Glenn v. Union, ILA Local Union 333 et al

Filing 63

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge A. David Copperthite on 11/25/2024. (bw5s, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
RENWICK A. GLENN,

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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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Civil Action No. ADC-23-03204
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UNION, ILA LOCAL UNION 333, et al., *
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Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendants Marine Terminals Corporation – East (“MTCE”) and Steamship Trade
Association of Baltimore, Inc. (“STA”), move this Court for Summary Judgment pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). ECF No. 57; ECF No. 58. Plaintiff has responded
in opposition, ECF No. 60, and Defendants have further filed replies. ECF Nos. 61 and 62.
After considering the motion and the responses thereto, the Court finds that no hearing is
necessary.1 Loc.R. 105.6 (D.Md. 2021). For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ Motions
are GRANTED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is an African American male, aged 62, who resides in Baltimore, Maryland.
ECF No. 22 at ¶¶ 21, 63, 97. Plaintiff claims he is employed by Ports America Chesapeake,

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On November 27, 2023, this case was assigned to United States Magistrate Judge A. David
Copperthite for all proceedings in accordance with Standing Order 2019-07. ECF No. 3. All parties
voluntarily consented in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). ECF No. 15.

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LLC (“Ports America Chesapeake”) and the Steamship Trade Association of Baltimore,
Inc. (“Steamship Trade Association”). Id. at ¶ 25.
Ports of America Chesapeake is “a large terminal operator and stevedore operating
throughout the United States, which includes loading and unloading cargo from ships and
other operational activities.” ECF No. 22 at ¶ 27. Plaintiff asserts that “Ports of America
Chesapeake, LLC” is a d/b/a for named Defendant “Marine Terminal Corporation – East.”
See ECF No. 22. The Steamship Trade Association is “a multi-employer association
representing employers in the Port of Baltimore,” which “provides labor management
relations, payroll processing, and work hours database management for those employed in
the maritime trade industry.” Id. at ¶¶ 23, 28. Plaintiff is also a member of Local 333, a
union, which operates as an affiliate of the International Longshoreman’s Association
(ILA). Id. at ¶ 22. The ILA is a labor union that represents longshoreman, clerks, checkers,
and maintenance employees working on ships and terminals in ports on the East and Gulf
coasts of the United States. Id. at ¶ 29. The relationship between the Steamship Trade
Association and Local 333 is governed by a collective bargaining agreement. Id. ¶ 23.
Plaintiff asserts that while employed by Defendants, he completed and passed a
simulated crane training program on or about February 2, 2007; on or about August 20,
2010; and on or about January 20, 2012. Id. at ¶¶ 66–68. He believes that he was required
by Defendants to retake the program a second and third time “to prevent [him] from getting
practical crane training on the pier and ship.” Id. at ¶ 66. Plaintiff claims he was ultimately
never given the opportunity to become a “Certified Crane Operator” despite having
completed and passed the required test. Id. at ¶ 69. However, he contends that three White
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males, and one African American male, all younger than himself, “completed an
application for Crane Operator Trainee and received a promotion to Crane Operator
Trainee over Plaintiff despite having less seniority.” Id. at ¶ 70.
While the Amended Complaint provides few details, Plaintiff also asserts that on
September 14, 2018, internal union charges were brought against him after he filed a charge
of discrimination with the EEOC. Id. at ¶¶ 72–73. That same day, Plaintiff was suspended
from membership in the ILA for a period of one year. Id. at ¶ 74. Plaintiff contends that
when he inquired as to why he was not promoted, his supervisor stated that it was because
Plaintiff had filed complaints with the EEOC. Id. at ¶ 75. In addition to these alleged acts
of adverse treatment and retaliation, Plaintiff further claims that Defendants suspended him
“in an act of retaliation” on several different instances spanning fifteen years. ECF No. 60
at 5.
Procedural Background
On November 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff filed
an Amended Complaint on January 16, 2024, alleging that all Defendants discriminated
against him on the basis of race, in violation of Title VII (Count I) and on the basis of age,
in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) (Count II). ECF No.
22. Plaintiff further alleged that all Defendants retaliated against him in violation of Title
VII (Count III) and discriminated against him in violation of § 1981 (Count IV). Id. In the
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff also removed “Ports of America Chesapeake,” as a
defendant and added “Marine Terminal Corporation – East (d/b/a Ports America

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Chesapeake, LLC).” Id. Plaintiff also changed the name of “Steamship Trade Association”
to “Steamship Trade Association of Baltimore, Inc.” ECF No. 22.
On January 22, 2024, Defendant Local 333 filed a Motion to Dismiss for
Insufficiency of Service and Failure to State a Claim, or in the alternative, a Motion for
Summary Judgment. ECF No. 29. Also on January 22, 2024, Defendants Steamship Trade
Association and Marine Terminal Corporation filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
State a Claim.2 ECF No. 30. On February 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition
to Steamship Trade Association and Marine Terminal Corporation’s Motion, and those
Defendants replied on February 14, 2024. ECF Nos. 36, 37. Plaintiff did not respond to
Defendant Local 333’s Motion. See ECF No. 29.
This Court issued a Memorandum Opinion on February 26, 2024, to address these
Motions. ECF No. 38. Specifically, this Court granted Defendant Local 333’s Motion to
Dismiss. Furthermore, this Court granted Defendants Steamship Trade Association and
Marine Terminal Corporation – East’s Motion to Dismiss as to Counts I, II, and IV, but
denied the Motion as to Count III. Id. at 17. On September 20, 2024, Defendants Steamship

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The Motion was also filed on behalf of Ports America Chesapeake, LLC, because the
Defendants were “uncertain from Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint if Marine Terminal
Corporation East has replaced Ports America Chesapeake, LLC, as a Defendant.” Defendants
further contend that the correct d/b/a for Marine Terminal Corporation East is “Ports America,”
and not “Ports America Chesapeake, LLC.” ECF No. 30 at n.1.
It is clear to the Court that, in its Amended Complaint, Plaintiff did remove Ports of America
Chesapeake as a defendant and add Marine Terminal Corporation – East as an additional
defendant, regardless of whether Plaintiff correctly listed the d/b/a of Marine Terminal
Corporation. See ECF No. 22. Therefore, Ports of America Chesapeake is not a separate party to
this suit, and the Court only addressed Defendants’ arguments as they related to the Steamship
Trade Association and the Marine Terminal Corporation.

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Trade Association and Marine Terminal Corporation filed separate Motions for Summary
Judgment with this Court. ECF Nos. 57; 58.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
Pursuant to Rule 56, a movant is entitled to summary judgment where the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). See
English v. Clarke, 90 F.4th, 636, 645 (4th Cir. 2023) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48
(1986) (“[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not
defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is
that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” (emphasis in original). An issue of fact is
material if, under the substantive law of the case, resolution of the factual dispute could
affect the outcome. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. There is a genuine issue of material fact “if
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Id.; see Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012). On the
other hand, if after the Court has drawn all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party and “the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary
judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (citations omitted); see also
McMichael v. James Island Charter School, 840 Fed.Appx. 723, 726 (4th Cir. 2020).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing either
that no genuine issue of material fact exists or that a material fact essential to the non5

movant’s claim is absent. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322–24. Once the movant has met its
burden, the onus is on the non-movant to establish that there is a genuine issue of material
fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In order
to meet this burden, the non-movant “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of
[its] pleadings,” but must instead “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.” Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir.
2003) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).
Analysis
Retaliation in Violation of Title VII (Count III)
A Title VII retaliation claim can be proven “through direct evidence of retaliatory
animus or via the application of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.”
Roberts v. Glenn Inds. Grp., Inc., 998 F.3d 111, 122 (4th Cir. 2021). Under the McDonnell
Douglas framework, a Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation by
proving “‘(1) that she engaged in a protected activity,’ as well as ‘(2) that her employer
took an adverse employment action against her,’ and ‘(3) that there was a causal link
between the two events.’” Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 281 (4th
Cir. 2015) (en banc) (quoting EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 405-06 (4th
Cir. 2005)). After this showing is made, “the burden shifts to the employer to show that it
took adverse action for a legitimate non-retaliatory reason.” Roberts, 998 F.3d at 122. If
the employer makes this showing, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to “rebut the
employer's evidence by demonstrating the employer's purported non-retaliatory reasons
were pretext for discrimination.” Id.
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I.

Defendant Marine Terminal Corporation East’s Motion for Summary Judgment
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant Marine Terminal Corporation –

East argues that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact concerning Plaintiff’s
retaliation claims and that it is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ECF No.
57 at 1. Specifically, Defendant MTCE references Plaintiff’s deposition, where Plaintiff
claims he worked for MTCE on a single occasion in the past several years, ECF No. 57-3,
and Plaintiff’s answers to interrogatories, where he claims he is not an employee of MTCE.
ECF No. 59 at 6. MTCE further stresses that Plaintiff never filed a charge with the EEOC
against MTCE. ECF No. 57-1 at 4. Lastly, MTCE argues that it does not do business as
Ports of America Chesapeake and that they are separate companies. Id. at 5-6.
Applying the relevant legal framework to the facts at hand, it’s clear that MTCE is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiff’s retaliation claims. MTCE correctly
points out that Plaintiff never filed an EEOC complaint against MTCE directly. ECF No.
57-1 at 4. While Plaintiff claims that MTCE does business as Ports of America Chesapeake,
and that he filed EEOC complaints against this entity, MTCE disputes this characterization,
and puts forward evidence that the two organizations represent separate business entities.
Id. at 5. MTCE has provided additional evidence to show that it did not serve as Plaintiff’s
employer during the events in question, including Plaintiff’s own testimony. Id. at 1-3.
Plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient evidence to show MTCE exercised the level of
control over Plaintiff’s work to qualify as an employer under the law. See, e.g., Butler v.
Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., 793 F.3d 404, 413 (4th Cir. 2015). On this basis, the Motion is
GRANTED.
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Assuming Plaintiff could show that MTCE served as his employer, and that he
exhausted his administrative remedies as it relates to MTCE, his retaliation claims against
MTCE would still fail. As an initial matter, Plaintiff offers no direct evidence of retaliation
on the part of MTCE. Turning to the McDonnell Douglas framework, Plaintiff cannot show
that MTCE took a retaliatory action against him, admits as much in his own responses to
Defendant’s interrogatories, ECF No. 59 at 4, and thus fails element two of the relevant
analysis here. ECF No. 59 at 4. As Defendant stresses in its memorandum, Plaintiff
explicitly stated in his deposition that he suffered no retaliatory conduct at the hands of
MTCE. Id. In his Response, Plaintiff focuses squarely on Defendant STA’s Motion, and
does not address the evidence presented by MTCE directly. ECF No. 60.
In sum, even if Plaintiff could show that MTCE was his employer during the time
in question and that Plaintiff timely filed an EEOC complaint against MTCE, which he has
not, a reasonable jury could not conclude that MTCE unlawfully retaliated against Plaintiff,
and no genuine dispute as to a material fact exists as it relates to this Count against MTCE.
Accordingly, Defendant MTCE’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
II.

Defendant Steamship Trade Association of Baltimore, Inc.’s Motion for
Summary Judgment
Defendant STA similarly requests this Court grant summary judgment in its favor

as to Plaintiff’s Count III. ECF No. 58. Specifically, STA claims that it never employed
Plaintiff, that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies against STA, and that,
even if this Court disregards STA’s other arguments, it did not retaliate against Plaintiff,

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as its denial of Plaintiff’s training request was the result of a widely implemented policy.
ECF No. 58-1.
A. STA’s Alleged Status as an Employer
As a preliminary matter, STA argues that it does not qualify as a joint employer of
Plaintiff. ECF No. 58-1. Specifically, STA acknowledges that it tracks union-represented
worker hours and wages “so that various Taft-Hartley Funds providing fringe benefits to
labor . . . can determine an individual’s qualifications.” ECF No. 62 at 2. However, STA
argues that fund trustees make these decisions as to benefits, not STA itself. Id. STA also
acknowledges that it has computer records of Local 333 members’ skills “so that Local 333
dispatchers’ computers can match job opportunities to labor.” Id. at 3. STA further admits
that it publishes “the port employers’ work orders on its website and to Local 333.” Id.
Still, STA argues that these tasks represent “ministerial functions” as opposed to control
over the means, methods, or functions of the Plaintiff’s work. Id.
Plaintiff disputes this notion, relying on much of the same evidence. ECF No. 60 at
7-8. In Plaintiff’s view, STA’s maintenance of employment records, provision of training,
together with its ability to discipline workers like Plaintiff, all amount to control over the
Plaintiff’s work in a way that aligns with that of an employer. Id. at 8. Given the facts
presented, taken together with the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Butler, STA appears to
exercise some ministerial control over Plaintiff’s work which could arguably be seen as
that of an employer. It is a close call. Assuming Plaintiff presented sufficient facts as to
STA’s status as a joint-employer, which this Court has great reservations about, Plaintiff’s
retaliation claims against STA ultimately fail due to the deficiencies discussed below.
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B. Exhaustion
Turning to the issue of exhaustion, STA argues that Plaintiff’s claims concerning
suspensions as retaliations are time-barred. ECF No. 58-1 at 5. Specifically, STA claims
that each of Plaintiff’s EEOC complaints as to retaliatory suspensions fall outside of the
300-day window that an individual must submit their complaint. Id. This is not a close call,
and the Court here agrees with STA.
An individual alleging discrimination in violation of Title VII must file an
administrative charge with the EEOC within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). If a charge filed with the
Commission is dismissed by the Commission…the person aggrieved is given ninety days
after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
In other words, before a Plaintiff has standing to file suit under Title VII, he must exhaust
his administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC. Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md. Inc.,
288 F.3d 124, 131 (4th Cir. 2002); See Smith v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 247
(4th Cir. 2000). The EEOC charge defines the scope of the plaintiff’s right to institute a
civil suit. Id.
In calculating within what time period an EEOC charge must be filed, “[e]ach
discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act. The
charge, therefore, must be filed within the 180– or 300–day time period after the discrete
discriminatory act occurred.” National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113
(2002) (holding that a failure to promote and other retaliatory adverse employment
decisions are “discrete acts which constitute “separate actionable ‘unlawful employment
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practices’”). Further, “[a] discrete retaliatory or discriminatory act ‘occurred’ on the day
that it ‘happened.’ Id. at 110.
As STA explains in their memorandum, any of Plaintiff’s charges related to
suspensions as retaliation, arising from incidents in 2006, 2010, 2018, and 2021, were
brought well past the 300-day mandatory filing period. ECF No. 58-1 at 16-17. Therefore,
by filing his charges after 300 days, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s retaliation claims as to his suspensions fail.
C. Retaliation and Training
Here, Plaintiff cannot show direct evidence of discrimination on the part of STA at
this stage. See also Ortiz v. Baltimore Police Dep’t, 2024 WL 4287999, at *4 (D.Md Sept.
25, 2024) (“Hearsay cannot be considered in the summary judgment context.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff argues that he has established a prima facie case of discrimination
via the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. ECF No. 60-1 at 8. Specifically,
Plaintiff argues that he was “continuously and consistently denied crane training, despite
passing multiple simulated tests on February 2, 2007, August 20, 2010, and January 2012,
as well as one test identified by STA as the actual crane test on June 6, 2017.” Id. at 11.
Plaintiff contends that these and other actions on the part of STA “demonstrate a clear
pattern of retaliation.” Id.
In their Motion, where it concerns Plaintiff’s claims as to training, STA argues that
Plaintiff’s arguments fail to satisfy the second element of the McDonnell Douglas test. ECF
No. 58-1 at 16. As to the second element at issue, STA claims that Plaintiff cannot show
that it acted adversely to him, as it “is uncontested that the STA does not select crane
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training candidates.” Id. at 18. Instead, STA claims that, per the Local 333 Agreement
Memorandum of Settlement dated March 25, 2015, the “employers and the Local 333
Union make that decision.” Id. at 18.
STA claims that, consistent with this agreement, the parties prioritized “applicants
who never received crane training over applicants who declined, failed, or quit crane, RTG,
and Toploader training.” Id. In sum, Defendant claims that “STA did not make this decision
and did not retaliate against Plaintiff.” Id. at 19. Furthermore, STA argues that it trained
the Plaintiff “in the Toploader and RTG at approximately the same time his application for
STS training was pending[,]” and that “there was no issue concerning STA training
Plaintiff in these cranes, notwithstanding his filing of EEOC Charges against the STA.” Id.
And, as to the third element of the McDonnell Douglas test, STA claims that Plaintiff
cannot show any causal connection between any retaliation and his protected activity.
Specifically, STA cites to Defendant’s deposition where he “enthusiastically concedes that
many other individuals who filed EEOC Charges against STA received crane training and
can bid on crane operator positions.” Id. at 20.
Lastly, Defendant STA argues that even “if Plaintiff could show the STA was
responsible for purportedly retaliating against him, the bargaining parties' action resulted
from a legitimate non-retaliatory reason.” Id. Specifically, STA claims that the bargaining
parties “confronted with an increasing number of applicants who failed, declined, or quit
training … decided to advance individuals who had yet to have the opportunity for training
in the Toploader, RTG, or STS cranes.” Id. STA claims that this decision, which has since
been modified, affected all applicants. Id. In closing, STA stresses that it has produced a
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legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the termination at issue here, that Plaintiff now bears
the burden of offering evidence that this proffered reason was pretextual, and that Plaintiff
cannot meet this burden. Id. at 21.
Here, it’s apparent that Plaintiff’s claims as to STA’s refusal to train are insufficient
to survive STA’s motion for summary judgment. As it relates to the second element of the
McDonnell Douglas test, STA makes strong arguments as to how it serves as an
administrator of training for certain employers, but that STA itself is not the ultimate
decision-maker in this regard, and therefore incapable of taking adverse action. ECF No.
58-1 at 18. However, even if Plaintiff were to satisfy the second element here, the causal
connection that Plaintiff attempts to draw between his EEOC complaints and STA’s refusal
to provide him with training is inadequate. Specifically, although Plaintiff filed EEOC
complaints against STA, STA still provided him with Toploader and RTG training at the
same time it denied him STS crane training. Id. at 20. And, both STA and Plaintiff agree
that STA provided the training in question to other individuals who filed EEOC complaints
against STA. Id. at 19; ECF No. 58-2 at 93. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims as to the denial of
training here falter at the third element of the McDonnell Douglas test.
Lastly, even if Plaintiff were able to prove a prima facie case of retaliation, STA has
further demonstrated that it had a valid, non-retaliatory rationale for denying Plaintiff
training. ECF No. 58-1 at 20. STA has established that its denial of STS training resulted
from a policy decision that affected all applicants, and one that was driven by its own needs
to curtail training provided to those who had previously withdrawn from such programs.
While Plaintiff disputes this argument, STA has provided records to substantiate its claims,
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ECF No. 62-1 and ECF No. 62-2, and Plaintiff is not otherwise able to show that this
proffered reason from STA is pretextual. Accordingly, this Court will GRANT STA’s
Motion for Summary Judgment and dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this Memorandum Opinion, Defendants’ Motions (ECF
No. 57; ECF No. 58) are GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is DISMISSED.

Date: 11/25/24

/s/
A. David Copperthite
United States Magistrate Judge

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