Fitriyaohniya v. Maryland Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services Inc

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Matthew J. Maddox on 9/25/2024. (c/m 09/25/2024 - bw5s, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
JAMOND JACKSON,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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Civil Action No. MJM-22-2444

MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC *
SAFETY & CORRECTIONAL SERVICES,
*
Defendant.
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MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Jamond Jackson filed two complaints that were consolidated into this single
action. ECF No. 4. The Court provided Jackson an opportunity to file a supplement to the
consolidated action, and then determined on a provisional basis that Jackson’s claims would
proceed solely against defendant Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services
(“DPSCS” or “Defendant”). ECF Nos. 4, 15.
DPSCS moves to dismiss the complaint or, alternatively, for summary judgment in its
favor. ECF No. 22. Jackson was advised of his opportunity to respond to the dispositive motion
and did so. ECF Nos. 24, 26. DPSCS did not file a reply. No hearing is necessary to determine
the matters pending. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2023). For the reasons stated below, DPSCS’s
motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
I.

BACKGROUND
By Order entered on May 12, 2023, the Court determined that this matter would

provisionally proceed against DPSCS on the following grounds: equal protection challenge to the

disparate treatment Jackson received in the mental health unit of Patuxent Institution (“Patuxent”)
as compared to inmates in the general population (injunctive relief only); and disability
discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101
et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. ECF No. 15.
In support of his claims, Jackson asserts that he was housed in a mental health unit at
Patuxent “against [his] will.” ECF No. 1 at 2. He was housed in a mental health unit for 15 years
but does not have a psychiatric need that justifies this placement. Id. at 4–7. While housed in the
mental health unit Jackson was unable to be assigned to prison programs and job assignments that
allow him to work and earn wages and are “equal” to those available to persons in general
population. Id. at 2. He also states that individuals housed in the mental health unit are not eligible
to participate in “school” programs. ECF No. 10 at 3. On July 1, 2022, Jackson sent letters to the
Warden and Director of Patuxent and the Case Management Department requesting transfer to
general population at Patuxent and/or eligibility for nine specific job assignments: landscaping;
assistant plumber; dog program; painting; gym/yard hazmat worker; third-shift tier/hazmat
sanitation worker to be paid $93.00 to $130.00 per month; kitchen worker; observation therapist;
and office work stocking inventory. ECF No. 1 at 3. On July 6, or July 13, 2022, a staff member
advised Jackson to advocate for his transfer out of the mental health unit in order to be eligible for
particular job programs. ECF No. 1 at 3.
On August 17, 2022, Jackson was advised that he would be discharged from the mental
health unit pending “transfer.” Id. On September 7, 2022, he was advised that, although he was
being discharged from the mental health program, he was not accepted into a job or education
program at Patuxent and would be transferred to any facility with available bed space in the state.

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Id. at 4. He was also advised that it could take from one week to one year or more for the transfer
to take place. Id.
According to DPSCS records, Jackson was housed at Patuxent from February 6, 2007,
through January 28, 2023, at which time he was transferred to Western Correctional Institution
(“WCI”). 1 ECF Nos. 22-2 at ¶¶ 3–4; 22-3 at 1; 22-4 at ¶ 2. From October 27, 2017, through May
10, 2020, while housed in the Patuxent mental health unit, Jackson was employed as a sanitation
worker. ECF No. 22-2 at ¶ 4. This position ended when Jackson was placed on administrative
segregation. Id. Jackson was again employed as a sanitation worker while in the mental health
unit from March 31, 2021, through June 8, 2021. Id. This position ended when Jackson was
placed on disciplinary segregation. Id. Jackson was employed again as a sanitation worker while
in the Patuxent mental health unit from November 9, 2021, through January 28, 2023, the date he
was transferred to WCI. Id.
Jackson has been housed in a general population unit since he arrived at WCI. ECF No.
22-4 at ¶ 2. At WCI, from February 14, 2023, through March 6, 2023, Jackson was assigned “Job
Bank” as his program. ECF No. 22-2 at 3. On March 6, 2023, Jackson was transferred to an
education program to earn his General Education Diploma (“GED”). ECF Nos. 22-2 at 3; 22-4 at
¶ 3. Individuals enrolled in this education program are not permitted to hold a job at the same time
but earn both “credits” and monetary compensation for participating in the program. ECF No. 224 at ¶¶ 3–4. As of December 11, 2023, Jackson remained enrolled in the GED program. Id. at ¶
3.

There appears to be an error in both Defendant’s memorandum and the declaration of Kristian
Donnelly stating that Jackson was transferred to WCI on January 8, 2023. ECF Nos. 22-1 at 2; 22-2 at ¶ 4.
The Declaration of Jason Clise and Jackson’s Traffic History reflect the transfer occurred on January 28,
2023. ECF Nos. 22-3 at 1; 22-4 at 1.

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Jackson, in his response to Defendant’s motion, states that he was discriminated against
due to his race while housed in the mental health unit at Patuxent. ECF No. 26. He states that he
was unable to work in the kitchen or food service, could not attend school to complete his
education, could not go to “night gym” or the “yard,” could not work in the “shops,” or be assigned
a hazmat sanitation job. Id. at 1. Jackson does not dispute that he received a job assignment in
sanitation while at Patuxent. Though he does not make this claim in his initial complaint, in his
motion response, he claims that his transfer to WCI was racially motivated and complains about
conditions at WCI following his transfer. Id. at 2. 2
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
DPSCS asserts that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the alternative, that summary judgment should be granted
pursuant to Rule 56. ECF No. 22. A motion to dismiss styled in the alternative as a motion for
summary judgment implicates the court’s discretion under Rule 12(d). See Kensington Vol. Fire
Dept., Inc. v. Montgomery Cnty., 788 F. Supp. 2d 431, 436–37 (D. Md. 2011), aff’d, 684 F.3d 462
(4th Cir. 2012). Conversion of a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment under Rule 12(d)
is permissible where the plaintiff has “actual notice” that the motion may be disposed of as one for
summary judgment. See Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260–61 (4th Cir.
1998). When a movant expressly captions its motion to dismiss “in the alternative” as one for
summary judgment and submits matters outside the pleadings for the court’s consideration, the

Jackson’s WCI-related claims were previously dismissed. See ECF No. 15. Further, because
Jackson did not assert any claim of race discrimination in his Complaint or Supplement, the Court does not
recognize any claim of race discrimination in this action. “It is axiomatic that the complaint may not be
amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.” McDonald v. LG Elecs. USA, Inc., 219 F.
Supp. 3d 533, 541 (D. Md. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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parties are deemed to be on notice that conversion under Rule 12(d) may occur; the court “does
not have an obligation to notify parties of the obvious.” Id. at 261.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead enough factual
allegations “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint need not include “detailed
factual allegations,” but it must set forth “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” a
cognizable cause of action, “even if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . .
recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Furthermore, federal pleading rules “do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for
imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” Johnson v. City of Shelby,
574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (per curiam). However, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of
his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action’s elements will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (cleaned up).
And though district courts have a duty to construe pleadings by self-represented parties liberally,
even a pro se plaintiff must allege facts that state a cause of action. See Beaudett v. City of
Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir.1985) (duty to construe liberally does not require courts
to conjure up questions never squarely presented). Liberal construction does not mean that a court
can “ignore an obvious failure to allege facts setting forth a plausible claim for relief.” Sheehan
v. Saoud, 650 F. App’x 143, 152 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Weller v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 901 F.2d
387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990)).

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Rule 56 provides that summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute is genuine if ‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.’” Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012)). “A fact is
material if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’” Id. (quoting Henry
v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 548 (4th Cir. 2011)). Accordingly, “the mere existence of some alleged
factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment . . . .” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). “[I]n
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, ‘[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 651 (2014)
(per curiam) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255) (second alteration in original). At the same time,
the court must “prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.”
Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 526 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Drewitt
v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir. 1993)).
A defendant may also move to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
DPSCS asserts in its motion that there are no material facts in dispute, it is entitled to
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, and Jackson has failed to state a claim for relief. ECF
No. 22. The motion attaches exhibits that relate to each of Jackson’s pending claims. ECF Nos.
22-2, 22-3, 22-4. In response, Jackson does not argue, nor does it appear to the Court, that he
requires discovery to oppose the motion effectively. The motion will be construed as one for
summary judgment where appropriate.

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III.

DISCUSSION
A. Immunity From the Fourteenth Amendment Claim
Jackson asserts an equal protection claim based on the treatment he received in the mental

health unit at Patuxent. While housed in the mental health unit Jackson alleges that he was unable
to be assigned to prison programs and job assignments that allow him to work and earn wages and
are “equal” to those available to persons in general population. ECF No. 1 at 2. He also alleges
that individuals housed in the mental health unit are not eligible to participate in “school”
programs. ECF No. 10 at 3.
Defendant argues that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not abrogate the State’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity. ECF No. 22-1 at 8. Defendant argues that the Eleventh Amendment bars any suit in
federal court, absent consent, by its own citizens. Id. at 9. Further, it is well-established that the
Eleventh Amendment bars federal court actions against agencies and departments of the state,
alongside the state itself. Id.
The Eleventh Amendment “limits the Article III jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear
cases against States and state officers acting in their official capacities.” Kitchen v. Upshaw, 286
F.3d 179, 183–84 (4th Cir. 2002); see also Lawson v. Union Cnty. Clerk of Ct., 828 F.3d 239, 250
(4th Cir. 2016) (states and state agencies alike are protected from federal suit by the Eleventh
Amendment) (citations omitted). Under the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, “an
unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as
by citizens of another State.” Amison v. George Mason Univ., No. 23-1042, 2023 WL 8946774,
at *2 (4th Cir. Dec. 28, 2023) (per curiam) (quoting P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf &
Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993)). “While the State of Maryland has waived its sovereign
immunity for certain types of cases brought in State courts, see Md. Code, Ann., State Gov’t, §§

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12-101, et seq., it has not waived its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal
court.” Dixon v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, 345 F. Supp. 2d 512, 513 (D. Md. 2003), aff’d, 88
F. App’x 610 (4th Cir. 2004). 3
Here, DPSCS is a department or agency of the State of Maryland. Md. Code Ann., Corr.
Servs. § 2-101; see Clark v. Md. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 316 F. App’x 279, 282 (4th
Cir. 2009) (“[T]he Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services is
undoubtedly an arm of the state.”); Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. Doe, 439 Md. 201, 207
n.2 (2014) (stating that DPSCS is “an agency of the State”). Therefore, DPSCS has sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
the claim. Pevia v. Hogan, 443 F. Supp. 3d 612, 631 (D. Md. 2020) (“The Fourth Circuit has
recognized that the defense of sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional bar, stating that sovereign
immunity deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to hear claims, and a court finding that a party is
entitled to sovereign immunity must dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”)
(quoting Cunningham v. Gen. Dynamics Info. Tech., Inc., 888 F.3d 640, 649 (4th Cir. 2018))

The Court notes that, under the Ex parte Young doctrine, a private individual may bring suit against
state officials for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief “designed to remedy ongoing violations of
federal law.” Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275, 292 (4th Cir. 2001); Daryl Bowling v. Department
of Public Safety and Correctional Services, et al., No. 1:23-CV-01785-JRR, 2024 WL 4056636, at *3 (D.
Md. Sept. 5, 2024). “Under the Ex parte Young doctrine, ‘a federal court has jurisdiction over a suit against
a state officer to enjoin official actions that violate federal law, even if the State itself is immune from suit
under the Eleventh Amendment.’” Bowling, 2024 WL 4056636, at *4 (quoting Idaho v. Coeur D’Alene
Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 288 (1997)).
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However, this doctrine “only allows suit for injunctive or declaratory relief against individual
officers or officials of a state or local government, not against a state or state agencies.” Libertarian Party
of Virginia v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, No. 1:10-CV-615 LMB/TCB, 2010 WL 3732012, at *5 (E.D.
Va. Sept. 16, 2010), aff’d sub nom. Libertarian Party of Virginia v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 434 F. App’x
174 (4th Cir. 2011). Because the remaining claims in the instant suit are solely against DPSCS and not any
individual state official, Ex parte Young does not apply. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14
(1985); (“Unless a State has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity or Congress has overridden it, . . .
a State cannot be sued directly in its own name regardless of the relief sought. . . . Thus, implementation of
state policy or custom may be reached in federal court only because official-capacity actions for prospective
relief are not treated as actions against the State.”) (citations omitted).

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(internal quotations omitted), see Bowling, 2024 WL 4056636, at *4 (dismissing claim against
DPSCS because DPSCS was entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and,
therefore, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction).
Accordingly, Jackson’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim will be dismissed.
B. ADA and Rehabilitation Act
Jackson’s ADA and RA claims arise from the same facts as his equal protection claim. He
alleges that while housed in the mental health unit, he was unable to be assigned to prison programs
and job assignments that allow him to work and earn wages and are “equal” to those available to
persons in general population. ECF No. 1 at 2. He also alleges that individuals housed in the
mental health unit are not eligible to participate in “school” programs. ECF No. 10 at 3.
Defendant asserts that Jackson fails to state a claim for a violation of the ADA or Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act because Jackson fails to allege that he was subject to intentional
discrimination, disparate treatment, or disparate impact, or that Defendant failed to make a
reasonable accommodation. ECF No. 22-1 at 11.
To seek recovery for violation of either the ADA or the RA, a plaintiff “must allege that
(1) she has a disability[4], (2) she is otherwise qualified to receive the benefits of a public service,
program, or activity, and (3) she was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of such
service, program, or activity, or otherwise discriminated against, on the basis of her disability.”

The ADA provides that an individual is “regarded as having” a qualifying impairment “if the
individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because
of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived
to limit a major life activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (emphasis added). When a plaintiff claims they
are “regarded-as” having a disability, “the perception of the employer becomes the relevant inquiry for the
court.” Chamberlain v. Securian Fin. Grp., Inc., 180 F. Supp. 3d 381, 399 (W.D.N.C. 2016); see also
Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 784 F.3d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 2015) (“where an employee relies on a
‘regarded as’ disabled theory, we focus ‘on the reactions and perceptions of the employer’s
decisionmakers’”) (citation omitted).
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Cartagena v. Lovell, 103 F.4th 171, 184 (4th Cir. 2024) (citing Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors
of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 498 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132); see also
29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
As stated above, Defendant does not contest the facts presented by Jackson, that individuals
in the mental health housing unit were denied access to certain jobs and educational programs, nor
does it offer any rationale or justification for the denial of access to these programs. Defendant’s
assertion that Jackson’s sanitation job at Patuxent disproves discrimination at that facility is
insufficient to overcome Jackson’s allegation that he was categorically denied access to certain job
and education programs because he was housed in a mental health unit.
Defendant next argues that Plaintiff fails to overcome Defendant’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity to suit under the ADA and RA “because none of the complained-of conduct violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.” ECF No. 22-1 at 10. Where a state has not consented to suit, Eleventh
Amendment immunity may only be abrogated by a clear legislative statement (1) indicating
Congress’s intent to abrogate the immunity and (2) made pursuant to a valid exercise of its power.
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55–56 (1996) (citations omitted). In United States
v. Georgia, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that Congress intended to permit disabled inmates
to bring claims against states for money damages through Title II of the ADA, so long as the state’s
conduct was unconstitutional. 546 U.S. 151, 158–59 (2006). Disabled inmates may also sue for
money damages through Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See Andrews v. Md. Dep’t of Pub.
Safety & Corr. Servs., Civ. No. JMC-23-00172, 2024 WL 520038, at *8 (D. Md. Feb. 9, 2024)
(noting that remedies for Section 504 violations expressly mirror those for Title II violations)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12133).

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Jackson has adequately stated a claim under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act based on
conduct that plausibly violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To
state a claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause in the prison context, a plaintiff must
allege that the disparate treatment they received was not reasonably related to any legitimate
penological interests. Fauconier v. Clarke, 966 F.3d 265, 277 (4th Cir. 2020). Here, Jackson
adequately alleged disparate treatment. He alleges that when he was housed in the mental health
unit, he was unable to be assigned to prison programs and job assignments that allow him to work
and earn wages and are “equal” to those available to persons in general population, ECF No. 1 at
2, and that individuals housed in the mental health unit are not eligible to participate in “school”
programs, ECF No. 10 at 3. Defendant does not contest the foregoing facts presented by Jackson,
nor does it offer any rationale or justification for the denial of access to these programs. Therefore,
Jackson has plausibly alleged a violation of the Equal Protection Clause and has adequately stated
a claim under the ADA and RA based on that violation. 5
Jackson’s Complaint adequately stated a claim for violation of the ADA and RA and
Defendants do not present any evidence entitling them to judgment as a matter of law. For these
reasons, Defendants motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment will be denied
as to the ADA and RA claim.
C. Injunctive Relief

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Even though Jackson’s Fourteenth Amendment claim will be dismissed, as explained
supra, that dismissal is based solely on Defendant’s sovereign immunity—not based on any failure
by Jackson to plead a plausible equal protection violation. Jackson’s ADA claim is not subject to
dismissal because Congress has abrogated sovereign immunity for ADA violations that also
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006)
(“insofar as Title II [of the ADA] creates a private cause of action for damages against the States
for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state
sovereign immunity”).
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DPSCS asserts that Jackson’s request for injunctive relief on his Fourteenth Amendment
claim is moot and argues that he is not entitled to a preliminary injunction. ECF No. 22-1 at 6–8.
The Court notes that, contrary to DPSCS’s assertion, Jackson has not requested a preliminary
injunction. The Court declines to rule on Jackson’s request for injunctive relief at this juncture,
while his ADA claim is still pending.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, DPSCS’s motion is granted in part and denied in part. Jackson’s

Equal Protection claim against DPSCS must be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. However, Jackson’s disability discrimination claim in violation of the ADA
and the Rehabilitation Act may proceed.
A separate Order follows.
_9/25/24 ___
Date

_________/S/____________________
Matthew J. Maddox
United States District Judge

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