Malcolm v. Kijakazi

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Brendan Abell Hurson on 1/17/2023. (heps, Deputy Clerk)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]

BRENDAN A. HURSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

[e-mail]

January 17, 2023
LETTER TO ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD
Re:

Tracey M. v. Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. 22-0967-BAH

Dear Counsel:
On April 20, 2022, Plaintiff Tracey M. (“Plaintiff”) petitioned this Court to review the
Social Security Administration’s (“SSA’s” or “Commissioner’s” or “Defendant’s”) final decision
to deny Plaintiff’s claim for Social Security benefits. ECF 1. This case was then referred to me
with the parties’ consent. See 28 U.S.C. § 636; Loc. R. 301 (D. Md. 2021). I have considered the
record in this case, ECF 8, and the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, ECFs 9 and 16. 1
I find that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2021). This Court must uphold the
decision of the SSA if it is supported by substantial evidence and if the SSA employed proper legal
standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).
Under that standard, I will DENY Plaintiff’s motion, GRANT Defendant’s motion, and AFFIRM
the Commissioner’s decision. This letter explains why.
I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed a Title II application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and a Title
XVI application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits in May 2019, alleging a
disability onset of February 2, 2018. Tr. 286–303. Plaintiff’s claims were denied initially and on
reconsideration. Tr. 154–61, 169–75. On April 9, 2021, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
held a hearing, Tr. 34–69, as well as a supplemental hearing on August 21, 2021, Tr. 70–95.
Following the hearing, on September 29, 2021, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled
within the meaning of the Social Security Act 2 during the relevant time frame. Tr. 9–33. The
Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, Tr. 1–6, so the ALJ’s decision constitutes
the final, reviewable decision of the SSA. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106–07 (2000); see also
1

The Court acknowledges Standing Order 2022-04 amending the Court’s procedures regarding
Social Security appeals to comply with the Supplemental Rules for Social Security Actions under
42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which became effective December 1, 2022. Under the Standing Order, the
nomenclature of parties’ filings has changed to “briefs” from “motions for summary judgment.”
Because the motions in this case were filed prior to the effective date of the Standing Order, the
Court will refer to them as motions for summary judgment.

2

42 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.

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20 C.F.R. § 422.210(a).
II.

THE ALJ’S DECISION

Under the Social Security Act, disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1505(a), 416.905(a). The ALJ is required to evaluate a claimant’s disability determination
using a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. “Under this
process, an ALJ evaluates, in sequence, whether the claimant: ‘(1) worked during the alleged
period of disability; (2) had a severe impairment; (3) had an impairment that met or equaled the
requirements of a listed impairment; (4) could return to her past relevant work; and (5) if not, could
perform any other work in the national economy.’” Kiser v. Saul, 821 F. App’x 211, 212 (4th Cir.
2020) (citation omitted) (quoting Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012)).
Here, at step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since February 2, 2018, the alleged onset date.” Tr. 15. At step two, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of “history of obesity; fibromyalgia; peripheral
neuropathy; plantar fasciitis; major depressive disorder; generalized anxiety disorder; and PostTraumatic Stress Disorder (‘PTSD’).” Tr. 15. The ALJ also determined that Plaintiff suffered
from the non-severe impairments of “migraine headaches, mild carpal tunnel syndrome,
degenerative disc disease (‘DDD’) of the lumbar and cervical spine, gastroesophageal reflux
disease (‘GERD’), right-side sciatica, and gluten intolerance.” Tr. 15. At step three, the ALJ
determined that Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets
or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1.” Tr. 16. Despite these impairments, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except:
occasional ramps/stairs; no ladders/ropes/scaffolds; occasional balance, stoop,
kneel, crouch or crawl; frequently handle/finger/feel bilaterally; occasional
concentrated exposure to extreme temperatures, to vibration to humidity and to
hazards such as moving machinery and unprotected heights; no production pace
work (work where duties are performed side by side with other employees where
productivity of one affects the productivity of another, such as assembly line work);
and no work with strict hourly quotas.
Tr. 20. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not able to perform past relevant work as a bar
tender (DOT 3 312.474-010) or a receptionist (DOT 237.367-038) but could perform other jobs
3

The “DOT” is shorthand for the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. The Fourth Circuit has
explained that “[t]he Dictionary of Occupational Titles, and its companion, Selected
Characteristics of Occupations Defined in the Revised Dictionary of Occupational Titles . . . , are
[SSA] resources that list occupations existing in the economy and explain some of the physical

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that existed in significant numbers in the national economy. Tr. 25–27. Therefore, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. Tr. 27.
III.

LEGAL STANDARD

As noted, the scope of this Court’s review is limited to determining whether substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s factual findings and whether the decision was reached through the
application of the correct legal standards. See Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir.
1987); see also Britt v. Saul, 860 F. App’x 256, 259 (4th Cir. 2021) (citing Mascio v. Colvin, 780
F.3d 632, 634 (4th Cir. 2015)) (“A disability determination must be affirmed so long as the agency
applied correct legal standards and the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.”).
“The findings of the [ALJ] . . . as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Substantial evidence is “evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to
support a particular conclusion.” Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966); see also
Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305
U.S. 197, 229 (1938)) (“[Substantial evidence] means—and means only—“such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”). It is “more than a mere
scintilla . . . and somewhat less than a preponderance.” Laws, 368 F.2d at 642. In conducting the
“substantial evidence” inquiry, my review is limited to whether the ALJ analyzed the relevant
evidence and sufficiently explained their findings and rationale in crediting the evidence. See, e.g.,
Sterling Smokeless Coal Co. v. Akers, 131 F.3d 438, 439–40 (4th Cir. 1997); DeLoatche v. Heckler,
715 F.2d 148, 150 (4th Cir. 1983) (“Judicial review of an administrative decision is impossible
without an adequate explanation of that decision by the [ALJ].”).
IV.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff raises one overarching argument on appeal: that the ALJ’s RFC failed to reflect
all of Plaintiff’s “substantiated limitations.” ECF 9-1, at 13–15. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that
“the ALJ’s RFC does not adequately represent all of [Plaintiff’s] physical and mental
impairments,” relying in large part on the medical opinions of Dr. Vincent Cantone, and Ms. Katie
Smith, CRNP. Id. at 14. Defendant counters that the ALJ’s opinion is supported by substantial
evidence because the ALJ “comprehensively explained” how the RFC adequately accounted for
Plaintiff’s physical and mental impairments and why the medical opinions of Dr. Capone and Ms.
Smith were unpersuasive. ECF 16-1, at 6–9.
“‘[A] proper RFC analysis’ proceeds in the following order: ‘(1) evidence, (2) logical
explanation, and (3) conclusion.’” Dowling v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 986 F.3d 377, 388 (4th
and mental requirements of those occupations. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Dictionary of Occupational
Titles (4th ed. 1991); U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Selected Characteristics of Occupations Defined in the
Revised Dictionary of Occupational Titles (1993).” Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204, 211 n.1 (4th
Cir. 2015).

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Cir. 2021) (quoting Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307, 311 (4th Cir. 2019)). “An RFC analysis
must “include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing
specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities,
observations).” Mascio, 780 F.3d at 636. In Mascio, the Fourth Circuit held that “[r]emand may
be appropriate . . . where an ALJ fails to assess a claimant’s capacity to perform relevant functions,
despite contradictory evidence in the record, or where other inadequacies in the ALJ’s analysis
frustrate meaningful review.” Id. (quoting Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2015)
(per curiam)). “While there is no requirement that each impairment correlate with the particular
restrictions in the RFC, the ALJ’s findings of Plaintiff’s limitations must be supported by
substantial evidence.” Larry J. v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. SAG-20-3252; 2021 WL
4170250, at *2 (D. Md. Sept. 14, 2021) (citing Carrier v. Astrue, No. SAG-10-3264, 2013 WL
136423, at *1 (D. Md. Jan. 9, 2013)).
Plaintiff points to numerous pieces of evidence shedding light on Plaintiff’s “complaints
of pain all over, especially in her lower back that radiates into her bilateral legs; numbness and
tingling in her hands, feet, face, jaw and legs; and migraine headaches,” as well as her “multiple
tender points in her upper back, mid back, lower back, arms and legs.” ECF 9-1, at 14. As noted,
the ALJ found Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia and peripheral neuropathy to be severe impairments, and
her migraine headaches, mild carpal tunnel syndrome, DDD of the lumbar and cervical spine,
GERD, and right-side sciatica to be non-severe impairments. Tr. 15. The ALJ added limitations
in the RFC to address these impairments, including limiting Plaintiff to sedentary work with a
number of exertional limitations. Tr. 20. Plaintiff asserts that “a more appropriate RFC is one that
limits [Plaintiff] to less than sedentary work, includes more restrictive manipulative limitations, a
sit/stand option and accounts for unscheduled breaks.” ECF 9-1, at 14. Yet, it is clear from the
opinion that the ALJ evaluated the relevant evidence in the record addressing Plaintiff’s pain,
including the same medical records Plaintiff cites in support of the argument that the ALJ should
have reached a different conclusion. For example, the ALJ expressly acknowledged that “[t]he
records show findings of multiple areas of tenderness and fatigue,” “numbness in her legs and
feet[,] and uncontrolled fibromyalgia.” Tr. 21–22. Nevertheless, the ALJ concluded, based on
other evidence in the record, that Plaintiff’s “alleged limited functioning is not supported by the
evidence.” Tr. 21. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument amounts to a request to reweigh the
evidence.
“This court does not reweigh evidence or make credibility determinations in evaluating
whether a decision is supported by substantial evidence; ‘[w]here conflicting evidence allows
reasonable minds to differ,’ we defer to the Commissioner’s decision.” Fisk v. Astrue, 476 F.
App’x 526, 527 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoiting Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005)
(per curiam)). Even if there is other evidence that may support Plaintiff’s position, I am not
permitted to reweigh the evidence or to substitute my own judgment for that of the ALJ. See Hays
v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Thus, I find that the ALJ’s analysis regarding
Plaintiff’s physical limitations is supported by substantial evidence.
Regarding her mental impairments, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s “fail[ure] to include
non-exertional limitations, including an off-task limitation, in the RFC undermines the basis for

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an ALJ’s denial.” ECF 9-1, at 15. In support of this argument, Plaintiff points the Court to the
medical source statements of Ms. Smith and Dr. Cantone, which “indicate that [Plaintiff] will be
off task more than 15 percent during an eight-hour workday and absent more than two days per
month.” Id. Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s compliance with the relevant regulations and
caselaw in evaluating these medical opinions. Rather, Plaintiff’s contention is ultimately a request
to re-weigh the evidence, so Plaintiff’s second argument fails for the same reason as the first.
Ultimately, my review of the ALJ’s decision is confined to whether substantial evidence,
in the record as it was reviewed by the ALJ, supports the decision and whether correct legal
standards were applied. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 404 (1971). Here, the ALJ
provided substantial evidence to support the conclusions in the RFC, and, thus, I must uphold it.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, ECF 9, is
DENIED and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ECF 16, is GRANTED. Pursuant to
sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the SSA’s judgment is AFFIRMED. The clerk is directed to
CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as a Memorandum Opinion.
A separate implementing Order follows.
Sincerely,
/s/
Brendan A. Hurson
United States Magistrate Judge