Hood-Wilson v. Community College of Baltimore County

Filing 95

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Lydia Kay Griggsby on 11/26/2024. (bw5s, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

MELANIE HOOD-WILSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
COMMUNITY COLLEGE OF
BALTIMORE COUNTY,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 20-cv-00124-LKG
Dated: November 26, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.

INTRODUCTION
In this employment discrimination matter, the Plaintiff, Melanie Hood-Wilson, asserts

disparate treatment discrimination claims, based upon race and gender, against the Defendant,
the Board of Trustees of the Community College of Baltimore County (“CCB”), pursuant to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. ECF No. 36. The
Defendant has moved for summary judgment in its favor on these claims, pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56. ECF No. 80. This motion is fully briefed. ECF Nos. 80, 81, 89, 90, 92, 93. No
hearing is necessary to resolve the motion. See L.R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2023). For the reasons that
follow, the Court: (1) GRANTS CCB’s motion for summary judgment and (2) DISMISSES the
amended complaint.

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II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1
A. Factual Background
In this employment discrimination matter, the Plaintiff asserts disparate treatment race

and gender discrimination claims against CCB, arising from her non-selection for the position of
Assistant Dean for Workforce Solutions, pursuant to Title VII. ECF No. 36. Specifically, the
Plaintiff asserts claims in the amended complaint for disparate treatment based upon race (Count
I) and disparate treatment based upon gender (Count II). Id. at ¶¶ 54-70. As relief, the Plaintiff
seeks, among other things, to recover monetary damages, front pay, future benefits and
attorneys’ fees and costs from CCB. Id. at Prayer for Relief.
The Parties
Plaintiff Melanie Hood-Wilson self-identifies as an African American female and she is a
former administrator for CCB. Id. at ¶ 2.
Defendant CCB is a post-secondary education institution, which operates several
campuses located in Baltimore City and Baltimore County, Maryland. Id. at ¶ 1.
The Plaintiff’s Employment History
As background, CCB hired the Plaintiff to serve as an adjunct instructor for the college in
February 2001. ECF No. 81 at ¶ 1. The Plaintiff was employed as the Coordinator of CCBC’s
Single Step program from her hiring in 2001 until 2006, when she became the Director of
Special Populations. Id. at ¶ 2.
In her position as Director of Special Populations, the Plaintiff was responsible for all
aspects of her program, including budget management and financial oversight. Id. at ¶ 4.
Plaintiff served in that role through 2018. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 5. Dean Louise Slezak (Caucasian
Female) was the Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor when she served as the Director of Special
Populations. Id. at ¶¶ 20-21.

The facts recited in this memorandum opinion are derived from the amended complaint; the Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment and the memorandum in support thereof; the parties’ joint statement of
undisputed facts; the Plaintiff’s response to the joint statement of undisputed facts; and the parties’ joint
record exhibits. ECF Nos. 36, 80, 80-1, 81, 90, 93. Unless otherwise stated, the facts recited herein are
undisputed.

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The Plaintiff’s Non-Selection For The Assistant Dean Position
On September 14, 2018, CCB’s Executive Dean for Continuing Education & Online
Learning, Michael N. Netzer (Caucasian Male), emailed CCB’s Continuing Education Staff with
job descriptions for three newly-created Assistant Dean positions and directed any interested
applicants to apply by submitting their resumes via email. ECF No. 93 at 460, 476. And so, the
Plaintiff submitted an application to serve as the Assistant Dean of Workforce Solutions on
September 14, 2018. ECF No. 81 at ¶ 5; see ECF No. 93 at 459, 461-64.
At the time of her application, the Plaintiff had served as the interim chair of the
Baltimore County Department of Economic and Workforce Development, leading the Workforce
Innovation and Opportunity Act (“WIOA”) planning and writing team for services to individuals
with barriers to employment. ECF No. 89-1 at ¶ 16; see also ECF No. 93 at 462. Specifically,
this work involved partnering with agencies across Baltimore County to develop strategies to
improve access and funding streams to services. ECF No. 89-1 at ¶ 16.
Matthew Bernardy, (Caucasian Male) and Don Elliot (Caucasian Male) also applied for
the position of Assistant Dean of Workforce Solutions. 2 ECF No. 80-1 at ¶ 11; ECF No. 81 at ¶
6; see also ECF No. 93 at 470-74. Mr. Bernardy was ultimately selected to fill this position.
ECF No. 81 at ¶ 12.
At the time of his application, Mr. Bernardy was serving as Director of Connections to
Employment for CCB and also as the Interim Director of CCB’s Center for Adult and Family
Literacy (“CAFL”). ECF No. 80-1 at ¶ 7; see ECF No. 93 at 470, 472. Mr. Bernardy also had
experience managing large numbers of people, which CCB maintains is an important skill for the
Assistant Dean of Workforce Solutions position. ECF No. 80-1 at ¶ 8. Prior to his employment
with CCB, Mr. Bernardy had operational responsibility for the Advanced Skills Learning Center,
a $1.8 million nonprofit adult technical education center focused on workforce solutions and job
placements. Id. at ¶ 9; see ECF No. 93 at 472-73.
CCB’s selection process for filling the Assistant Dean of Workforce Solutions position
involved a five-person search committee, which was tasked with interviewing the candidates for
CCB maintains that Mr. Bernardy is Hispanic. ECF No. 80-1 at ¶ 11. But the Plaintiff alleges that Mr.
Bernardy is Caucasian. ECF No. 90-1 at ¶ 11.

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the three new Assistant Dean positions. ECF No. 81 at ¶ 7. The search committee’s members
included: Dean Netzer; Dean Slezak; Kenneth Buck (African American Male); Stephen Kabriel
(Caucasian Male); and Nikki Rogers (Caucasian Female). Id.
The search committee developed a set of 14 interview questions to ask each applicant.
Id. at 8. CCB maintains that these questions were “focused on having the candidates
demonstrate specific basic knowledge and designed to draw out responses involving experiences,
knowledge, and skills that the committee considered essential for the Assistant Dean positions.”
ECF No. 80-1 at ¶ 10. Each member of the search committee issued a score ranging from one
(lowest) to five (highest) for an applicant’s answer to each question. ECF No. 81 at ¶ 9.
Following each interview, the search committee held a discussion to review the
members’ scoring decisions for the interviewed candidate. ECF No. 80-1 at ¶ 12; ECF No. 90 at
¶ 12. The search committee then aggregated its members’ individual interview scores, resulting
in a final cumulative interview score for each applicant. ECF No. 90 at ¶ 13.
It is undisputed that the applicants’ cumulative interview scores were “an important part
of selecting the Assistant Dean for Workforce Solutions.” ECF No. 80-1 at ¶ 14; see ECF No.
90 at ¶ 14. It is also undisputed that Mr. Bernardy received the highest interview score (285) of
the three applicants for the Assistant Dean of Workforce Solutions position, and that the Plaintiff
received the lowest score (181) of the three applicants for the position. ECF No. 81 at ¶¶ 10-11.
It is further undisputed that the Plaintiff’s highest interview scores were awarded by search
committee members Dean Netzer and Dean Slezak. ECF No. 80-1 at ¶ 17; ECF No. 90 at ¶ 17.
Based upon the results of the search committee’s selection process, the search committee
recommended Mr. Bernardy for the Assistant Dean of Workforce Solutions position. ECF No.
80-1 at ¶ 18. CCB contends that Mr. Bernardy was the most qualified applicant for the job,
“[b]ased on his relevant experience, qualifications, and skills, which were demonstrated in his
resume and reflected in the scoring of his interview responses.” Id.
In this regard, Dean Netzer testified during his deposition that Mr. Bernardy was the most
qualified applicant for the position, because he: (1) demonstrated a history of managing large
organizations and budgets; (2) had experience understanding all facets of Workforce Solutions
programming; (3) had existing relationships with the agencies involved in Workforce Solutions
programming; (4) had extensive experience with WIOA funding; and (5) had significant
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experience writing and managing grants. ECF No. 93 at 479. Dean Netzer also testified that Mr.
Bernardy was more qualified than the Plaintiff for the Assistant Dean of Workforce Solutions
role, because the Single Step program that the Plaintiff had managed is relatively small and has a
narrow focus. Id. at 480.
Dean Netzer further testified that the Plaintiff was less qualified for the Assistant Dean
position than Mr. Bernardy, because she did not demonstrate a broad background in welfare-towork and workforce development systems, a familiarity with WIOA, or experience with writing
or managing grants or performance-based funding. Id. And so, Dean Netzer, as the
decisionmaker with respect to this hire, offered Mr. Bernardy the position. ECF No. 90 at ¶ 18.
The Plaintiff’s Resignation
On November 29, 2018, the Plaintiff tendered her resignation, effective as of February 1,
2019. ECF No. 81 at ¶ 13; see ECF No. 93 at 616. The Plaintiff alleges that, prior to the date on
which she tendered her resignation, Dean Slezak demoted two part-time coordinators under her
direct supervision, because they submitted timesheets with “overlapping” hours. ECF No. 36 at
¶¶ 32, 45. The Plaintiff also alleges that she feared that Dean Slezak “had been building a record
against her to justify [her] termination.” Id. at ¶ 46.
On December 12, 2018, Dean Slezak issued a Corrective Action Notice to the Plaintiff,
which provides, in relevant part:
As you are aware, I am very concerned with your ability to manage
critical details, provide accurate documentation/record keeping and
provide fiscal oversight when dealing with contracts, resources and
employees. I included the same concerns in your evaluations,
through numerous conversations and emails. Most recently you
authorized payment to two employees[] for time worked that was
inaccurate, went against policy and was poorly documented.
These incidents are serious financial improprieties. . . .
Over the past several evaluations and throughout the year, I have
met several times with you to discuss the importance of accuracy,
oversight and fiscal management. You were not able to present a
reasonable explanation or provide additional information to
satisfactorily explain any of these serious improprieties.
Therefore, as a result of our investigation, and after our discussions
we determined that you improperly and negligently mismanaged
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your fiscal responsibilities. Your poor management and
negligence placed CCBC at risk. . . .
In the absence of compelling justification for your unacceptable
actions and behavior, this is a final warning/last chan[c]e.
ECF No. 93 at 617-18. CCB maintains that this Corrective Action Notice was issued “separate
and independent from the search process for the [A]ssistant [D]ean position.” ECF No. 80-1 at ¶
21. The Plaintiff resigned from her position with CCB on February 1, 2019. ECF No. 81 at ¶¶
13-14.
The Plaintiff’s EEO Complaint
On December 19, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Maryland
Commission on Civil Rights (“MCCR”), alleging race and gender discrimination under Title VII.
Id. at ¶ 15. In the charge of discrimination, Plaintiff stated:
I have performed my duties without negative evaluation since
employed. I was continuously harassed by Ms. Louis[e] Slezak,
Dean. I was unknowingly accused of authorizing payment to two
employees for inaccurate time work. Similarly situated co-worker
Mr. Michael Tan[] authorized payment to employees for
unknowingly inaccurate time work, and was not discipline[d]. On
November 2, 2018, I applied for a posted position of Assistant
Dean for the Workforce Solution, I was denied promotion,
similarly situated co-worker Mr. Matthew Bernardy (White), with
less experience and track record via the metrics of evaluation was
promoted. I constructively discharged on November 2, 2018,
when continuous harassment from Ms. Slezak, became unbearable.
ECF No. 93 at 633.
On October 1, 2019, the MCCR notified CCB that it had closed the investigation into the
Plaintiff’s charge, because the Plaintiff had requested a right-to-sue letter from the United States
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). ECF No. 90 at ¶ 25. The Plaintiff
received her right-to-sue letter from the EEOC on October 21, 2019. ECF No. 36 at ¶ 14.
The Plaintiff’s Allegations
The Plaintiff commenced this employment discrimination matter on January 15, 2020.
ECF No. 1. The original complaint alleges disparate treatment claims based upon race and

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gender, and failure-to-promote claims based upon race and gender, in violation of Title VII and
the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (“MFEPA”). Id.
After the Court granted CCB’s motion to dismiss the complaint on August 3, 2020, the
Plaintiff noted a limited appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, to
challenge the dismissal of her failure-to-promote claims under Title VII. ECF Nos. 19, 20, 22.
The Fourth Circuit reversed the Court’s August 3, 2020, decision in this regard and remanded the
case on July 16, 2021. ECF No. 26.
On remand, the Fourth Circuit directed the Plaintiff to file an amended complaint
consistent with the Fourth Circuit’s decision. ECF No. 28. After the Plaintiff filed the amended
complaint, the parties engaged in discovery on Plaintiff’s remaining claims. See ECF No. 71.
In the amended complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that CCB discriminated against her, based
upon her race and gender, by: (1) failing to promote her to the position of Assistant Dean of
Workforce Solutions and (2) disciplining her for timecard errors committed by her subordinates.
ECF No. 36 at ¶¶ 54-70. And so, the Plaintiff alleges that CCB treated her less favorably than
other similarly situated individuals who were employed by CCB.
To support her disparate treatment discrimination claims, the Plaintiff alleges that CCB
selected Matthew Bernardy for the Assistant Dean of Workforce Solutions position, even though
he “was far less qualified than [Plaintiff] in both tenure, experience and in all areas pertinent to”
the role. Id. at ¶ 60. Plaintiff also alleges that CCB discriminated against her with regards to the
discipline of two of her subordinates, because two other Directors at CCB were not disciplined
when their subordinates submitted timesheets with overlapping hours. Id. at ¶ 36.
In this regard, Plaintiff alleges that another supervisor, Michael Tan (Caucasian Male),
who served as Director of ACCESS for CCB, approved some of the timesheets with
“overlapping” hours that had been submitted by the same two employees working under her. Id.
at ¶ 34. The Plaintiff also alleges that Steven Jurch (Caucasian Male), who was serving as the
Director of Allied Health, approved timesheets for another employee that contained similar
deficiencies. Id. at ¶ 36. But, the Plaintiff contends that Dean Slezak took no corrective action
against Mr. Tan or Mr. Jurch for these timesheet errors, despite disciplining Plaintiff for the same
infraction. Id. at ¶¶ 37, 62, 69. And so, the Plaintiff alleges that CCB discriminated against her
when Dean Slezak issued a Corrective Action Notice, which was “the last step before
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termination,” even though she “had never been disciplined prior to” the issues with her
subordinates’ timesheets. Id. at ¶¶ 48, 53.
Lastly, the Plaintiff relies upon several alleged statements and conduct by Dean Slezak to
show discriminatory animus. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges that Dean Slezak: (1) downplayed
her achievements in front of her colleagues “while being noticeably more congratulatory of the
work of [the Plaintiff’s] White male colleagues;” (2) “ask[ed] blatantly racist questions about
Blacks and then sarcastically look[ed] to [the Plaintiff] to humiliate her as if she were a
representative for all Blacks;” (3) referred to people in Baltimore City, which is majority Black,
as “jumping rent;” and (4) stated that she “didn’t like it” in Martha’s Vineyard, after expressing
surprise that “[t]here were a lot of Black people” there. Id. at ¶¶ 22, 24-26. And so, the Plaintiff
contends that CCB has subjected her to disparate treatment based upon her race and gender, in
violation of Title VII. See generally id.
B. Procedural History
The Plaintiff commenced this action on January 15, 2020. ECF No. 1. On August 17,
2021, the Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. ECF No. 36.
On May 14, 2024, the Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56, and a memorandum in support thereof. ECF No. 80. On May 14, 2024, the parties
filed a joint statement of undisputed facts. ECF No. 81.
On June 21, 2024, the Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the Defendant’s motion
for summary judgment and a response to the joint statement of undisputed facts. ECF Nos. 89,
90. The Defendant filed a reply brief on July 17, 2024. ECF No. 92. On July 24, 2024, the
parties filed their joint record exhibits. ECF No. 93.
The Defendant’s motion for summary judgment having been fully briefed, the Court
resolves the pending motion.
III.

LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56
A motion for summary judgment filed pursuant to Rule 56 will be granted only if there

exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250
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(1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). And so, if there clearly exist factual
issues “that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be
resolved in favor of either party,” then summary judgment is inappropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 250; see also Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Props., 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987);
Morrison v. Nissan Motor Co., 601 F.2d 139, 141 (4th Cir. 1979).
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe the facts
alleged in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See United States v.
Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962); Gill v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 773 F.2d 592, 595
(4th Cir. 1985). In this regard, the moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Catawba Indian Tribe of S.C. v. South Carolina, 978 F.2d 1334, 1339
(4th Cir. 1992). But, a party who bears the burden of proof on a particular claim must also
factually support each element of his or her claim. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.
Given this, “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element . . . necessarily renders
all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. And so, for those issues on which the nonmoving party
will have the burden of proof, it is the nonmoving party’s responsibility to confront the motion
for summary judgment with an affidavit or other similar evidence in order to show the existence
of a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256
The Fourth Circuit has held that, “[a] mere scintilla of evidence in support of the
nonmovant’s position will not defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Detrick v. Panalpina,
Inc., 108 F.3d 529, 536 (4th Cir. 1997). And so, there must be “sufficient evidence favoring the
nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable,
or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
249-50 (internal citations omitted). Conclusory assertions of a defendant’s state of mind and
motivation are also not enough to withstand summary judgment. Goldberg v. B. Green & Co.,
836 F.2d 845, 848 (4th Cir. 1988); see also Foreman v. Weinstein, 485 F. Supp. 2d 608, 612 (D.
Md. 2007) (“[A] subjective, even if genuine, belief of discrimination will not shield a nonmoving
plaintiff from a grant of summary judgment.”). Rather, a plaintiff must advance specific material
evidentiary facts, not unsupported speculation. Ash v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 800 F.2d 409,
411-12 (4th Cir. 1986).
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B. Title VII And Disparate Treatment Claims
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex and
national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. There are two methods for proving intentional
discrimination in employment under Title VII: (1) through direct or indirect evidence of
intentional discrimination, or (2) through circumstantial evidence under the burden-shifting
scheme set forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802-05 (1973).
A plaintiff may utilize “ordinary principles of proof using any direct or indirect evidence
relevant to and sufficiently probative of the issue.” Brinkley v. Harbour Recreation Club, 180
F.3d 598, 606-07 (4th Cir. 1999). In this regard, the Fourth Circuit has held that direct evidence
of discrimination is that which demonstrates the defendant “‘announced, or admitted, or
otherwise unmistakably indicated that the [discriminatory consideration] was a determining
factor.’” Palmer v. Liberty Univ., Inc., 72 F.4th 52, 63 (4th Cir. 2023) (resolving an intentional
discrimination claim in the ADEA context) (citation omitted). And so, to overcome a summary
judgment motion, a plaintiff “‘must produce direct evidence of a stated purpose to discriminate
and/or [indirect] evidence of sufficient probative force to reflect a genuine issue of material
fact.’” Brinkley, 180 F.3d at 607 (quoting Goldberg, 836 F.2d at 848 (brackets existing)).
The Fourth Circuit has held that comments proffered as direct evidence of discrimination
must be made by a final decisionmaker involved in the alleged adverse employment action. Hill
v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., 354 F.3d 277, 289 (4th Cir. 2004); Schafer v. Md. Dep’t of
Health & Mental Hygiene, 359 F. App’x 385, 389 (4th Cir. 2009). The Fourth Circuit has also
recognized that alleged discriminatory comments made years before the alleged adverse
employment action were too remote to constitute direct evidence of discrimination. Birckbeck v.
Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 511-12 (4th Cir. 1994).
If the plaintiff cannot point to direct or indirect evidence of intentional discrimination,
she may proceed under the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Tuck v. Henkel
Corp., 973 F.2d 371, 374 (4th Cir. 1992). Under McDonnell-Douglas, a plaintiff must first
establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
A plaintiff alleging discrimination based upon failure to promote can establish a prima facie case
of discrimination by showing that: (1) she is a member of a protected group; (2) there was a
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specific position for which she applied; (3) she was qualified for the position; and (4) her
employer denied her promotion and/or rejected her application under circumstances giving rise
to an inference of unlawful discrimination. 3 Walton v. Harker, 33 F.4th 165, 176 (4th Cir.
2022); Alvarado v. Bd. of Trs. of Montgomery Cnty. Comm. Coll., 928 F.2d 118, 121 (4th Cir.
1991); Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 959-60 (4th Cir. 1996). The
failure to demonstrate one of these required elements is fatal to a plaintiff’s ability to establish a
prima facie case. See Hemphill v. ARAMARK Corp., 2014 WL 1248296, at *19 (D. Md. Mar.
25, 2014), aff'd, 582 F. App’x 151 (4th Cir. 2014).
If a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of production
shifts to the defendant to present a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action alleged. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142
(2000) (citing Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)). If the
defendant succeeds in doing so, that showing will rebut the presumption of discrimination raised
by the plaintiff’s prima facie case. See Stokes v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 206 F.3d
420, 429 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10). The plaintiff then must “prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not
its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
In this regard, in a failure-to-promote case, a plaintiff must prove that she was a better
candidate for the position than the chosen applicant. Venugopal v. Shire Labs., 334 F. Supp. 2d
835, 844 (D. Md. 2004). Given this, a plaintiff can establish pretext, by showing that she was
more qualified than the candidate selected, or by amassing circumstantial evidence that
undermines the credibility of her employer’s stated reasons for the non-selection. Heiko v.
Colombo Savs. Bank, F.S.B., 434 F.3d 249, 259 (4th Cir. 2006). But, “[t]he plaintiff always
bears the ultimate burden of proving that the employer intentionally discriminated against her.”
Evans, 80 F.3d at 959 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).

The Fourth Circuit has held that the review of professorial tenure and promotion decisions should give
deference to the employer’s determination regarding a candidate’s scholarly potential. Jiminez v. Mary
Washington Coll., 57 F.3d 369, 376 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Smith v. Univ. of N.C., 632 F.2d 316, 345
(4th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted).

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IV.

ANALYSIS
CCB has moved for summary judgment on the Plaintiff’s employment discrimination

claims, upon the grounds that the undisputed material facts show that: (1) the Plaintiff cannot
adduce direct or indirect evidence of race or gender discrimination by CCB; (2) the Plaintiff
cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination, because she cannot provide evidence to
show that CCB rejected her application under circumstances that give rise to an inference of
discrimination; and (3) CCB had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not hiring the
Plaintiff, which she cannot show were a pretext for unlawful race or gender discrimination. ECF
No. 80-1 at 9-21. And so, CCB requests that the Court enter summary judgment in its favor and
dismiss the amended complaint. Id. at 22.
The Plaintiff largely does not substantively address CCB’s arguments in her response in
opposition. See generally ECF No. 89-1. But, the Plaintiff generally argues that CCB is not
entitled to summary judgment, because there are material factual disputes in this case regarding
whether CCB rejected her application under circumstances that give rise to an inference of
unlawful discrimination that preclude summary judgment. Id. at 21-23. Specifically, the
Plaintiff argues that: (1) there is admissible evidence in this case of Dean Slezak’s “racist
actions” and CCB’s disparate treatment of Black female employees by, among other things,
promoting less qualified White males over Black females; (2) her former co-workers have
testified that they believe Mr. Bernardy was “pre-selected” for the Assistant Dean of Workforce
Solutions position; (3) there is admissible evidence to show that she was more qualified for the
Assistant Dean position than Mr. Bernardy and that the selection process was altered to ensure
that Mr. Bernardy was hired; and (4) there is a question for the jury regarding whether CCB
rejected her application under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination. Id. at 13-27. And so, the Plaintiff requests that the Court deny CCB’s motion for
summary judgment. Id. at 27.
For the reasons that follow, the undisputed material facts in this case show that the
Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination based upon failure to promote,
because she cannot show that CCB declined to select her for the Assistant Dean of Workforce
Solutions position under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.
The undisputed material facts also demonstrate that the Plaintiff cannot show that CCB’s
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proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not selecting her for the Assistant Dean
position were a pretext for discrimination. And so, the Court: (1) GRANTS CCB’s motion for
summary judgment and (2) DISMISSES the amended complaint.
A. The Plaintiff Cannot Establish A Prima Facie Case Of Discrimination
As an initial matter, CCB argues with persuasion, and the Plaintiff does not appear to
dispute, that the Plaintiff does not adduce any direct or indirect evidence to show intentional
discrimination upon the basis of race or gender in this case. ECF No. 80-1 at 9-13; ECF No. 92
at 2; see generally ECF No. 89-1. Given this, the Court begins its analysis by considering
whether the Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of discrimination to prevail on her failureto-promote claims.
In this regard, the undisputed material facts in this case show that the Plaintiff cannot
produce evidence to satisfy the elements of her discrimination claims. To prevail on her failureto-promote claims, the Plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected group; (2)
there was a specific position for which she applied; (3) she was qualified for the position; and (4)
her employer denied her promotion and/or rejected her application under circumstances giving
rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Walton v. Harker, 33 F.4th 165, 176 (4th Cir.
2022); Alvarado v. Bd. of Trs. of Montgomery Cnty. Comm. Coll., 928 F.2d 118, 121 (4th Cir.
1991); Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 959-60 (4th Cir. 1996). Because
the parties agree that the Plaintiff is a member of a protected group, that she applied for the
position of Assistant Dean of Workforce Solutions and that she met the qualifications for this
position, the Court must determine whether the Plaintiff can establish the fourth element of her
claims—that CCB rejected her application under circumstances giving rise to an inference of
unlawful discrimination. ECF No. 80-1 at 14.
The undisputed material facts in this case make clear that the Plaintiff cannot show that
CCB rejected her application for the Assistant Dean of Workforce Solutions position under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful race or gender discrimination for several
reasons. First, the unrebutted evidence in this case demonstrates that the Plaintiff cannot point to
any statements or conduct during the selection process for the Assistant Dean position that would
give rise to an inference that the search committee was influenced by racial or gender-based
animus.
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The Plaintiff alleges that the Assistant Dean selection process was influenced by
discriminatory animus, because Dean Louise Slezak displayed “discriminatory animus” towards
her prior to and during the selection process. ECF No. 36 at ¶ 51. To support this claim, the
Plaintiff further alleges that Dean Slezak: (1) downplayed the Plaintiff’s achievements in front of
her colleagues “while being noticeably more congratulatory of the work of [the Plaintiff’s] White
male colleagues;” (2) “ask[ed] blatantly racist questions about Blacks and then sarcastically
look[ed] to [the Plaintiff] to humiliate her as if she were a representative for all Blacks;” (3)
referred to people in Baltimore City, which is majority Black, as “jumping rent;” and (4) stated
that she “didn’t like it” in Martha’s Vineyard, after expressing surprise that “[t]here were a lot of
Black people” there. Id. at ¶¶ 22, 24-26. In addition, the Plaintiff alleges that there is evidence
of racial and gender-based discrimination, because Dean Slezak punished her for approving her
subordinates’ incorrect timesheets, but did not discipline two other Directors—who are not Black
women—who also “supervised employees who [had] been charged with committing timecard
fraud.” Id. at ¶ 36.
But, the Plaintiff fails to point to any conduct or statements by Dean Slezak, or any other
member of the search committee, that show that she was not selected for the Assistant Dean of
Workforce Solutions position due to her gender. See generally ECF Nos. 36, 89-1; see also ECF
No. 93 at 386-88. Moreover, to the extent that statements and comments attributed to Dean
Slezak could be construed to reflect “discriminatory animus” based upon race, the undisputed
material facts also make clear that Dean Slezak was not the final decisionmaker with regards to
the selection of the new Assistant Dean. ECF No. 90 at ¶ 18; see also ECF No. 93 at 480.
It is also undisputed that none of the alleged discriminatory statements that the Plaintiff
attributes to Dean Slezak occurred at, or near, the time of the selection process for the Assistant
Dean position. In fact, the evidence before the Court shows that Dean Slezak’s alleged
comments about her trip to Martha’s Vineyard in September 2017 occurred a year before the
Plaintiff applied for the Assistant Dean of Workforce Solutions position. ECF No. 81 at ¶ 5; see
also ECF No. 93 at 901. The parties also agree that Dean Slezak issued a Corrective Action
Notice to the Plaintiff on December 12, 2018, which was several weeks after the selection
process for the Assistant Dean position had concluded. ECF No. 90 at ¶ 21; see ECF No. 93 at
617-18.
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Given these undisputed facts, the evidence before the Court regarding Dean Slezak’s
alleged statements and conduct simply do not give rise to an inference of discrimination with
regards to the Plaintiff’s non-selection for the Assistant Dean position. See, e.g., Walton, 33
F.4th at 177-78 (noting that comments purporting to show discriminatory animus must have a
“nexus” to the contested employment decision); Birckbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d
507, 511-12 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that alleged discriminatory comments made years before
the alleged adverse employment action were too remote to constitute evidence of
discrimination). 4
The Plaintiff’s argument that there is an inference of discrimination in this case, because
Mr. Bernardy “was far less qualified than [Plaintiff] in both tenure, experience and in all areas
pertinent to” the position, is also contradicted by the unrebutted evidence. ECF No. 36 at ¶ 60.
The undisputed material facts show that, at the time of her application, the Plaintiff had served as
the interim chair of the Baltimore County Department of Economic and Workforce
Development, leading the WIOA planning and writing team for services to individuals with
barriers to employment. ECF No. 89-1 at ¶ 16; see also ECF No. 93 at 462. It is also undisputed
that the Plaintiff’s work involved partnering with agencies across Baltimore County to develop
strategies to improve access and funding streams to services. ECF No. 89-1 at ¶ 16.
By comparison, it is undisputed that at the time of his application, Mr. Bernardy was
serving as Director of Connections to Employment for CCB; serving as the Interim Director of
CCB’s CAFL; and had prior experience managing large numbers of people, which CCB
maintains is an important skill for the Assistant Dean of Workforce Solutions position. ECF No.
80-1 at ¶¶ 7-8; see ECF No. 93 at 470, 472. Notably, the unrebutted evidence also shows that,
prior to applying for the Assistant Dean position, Mr. Bernardy had operational responsibility for
the Advanced Skills Learning Center, which is a $1.8 million nonprofit adult technical education
center focused on workforce solutions and job placements. ECF No. 80-1 at ¶ 9; see ECF No. 93
at 472-73.

4

The Plaintiff does not identify the timing of Dean Slezak’s alleged comment about people in Baltimore
City “jumping rent.” ECF No. 36 at ¶ 25; ECF No. 80-1 at 10 n.5.

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The evidence before the Court also shows that Dean Netzer testified during his deposition
that the Plaintiff was less qualified for the Assistant Dean position than Mr. Bernardy, because
she did not demonstrate a broad background in welfare-to-work and workforce development
systems, a familiarity with WIOA, or experience with writing or managing grants or
performance-based funding. ECF No. 93 at 480. Dean Netzer also testified that Mr. Bernardy
was more qualified than Plaintiff for the Assistant Dean of Workforce Solutions position,
because the Single Step program that Plaintiff had previously managed is relatively small and
has a narrow focus. Id.
The Plaintiff points to no evidence to rebut Dean Netzer’s testimony in this regard, nor
does she dispute the evidence before the Court regarding Mr. Bernardy’s qualifications. ECF
No. 89-1 at 13-15. Given this, the Plaintiff’s claim that she was more qualified than Mr.
Bernardy for the Assistant Dean position lacks evidentiary support.
The Plaintiff’s reliance upon the testimony of other CCB employees, “about the racist
and biased environment” fostered by Dean Slezak and CCB, to support her discrimination claims
is also misplaced. Id. at 23. The Plaintiff argues that there are material facts in dispute about
whether there is an inference of discrimination in this case, because:
•

Karen Paris, Director of Marketing and Adjunct Faculty Support, testified in her
deposition that she saw an email from Dean Netzer, which stated that CCB had created
three Assistant Dean positions for certain White male employees, including Mr.
Bernardy, so they would not leave CCB;

•

Don Elliot, Director of Continuing Education, who also interview for the Assistant Dean
of Workforce Solutions position, testified in his deposition that observed irregularities in
CCB’s hiring process and took issue with the composition of the search committee; and

•

Mr. Elliot also testified that he believed the interview questions for the Assistant Dean
position were slanted in favor of Mr. Bernardy, and that he was equally, if not better,
qualified than Mr. Bernardy for the role.

ECF No. 89-1 at 22-24; see also ECF No. 93 at 1065-67, 1100-02. But, even accepting this
testimony as true, the undisputed material facts in this case show that the Plaintiff was not
selected for the Assistant Dean position because Mr. Bernardy was more qualified and received a
superior evaluation during CCB’s selection process. Notably, it is undisputed that the
applicants’ cumulative interview scores were “an important part of selecting the Assistant Dean
for Workforce Solutions.” ECF No. 80-1 at ¶ 14; see ECF No. 90 at ¶ 14. It is also undisputed
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that Mr. Bernardy received the highest interview score (285) of the three applicants for the
Assistant Dean of Workforce Solutions position, and that the Plaintiff received the lowest score
(181) of the three applicants for the position. ECF No. 81 at ¶¶ 10-11.
The unrebutted evidence also shows that, based upon these results, the search committee
recommended Mr. Bernardy for the Assistant Dean position, because he was the most qualified
applicant for the job, “[b]ased on his relevant experience, qualifications, and skills, which were
demonstrated in his resume and reflected in the scoring of his interview responses.” ECF No.
80-1 at ¶ 18. Notably, Dean Netzer testified during his deposition that Mr. Bernardy was the
most qualified applicant for the position, because he: (1) demonstrated a history of managing
large organizations and budgets; (2) had experience understanding all facets of Workforce
Solutions programming; (3) had existing relationships with the agencies involved in Workforce
Solutions programming; (4) had extensive experience with WIOA funding; and (5) had
significant experience writing and managing grants. ECF No. 93 at 479.
Given this evidence, the Plaintiff can neither show that she was the most qualified
applicant for the Assistant Dean of Workforce Solutions position, nor that there is a genuine
dispute with regards to the material facts about why she was not selected for this position.5
Walton, 33 F.4th at 178; Venugopal v. Shire Labs., 334 F. Supp. 2d 835, 844 (D. Md. 2004).
And so, the Court must GRANT CCB’s motion for summary judgment on the Plaintiff’s
discrimination claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
B. The Plaintiff Cannot Show Pretext
As a final matter, the Court also observes that, even if the Plaintiff could establish a
prima facie case of discrimination, her discrimination claims would still fail because the
undisputed material facts show that the Plaintiff cannot show that CCB’s stated reasons for her
non-selection were a pretext for discrimination. If the Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case
of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to CCB to present a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the decision not to hire her as Assistant Dean of Workforce
Solutions. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (citing Tex.

To the extent that the Plaintiff maintains that this evidence shows either direct or indirect evidence of
discrimination, her arguments fail for the reasons stated above.

5

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Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)). If CCB succeeds in doing so, the
Plaintiff then must “prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered
by [CCB] were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at
253. Relevant here, the Plaintiff can establish pretext in this case by showing that she was better
qualified than Mr. Bernardy for the Assistant Dean position, or by amassing other circumstantial
evidence that undermines the credibility of CCB’s stated reasons for her non-selection. Heiko v.
Colombo Savs. Bank, F.S.B., 434 F.3d 249, 259 (4th Cir. 2006).
As discussed above, the undisputed material facts show that Mr. Bernardy was more
qualified than the Plaintiff for the Assistant Dean position. See ECF No. 93 at 479 (Dean Netzer
testifying that Mr. Bernardy was the most qualified applicant for the position, because he: (1)
demonstrated a history of managing large organizations and budgets; (2) had experience
understanding all facets of Workforce Solutions programming; (3) had existing relationships
with the agencies involved in Workforce Solutions programming; (4) had extensive experience
with WIOA funding; and (5) had significant experience writing and managing grants). Given
this, CCB represents to the Court that it selected Mr. Bernardy for this position due to his
superior qualifications. ECF No. 80-1 at 15.
While the Plaintiff understandably disagrees with CCB’s decision to select and hire Mr.
Bernardy for the Assistant Dean position, she points to no evidence to show that the CCB’s
reasons for doing so were a pretext for racial or gender-based discrimination. Heiko, 434 F.3d at
259; Evans, 80 F.3d at 960. For this reason, the Court also must GRANT CCB’s motion for
summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
V.

CONCLUSION
In sum, the undisputed material facts in this case show that the Plaintiff cannot establish a

prima facie case of discrimination, based upon race or gender, to prevail on her failure-topromote claims. The undisputed material facts also show that the Plaintiff cannot show that
CCB’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not selecting her for the Assistant
Dean of Workforce Solutions position were pretextual. And so, for the foregoing reasons, the
Court:
(1) GRANTS CCB’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 80); and

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(2) DISMISSES the amended complaint.
A separate Order shall issue.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Lydia Kay Griggsby
LYDIA KAY GRIGGSBY
United States District Judge

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