Courthouse News Service v. Harris et al

Filing 124

LETTER ORDER denying 120 Motion to Vacate. Signed by Judge Brendan Abell Hurson on 11/22/2024. (dass, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]

BRENDAN A. HURSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

[e-mail]

November 22, 2024
LETTER TO ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD
Re:

Courthouse News Service v. Rupp, et al.
Civil No. 22-00548-BAH

Dear Counsel:
On October 28, 2024, the parties filed a joint motion to vacate Judge Hollander’s 81-page
memorandum opinion at ECF 66, which denied Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction and
Defendants’ motion to dismiss. ECF 120. As the motion did not provide sufficient basis for doing
so, I then directed the parties submit additional briefing in support of the motion to vacate. ECF
121. The parties jointly did so. ECF 123. I find that no hearing is necessary. Loc. R. 105.6 (D.
Md. 2023). Considering the motion, ECF 120, the supplemental briefing, ECF 123, and for the
reasons set forth more fully below, the joint motion to vacate, ECF 120, is DENIED.
The parties’ positions on the motion to vacate differ, though the motion was made jointly
as a condition of settlement. See ECF 123, at 1, 7. Plaintiff argues that Judge Hollander’s
“preliminary injunction order contained several fundamental errors, culminating in the challenged
policy not being subjected to the requisite constitutional scrutiny.” Id. at 2. Now, with settlement,
Plaintiff asserts it will not have an opportunity to correct those issues through summary judgment
or trial. Id. Plaintiff admits that it is not aware of any “decisions from the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals or district courts of the Fourth Circuit that address a district court’s vacatur of its own
interlocutory orders in connection with the parties’ settlement of a case.” Id. at 3.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), a non-final order “may be revised at any time before the entry
of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.” In Valero
Terrestrial Corp. v. Paige, the Fourth Circuit held that when faced with whether to vacate its own
prior final order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) for mootness, a district court should consider
relative fault and public interest, and may otherwise grant vacatur in “exceptional circumstances.”
Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Paige, 211 F.3d 112, 121 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting U.S. Bancorp Mtge.
Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 29 (1994)). The Court is not aware of, and the
parties have not directed the Court to, any binding caselaw confronting whether or when a district
court should vacate its own non-final orders when parties have settled.
Plaintiff acknowledges that the Supreme Court has held that “‘the mere fact that the
settlement agreement provides for vacatur’ is insufficient to establish such exceptional
circumstances” in the context of final orders. ECF 123, at 3 (quoting Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 29).
Nevertheless, Plaintiff asserts that where the order at issue is non-final, these factors are not
controlling. ECF 123, at 3. Plaintiff points the Court to several cases in which a district court has

Courthouse News Service v. Rupp, et al.
Civil No.: 22-00548-BAH
November 22, 2024
Page 2
vacated its own prior decision upon settlement of the parties and argues that the balance of equities
in this case similarly warrants vacatur. ECF 123, at 3–5 (citing Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Telcordia Techs.,
Inc., 590 F. Supp. 2d 828 (E.D. Tex. 2008); Lycos, Inc. v. Blockbuster, Inc., No. C.A. 07-11469MLW, 2010 WL 5437226 (D. Mass. Dec. 23, 2010); TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc. v. Avago Techs.
Ltd., No. CV 09-1531-PHX-JAT, 2012 WL 1768084 (D. Ariz. May 17, 2012); Lineweight LLC v.
Firstspear, LLC, No. 4:18-CV-00387-JAR, 2021 WL 2402008 (E.D. Mo. June 11, 2021))).
Plaintiff argues that “[v]acating the preliminary injunction decision would not erase it from the
record or deprive the public of whatever persuasive value it might offer,” 1 and would save the
litigants and the Court resources, making vacatur in the public interest. ECF 123, at 5.
None of the cases cited by Plaintiff, however, are controlling, and all of them are patent
infringement cases, a detail which was relevant to the respective courts’ application of the
equitable factors as patent cases are particularly complex and generally require an inordinate
amount of judicial resources at the district court and appellate levels. See Cisco, 590 F. Supp. 2d
at 830–32; Lycos, 2010 WL 5437226, at *4 (“At this stage of a patent case involving complex
technology, settlement will conserve substantial judicial resources.”); TriQuint, 2012 WL
1768084, at *2; Lineweight, 2021 WL 2402008, at *2 (“This Court’s claim construction order
would be subject to modification if the litigation continued, and there has been no final
determination on the merits in this case. The Court also notes the high rate of reversal in complex
patent cases such as these.”); see also Allen-Bradley Co., LLC v. Kollmorgen Corp., 199 F.R.D.
316, 318 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (“Settlement that spares the court a Markman hearing will often save
much more in terms of judicial resources than will settlement that obviates the need for a trial or
entry of judgment in a non-patent case.”).
Defendants, while they do not argue against vacatur, point the Court to more apposite
caselaw. In Amaefule v. Exxonmobil Oil Corp., the parties settled and jointly moved for vacatur
of the court’s preliminary injunction and summary judgment rulings. 630 F. Supp. 2d 42, 42
(D.D.C. 2009). The District Court for the District of Columbia denied the motion, finding that the
parties had not “demonstrated any exceptional circumstances justifying deviating from
longstanding policy in [the D.C. Circuit] against vacatur following settlement” or argued that “the
previous rulings in this action were erroneous.” Id. at 43. Here, while Plaintiff asserts that the
preliminary injunction opinion contained errors that could have been corrected at a later stage of
the litigation, presumably after more discovery had been completed and a more fulsome record
was before the Court, Plaintiff does not argue that the decision itself contained factual or legal
errors warranting vacatur. Nor is the Court persuaded that the resulting conservation of judicial
resources upon consummation of the settlement warrants vacatur of the non-final ruling. 2 “While
1

This factor seems to contradict Plaintiff’s stated reason for seeking vacatur: to “emphasize the
limited nature of [the memorandum opinion’s] status as persuasive authority.” ECF 123, at 2.
2

Indeed, the settlement itself is not conditioned on the Court granting the joint motion for vacatur.
See ECF 123, at 5 (“[T]he parties’ agreement requires Courthouse News to file a stipulation of
dismissal with prejudice within three business days of the Court’s ruling on the joint motion to
vacate (whether or not vacatur is granted).”)

Courthouse News Service v. Rupp, et al.
Civil No.: 22-00548-BAH
November 22, 2024
Page 3
vacatur of a final order may be a greater affront to judicial integrity, the court declines to find that
the threat to judicial integrity is completely ameliorated simply because the order at issue in this
case was nonfinal.” Slone v. State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2:19-CV-00408, 2021 WL
5629042, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 30, 2021).
Plaintiff is reminded that Judge Hollander’s decision was issued based on the limited record
before Judge Hollander at the preliminary injunction stage of the litigation, which necessarily
affects its precedential value in other cases. Regardless, “[j]udicial precedents are presumptively
correct and valuable to the legal community as a whole. They are not merely the property of private
litigants and should stand unless a court concludes that the public interest would be served by a
vacatur.” Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 26–27 (quoting Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S.
Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 40 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). As Judge Hargrove put it:
Wholly aside from the monstrous obstacles which settlements like the one [the
parties] reached pose for the efficient management of trial courts’ dockets, private
parties’ attempts to undo decisions and to force courts to decide matters on different
grounds threaten to undermine the independence and unique role of the judiciary.
It is profoundly the duty of courts to declare the state of the law; perhaps this Court
erred in its interpretation or application of the law . . . , but that is a determination
properly left for the Fourth Circuit, not private agreement. Nor can parties, in the
course of litigation, bind the Court by stipulation to their particular view of the law.
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land in Prince George’s Cnty., Civ. No.
HAR-88-618, 1993 WL 524783, at *5 (D. Md. Nov. 22, 1993). Because the parties have failed to
demonstrate that vacating Judge Hollander’s memorandum opinion is warranted here, the joint
motion to vacate, ECF 120, is DENIED. The Court awaits the filing of the stipulation of dismissal
referenced by the parties.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it is an Order of the Court and shall be docketed
as such.
Sincerely,
/s/
Brendan A. Hurson
United States District Judge