Hamilton v. Bivens et al

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Brendan Abell Hurson on 9/23/2024. (c/m 9/24/2024)(kk5s, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

HENRY ERIC HAMILTON,
Petitioner,
Civil Action No.: BAH-21-2417

v.
WARDEN DA YID GREENE, et al.,
Respondents.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Petitioner Henry Eric Hamilton filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254 in which he challenges his 2015 conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree
assault. The Petition is fully briefed. Upon review of the submitted materials, the Court finds no

,

need for an evidentiary hearing. See Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United
States District Courts; D. Md. Local R. 105.6. For the reasons set forth below, the Petition will be
DENIED and a certificate of appealability shall not issue.
BACKGROUND

I.

Conviction and Sentence
Hamilton stood trial on fourteen separate counts in the Circuit Court for Cecil County,

Maryland in connection with the September 24, 2014 shooting death of Harrison Meran-Garcia

and the wounding of Alexander Meran. See Hamilton v. State, 2018 WL 904348, at *2 (Md. App.
Feb. 14, 2018) 1; ECF 1-6 at 54. 2 The following events led to Hamilton's arrest and trial.
On September 24, 2014, Alexander Meran and his uncle Harrison Meran-Garcia drove to
Hamilton's house in Elkton, Maryland for the purpose of delivering cocaine to Hamilton. ECF 115, at 10, 13, 27. Meran-Garcia was known to Hamilton as a drug dealer named "Fernando." ECF
1-6, at 60. Meran-Garcia had been to Hamilton's house several times in t)le past and Hamilton
was expecting him that evening. Id. According to text messages found on Meran-Garcia's phone,
he was bringing Hamilton cocaine which Hamilton intended to sell to Bank of America employees.
ECF 1-13, at 66-70. 3

1

On November 8, 2022, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the
name of the Court of Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court of Maryland and the Court of
Special Appeals was renamed the Appellate Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on
December 14, 2022. This was a change in name only and does not affect the precedential value of
the opinions of the two courts issued befo_re the effective date of the name change.
2

Petitioner attached the unreported opinion of the Maryland Appellate Court addressing his direct
· appeal, which includes a summary of many of the relevant facts. See ECF 1-6, at 52 - 93. The
opinion is also available at Hamilton v. State, No. 736, 2018 WL 904348 (Md. App. Feb. 14, 2018).
For convenience, the Court will cite primarily to the copy attached to the petition. See ECF 1-6,
at 52-91. Other opinions from the Appellate Court of Maryland addressing Hamilton's claims are
also attached to his filings. The Court will generally cite to them by citing to the attached copies
and occasionally to a Westlaw citation.
3

Petitioner attaches portions of the transcript of trials and relevant hearings at ECF 1-9: at 1-20
(pretrial conference), ECF 1-10, at 1-6 (pretrial conference), ECF 1-11, at 1-38 (motions hearing),
ECF 1-12, at 1-162 (trial day one, March 23, 2015), ECF 1-13, at 1-126 (trial day three, March 25,
2015), ECF 1-14, at 2-196 (trial day two, March 24, 2015); ECF 1-15, at,1-123 (trial day four,
March 26, 2015); ECF 1-16, at 1-86 (trial day five, March 27, 2015); ECF 1-17, at 1-60 (motion
for a new trial and sentencing), ECF 1-18, at 1-6 (preliminary proceedings), ECF 1-19, at 1-3
(pretrial conference), ECF 1-4, at 2-324 (postconviction hearing); ECF 1-5, at 1-124
(reconsideration .of posttrial motion). After the Court noticed that some pages were missing in
ECF 1-14, Respondent provided new transcripts for the March 24 and 25, 2015 trial dates. See
ECF 23-1, at 1-196 (trial day two, March 24, 2015); ECF 23-2, at 1-129 (trial day three, March
25, 2015).
2

According to Meran, his uncle drove into Hamilton's driveway and shortly thereafter
Hamilton came to the side of the car and spoke briefly with Meran-Garcia. ECF 1-15, at 13-14.
Because Meran does not speak English, he could not provide any information regarding the content
of the conversation. Id. at 14. Hamilton returned to the house and started sweeping the front porch
and, according to Meran, "bullets started flying." Id. Meran did not see anyone other than
Hamilton approach the car. Id. at 15. As shots penetrated the car, Meran-Garcia put the car in
reverse and stepped on the gas causing the car to collide with trees located at the end of the
driveway. Id. Although he had been shot five times, Meran managed to escape through a window
into the woods nearby. Id. Meran-Garcia sustained multiple gunshot wounds and was pronounced
dead at the scene. ECF 1-14, at 45-46, 70-103.
Deputy Jonathan Wight of the Cecil County Sheriffs Office reported to the area. after
receiving a call for multiple shots fired. Id. at 32. Upon his arrival, Wight observed a car in the
wood line approximately twenty to thirty feet off the driveway of Hamilton's residence. Id. at 3233. Wight saw a black male in the driver's seat with a gunshot wound to his face with no signs of
life; a plastic bag containing a white substance was in his hand. Id. at 33. Meanwhile, Meran
managed to convey his need for assistance to a 911 dispatch officer and, upon encountering two
other Cecil County Sheriffs deputies, was taken to the hospital for treatment. ECF 1-15, at 99100.
Through the trial testimony of Anastasia Maivelett and Kimberlie Perez it was established
that Hamilton and his son, Hank Hamilton,4 we.nt to a nearby marina following the shooting at
Hamilton's house. ECF 23-2, at 16. Perez, who was Hamilton's girlfriend, testified that after
leaving work at 11 :30 p.m. she met Hamilton and Hal)k at a restaurant off the marina where

4

The Court will use Hank Hamilton's first name throughout this opinion to avoid confusion.

3

Hamilton docked his boat. Id. at 34. Hamilton asked Perez to take Hank back to the house so he
could get his car, but the police were at the house, so they drove back to the marina. Id. at 36.
Maivelett, who was Hank's girlfriend, testified that at approximately 1:00 a.m., Hank
contacted her and asked her to pick him up in Chesapeake City where Hamilton had taken Perez
and Hank by boat. ECF 23-2, at 15-16. When she arrived, Maivelett recalled seeing Hamilton
backing his boat into the dock. Id. Hank then took bags, which she recognized as bags he used to
store his guns, off the boat and put them in the trunk of her car. Id. at 17. Maivelett then dro.ve
Hamilton, Perez, and Hank to the hotel where Hank had been staying and found a room for
Hamilton and Perez to stay. Id.
Once in their hotel room, Perez recalled that Hamilton told her, "there was just a bunch of
shooting and there was glass breaking ... [and] basically he said all hell broke loose." Id. at 39.
Hamilton assured Perez that he did not shoot anyone, but when asked about Hank, Hamilton stated
he was "not going to turn in his son." Id. Later that morning, Hank and Maivelett returned to pick
Hamilton and Perez up from the hotel. Id. at40-41. Hamilton was dropped off"on the side of the
road" and Perez returned to Hamilton's house where she spoke to police. Id. at 40. Perez was
untruthful and told police she had slept on Hamilton's boat because there was mold in the house
and that she had not seen Hamilton recently. Id, at 40-41.
Maivelett testified that she traveled with Hamilton and Hank to Hank's stepfather's house •
where Hank removed the guns in the trunk of her car and put them in the garage. ECF 23-2, at 1920. A search warrant executed on Hank's stepfather's house revealed a black bag containing three
guns: a 223 caliber Marlin Firearm, a 223 caliber Smith and Wesson, and a 22 caliber Smith and
Wesson. ECF 1-14, at 160-61. The latter two firearms were stipulated to at Hamilton's trial a_s
belonging to Hank. Id. at 163. Ten cartridge casings recovered from an area in front of the parked

4

cars at Hamilton's residence were identified as having been fired from the 22 caliber Smith and
Wesson semiautomatic rifle belonging to Hank. Id. at 180.
Hamilton was arrested on September 30, 2014 and interviewed by Detective Mallery. ECF
23-2, at 97. Although Hamilton's statement was not transcribed, an audiotape of his interview was
played for the jury. Id. at 107. According to the Appellate Court of Maryland's summary of the
facts, Hamilton told Mallery the following:
[T]he driver of the car, Mr. Meran-Garcia, was a drug dealer known to him as "Fernando,"
who had been to his house multiple times in the past, and who he had arranged to meet that
day. [Hamilton] explained that the evening of the shooting had gone awry and he did not
want implicate anyone else, but he did not have a gun and had not fired a single shot. He
thought the shots came from inside the vehicle towards the outside and vice versa, and said
that, "I don't know who reached for what. Who did what first, I don't know. My back was
to the vehicle when all this shit went down and that's the God honest truth." (Hamilton]
believed "there was a misperception by someone. That, when the two misperceptions met
... one fired first, the other fired second, I don't know who."
ECF 1-6, at 5 n3. Hamilton did not testify. Id.
Pertinent to Hamilton's claims in this Court, Meran was interviewed by police on three
separate occasions, two of which were recorded. ECF 1-15, at 4-5. Because Meran could not
speak English, Detective Angel Valle accompanied Detective Mallery to Christiana Hospital to
act as interpreter while Meran viewed a photo line-up. ECF 23-2, at 82. Meran identified Hamilton
as the man he saw speaking with his uncle moments before his uncle was shot. Id. at 83.
Dur_ing his testimony at trial, Meran maintained that after speaking with Meran-Garcia,
Hamilton went to the porch, started sweeping, and soon thereafter, the shooting started. ECF 115, at 14. Defense counsel objected to Meran's testimony because the State had not provided .the
defense with transcripts of Meran's statements to the police, only audio recordings. Id. at 4-5.
Counsel further explained that his request to the head of the local public defender's office to retain
the services of a Spanish interpreter to translate the interviews was denied due to the estimated

5

cost being $3,000.00. Id. at 6. The trial court found that the State had complied with discovery
rules by providing audio of the interviews, overruled the defense's objection, and allowed Meran
to testify. Id.
On cross examination, Meran discussed three interviews he gave to police. As summarized
by the Appellate Court of Maryland, Meran stated:
On cross-examination, Meran testified that the police came to the hospital after he was shot
and interviewed him three times. He told police various versions of the shooting,
including: appellant was sweeping when they first drove up, appellant walked away and
then the shots happened, and he observed a second white male dressed in black clothes
who began shooting. Mr. Meran initially told police that several people came out of the
woods shooting. He clarified that he did not know how many people were shooting because
the only person he could see well was [Hamilton] and [Hamilton) was not shooting."
ECF 1-6, at 58. Later, counsel for Hamilton attempted to play the entirety of two recordings of
Meran's recorded statements to police. ECF 1-6, at 32. At a bench conference after an objection
by the prosecutor, the trial judge limited to counsel to playing only those portions of the recordings
"relating to the statements that [Meran) made previously which differ [from the recordings]." Id.
at 35. The trial judge agreed with the prosecutor that Mera!! "admitted [to] having made [a prior]
statement" and thus concurred that playing the tapes would serve no "impeachment purposes." Id.
Counsel again returned to questioning Mera about his prior inconsistent statement, ending his cross
examination with the following exchange:
Q: In your first interview you said that the defendant was sweeping when you pulled in
the driveway. Do you recall that?
A: He was sweeping.

Q: And then in your second interview you said that the shooting started after this gentleman
started sweeping. Do you recall that?

6

A: Mm-hmm, yes.
Q: Just a little confused as to what the truth is. Nothing further.
Id. at36-37.

At the end of the State's case, defense counsel moved for judgment of acquittal. ECF 115, at 77-80. The trial court granted the motion as to the first-degree and second-degree murder

'
charges but held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to consider the two related
conspiracy counts. Id. at 85-86; 91-92. The trial court also granted the motion on armed robbery,
conspiracy to commit armed robbery, robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, first-degree assault,
and attempted murder. Id. at 92-93. The jury was left to consider the following charges in their
deliberations: two counts of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, two counts of conspiracy
to commit second-degree murder, and conspiracy to commit first-degree assault.
During their deliberations, the jury sent out a total of eleven notes .. ECF 1-16, at 73. In
response to the first ten notes, the trial court instructed the jury to rely on their collective memories
of the facts and the law as supplied by the court in its instructions. Id. at 59-62. In response to the
eleventh note asking whether intent for the purposes of assault is the same as the intent involved
in self-defense, the trial court sent a pattern jury instruction on intent to the jury. Id. at 74. At
Hamilton's request, defense counsel raised an objection to the manner in which the jury's questions
,

were addressed, believing that the questions were not being answered by simply sending a
generalized instruction on int~nt into the jury room. Id. at 78. The jury returned a guilty finding
on the charge of conspiracy to commit first degree assault on Garcia-Meran and found Hamilton
not guilty on the remaining charges. Id. at 78-80.
On June 5, 2015, Hamilton was sentenced to serve 25 years in the Department of
Corrections. ECF 1-17 at 56. In imposing sentence, the trial court commented that H·amilton

7

would have to "serve at least one-half of the sentence" before he would be eligible for parole
consideration. Id.
II.

Direct Appeal

Hamilton filed a direct appeal pro se in which he raised 12 claims that the Appellate Court .
of Maryland chose to

"combine □,

rephrase[], and reorder[] as follows":

I.
Did the circuit court properly determine that [Hamilton] could not act as
co-counsel at trial?
2.
Did the circuit court properly exercise its discretion in precluding
testimony of two police officers about the termination of Officer Daniel
Darienzo from the Elkton Police Department following his guilty plea for sexual
offense against [Hamilton's] daughter?
3.
Did the circuit court properly exercise discretion in allowing the testimony
of Alexander Meran without his pretrial statements having been transcribed?
4.
Did the circuit court properly exercise its discretion in denying
[Hamilton's] motion in limine to prevent mention of weapons that were not
linked by ballistics to the shooting?
5.
Did the circuit court properly exercise its discretion in allowing
interpreters in the courtroom during the first three witnesses and in not inquiring
whether further remedy was required after learning that the jury found the
interpreters' presence distracting?
6.
Did the circuit court properly decline to instruct the jury on self-defense
and defense of others?
7.
Did the circuit court properly exercise discretion in responding to jury
notes during deliberations?
8.
Did the circuit court properly deny [Hamilton'~] motion for judgment of
acquittal in part?
ECF 1-6, at 53. The appellate cou;1 also noted that Hamilton raised two additional claims that the
court declined to address because Hamilton "did not brief or argue either question in his brief."
Id. at 1-2, n. I; ECF 1-6 at 53-54, n. I. Those two claims were stated as:

8

[] Did the circuit court err in disallowing the other inconsistent pretrial
statements of Alexander Meran, (all of which were in Spanish) by requiring
counsel to demonstrate where said Spanish statements differed?
***·
[] Did the circuit court err in restricting the closing arguments of appellant as to
self defense, by granting the State's motion in /imine to preclude the same?
ECF 1-6, at 54 n.1.

In addressing Hamilton's claim that the trial court erred when it reversed its initial ruling
that he could act as co-counsel, the Appellate Court of Maryland noted that "[!]here are only 'two
types of representation constitutionally guaranteed - representation by counsel and representation

prose - and they are mutually exclusive."' ECF J--6, at 73 (quoting Farren v. State, 523 A.2d
597,599 (Md. 1987)). Hamilton never asked for his counsel to be dismissed nor did he ihvoke his
right to appear prose and therefore, the court reasoned, he was "not entitled to act as co-counsel."

Id. at 75. The appellate court agreed with the State "that the fact that the court and prosecutor did
not recognize initially that the two rights are disjunctive, does not transform them into conjunctive
rights" and thus held "that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion" when it denied Hamilton's
request to act as co-counsel. Id.
Hamilton's allegations of trial court error in excluding or admitting evidence were
examined by the appellate court pursuant to Maryland evidentiary rules. ECF 1-6, at 75-82. The
court first cited Md. Rule 5-401, which defines relevant evidence as "'evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more_probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."' Id. at 75 (quoting Md.
Rule 5-40 I). The appellate court's review of the trial court's determination of evidence as relevant
is a conclusion of law that the appellate court reviewed de novo. Id. The trial court's decision to
admit relevant evidence that should have been excluded as unfairly prejudicial is reviewed for

9

abuse of discretion. Id. "[A]bsent an abuse of discretion (oran error oflaw), a trial court's decision
to admit relevant evidence will not be reversed." Id. at 76.
Applying these standards to the trial court's decision to exclude testimony from Officer
Darienzo and Lt. Waldridge, the appellate court found that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion. ECF 1-6, at 76. The court observed that while '[b]ias is nearly always relevant,"
Hamilton had not presented any evidence that the proffered testimony "of a police officer charged
with sex offenses that had involved [Hamilton's] daughter" was relevant to the State's prosecution
of the charges against him, "particularly where the prior event took place within a different police
department." Id. The court concluded that the trial judge "was in the best position to determine
relevance and did not abuse her discretion." Id.
The appellate court als~ found that the trial court "determined correctly the relevance of
Mr. Meran's testimony, and then exercised properly its discretion when it admitted Mr. Meran's
testimony." ECF 1-6, at 77. It further observed that Meran's testimony, which included his
recollection of Hamilton speaking with the deceased prior to the shooting, identification of
Hamilton as the man he saw at the scene of the shooting, and his testimony that Hamilton returned
to the house where he started sweeping the porch, "made the existence of [Hamilton's]
involvement more probable than not, and as such was relevant." Id.
Hamilton also argued that cross-examination of Meran was made more difficult by the
absence of a translated transcript of his statements to the police. ECF 1-6, at 77. He maintained
that Meran had changed his story multiple times and argued that a transcript was "necessary
because the officers either lied about or misinterpreted Mr. Meran's testimony from the pretrial
interviews." Id. Initially, Hamilton attempted to prevail upon the appellate court to obtain a
transcript and to compare it with the audio ofMeran's statements to confirm the discrepancies. Id.

Hamilton then sought to correct the record by submitting an independent translation of Meran's
statements he had obtained on his own, but the appellate court declined to consider it as it was
never considered by the trial court and was not properly presented on appeal. Id: at 78 n.8. The
appellate court rejected Hamilton's claim, observing that the trial court was "not obligated to
obtain a last minute transcript of Mr. Meran's statements for defense counsel," particularly where
counsel had "copies of the recordings for approximately a month and a half prior to trial and ...
never alleged a discovery violation." Id. at 78.
Hamilton's assertion that the trial court abused its discrntion when it permitted "three
'

assault style rifles to be admitted into evidence and then later permitted the state to display one of
the rifles before the jury" was rejected by the Appellate Court of Maryland as unpreserved for
review. ECF 1-6, at 79. Specifically, Md. Rule 4-323(a) "requires that the party opposed to
admission object at the time the evidence is actually.offered" after the trial court rules _in /imine
that the evidence is admissible so that the issue is preserved for appellate review. Id. (citing
Washington v. State, 990 A.2d 549, 573 (Md. App. 20 I 0)). The narrow exception to the rule,

where the trial court restates ihe pretrial ruling shortly before the challenged evidence is admitted,
did not apply to Hamilton's case because trial counsel affirmatively stated he had no objection to
the introduction of the guns. Id. at 80. The appellate court alternatively 'ruled that had the issue
been preserved for review, the claim would fail on the merits "because the court admitted
photographic evidence of all the weapons without objection." Id. at 81.
Hamilton's claim on direct appeal that he was denied due process related to: I) the trial
court's decision not to have the testimony of the first three witnesses repeated or transcribed after
the jury said the presence of the interpreters in the courtroom was distracting; and 2) the trial
court's denial of a request for a self-defense instruction; and 3) providing the jury with a general

II

pattern instruction on intent in response to one of its questions during deliberation. ECF 1-6, at
70, 82.
The interpreters that were present in the courtroom were there to translate for the family
members of the victims who were attending the trial. ECF 1-6, at 82. Hamilton argued that
permitting the interpreters to be present in the courtroom distracted the jury and, after confirming
the jury members were distracted, the trial court compounded the problem because some testimony
was not repeated or transcribed.

Id. at 82-83.

The appellate court _rejected this claim as

unpreserved for review, but also found no error by the trial court in permitting the interpreters to
be in the courtroom. Id. at 84-85. Under Maryland law, "the victim's family members have a
right, if practicable, to attend a proceeding, and the trial judge has wide discretion in the conduct
of a trial." Id. at 84. By addres_sing the distraction as it did, the trial court "acted well within its
discretion by making proper efforts to resolve any distraction the interpreters posed to the jury."

Id. (citing State v. Hawkins, 604 A.2d 489, 493 (Md. 1992)). The failure by defense counsel to
object or to offer any further argument when the trial court stated that the interpreters would be
moved offsite meant that th~ trial court had no clear indication from the defense that another step
was needed to remedy the distraction. Id. at 85.
Hamilton also argued that it was error and a denial of due process when the trial court
refused to instruct the jury on self-defense and defense of others because, Hamilton claimed, there
was sufficient evidence to support providing both instructions. ECF 1-6,-at 85. This claim was
also not preserved for appellate review due to the failure to offer a contemporaneous objection
pursuant to Md. Rule 4-325(±). Id. To comply with the rule:
[T]here must be an objection to the instruction; the objection must appear on the
record; the objection must be accompanied by a definite statement _of the ground
for objection unless the ground for objection is apparent from the record and the

12

circumstances must be such that a renewal of the objection after the court
instructs the jury would be futile or useless.
ECF 1-6, at 86 (quoting Gore v. State, 522 A.2d 1338, 1340 (Md. 1987)). Although Hamilton's
counsel requested the jury instructions for self-defense and defense of others, the Appellate Court
of Maryland noted that he did not "object promptly after the jury instructions, in fact stating that
he had no objections." Id. at 87. The Court noted that "defense counsel was not merely silent after
the court instructed the jury with no self-defense or defense cif others instruction[,]
but"[c]ounsel affirmatively stated that he was satisfied.'_' Id. The appellate court went on to state
that even had this claim been preserved, it would have failed on its merits because Hamilton "never
conceded that he fired a gun nor did he offer any testimony to show he fired in self-defense or
defense of others." Id. at 87. On the contrary, Hamilton told police that "he did not have a gun
nor did he fire a single shot." Id.
The appellate court also rejected Hamilton's claim that his right to due process was also
violated when the trial court provided the jury with the "Maryland Pattern Criminal Jury'
Instruction on intent" in response to a note inquiring about the requisite intent to establish selfdefense. ECF 1-6, dat 87-88. The appellate court noted that the "'main purpose of a jury
instruction is to aid the jury in clearly understanding the case, to provide guidance for the jury's
deliberations, and to help the jury arrive at a correct verdict."' Id. at 88 (quoting Chambers v.
State, 650 A.3d 727, 729 (Md. 1994)). Hamilton disagreed with the trial court's approach because,
in his view, the pattern jury instruction on intent did not provide a direct answer to the jury's
question. Id. Under Maryland law, the decision whether to give a jury supplemental instructions
in a criminal case is left to the discretion of the trial judge. Id. (citing Md. Rule 4-325 and Lovell
v. State, 702 A.3d 261, 278 (Md. 1997)). In the appellate court's view, however, the evidence
produced at trial did not support a theory of self-defense as explained supra and, therefore, the
13

trial court's use of the general instruction on intent was not an abuse of discretion and did not
violate Hamilton's due process rights. Id. at 89.
Lastly, the appellate court addressed Hamilton's claim that the trial court "erred in denying
his motion for judgment of acquittal as to the charges of conspiracy because the prosecution was
essentially 'subdividing' one conspiracy into seven within the same case, thus violating double
jeopardy." ECF 1-6, at 89-91. The court found that the issue was not preserved for review and,
even if it had been preserved, the claim was without merit. .Id. First, the court noted that defense
counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal at the end of the State's case but failed to renew the
motion at the end of all the evidence. Id. at 90. A motion for judgment of acquittal at.the close of
all the evi_dence in a jury trial is required by Md. Rule 4-324(a) to preserve appellate review ofa
sufficiency of the evidence claim. Id. at 89-90. Absent such a motion, the Maryland appellate
courts are precluded from entertaining such a claim. Id.
In addition to the failure to preserve the claim, Hamilton presented a different argument on
appeal than he made at trial. Id. Under Md. Rule 4-324(a) the "issue of sufficiency of the evidence
is not preserved when appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal is on a ground different than
that set forth on appeal." Id. at 90 (citing Anthony v. State ofMaryland, 699 A.2d 505, 508 (Md .
App. 1997)). The argument advanced to the trial court was that there "was no evidence of a
meeting of the minds or even any specific identification of[Hamilton's] alleged co-conspirators."

Id. at 91. On appeal, Hamilton argued double jeopardy, an argument the appellate court found was
without merit because the "State acknowledged that the conspiracies would have merged for the
purposes of sentencing had the jury convicted [Hamilton] of more than one conspiracy," but, the
court correctly noted, Hamilton was convicted of only one count of conspiracy. Id.

III.

Post-Trial Motions to Correct Illegal Sentence

14

Hamilton filed five motions to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Md. Rule 4-345(a),
all of which were denied by the trial court. ECF 16-1, at 10-14, 17-22, 24-28, 34-42. Hamilton.
appealed the denial of each cif his motions and the Appellate Court of Maryland consolidated the
appeals into one case. Hamilton v. State, No. 2343, 2018 WL 904470 (Md. App. Feb. 14, 2018);
ECF 1-6, at 36-50. The issues on appeal, as "rephrased by the State" and adopted by the.appellate
court, were as follows:

I.
Did the trial court properly sentence [Hamilton] for the crime of
conspiracy to commit first-degree assault, notwithstanding that he had been
acquitted of conspiracy to commit robbery with a deadly weapon and other
offenses?
•
2.
Should this Court decline to consider the significance of the trial court's
comment, at sentencing, that [Hamilton] would serve at least half of his
sentence, pursuant to statute?
3.
Did the trial court properly sentence appellant for conspiracy to commit,
first-degree assault, notwithstanding his assertion that he is innocent?
ECF 1-6, at 37.
In reaching the conclusion that the circuit court committed no error in denying Hamilton's
motions, the appellate court first addressed Ha~ilton's double jeopardy claim. ECF 1-6, at 43.
Hamilton claimed that he was improperly sentenced for the crime of conspiracy to commit firstdegree assault because, before the jury received the case for deliberation, the trial court acquitted
him on charges of armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, second-degree murder,
and conspiracy to commit second-degree murder. ECF 1-6, at 40. In Hamilton's view, the
indictment did not sufficiently detail what conduct amounted to assault in the first degree and the
evidence presented at trial focused on a theory of an alleged armed robbery or murder by ambush.
Id. Hamilton argued that "his con~iction of conspiracy to commit assault is a lesser included

offense of both armed robbery and second-degree murder." Id. Because he was acquitted of both

15.

armed robbery and second-degree murder, Hamilton claimed that his conviction of conspiracy to
commit first-degree assault is "an inconsistent verdict, and therefore he was sentenced improperly
in violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy" making his sentence illegal. 5 Id.
The Appellate Court of Maryland first noted that Md. Rule 4-345(a) "allows a limited
exception to the general rule of finality and permits a court to correct an illegal sentence at" any
time" but pro_vides "only a narrow exemption to the preservation requirement." ECF 1-6, at 43
(citing Chaney v. State, 918 A.2d 506, 51.0 (Md. 2007)). Specifically, an illegal sentence is
"limited to those situations in which the illegality inheres in the sentence itself, i.e., there either
has been no conviction warranting any sentence for the particular offense or the sentence is not a
permitted one for the conviction upon which it was imposed and, for either reason, is intrinsically
and substantively unlawful." Id. at 44 (quoting Chaney, 918 A.2d at 510). When the alleged
illegality is based on "any other deficiency," it may be grounds to vacate the sentence on appeal,
but it cannot be challenged through a motion pursuant to Md. Rule 4-345(a). Id. "Protections
against double jeopardy prohibit (a) successive prosecutions for the same offense, and (b) multiple
punishments for the same offense." 'Id. at 44 (citing Ingram v. State, 947 A.2d 74, 83 (Md. App.
2008)).
The appellate court reasoned that in Hamilton's case, there were no successive
prosecutions. ECF 1-6, at 43. Even if there were, the court held that while a claim of"multiple
sentences in a single prosecution is one in which the illegality inheres in the sentence itself, there
are no multiple sentences here as [Hamilton] was sentenced on one count only." Id. (citing Britton

5

While this case was pending, Hamilton successfully challenged the legality of his 25-year
sentence, but the Appellate Court of Maryland found that his sentence was illegal for a different
reason than the one argued here. See ECF 26-1. The basis of the decision is explain~d in more.
detail below.
16

v. State, 30 A.3d 236, 238 (Md. App.2011)). Thus, Hamilton's double jeopardy claim was not

properly raised in a motion to correct illegal sentence. ECF 1-6, at 45. • The appellate court went
on to note that had the claim been properly raised, it would fail on the merits. Id.
Sentences for first-degree assault will often merge into sentences for robbery
with a deadly weapon. See, e,g., Morris v. State, 192 Md. App. 1, 7-8 [993 A.2d
716, 720] ,(2010). The reverse, however, is not true. Appellant could have
committed an assault with a firearm without having the intention to take and
carry away the personal property of another. Similarly, he could have been
convicted of conspiracy to murder decedent even though he wa_s acquitted of the
murder. Conspiracy to commit murder and murder are two separate offenses.
In both instances appellant was convicted of the lessor offense. Therefore,
merger does not apply and there is no double jeopardy violation here.
Appellant appears to argue also that the division of one conspiracy into multiple
conspiracies violates dol!ble jeopardy when an individual is acquitted of all the
conspiracies except one. We addressed this issue in Hamilton v. State, No. 736,
Sept. Term 2015 (filed 2018). There, we held that because the jury convicted
appellant of only one count of conspiracy, there is nothing to merge or vacate,
and this argument is without merit. Our view is no different here.
ECF 1-6, at 46.
Hamilton's claim regarding the trial judge's comment at sentencing that Hamilton would
be required to serve 50% of his sentence prior to parole eligibility was also rejected by the appellate
court. ECF 1-6, at 47. The sentencing court referred to Md. Code Ann., Md. Code Ann., Corr.
Servs. § 7-30l(c)(l)(i), which requires any person who is convicted of a violent crime to serve
one-half of the sentence before they may be considered for parole. Id. However, conspiracy to
commit first-degree assault does not "meet the statutory requirement of a crime of violence." Id.
at n. 4, see also Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 14-l0l(a). Regardless, the erroneous statement
made by the sentencing court was not included on Hamilton's commitment order and therefore the
appellate court noted that it had no effect on Hamilton's sentence. ECF 1-6, at 47.
Lastly, the appellate court rejected Hamilton's claims implicating the merits of the
underlying conviction, i.e., that the evidence did not support a finding of guilt, because those
17

claims were not properly raised in a motion to correct illegal sentence. ECF 1-6, at 49. As with·
Hamilton's first claim, Maryland law does not permit a challenge of this sort through a motion to
correct illegal sentence as the illegality does not inhere in the sentence itself. Id.
Wli.ile this case has been pending in this Court, Hamilton successfully appealed the Circuit
Court's denial of his Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence. Hamilton v. State, No. 2343, 2018 WL
904470 (Md. App. Feb. 14, 2018); ECF 26-1, at 1-12. The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed
the circuit coµrt's denial and remanded the case for a new sentencing. ECF 26-1, at 2. The
Appellate Court found error in the trial court's response to one of the notes sent out by the jury
asking for clarification on "rules for conspiracy and degrees." Id. at 4. The trial court sent a
suminary of the instructions, which the court reassured the parties tracked the instructions provided
to the jury earlier. Id. "But," as the appellate court noted, "it tum[ed] out that the summary didn't
track the instructions the court had given orally - it tracked the pattern instruction, which
separate[d] the two modalities of first-degree assault with the disjunctive 'or,' not the conjunctive
'and. Id. (emphasis in original). The court further found that the conspiracy to commit armed
robbery charge and the conspiracy to commit first-degree assault charge were predicated, upon the
same events. Id. at 8. However, the appellate court held that it could not be discerned whether the
jury found Hamilton guilty of conspiracy to commit first-degree assault under the firearm modality
or the intent modality "because th[ e] jury was given different instructions at different times." Id.
at I 0. This mattered because a conspiracy to commit first-degree assault merges into conspiracy
to commit armed robbery if the State "relied on the 'firearm' modality to prove first-degree
assault." Id. at 9. If the State relied on the intent modality, however, the _conspiracy to commit
first-degree assault "is not a lesser-included offense of armed robbery." Id. Here, the trial court's
incorrect instruction to the jury, and the later conflicting instruction, made it unclear which

18

modality was the basis for the conviction. Id. And if the conspiracy to commit first-degree assault
merged with the ,armed robbery, Hamilton could have only been sentenced to 20 years, the
maximum sentence allowed for robbery, instead of the 25 years he received. Id. at 11-12.
Accordingly, Hamilton's sentence was vacated and he was resentenced on December 12, 2023 to
20 years in custody. See State v. Hamilton, Case No. 07-K-14-001735 (Cecil Co. Cir. Ct.),
available at http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/casesearch/ (last viewed September 16, 2024).

IV.

Motion to Strike Judgment
On August 30, 2016, Hamilton filed a "Motion to Strike Judgment Obtained by Evidence

Fabrication and Demand for Appropriate Relief' in the Circuit Court for Cecil County. ECF 161, at 100-106. Hamilton filed another similar motion on September 18, 2016. Id. at 130-38. Both
motions were denied by marginal order dated October 26, 2016. Id. at 106, 137. Hamilton alleged
in each motion that the State used fabricated evidence to convict him. ECF 16-1, at 103, 132.
Hamilton noted that the State's claim at trial was that Hamilton conspired with his son to ambush
Meran-Garcia and Meran and the State relied on a translated statement by Meran to support that
theory. Id. Specifically, the State maintained that Meran said that Hamilton returned to the porch
and began sweeping after speaking with Meran-Garcia in his car. Id. The act of Hamilton
sweeping his porch was portrayed as a "signal" to Hamilton's son to open fire. Id. 6
Hamilton procured a translation of Meran's statement to the police which Hamilton
contends differed from the testimony Meran presented at trial. In the newly-translated statement
Meran said, '-'when they finished talking [Hamilton] went back to the house, then I lost sight of

6

In closing, the State argued that after Hamilton spoke to Meran-Garcia at the car, Hamilton
"back(ed] up, pick[ed] up a broom and start[ed] sweeping [and] the next thing [Mr. Meran] knows
[is] bullets are coming from the right." ECF 1-16, at 27. The sweeping was referenced by the
state as "a signal." Id. at 28 ("The defendant checked to make sure everything was ready before
he backed up to give the signal. Bullets start flying.").
19

him, that's where the shooting started." ECF 16-1, at 147. Later during an interview in which
Detective Valle acted as a translator for Meran, Meran allegedly stated that "[t]he guy came down,
they had the conversation. Next thing you know [Hamilton] goes up, starts sweeping again." Id.
at 152. During the trial Meran testified that Hamilton went back to the house after talking with
Meran-Garcia and started sweeping, then the gunfire started. ECF 1-15, at 14.
In his motions to strike, Hamilton stated that his attempts to have Meran's statement
translated prior to and during trial were denied by both the State's Attorney's Office and the Office
of the Public Defender. ECF 16-1, at 102-103; 131-32. Because Hamilton does not speak Spanish,·
he alleges that he could only rely on the representation of what Det. Valle claimed Meran had said
during the interview for purposes of identifying any inconsistent statements. Id. at 132. After the
trial, Hamilton paid for his own translation of the interview and claims that he then determined
that "Valle misrepresented the statement of Alexander Meran in claiming that [Meran] stated
during the audio and video record~d interview that he witnessed [Hamilton] 'start sweeping again"
immediately before the shooting. Id. at I 03, 133. Hamilton also argued that the manner in which
Meran was interviewed and the representations as to what Meran said during the interview caused
false evidence to be presented at trial and denied Hamilton the right to meaningfully cross-examine
the witness. Id. at 135. •
In addition, Hamilton faults Valle for attempting to "assist the witness in exaggerating his
reasons ... for [Meran's] illegal immigration by claiming falsely ... that [Meran's] father had
government secrets, and that ICE verified the information" and that Meran was released from ICE
custody to his uncle so that he could be protected. Id. at 133. Hamilton alleges that this. "statement
[] was never made during the interview." Id. Hamilton alleges that Valle and his fellow officers
suborned perjury by promising Meran they would check on him weekly and would ensure his

20

safety, promises made to induce testimony favorable to the State at Hamilton's trial. Id. at 13334.
Although his motions were initially denied, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing
after Hamilton filed a motion for reconsideration. ECF 1-5, at 2-124. Following a hearing, the
circuit court denied Hamilton's rnotion to strike by memorandum dated April 26, 2017, because
the court was "unable to find that Defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial." ECF 16-2, at
36-40. More specifically, the court found that police and prosecutors had no "obligation to
translate the statement of a Spanish speaking witness and then provide a transcript of that statement
to the ·Defendant." Id. at 39. Plus, even if discrepancies existed between the initial interpretation
of Meran interview by Valle and Hamilton's self-financed transcript, this did not amount to
"extrinsic fraud" required to set aside the judgment. Id. The circuit court rejected the remainder
of Hamilton's arguments as well and Hamilton appealed the ruling to the Appellate Court of
Maryland. ECF 16-2, at 69, Hamilton v. State, No. 473, 2018 WL 2970775 (Md. App. June 12,
2018); ECF 1-6, at 95-104.
In affirming the lower court's ruling, the appellate court first noted that because Hamilton's
motion was filed "more than 90 days after the imposition of sentence, but before disposition of his
direct appeal," relief could only be granted if there was either "l) 'fraud,' pursuant to Maryland
Rule 4-33 l(b); or 2) 'newly discovered evidence,' pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-33 l(c)." ECF 16, at 98-99. In the appellate court's view, "Hamilton's motion fails under either ground." Id. The
type of fraud required for relief is "extrinsic fraud" which is defined as fraud that is "collateral to
the issues in the case and 'actually prevents an adversarial trial."' ECF 1-6, at 99 (quoting Pelletier
v. Burson, 73 A.3d 1180, 1184 (Md. App. 2013)). The Appellate Court of Maryland assumed
without deciding that "Deputy Valle's summary ofMeran's statements constituted a 'fraud''.' but

21

was "not persuaded that the circuit court erred in determining that said fraud was intrinsic rather
than extrinsic." Id. at 100. The court reasoned that Valle's su~mary ofMeran's statements was
not presented at trial; rather, Meran provided direct testimony implicating Hamilton. Id. Meran
was cross-examined by defense counsel regarding various inconsistent statements he made to
police. Id. at 101. As such, Meran's "credibility vis-a-vis his statements to the police was
presented to the jury." Id. 7
The appellate court further found that "Hamilton's evidence is not 'newly discovered"'
because under Maryland ·1aw, "'newly discovered' evidence must not have been discovered, or
been discoverable by the exercise of due diligence, within ten days after the jury has returned a
verdict." ECF 1-6, at IOI (citing Argyrou v. State, 709 A.2d 1194, 1200-01 (Md. 1998)). The
court then noted:
Here, the record shows that Hamilton had access to the recordings of Meran' s
statements prior to trial and could have had them transcribed then. Although
Hamilton claims that he submitted requests to the State and the Office of the
Public Defender to have the records transcribed, we are not persuaded that those
efforts constituted "due diligence." Clearly, having the recordings transcribed
by a third-party was not an impossibility, as Hamilton did just that in preparation
for his motion to strike. Hamilton has provided no explanation as to why he did
not pursue that option in time to move for a new trial pursuant to Rule 4-331 (a).
Accordingly, Hamilton has failed to meet his burden of due diligence.
•
ECF 1-6, at 101-102. The appellate court a_lso rejected the remainder of Hamilton's claims.· Id. at
102. Specifically, the circuit court's erroneous cite to Md. Rule 2-535, rather than Md. Rule 4331, both of which deal with fraud, was "inconsequential, as 'the words fraud, mistake or
irregularity mean the same thing in Rule 4-33l(b) as in Rule 2-535(b)."' Id. (quoting Minger v.

7

In his closing at trial, Hamilton's counsel stressed that Meran had "changed his story" multiple
times during his interviews with police. ECF 1-16, at 42 "It goes back to the old adage[:] [i]t's
hard to keep lies straight, particularly when you're interviewed by the police three times, and you
changed your story each time. And then you get on the stand under oath . . . and you do a
conglomeration of all four.").
22

State, 849 A.2d I 058, I 067 (Md. App. 2004)). The circuit court's limitation on Hamilton's crossexamination of a witness during the hearing on his motions to strike was not an abuse of discretion •
in light of the court's finding that "the two questions at issue [were] argumentative and more
appropriate for the argument portion of the hearing." Id. "Lastly, Hamilton's assertion that
transcripts of Meran' s interviews somehow existed prior to trial was directly refuted by the State,
which, during the hearing, stated that no such transcripts existed." Id.

V.

State Post-Conviction Proceedings
On Jamiary 17, 2017, Hamilton filed a petition for post-conviction relief, raising numerous

grounds for relief. ECF 16-2, at 11-34. On December 11, 2018, Hamilton supplemented his first
petition with a second. Id. at 298-330. The post-conviction court addressed Hamilton's claims
following a hearing that was held on January 18, 2019. ECF 1-4. The claims Hamilton raised
concerned ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and trial court error.
Hamilton's numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel alleged that trial counsel
failed to: investigate and make an appropriate motion as to agents of the prosecution recording
attorney-client phone calls held between Hamilton and his attorney when Hamilton was confined
•to the Cecil County Detention Center; investigate the pretrial statements of Meran and to have the
statements translated; renew an objection raised by a motion in limine regarding the introduction
of firearms and photographs of firearms not linked to the crime thereby failing to preserve the issue
for appeal; proffer expected testimony of witnesses Daniel Darienzo and Lt. Larry Waldridge of
Elkton Police, who Hamilton sought to call as witnesses for the defense; argue a motion for
judgment of acquittal at the close of all evidence; object to trial court's failure to rule on an
objection by Hamilton regarding questions posed by the jury; object to an inconsistent verdict of
the jury; object to the trial court's remark regarding a requirement for Hamilton to serve one-half

23

of his sentence before he was eligible for parole; object to the trial court's failure to provide an
order denying Hamilton's motion to correct his illegal sentence; consult Hamilton prior to filing
pleadings, thus depriving Hamilton of the opportunity to present an argument regarding double
jeopardy; investigate evidence of local law enforcement bias to counter the State's argument to
exclude testimony regarding Daniel Darienzo's sexual assault of Hamilton's daughter; object to
the manner in which the trial court provided jury instructions, thereby permitting the court to
withhold the written instructions and allowing the selective provision of one instruction which
allowed an invasion into the province of jury deliberations; conduct a voir dire of the jury to
determine if, after having been distracted by interpreters, they needed testimony repeated; offer

.

.

evidence provided by the State during discovery that tended to show there was a transcript of
Meran' s pretrial statement; conduct pretrial investigation into the alleged existence of a transcript
ofMeran's pretrial statement; raise all arguments in support of the motion for judgment of acquittal
including Hamilton's double jeopardy claim that the conspiracy charges were illegally subdivided,
that the jury should receive an instruction on "hot blooded response to legally adequate
provocation," and manipulation of Meran's statement by Valle; obtain an En.glish translation of
Meran's statement; investigate Meran's statements to police beyond a cursory review which
prejudiced Hamilton's ability to uncover evidence of manipulation of the statement by law
enforcement; investigate the statements of witnesses beyond the police reports; object to the trial
court's refusal to provide a self-defense/defense of others instruction; present evidence of malice
by the decedent toward Hamilton; obtain or request a trajectory expert for the shots fired into
Hamilton's home; advise Hamilton that a translator forMeran's pretrial statements had to be courtcertified; file a motion, despite promising to do so, regarding the ability io have the pretrial
statements ofMeran translated; seek further remedial action after the Office of the Public Defender

24

denied payment for a translation of Meran's statements; properly advise Hamilton to testify so
Hamilton could clarify his statements made to police and produce evidence to support selfdefense/defense of others and/or "hot-blooded response to legally adequate provocation";
introduce photographs of additional shell casings found at the scene to establish the veracity of
Hamilton's statement to the police that shots had been fired at his home and that he heard two
different calibers being fired; present evidence of the lighting conditions at the scene; present
evidence of an additional party being on the scene as evidenced from statements of Natalee
Chambers and Corporal Brian Soler; call Natalee Chambers as a witness to testify she deleted the
contents of her phone and to establish the existence of another party in the car with Jose Figueroa;
present evidence of a traffic stop involving the decedent by New Castle County Police weeks prior
to the incident which Hamilton stated was part of the motive of malice from the decedent toward
Hamilton; obtain an independent review of the medical examiner's conclusion that "pseudo
'

stippling" was seen on decedent's skin; file a moti~n regarding discovery violations; request a
formal independent translation of Meran's pretrial statement by motion filed with the trial court;
call witnesses supportive of Hamilton's innocence or to interview witnesses; provide discovery
materials to Hamilton in sufficient time before trial so Hamilton could make requests of the Office
of the Public Defender to rebut the evidence provided by the State; and to question witnesses about
the failure to test clothing items worn by Meran and Meran-Garcia for gunshot residue to establish
close range firing inside the car. ECF 1-6, at 2-7.
Hamilton also alleged ineffective assistance by appellate and post-conviction counsel. He
claimed appellate and post-conviction counsel rendered ineffective assistance by refusing to obtain
an independent translation of Meran's pretrial statements, which delayed Hamilton's ability to
present the evidence of a false translation. ECF 1-6, at 5, 7. Hamilton premised his ineffective

25

assistance of appellate counsel claim on counsel's agreement to postponements requested by the
State without Hamilton's consent and contrary to .Hamilton's stated wishes. ECF !'-6, at 7. He
claimed post-conviction counsel rendered ineffective assistance because, after conducting'a full
review ofHamilt~n's case, counsel sought a postponement and later.abandoned Hamilton's c~se,
which Hamilton alleges required ·appointment of another public defender.. Id.
at 7. Hamilton
also
.
'
alleges that his post-conviction counsel failed to review his case, advised Hamilton to discharge
counsel, and told Hamilton that the average postponement of post-conviction cases in "3-5 years."
Id. Hamilton alleges these factors forced him to proceed pro se in his post-conviction proceedings.

Id.
Hamilton also asserted claims of prosecutorial misconduct or error. He alleged that the
prosecutor provided false translations of statements during discovery and "fabricated witness
.. statements," effectively concealing exculpatory evidence disproving the existence of a conspiracy,
prejudicing the cross-examination and confrontation rights of Hamilton, and concealing evidence·
of bias by local law enforcement. ECF 1-6, at 8-9. Hamilton alleged that the prosecution erred by
'

•

noting in discovery documents that a "transcript" ofMeran's first and second interviews with
police existed, even though these interviews were only audio recorded, Id. at 7. This mislead
defense counsel and Hamilton into believing that actual transcripts ofthe·statements existed, only
to have the State then deny their existence at trial when. counsel requested them. Id. Hamilton
alleges that the prosecutor acted improperly in refusing to provide a translated and transcribed
version of the Spanish-language statements and, instead, provided only the "false translation"
. produced when Det. Valle translated Meran's statements. Id. Hamilton further claimed that State
agents and prosecutors "knowingly and intentionally intercepted and listened to, without a warrant
or court order ·to do so, the attorney client calls" between Hamilton and his counsel, and when

26

prosecutors were made aware of the issue, they did nothing to prevent it. Id. Hamilton alleged
that the Cecil County Sheriff's Office and Detective Mallery withheld evidence of additional
instances of intercepted privileged communications between Hamilton and his counsel and
prejudiced Hamilton's ability to present the issue to the court. Id. Hamilton claimed that former
State's Attorney Edward D.E. Rollins and Assistant State's Attorney Kevin Urick refused to
provide discovery materials directly to Hamilton, thereby hampering his ability to review the
material before trial and to obtain expert witnesses. Id. Hamilton further alleged that "[t]he
prosecution presented false information in pleadings before the Court in response to [Hamilton's]
motion to strike judgment." Id. Hamilton alleged that prosecutors improperly interviewed counsel
for Hank Hamilton and falsely advised Hank that Hamilton "had engaged in plea negotiations and
intended to provide testimony against him as part of negotiations which never occurred, to attempt
to elicit trial testimony against [Hamilton]." Id.
Hamilton also raised two· claims asserting trial court error. Hamilton claimed he was
denied a fair trial because ti)e court initially failed to provide the jury with written jury instructions,
only to provide them later on the sole issue of intent, and then only after the jury asked a question.
ECF 1-6, at 9. Hamilton also alleged that the trial court placed "undue emphasis on isolated
specific instructions (i.e. the intent instruction) and invaded the province of juror deliberations by
instructing the jury in a non-neutral manner to essentially disregard reasonable inferences from the
evidence." Id. Additionally, Hamilton alleged the trial court erred when it did not provide for a
remedy or a sanction after learning that the sheriff's office was recording calls between Hamilton
and his trial attorney. Id.
The post-conviction court denied relief in a Memorandum Opinion and Order dated August
12, 2019. ECF 1-6, at 2-34. Hamilton filed an application for leave to appeal the denial of post-

27

conviction relief, which was summarily denied. Hamilton v. State of Maryland, No. 1918 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. July 10, 2020), ECF 1-3, at 2-3. Hamilton's Motion for Reconside~ation of the
denial of his application for leave to appeal, id. at 4-8, was denied on July 31, 2020, ECF 3-1, at
98.

VI.

Federal Habeas Claims
Hamilton generally claims that his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendments were violated and attempts to incorporate into his federal habeas petition all claims.
raised in all State court proceedings. 8 ECF I, at 9-20. "While each § 2254 petition must contain
the overarching assertion of custody in violation of federal law, it must also contain specifically
'asserted grounds for relief,' otherwise termed as 'issues' or 'claims."' Folkes v. Nelsen, 34 F.4th
258, 267-68 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Samples v. Ballard, 860 F.3d 266, 273 (4th Cir. 2017)).
"Both AEDPA and the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts
provide that different grounds for relief are treated as different claims, Samples, 860 F.3d at 274,
and that petitioners must "state the facts supporting each ground," Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644,
655 (2005) (quoting Habeas Corpus R. 2(c))." Id. This Court will therefore only address the
claims that Hamilton has adequately stated in his § 2254 Petition and will not peruse the entire
record to address the more than fifty claims he raised in various State courts but fails to adequately
raise here. 9

8 Hamilton

states in part that he "hereby adopts and incorporates for this Court's consideration, all
arguments and issues as were presented to the trial court, motion to strike judgment court, motion
to correct illegal sentence court .. and all issues as were presented to the [Appellate Court of
Maryland] in cases Nos. 736, 2343, and 0473 .... " ECF I, at 9. He additionally purports to
incorporate all issues raised in post-conviction proceedings and in petitions for writ of certiorari
that he filed with the Maryland Court of Appeals, now the Supreme Court of Maryland. Id.
9

Even if all of Hamilton's claims were considered on their merits, he would not be entitled to
relief. This Court gives "considerable deference to the state court decision," and may not grant
28

In his Petition, Hamilton asserts the trial court erred when it: denied his request to act as
co-counsel, ECF I, at IO; allowed Meranto testify without providing the defense with a transcript
of Meran's statement to the police, id. at 11, 12; excluded evidence of bias by local law
enforcement, id.; and allowed evidence of firearms not connected with the crime to be introduced
at trial, id. at 11-12. He alleges the appellate courts erred when they: affirmed the decision to allow
firearms evidence; reworded Hamilton's issues on appeal; denied Hamilton's claim that the verdict
was inconsistent; and found that Hamilton did not exercise due diligence in obtaining an
independent translation of Meran's statement. Id. at 15-16. He claims that both the trial and
appellate courts erred when the evidence offered at the motion to strike judgment hearing was not
analyzed as a discovery violation. Id. at 16. He also claims the Office of the Public Defender
delayed pursuing a direct appeal, forcing Hamilton to proceed pro se on his direct appeal. Id. at
15. Hamilton assigns error to the post-conviction court when it: refused to consider many claims
it deemed finally litigated on appeal; permitted trial counsel to disobey a subpoena requiring h_im
to appear at the hearing with aH trial records; did not ensure other subpoenas were properly served,
resulting in key witnesses being absent from the proceedings; and relied on unpublished opinions
to support a conclusion that certain claims were finally litigated. Id. at 16-20. Hamilton also
claims the prosecution improperly and illegally subdivided a single count of conspiracy into seven
separate counts, giving the jury "multiple bites of the apple." Id. at 20.

habeas relief unless the state court arrived at a '"decision that" was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States,' or 'a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."' Nicolas v. Att 'y Gen. of Md.,
820 F.3d 124, 129 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). This Court has carefully
reviewed the record in this case and finds that Hamilton has not made such a showing.
29

Respondents assert in their Second Supplemental Response that Hamilton's claims are not
cognizable grounds for federal habeas relief, procedurally defaulted, or otherwise meritless. ECF
16, at 25-135. Hamilton's claims are addressed below.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Cognizability
A federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus may be granted only for violations of the

Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see also Wilson v. Corcoran, 562
U.S.!, 1 (2010) ("Federal courts may not issue writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners whose
confinement does not violate federal law."); Youngv. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 383 F. Supp. 986,
1009 (D. Md. 1974) C'It is axiomatic that only the violation or denial of some federal constitutional
right, and not alleged errors in the interpretation or application of state law, can be the basis for
federal habeas corpus relief."), ajf'd, 532 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1976); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.
62, 67-68 (1991) ("In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a
conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of th.e United States."). (citations omitted).

II.

Deferential Review
The federal habeas statute sets forth a highly deferential standard for evaluating state court

rulings under which state court decisions are to "be given the benefit of the doubt." Bell v. Cone,
543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005) (citations omitted); see also Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7
(1997). The standard is "difficult to meet." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 4)9-20
(2014) (state prisoner must show state court ruling_ on claim presented in federal court was "so
lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law

30

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement") (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.
86, 103 (2011)).
A federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus unless the state court's adjudication
on the merits: (I) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court;
or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court's
adjud_ication is contrary to clearly established federal law under§ 2254(d)(l) when the state court
(I) "arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question oflaw";

or (2) "confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court
precedent and arrives at a result opposite to [the Supreme Court's]." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 405 (2000) (citation omitted). "Under the 'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas
court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the
Supreme] Court's. decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's
case." Id. at 413. "For an 'application of federal law' to be 'unreasonable,' it must be 'objectively'
so." Mahdi v. Stirling, 20 F.4th 846,892 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Owens v. Stirling, 967 F.3d 396,
411 (4th Cir. 2020)). "To qualify, the state court must 'correctly identif{y] the governing legal
principle from the Supreme Court's decisions but unreasonably appl[y] that principle to the facts
of the particular case."' Id. (quoting Tyler v. Hooks, 945 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2019)).
"[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because [it] concludes in its
independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied established federal law
errnneously or incorrectly." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S 766, 773 (2010) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S.
at 411). The state court's application of federal law must be "objectively unreasonable." Id.

31

(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409). Furthermore, under § 2254(d)(2), "a state court factual
determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a
different conclusion in the first instance." Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010) (citation
omitted). The fact that "reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the finding
in question" is not enough to deem a state court's factual determination unreasonable.

Id.

-"[D]eterminations of facts are 'unreasonable' when they are "'sufficiently against the weight of
the evidence."' Mahdi, 20 F.4th at 892 (citing Williams v. Stirling, 914 F.3d 302,312 (4th Cir.
2019) (quoting Winston v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 535, 554 (4th Cir. 2010))). A "state court's factual
determinations are presumed correct, and the petitioner must rebut this presumption by dear and
convincing evidence." Bennett v. Stirling, 842 F.3d 319,322 (4th Cir. 2016).

III.

Exhaustion
A petitioner seeking habeas relief in federal court must first properly exhaust the remedies

available in state_ court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(l)(A); see also O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838,
842 (1999) ("Before a federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must
exhaust his remedies in state court."). This requirement is satisfied by seeking review of the
petitioner's claims in the highest state court with jurisdiction to consider the claim. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(c).

For a person convicted _of a criminal offense in Maryland, ·exhaustion may be

accomplished either on direct appeal or in post-conviction proceedings. To exhaust claims on
direct appeal in non-capital cases, a defendant must assert them in an appeal to the Appellate Court
of Maryland and then to the Supreme Court of Maryland by way ofa petition for a writ of certiorari.
See Md; Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 12-201, 12-301. To exhaust claims through postconviction proceedings a defendant must assert them in a petition filed in the Circuit Court where •
the inmate was convicted within 10 years of the date of sentencing. See Md. Code Ann., Crim.

32

Proc. §§ 7-101 to 7-103. After a decision on~ post-conviction petition, further review is available
through an application for leave to appeal filed with the Appellate Court of Maryland. Id. at §.7109. If the Appellate Court of Maryland denies the application, there is no further review available
and the claim is exhausted. Md .. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 12-202. If the application is
granted, but relief is denied on the merits of the claim, a petitioner must file a petition for writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court of Maryland. See Williams v. State, 438 A.2d 1301, 1304-05-(Md.
1981).

IV.

Procedural Default
"[A] federal habeas court may not review constitutional ·claims when a state court has

declined to consider their merits on the basis of an adequate and independent state procedural
rule." Burket v. Angelone, 208 F .3d 172, 183 (4th Cir. 2000).

"State courts may not avoid

deciding federal issues by invoking procedural ·rules that they do not apply evenhandedly to all
similar claims." Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 263 (1982). For a state procedural bar to be
'

adequate, it must be based on a rule that "is regularly and consistently applied by the state court."
Yeatts v. Angelone, 166 F.3d 255,260 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Johnson v. Lee, 578 U.S. 605,608
(2016) (state procedural rule is adequate to preclude ·federal habeas review if it is ''firmly
established and regularly followed"). "Whether a state procedural rule is adequate to preclude
federal review is'a question of federal law." Woodfolk v. Maynard, 857 F.3d 531, 543 (4th Cir.
2017) (citing Beardv. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 60 (2009)). A state's contemporaneous objection rule
is an adequate and independent state ground. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 85 (1977)
(holding that a federal habeas petition who failed to comply with a state's contemporaneous
objection rule must show cause for the procedural default to dbtain habeas review); Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-92 (1986) (same); Lowe v. Dovey, Civ No. SAG-20-3429, 2023 WL

33

131042, at *5 (D. Md. Jan. 9, 2023) (finding that Maryland's contemporaneous objection rule is
an independent and adequate state ground sufficient to bar federal habeas review).
When a state prisoner's habeas claim has been procedurally defaulted, a federal court may
not address the merits of the claim unless the petitioner can show both "cause for the default and
actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law." Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722,750 (1991); Breardv. Pruett, 134.F.3d 615,620 (4th Cir. 1998). "Cause" consists of
"some objective factor external to the d,efense" that "impeded cou_nsel's efforts to comply with the
State's procedural rule." Murray, 477 U.S at 488. To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must
show "not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked
to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional
dimensions." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) (emphasis in original); see also

Murray, 477 U.S. at 494. In addition, a petitioner may obtain review of procedurally defaulted
claims if the case "falls within the 'narrow class of cases ... implicating a fundamental miscarriage
of justice."' Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.298,314-15 (1995) (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S.
467,494 (1991) (alteration in original)); Coleman, 50 I U.S. at 750 (holding that procedural default
may be excused if the failure to consider the claims will result in a "fundamental miscarriage of
justice") (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 495)). Such cases are generally limited to those for which
the petitioner can show that "a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of
one who is actually innocent." Murray, 477 U.S. ·at 496. To be .credible, "a claim of actual
innocence must be based on reliable evidence not presented at trial." Calderon v. Thompson, 523
U.S. 538,559 (1998).

V.

Effective Assistance of Counsel

34

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution affords a criminal defendant the
right to "Assistance of Counsel." U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Supreme Court has stated that
"assistance which is ineffective in preserving fairness [of a trial] does not meet the constitutional
mandate." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002). A petitioner alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment must ordinarily meet the standard
established by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under this
standard, the petitioner must show both deficient performance and prejudice-that "counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment," id. at 687, and that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," id. at 694.
On the issue of deficient performance, a defendant must show "that counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Kimme/man v. Morrison, 477
U.S. 365, 375 (1986). "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential" and
not based on hindsight. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. "[A] court must indulge a strong presumption
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id.
Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant "has a right to effective representation, not a right to an
attorney who performs his duties 'mistake-free."' Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286, 300
(2017) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147 (2006)).
On the issue of prejudice, "[t]he essence of an ineffective-assistance claim is that counsel's
unprofessional errors so upset the adversarial balance between defense and prosecution that the
trial was rendered unfair and the verdict rendered suspect." Kimme/man, 477 U.S. at 374. Thus,
in order to prevail, the petitioner must show "that there exists a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at

35

375. A determination whether the attorney's performance was deficient need not be made if it is
clear that there was no prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
"The standards created by Strickland and § 2254( d) are both highly deferential, and when
the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105 (internal citations
omitted). "When§ 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable.
The questiorl is whether there is any reasonable argument tliat counsel satisfied Strickland's
deferential standard." Id.
ANALYSIS
I.

Trial Court Error

Hamilton's claim that his request to act as co-counsel was improperly denied was
addressed by the Appellate Court of Maryland when it noted that "[t]here are only 'two types of
representation constitutionally guaranteed - representation by counsel and representatio·n pro se and they are mutually exclusive."' ECF 1-6, at 73 (quoting Parren, 523 A.2d at 599). Hamilton
was not permitted to pursue both self-representation and representation by counsel under the Sixth
Amendment. Parren, 523 A. 2d at 599 ("In short, '[a] criminal defendant does not have. an
absolute right to both self-representation and the assistance of counsel."') (quoting United States
v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir.1981) (emphasis.in Haibert)). The record reflects that

Hamilton did not request to discharge trial counsel, nor did he invoke his right to represent himself
at trial. As such, the State court's analysis is without error and survives scrutiny under the
deferential standard for federal habeas corpus review.
Hamilton asserts that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of police bias when it

,

would not allow the defense to introduce evidence concerning a separate sexual assault case
involving his daughter's accusation against an Elkton police officer. ECF I, at 11. The trial court

36

granted the State's motion in limine, preventing the defense from eliciting testimony about those
accusations from Officer Daniel Darienzo, who pied guilty to sexual offenses against Hamilton's
daughter, or Lt. Larry Waldridge, who was a witness in the case against Darienzo. ECF 1-6, at
17. The trial court held that the testimony was irrelevant because the Elkton police, who employed
both officers, was not involved in the criminal investigation or prosecution of Hamilton. ECF 16, at 17; 64-65.
Hamilton next asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied a defense •
motion in limine and admitted evidence of firearms that were neither yossessed nor owned by
Hamilton and were not tied to the offense through ballistics evidence. ECF I, at 11, see also ECF
1-12 at 26-27. Although Hamilton raised this claim on direct appeal, he did not include an
allegation ofa federal Constitutional violation. Hamilton, 2018 WL 904348, at *I, *11-*12; ECF
1-6, at 53 and 63. Further, the Appellate Court of Maryland found that the claim had not been
preserved for review under Maryland's contemporaneous objection rule and, had it been preserved,
the trial court's ruling was "harmless. beyond a reasonable doubt because the court admitted
photographic evidence of all the weapons without objection" and also "ameliorated any potential
for unfair prejudice when it instructed the jury that two of the long guns ... belonged to Hank
[Hamilton]." Id. at 12, ECF 1-6, at 81-82.
Hamilton also· asserts that the trial court erred when it permitted Meran to testify at trial
without requiring the State to provide a translated transcript to the defense. ECF I, I 0-11.
Hamilton asserts that the
evidentiary ruling was improper because the Public Defender's
.
' Office
.
refused to pay for the translation, and he was denied a fair trial as a result because Sgt. Valle
created a false translation of the statement. Id. at 11. The trial court's ruling on the objection
raised by the defense was based on counsels' agreement that the defense was provided the

37

recordings of Meran's statements for approximately one-and-a-half months and that Meran's
testimony was relevant. ECF 1-15, at 4-6.
"A state court's resolution of an evidentiary question generally does not give rise to a
cognizable claim under § 2254." Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 692 (4th Cir. 2002) citing

Hutchins v. Garrison, 724 F.2d 1425, 1437 (4th Cir. 1983). Thus, Hamilton's claims regarding
the evidentiary rulings by the trial court are not cognizable unless the trial court's exclusion of the
-evidence violated a Constitutional provision or were so egregious that they rendered the entire trial
fundamentally unfair. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422,438, n. 6 (1983) (upholding Texas
evidentiary rule permitting introduction of prior conviction at the guilt determination stage). Here,
Hamilton cites no specific Constitutional provision that the trial court's rulings violated, nor did
he raise such a claim in State court. As such, these claims are _not cognizable.
Moreover, Hamilton has failed to show that the trial court's rulings on these claims were
"so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing
law beyond any possibility for fair minded disagreement." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103. Indeed,
the record reflects that the trial court considered Hamilton's arguments and provided ample
justification for its decisions. Federal habeas relief is therefore denied as to each of Hamilton's
claims of trial court error.

II.

Appellate Court Error
The Court turns next to Hamilton's claims of error by the appellate courts who reviewed

his case. Hamilton's claim regarding the firearms evidence was not preserved for the State
appellate courts to review. Hamilton, 2018 WL 904348, at *12; ECF 1-6, at 81. The Appellate
Court of Maryland rejected the claim because a contemporaneous objection was not lodged during
the trial when the evidence was introduced. Id. Thus, Hamilton's claim was rej~cted on an

38

adequate and independent state ground and as such it is procedurally defaulted and cannot be
considered. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 85. Additionally, because this claim concerns the application
of state evidentiary law and does not identify a specific constitutional right that was violated, the
claim is also not cognizable here. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see also Wilson, 562 U.S. at I.
Hamilton's claim that the appellate courts reworded the issues he raised on appeal does not
implicate a federal constitutional right and therefore is also without merit and not cognizable. Id.
Hamilton's· claim that it was error for the appellate courts to affirm an allegedly
in_consistent verdict was rejected on the basis of Maryland State law. Hamilton attempted to raise
this claim through a motion to correct illegal sentence. The motion was not the proper vehicle,
under established Maryland law, to challenge an inconsistent verdict because such a motion is
reserved for correction of a sentence in which the "'illegality inheres in the sentence itself; i.e.,
there either has been no conviction warranting any sentence for the particular offense or the
sentence is not a permitted one for the conviction upon which it was imposed."' ECF 1-6, at 44
(quoting Chaney v. State, 466,918 A.2d 506,510 (Md, 2007)). Because the defense did not raise
an objection to the alleged inconsistent verdicts, the issue was unpreserved for· appellate review.
Hamilton was not permitted to circumvent this by resorting to raising this issue in a motion to
correct illegal sentence which provides a "narrow exemption to the preservation requirement."
ECF 1-6, at 43. There is no basis for federal habeas relief on this claim.
_Hamilton's asserts error in the finding that an_ independent translation ofMeran's Spanish
language statements to the police did not constitute "newly discovered evidence" under Md. Rule
4-331(6). ECF 1-6, at 101-02. To qualify as "newly discovered evidence," the evidence "'must
not have been discovered, or beeri discoverable by the exercise of due diligence, within ten days
after the jury has returned a verdict."' Id. at 101 (quoting Argyrou, 709 A.2d at 600-01). The

39

Appellate Court of Maryland noted that the record in Hamilton's case established that he "had
access to the recordings of[Meran's] statemeqts prior to trial and could have had them transcribed
then." Id. The appellate court observed that "clearly, having the recordings transcribed by a thirdparty was not an impossibility, as Hamilton did just that in preparation for his motion to strike."
Id. The claim is based on the courts' interpretation of Maryland State law and does not implicate

a federal constitutional claim. As such, federal habeas relief is unavailable for this claim.
Hamilton asserts that the appellate courts erred when it "failed to analyze the evidence
offered at the motion to strike judgment hearing ... as one of a discovery violation .... " ECF I,
at 16. Hamilton first raised this discovery-based claim on appeal and did not present the translated
transcript to the trial court, nor did he claim a discovery violation before the trial court. ECF 1-6,
at 78 n. 8. As such, the Appellate Court of Maryland noted that the claim was "not preserved for
[its] review." Id. Moreover, Hamilton fails to allege the violation of a federal right associated
with this claim. The rncord reflects that Hamilton had access to the recording of the Meran' s
interview prior to trial and there is no argument that the State withheld it from the defense. Id.
("Defense counsel acknowledged that he had copies of the recordings for approximately a month
'

'

and a half prior-to trial and he never alleged a discovery violation."). Importantly, the appellate
court also correctly noted that defense counsel was able to effectively cross-examine Meran,
highlighting the discrepancies in his testimony for the jury, and this Court's review confirms this
finding. See ECF 1-15, at 31, 36-38.
Finally, Hamilton has not identified any Supreme Court precedent requiring the State to
'provide him with a free translated transcript of a witness's statement. The absence of Supreme
Court precedence on the matter means that "it cannot be said that the state court 'unreasonably
applied clearly established Federal law."' Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006), see also

40

White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415,419 (2016) (holding that clearly established federal law under§

2254(d)(l) only includes holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court).

Federal habeas relief must

therefore be denied on this claim.

III.

Post-Conviction Court Error
Hamilton assigns error to the post-conviction court for deeming many claims to be finally

litigated, allegedly permitting trial counsel to disobey a subpoena, not ensuring that trial subpoenas
were properly served, and relying on unpublished opinions to support its holdings. ECF I, at 1619. "A state prisoner has no federal constitutional right to post-conviction proceedings in state
court." Lawrence v. Branker, 517 F.3d 700, 717 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Lackawanna Cnty. Dist.
Att'y v. Coss, 532 U.S . .394, 402 (2001)). Therefore, "even where there is some error in state post-

conviction proceedings, a petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief because the assignment
of error .relating to those post-conviction proceedings represents an attack on a proceeding
collateral to detention and not to the detention itself." Lawrence, 517 F.3d at 717; Wright v.
Angelone, 151 F.3d 151, 159 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding no "basis for federal habeas relief" where a

petitioner argued that the state's highest court denied him equal protection when it determined in
a state collateral proceeding that he could be tried as an adult in circuit court, because the petitioner
was "not ... detained as a result of" that determination); Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366, 383
(2023) ("And, because there is no constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction
proceedings, ... a prisoner ordinarily must "bea[r] responsibility" for all attorney errors during
those proceedings[.]") (internal citations omitted); Bryant v. Maryland, 848 F.2d 492, 493 (4th
Cir. 1988) ("[C]laims of error occurring in a state post-conviction proceeding cannot serve as a
basis for federal habeas corpus relief."). An attack on a proceeding collateral to Hamilton's

41

detention, including the manner in which that proceeding is conducted, is .not cognizable in a
federal habeas corpus petition and is therefore·without merit. These claims shall be denied.
D.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Construing the Petition liberally, Hamilton claims that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to: (I) proffer expected testimony to be elicited from Elkton Police Officers Darienzo and
Waldridge, ECF I, at 11; (2) object to inconsistent verdicts, id. at 13-14; (3) allow Hamilton to
review pleadings before they were filed which compromised his double jeopardy claim, id. at IO;
(4) investigate and prevent certain evidence from being introduced such as police bias and evidence
fabrication, id. at 12, 18; and (5) object to the admission of photographs taken of firearms
recovered, id. at 11, 17. Respondents assert, and this Court agrees, that none of these claims
present a meritorious basis for federal habeas relief.
An ineffective assistance ofcounsel claim cannot be premised on counsel's failure to argue
for the admission of irrelevant evidence. Horne v. Peyton, 356 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1966) (the fact
that counsel could have done more is insufficient for reversal absent any showing of harmful
consequences). Under Strickland, there must be "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694. There is no "constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to press nonfrivolous
points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment, decides not to
present the points." Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). As noted, this Court must give
deference to the State court's findings of fact. Against this backdrop, the failure to proffer the
expected testimony of Elkton Police Officers did not prejudice Hamilton. The trial court found
that any testimony related to the abuse of Hamilton's daughter by an officer who committed the
abuse, and another who was a witness in the prosecution of his colleague- both of whom did not

42

work for the Cecil County Police Department or a_pparently play any role in Hamilton's
investigation and prosecution - was irrelevant. ECF 1-6, at 17. As such, the post-conviction court
found harmless any error in the failure of counsel to proffer expected irrelevant testimony. ECF
1-6, at 17. 10 The proffering of irrelevant testimony would not have changed the outcome;
Hamilton's claim is without merit.
Hamilton's claim regarding inconsistent verdicts relates to his assertion that the State
illegally "subdivided" one conspiracy count into seven different counts. ECF I, at 20. He claims
that his acquittal on the armed robbery count is inconsistent with the guilty finding on the count
alleging conspiracy to commit first degree assault because first degree assault is a lesser included
offense to armed robbery. ECF 1-6, at 40-41. The Appellate Court of Maryland found that the
claim regarding the conspiracy counts was not preserved for review on direct appeal, but"[ e]ven
if preserved," it noted, "[it] would find that [Hamilton's] argument fails on the merits." Hamilton,
2018 WL 904348, at *16. At trial, the "State acknowledged that the conspiracies would have
merged for the purposes of ~entencing had the jury convicted appellant of more than one
conspiracy." Id. However, Hamilton was convicted of only one count of conspiracy. Id. Further,.
Hamilton's assertion that his conviction on conspiracy to commit first-degree assault is
inconsistent with his acquittal for armed robbery is incorrect. As the Appellate Court of Maryland
observed: "Sentences for first-degree assault will often merge into sentences for robbery with a
deadly weapon. The reverse, however, is not true." Hamilton, 2018 WL 904470, at *5 (citation
'

'

10

Additionally, the post-conviction court noted that the Appellate Court of Maryland "ruled on
this issue and determined that the trial court did not err in precluding testimony of the desired
witnesses." ECF 1-6, at 17. Because the claim had been litigated on direct appeal, the claim was
deemed "finally litigated" precluding Hamilton raising it again in post-conviction proceedings.
The rule against raising claims that were previously litigated on direct appeal is an adequate and
independent state rule of law that also arguably renders this claim procedurally defaulted.
43

omitted). Hamilton "could have committed an assault with a fireann without having the intention
to take and carry away the personal property of another." Id. Because Hamilton was convicted of
the lesser included offense, merger and double jeopardy do not apply. Id. This application oflaw
to the facts of this case by the Appellate Court of Maryland is not unreasonable. Trial counsel's
failure to make this argument does not represent deficient" perfonnance and therefore does not
support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Hamilton contends that his inability to act as co-counsel violated his Sixth Amendment .
right and also appears to allege that this compromised his ability to present his. otherwise-viable
double jeopardy argument. ECF 1, at I 0. As noted, there was no meritorious double jeopardy
argument to raise, and thus his inability to effectively raise the argument is of no consequence.
Further, the Appellate Court of Maryland rejected Hamilton's claim that his rights were denied
when he was not pennitted to act as co-counsel because the two forms of representation are
mutually exclusive. ECF 1-6, at 74 (quoting Parren, 523 A.2d. at 599). Hamilton was not
pennitted to pursue both self-representation and representation by counsel under the Sixth
Amendment. As such, this claim also fails.
In connection with his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate police
bias and the alleged fabrication of evidence, Hamilton assigns error to trial counsel because the
Office of the Public Defender refused to pay for an independent translation ofMeran's interview
with police. ECF I, at 12. Hamilton alleges that the translation would have established "the
conspiracy theory advanced by the [S]tate was spun from whole cloth by the state's agents." Id.
Following his conviction, Hamilton did obtain a translation ofMeran's interview, which differed
from the extemporaneous translation by Det. Valle. Id. The difference being that Hamilton's
independently obtained translation states that Meran told police officers that, "[w]hen [Hamilton

44

and Meran-Garcia] finished talking, [Hamilton] went in the house, and when he went in the house,
I lost sight of him, and that's when the shooting started." ECF 16-1, at 325. The translation made
by Valle during the. interview of Meran summarized Meran's recollections on the moments
immediately preceding the shooting as follows: "All [Meran] knows is that he stopped there, there
was nobody in the driveway, they guy came down, they had the conversation, he goes up, and
starts sweeping again." Id. at 331. Hamilton also claims that the post-conviction court erred when
it found this claim was "finally litigated" in the proceedings held for Hamilton's Motion to Strike
because his ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not raised durin~ those proceedings. ECF
I, at 17,
Hamilton's trial counsel testified at the post-conviction hearing. ECF 1-4, at 43-231. He
explained that he shared Hamilton's concern that neither of the police officers who translated
Meran's statement were familiar with Meran's Dominican dialect which may have led to a
mistranslation of his ·statements. ECF 1-4, at 45-46. To address his concern, trial counsel
contacted a court-certified Spanish translator, Laurie Lane, who performed a cursory review of the •
transcript written in Spanish. ECF 1-4, at 46. Lane informed trial counsel that it would cost
$3,000.00 to have the interview translated. Id. Because trial counsel was a sole practitioner who
had taken Hamilton's case as a panel attorney, he could not absorb the cost of the translation and
sought to have the Office of the Public Defender pay for it. Id. The request was denied. ECF I 4, at 47.
Contrary to Hamilton's assertion that the post-conviction court failed to address this
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court actually rejected the claim after observing:
Petitioner alleges Counsel was deficient in failing to investigate the pretrial
statements of Alexander Meran and to have those statements translated. See
Petition at 9, ,r 2. As addressed by the [Appellate Court of Maryland], the trial
court did not err in allowing the testimony of Mr. Meran without his pretrial
45

statements being translated. See Hamilton v. State of Maryland, No. 736, Sept.
Tenn, 2015, 2018 WL 904348 (Md. App. Feb. 14, 2018). This Court fails now
to see how Petitioner was prejudiced by not obtaining his own translation of the
pretrial statements of the witness Mr .. Meran. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
Petitioner had every opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Meran in person at trial.
Moreover, except for the conspiracy theory spun by Petitioner that the police
were out to essentially frame him, trial counsel was not deficient in declining to
spending [sic] large sums of money ordering a separate translation of the pretrial
statements that were in Counsel's possession for a month and a half before the
trial commenced. See id. Therefore, this allegation fails the Strickland test for
ineffective assistance of counsel.
ECF 1-6, at 16. Hamilton's allegation that the post-conviction failed to analyze his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is unsupported by the record. Furthermore, this Court finds no error
in the post-conviction court's analysis. Trial counsel cross-examined Mr. Meran capably, bringing
'

to light several inconsistent statements he made in various interviews by the police. ECF 1-15, at
22-37; Hamilton, 2018 WL 2970775, at *l ("On cross-examination, defense counsel challenged
. M[e]ran with those inconsistent statements, which, presumably, had been disclosed as part of the_
summary of M[e]ran's interviews."). Given that these inconsistencies were adequately probed
through questioning, the failure to obtain a different translation ofMeran's statement to Det. Valle
did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Hamilton also asserts that he was forced to proceed pro se on direct appeal because the
Office of the Public Defender delayed his case by seeking endless extensions of time. ECF 1, at
_15. A criminal defendant does not have a federal constitutional right t_o appellate review of his
conviction. See Jones, 4_63 U.S. at 751 (no constitutional right to appeal), Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 18 (1956) ("State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts
or a right to appellate review at all."). However, where appellate review is available as a matter
of right, criminal defendants are entitled to appellate counsel. Miller v. Smith, 115 F.3d 1136,
1141 (4th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal

46

protection clauses underpin the rights afforded to indigent criminal appellants), see also United
States v. Marshall, 872 F.3d 213,217 (4th Cir. 2017) ("Significantly, the Supreme Court has never

held that defendants enjoy the right to counsel of choice on appeal."). Though he enjoyed an
appeal as a matter of right and therefore was entitled to counsel, the record before this Court
reflects that Hamilton was not denied appellate counsel. Instead, Hamilton became dissatisfied
with the length of time it took to brief the issues on appeal and made the choice to discharge his
counsel. ECF I, at 15 (noting that Hamilton believed he had a choice between continuing to be
represented by counsel or to "forego their representation[] and delays and fight for himself').
Where, as here, there is no means by which to determine whether appellate counsel's perfonnance
was defici~nt, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot be sustained. Additionally, under
the circumstances presented here, consenting to extensions of time or postponements does not
constitute deficient performance. Hamilton's perhaps understandable impatience with delays does
not mean he was denied the right to counsel when there is no evidence that counsel abandoned
Hamilton during his direct appeal.
CONCLUSION

While this case has been pending, Hamilton filed a Motion for Statu~ Update and for a
Certificate of Appealability. See ECF 27 and 28. As for the request for an update, the motion will
be denied as moot because of the issuance of this opinion. The Court also denies the motion for
of a certificate of appealability as moot as it will address the issue now.
Since Hamilton's detention arose out of State court process, this Court must detennine if a
certificate ofappealability is warranted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(l). A certificate ofappealability
may issue "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see also Buckv. Davis, 580 U.s: 100, 115 (2017). The petitioner

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" must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong," Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted), or that "the issues presented are adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further," Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). Because this
Court finds that there has been no substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a
• certificate of appealability shall be denied. See 28 U.S .C. § 2253(c)(2).
Hamilton may, however, still request that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit issue such a certificate. See Lyons v. Lee, 316 F.3d 528, 532 (4th Cir. 2003) (considering
whether to grant a certificate of appealability after the district court declined to issue one).
A separate Order follows.

Date

Brendan A. Hurson
United States District Judge

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