a false representation to the plaintiff”; (2) “the falsity of the
representation was either known to the defendant or the representation was made
with reckless indifference to its truth”; (3) “the misrepresentation was made for
the purposes of defrauding the plaintiff”; (4) “the plaintiff relied on the
misrepresentation and had the right to rely on it”; and (5) “the plaintiff suffered
compensable injury as a result of the misrepresentation.” Belyakov v. Med. Sci.
& Computing, 86 F.Supp.3d 430, 438 (D.Md. 2015) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp.
v. Albright, 71 A.3d 30, 49 (Md. 2013)).
Here, Barreto’s allegations fail to satisfy any of the elements of a fraud claim.
Barreto does not allege that Defendants made a representation, let alone one that
was false, and he suffered no injury as a result of the delay in processing his
debit card transaction. It is clear from Barreto’s allegations that Defendants
committed no wrongful act. Rather, Barreto simply failed to monitor his bank
accounts to ensure sufficient funds remained in the account until Defendants,
which Barreto agreed to pay, processed the $1194.00 debit card transaction. And
Defendants returned Barreto’s funds when he contested the transaction with his
bank. Thus, the Court concludes that the Complaint, as supplemented, fails to
state a claim and must be dismissed.
Barreto I at ECF 5, pp. 2-5.
Where there has been a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit, an identity of the cause
of action in both the earlier and the later suit, and an identity of parties or their privies in the two
suits, res judicata is established. See Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. Beverley, 404 F.3d 243, 248
(4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Jones v. S.E.C., 115 F.3d 1173, 1178 (4th Cir. 1997)). The doctrine of
res judicata precludes the assertion of a claim after a judgment on the merits in a prior suit by the
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same parties on the same cause of action. See Meekins v. United Transp. Union, 946 F.2d 1054,
1057 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing Harnett v. Billman, 800 F.2d 1308, 1312 (4th Cir. 1986). In addition,
“‘[n]ot only does res judicata bar claims that were raised and fully litigated, it prevents litigation
of all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were previously available to the parties, regardless
of whether they were asserted or determined in the prior proceeding.’” Id. (quoting Peugeot
Motors of America, Inc. v. E. Auto Distrib., Inc., 892 F.2d 355, 359 (4th Cir. 1989).
The only discernible difference between the instant complaint and the claims raised in
Barreto I is the addition of Wells Fargo as a defendant in this case. The claim against Wells Fargo
is premised on Barreto’s assertion that the delay in debiting his account may have been the bank’s
fault. ECF 1 at 12. The addition of the dubious claim against Wells Fargo does not change the
analysis regarding the applicability of res judicata to the claims asserted. Barreto is raising
identical claims based on the same set of facts, claims that this court found to be without merit.
Although Barreto paid the filing fee in this instance, this court may nevertheless dismiss a
complaint sua sponte where the matters asserted are plainly frivolous. Smith v. Kagan, 616
F. App’x 90 (4th Cir. 2015) (unpublished); see Chong Su Yi v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F. App’x 247,
248 (4th Cir. 2014) (same); Ross v. Baron, 493 F. App’x 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) (same). In
addition, “dismissal prior to service of process is permissible when a court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over a patently frivolous complaint.” Smith, 616 F. App’x at 90; Chong Su Yi,
554 F. App’x at 248 (same); Ross, 493 F. App’x at 406 (same). Where, as here, the complaint
concerns matters that were determined to be without merit, it is a frivolous complaint and must be
dismissed.
A separate order follows.

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Dated this 8th day of October, 2019 .

FOR THE COURT:

_____________/s/_____________________
James K. Bredar
Chief Judge

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