Stafford v. Acadia Pharmaceuticals, Inc. et al

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Julie Rebecca Rubin on 3/10/2025. (heps, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
MACKY STAFFORD,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 1:23-CV-03230-JRR

ACADIA PHARMACEUTICALS INC.,
et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 26, the
“Motion”). The court has reviewed all papers; no hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md.
2023).
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Macky Stafford’s claims arise from the termination of her employment by

Defendant Acadia Pharmaceuticals Inc. (“Acadia”) for failure to comply with its COVID-19
vaccination policy. The following facts are undisputed based on Defendants’ specific citations to
admissible record materials, including deposition testimony and documents exchanged in
discovery. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Plaintiff’s broad, wholesale assertion that “[n]ot a single material
fact averred by Defendants is undisputed in this matter” is unavailing, as are exclamations woven
throughout Plaintiff’s opposition that assertions of fact on which Defendants rely for their Motion
are “disputed” or “vigorously disputed.” (ECF No. 28 at p. 5; and id., passim.) Plaintiff may not
generate a genuine dispute of material fact through unsupported protestations of counsel,
generalized challenges to Defendants’ brief in support of the Motion, or non-specific references to
evidence developed through discovery. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) and (e) (requiring, inter alia, citation

to particular parts of materials in the record to assert that a fact cannot be, or is, genuinely disputed;
and noting that upon a failure to abide subsection (e), the court may accept the assertion of fact in
question as undisputed for purposes of ruling on a summary judgment motion). Where Plaintiff
has complied with Rule 56(c) to challenge a defense assertion of undisputed fact, or to generate a
genuine dispute of material fact, the court has considered same.
A. Plaintiff’s Employment Background
On or about March 7, 2016, Plaintiff accepted a job with Acadia as an Executive
Neuroscience Sales Specialist in the Baltimore, Maryland sales territory. (ECF No. 26-4, Offer
Letter.) In her role, Plaintiff was “responsible for all aspects of managing assigned sales territory,
including selling products and addressing customer needs.” (ECF No. 26-5, Job Description.) Her
responsibilities included travel to in-person meetings and trainings within her assigned territory,
and to regional and national meetings and events. Id.
B. Acadia’s COVID-19 Policy
By email sent to Acadia staff on May 28, 2021, Defendant Rob Ackles, Acadia’s Vice
President of People and Performance, advised: “[a]lthough vaccinations are not currently required
for employment at Acadia, they may be required for certain company events and activities (i.e.
medical congresses or conferences).” (ECF No. 26-9.) Mr. Ackles further instructed staff that
they would “receive a simple check-a-box assignment through Workday1 to communicate your
vaccination status and vaccination date. This information will be accessible to our People and
Performance team and will only be made available to the Covid Response Team and other Acadia
leaders as necessary.” Id. Employees were to complete the Workday assignment by June 2, 2021.
Id.

1

Workday is Defendant’s human resources electronic information system.

2

In the Workday portal, Plaintiff indicated that she was “fully vaccinated” and her “fully
vaccinated date (shot date)” was April 12, 2021. (ECF No. 26-10.) See ECF No. 26-13, Stafford
Deposition Tr. 35:3–6 (“When did you receive a COVID vaccination? A. I would say that was on
April 12th, 2021 when I was saved.); Tr. 74:16–25 (“It says that you were fully vaccinated on April
12th, 2021, correct? A. Yes. Q. It says: ‘Fully vaccinated date (shot date).’ Do you see that? A.
Yes. Q. Okay. Did you complete that? A. Yes.”).
On September 16, 2021, again by email, Mr. Ackles updated Acadia’s employees that
“[w]e are preparing to introduce a new policy that will take effect in December 2021, or sooner if
required by law, which will require all employees to be fully vaccinated.” (ECF No. 26-11.)
Additionally, Mr. Ackles wrote, “[w]e will work to accommodate Acadians who are not vaccinated
for religious or disability-related reasons. The accommodations process will be handled by our
People and Performance team.” Id.
Acadia’s COVID-19 Mandatory Vaccination Policy (the “Policy”) went into effect on
November 16, 2021. (ECF No. 26-12.) The Policy applied to all employees. Id. at p. 2. Under
the Policy, Acadia’s employees were required to be fully vaccinated by December 29, 2021. Id.
An employee was fully vaccinated per the Policy 14 days following receipt of the last dose, as
recommended by the vaccine manufacturer.

Id.

Employees were required to verify their

vaccination status with Acadia’s third-party vaccination verification service by December 23,
2021. Id. The Policy provided that employees may seek a temporary or long-term exemption
from the vaccine requirement on the basis of a disability, medical, or religious reason, and directed
those employees to contact their HR Business Partner for that purpose. Id. The Policy further
explained that exempt employees would be required to undertake safety protocols including

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masking, social distancing, testing regularly, “and/or having limited access to company or workrelated facilities and/or events.” Id. at p. 3.
C. Plaintiff’s Exemption Request and Accommodation Determination
On November 23, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a letter requesting a religious exemption to the
Policy. (ECF No. 26-14.) Her letter reads:
After reviewing the details of Acadia’s COVID-19 Mandatory
Vaccination Policy, I have realized that I need to submit this letter
of religious exemption. I cannot continue down this path and put
myself in a position I am not comfortable with which violates my
sincerely held religious beliefs.
Isaiah 33:22 states, “For the Lord is our judge, the Lord is our
lawyer, the Lord is our king; it is he who will save us.” This verse is
direct evidence of the important part God played in the writing of
the Constitution. I vehemently believe and model my life according
to this fact that the Lord my God had a direct hand in the creation of
the United States Constitution. Our Constitution protects my Godgiven freedoms, including my right to medical privacy. I know this
because I study the Bible daily.
Because of this most sincerely held religious belief, which Isaiah
33:22 so beautifully states, I cannot comply with Acadia’s policy on
the Covid-19 vaccination, or on any medical procedure for that
matter.
Thank you most graciously for accommodating my religious
exemption from your policy so that I can continue to perform the
job that I love.
Id.
On November 29, 2021, Plaintiff submitted Acadia’s “Religious COVID-19 Vaccination
Exemption Accommodation Worksheet.” (ECF No. 26-15.) In response to the worksheet’s first
two questions asking Plaintiff to “explain in her own words” why she requested an accommodation
and to “describe the religious principles that guide [her] objection to immunization,” Plaintiff
referred to her November 21 letter. Id. In response to the worksheet’s request to “[i]ndicate

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whether you are opposed to all immunizations, and if not, the religious basis that prohibits
particular immunizations,” Plaintiff wrote “I am not willing to waive my right to medical privacy.”
Id.
On January 12, 2022, after Plaintiff failed to verify her vaccination status per the Policy
through Acadia’s third-party service, Acadia employee Jennifer Toth followed up with Plaintiff to
complete the “HireRight2 vaccination verification.”

(ECF No. 26-17 at p. 3–4.)

Plaintiff

responded, “[a]s a reminder, I claimed my religious exemption on November 23, 2021, so I will
not be completing a vaccination verification.” Id. at p. 3. Ms. Toth informed Plaintiff that her
“accommodation request was for future requirements but you annotated in Workday and
communicated you were vaccinated []. For now, that is all Acadia is requiring so we would need
you to verify it through HireRight.” Id. In other words, Ms. Toth requested that Plaintiff input in
HireRight the information regarding her vaccinated status that Plaintiff had already provided
months earlier through Workday; Ms. Toth’s email did not request that Plaintiff provide new or
different information than Plaintiff had already provided over no objection (or contrary to an
exemption request). (See supra re ECF Nos. 26-10, 26-13.)
In response to Ms. Toth’s email, Plaintiff responded “I have complied with each of your
deadlines.” (ECF No. 26-17 at p. 2.) Ms. Toth again informed Plaintiff that she had not complied
with the HireRight verification process that was “completely separate from [her] accommodation
request.” Id. at p. 1. Ms. Toth told Plaintiff that if she did not complete the HireRight process,
Acadia would “need to take further action regarding you being out of compliance with our policy.”
Id. Five days later, in view of Plaintiff’s failure to input her previously self-reported vaccination
status into HireRight, Ms. Toth followed up with Plaintiff to inform her that she needed to follow

2

HireRight was Acadia’s third-party service employed to implement its Policy.

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Acadia’s protocols for unvaccinated employees until she completed the accommodation process.
(ECF No. 26-18.)
As part of Acadia’s accommodation process, Plaintiff met over videoconference with Mr.
Ackles and Karen Swanson, Director of Benefits & People Operations. (ECF No. 26-13, Stafford
Deposition Tr. 100:19–21.) Following their conversation, by letter of February 24, 2022, Mr.
Ackles wrote:
We received your request for an accommodation in which you did
not seek to be excused from taking the vaccine, but rather from
supplying proof of vaccination status. In particular, you objected to
the disclosure of the name of the healthcare provider who
administered the vaccine to you, as well as the type and date(s) of
the doses you received.
After careful review of this accommodation request, Acadia
Pharmaceuticals Inc. has approved a process that reduces the
information shared with the Company under the verification
requirement for our COVID19 Mandatory Vaccination Policy.
However, consistent with Company policy and out of consideration
for your fellow workers and others with whom you interact in your
work for Acadia, we cannot eliminate the verification component
completely. As such, rather than directly providing the Company
with a photocopy of your vaccine card or other healthcare forms
documenting your vaccine status, Acadia is willing to accept a valid
COVID-19 Vaccination QR Code, submitted directly to our thirdparty agent, HireRight, in order to verify your vaccination status. In
this way, Acadia will be not [] apprised of any of the specific
information you object to disclosing- it will only know that you are
confirmed as fully vaccinated.
.
.
.
You will need to provide your COVID QR Code to HireRight within
ten business days, by March 11, 2022.
(ECF No. 26-23.)
When Plaintiff failed to verify her vaccination status according to the terms of the
accommodation as described by Mr. Ackles, she was placed on Unpaid Administrative Leave.
(ECF No. 26-24.) During her period of Unpaid Administrative Leave, Plaintiff met with Acadia
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employees, Jennifer Toth and Monica Joynt. (ECF No. 26-27.) By email following the meeting,
Ms. Toth wrote, “[a]s discussed, we have two questions that we needed answered in order to move
forward. They are: (1) are you refusing to verify your vaccination status; and (2) are you refusing
to be vaccinated in general. You refused to respond to either of these questions during our
discussion and on multiple occasions in the past when we’ve asked.” Id. Ms. Toth provided
Plaintiff with a final set of options:
1. If you are vaccinated, you will remain on unpaid administrative
leave until you can verify your status. We will need this
information by today . . . . Recall we narrowed our request to
allow you to provide only QR Code.
2. If you are refusing to provide your vaccination status, despite us
narrowing the information sought, we will need to move forward
with your separation.
3. If you are not vaccinated, we will need this information by today
. . . . We will then also have to evaluate the fact that you
previously stated that you were vaccinated (when this was not
true) before moving forward with any discussions regarding an
accommodation.
Id. Plaintiff did not respond and was terminated the following day. Id.
D. Procedural History
Following a charge filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
regarding her termination of employment, on August 31, 2023, Plaintiff received a Right to Sue
Notice from EEOC. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 36.) Plaintiff initiated the instant action on November 28, 2023.
(ECF No. 1.) In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Hostile Work Environment (Count I), Religious
Discrimination (Count II), and Retaliation (Count III) claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”); “Religious Discrimination – Aiding and
Abetting” (Count IV) under “the Maryland Anti-Discrimination Act,” MD. CODE ANN., STATE
GOV’T §§ 20-601, et seq., and § 20-801; and Retaliation (Count V) under the “Maryland Human

7

Rights Act” MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T §§ 20-601, et seq.3 Id. Following discovery,
Defendants moved for summary judgment. (ECF No. 26, the “Motion.”) Plaintiff opposes the
Motion. (ECF Nos. 27, 28.)
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a court “shall grant summary judgment if

the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). A material fact is one that “might affect
the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308,
313 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A
genuine issue over a material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
When considering a motion for summary judgment, a judge’s function is limited to
determining whether sufficient evidence exists on a claimed factual dispute to warrant submission
of the matter to a jury for resolution at trial. Id. at 249. Trial courts in the Fourth Circuit have an
“affirmative obligation . . . to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding
to trial.” Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 526 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir. 1993)). A “party cannot create a genuine dispute
of material fact through mere speculation or compilation of inferences.” Shin v. Shalala, 166 F.
Supp. 2d 373, 375 (D. Md. 2001) (citations omitted); see Robinson v. Priority Auto. Huntersville,

Plaintiff brings claims of religious discrimination and retaliation under “the Maryland Anti-Discrimination Act” and
“Maryland Human Rights Act” (Counts IV and V), MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T §§ 20-601, et seq. Maryland
courts refer to this portion of the State Government article as the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act
(“MFEPA”). See, e.g., Peninsula Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Adkins, 448 Md. 197, 203 (2016). Accordingly, this court refers
to Counts IV and V as MFEPA claims.
3

8

Inc., 70 F.4th 776, 780 (4th Cir. 2023) (providing that “plaintiffs need to present more than their
own unsupported speculation and conclusory allegations to survive”).
In undertaking this inquiry, the court must consider the facts and all reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Libertarian Party of Va., 718 F.3d at 312; see
also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). The court “must not weigh evidence or make
credibility determinations.” Foster v. Univ. of Md.-Eastern Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 248 (4th Cir.
2015) (citing Mercantile Peninsula Bank v. French, 499 F.3d 345, 352 (4th Cir. 2007)); see also
Jacobs v. N.C. Adin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 569 (4th Cir. 2015) (explaining that the
trial court may not make credibility determinations at the summary judgment stage). Indeed, it is
the function of the fact-finder to resolve factual disputes, including issues of witness credibility.
Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656–57 (2014).
III.

ANALYSIS
A. Title VII Hostile Work Environment Claim
To establish a hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she

experienced unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment was based on her religion; (3) the
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and to
create an abusive atmosphere; and (4) there is some basis for imposing liability on the employer.
Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 746 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Bass v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours &
Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003)). Defendants argue summary judgment is appropriate
because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate she experienced any, much less religion-based and severe,
harassment.
In response to the Motion, Plaintiff reiterates her Complaint allegations that Defendants’
inquiries into the substance of her exemption request constituted harassment. Plaintiff states,

9

unsupported by any record citation, that Defendants “continued to harass and intimidate Ms.
Stafford into repeated new interviews, declarations, statements and ‘attestations’ of a detailed
analysis of her religious faith” and “continued to demand she submit to new inquiries, e-mailing
her throughout December that they could not recognize or grant her an accommodation until she
gave more information. Indeed, the evidence before the Court shows that Defendants even
demanded to know all her immunization objections and religious reasons.” (ECF No. 28 at p. 23;
emphasis in original.)
Without record support as required by Rule 56, Plaintiff’s statements are mere allegations
and insufficient to evade summary judgment; in other words, she fails to generate a triable issue
of fact no matter the force of protestations set forth in the opposition. Robinson, 70 F.4th at 780
(providing that “plaintiffs need to present more than their own unsupported speculation and
conclusory allegations to survive” summary judgment). Indeed, in the entirety of the hostile work
environment claim section of her opposition to the Motion, Plaintiff includes only one record
citation. (ECF No. 28 at pp. 21–23.) She cites Defendants’ Exhibit 1, a 49-page excerpt of
Plaintiff’s deposition testimony. Id. at p. 23. Plaintiff offers no specific citation within the excerpt
and the testimony in the excerpt concerns all facets of Plaintiff’s tenure at Acadia and subsequent
activities; it is not tailored to her hostile work environment allegations. (ECF No. 27-2.) Plaintiff
“does not coherently identify any facts or portions of the submitted documents that could create a
dispute of material fact, essentially leaving to this Court ‘the unenviable task of poring over
[voluminous] pages of . . . exhibits in search of bits of evidence that could preclude summary
judgment[.]” Letke v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., No. CV RDB-12-3799, 2015 WL 6163517,
at *1 (D. Md. Oct. 19, 2015), aff’d sub nom. Letke v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 639 F. App’x 955
(4th Cir. 2016).

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Even if Plaintiff had identified record support to substantiate her allegations, as a matter of
law, the calls and emails between and among Plaintiff and Acadia employees wherein Acadia
sought clarification of the scope of Plaintiff’s exemption request, and to follow up on Acadia’s
narrowed request for confirmation of Plaintiff’s vaccination status (per Plaintiff’s request that she
not be compelled to disclose what she viewed as private information) do not create a foundation
on which a reasonable factfinder could conclude she was subject to “severe and pervasive”
harassment. See, e.g., Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 184 (4th Cir. 2001)
(identifying relevant considerations to determining the degree of hostility as “frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it interferes with an employee’s workplace.” (quoting Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993))). In evaluating whether an environment is hostile,
courts examine the totality of the circumstances and apply “a subjective and objective test wherein
‘a plaintiff must demonstrate not only that [she] subjectively perceived [her] workplace as hostile,
but also that a reasonable person would perceive . . . that it was objectively hostile.’” Tawwaab v.
Virginia Linen Serv., Inc., 729 F. Supp. 2d 757, 775 (D. Md. 2010) (quoting Fox v. GMC, 247
F.3d 167, 178 (4th Cir. 2001)). Here, even crediting Plaintiff’s unsupported opposition, she fails
to generate a triable issue.
Broadening the court’s evaluation to be as permissive as possible, the court also considers
Plaintiff’s contention that the alleged workplace harassment resulted from the culminating effect
of the following: when Plaintiff’s manager asked on weekly Zoom calls whether the participants
were vaccinated; when Acadia sent company-wide emails announcing “things like ‘over 95% of
Acadians are fully vaccinated!;” when Plaintiff’s manager canceled an in-person meeting with
Plaintiff because she was not fully vaccinated; and in Zoom calls with Mr. Ackles and others to

11

address her exemption requests. (ECF No. 26-31, Plaintiff’s Interrogatory Responses at p. 7.) To
support a claim of hostile work environment under Title VII, Plaintiff must show that but for her
religion, she would not have been the victim of the alleged discrimination. See Tawwaab, 729 F.
Supp. 2d at 776 (finding harassment was not based on race when Plaintiff failed to adduce
“sufficient evidence to show that ‘but for’ his race he would not have been subject to” alleged
harassment.).
Plaintiff offers no record evidence on which a reasonable conclusion could be drawn that
comments on a weekly Zoom call or company-wide emails at unspecified times were made based
on her religion—she proffers no evidence that the speakers knew of her requested religious based
exemption or anything else about her religion. Even disparaging comments about vaccine status
generally, had Plaintiff showed they occurred, would not support harassment based on religion.
See Tawwaab, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 776 (drawing distinction between evidence of indiscriminately
abusive comments and explicitly racial comments; the former were not racially motivated and did
not support a Title VII hostile work environment claim). Plaintiff similarly fails to create a triable
issue as to whether her manager cancelled an in-person meeting because of Plaintiff’s religion.
Additionally, alone, the single instance of a cancelled meeting does not create a triable issue as to
the requisite pervasive nature of the alleged or complained-of harassment. Lissau v. S. Food Serv.,
Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 183 (1998) (explaining that “a recurring point” in courts’ opinions regarding
hostile work environment is that “isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to
discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment.”).
In interrogatory answers, Plaintiff described two Zoom calls with Rob Ackles and Karen
Swanson, and with Jennifer Toth and Monica Joynt that were “complete harassment” and
“pressure[d] her.” (ECF No. 26-31 ¶ 16.) Considering the totality of the circumstances—namely

12

that Defendants’ emails and calls sought information regarding Plaintiff’s vaccine exemption
request in light of her earlier self-reported vaccinated status and that Defendants ultimately granted
Plaintiff an accommodation—Plaintiff’s conclusory accusations of harassment based on these two
cited occasions, even considered in the light most favorable to her, do not create a foundation on
which a reasonable factfinder could conclude Plaintiff was subject to an “objectively hostile or
abusive work environment.” Lissau, 159 F. 3d at 183 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993));
Spriggs, 242 F.3d at 184 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21). Plaintiff has thus failed to generate a
triable issue of fact as to her hostile work environment claim.
B. Title VII Religious Discrimination
Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any
individual . . . because of such individual’s religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The definition of
“religion” includes “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an
employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or
prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of
the employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). “Because this definition includes a requirement
that an employer ‘accommodate’ an employee’s religious expression, an employee is not limited
to the disparate treatment theory to establish a discrimination claim. An employee can also bring
suit based on the theory that the employer discriminated against her by failing to accommodate her
religious conduct.” Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1018 (4th Cir. 1996)
(emphasis in original). Thus, courts generally recognize “two theories in asserting religious
discrimination claims,” “denominated as the ‘disparate treatment’ and ‘failure to accommodate’
theories.” Id. at 1017; see U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 554
F. Supp. 3d 739, 751 (D. Md. 2021) (same).

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i. Disparate Treatment
“To prove a Title VII claim under a disparate treatment theory, a plaintiff ‘must
demonstrate that the employer treated her differently than other employees because of her religious
beliefs.’” Barnett v. Inova Health Care Servs., 125 F.4th 465, 471 (4th Cir. 2025) (quoting
Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1012). “Accordingly, a plaintiff-employee, alleging disparate treatment
with respect to her discharge, satisfies her burden at the summary judgment state if she establishes
that her job performance was satisfactory and provides ‘direct or indirect evidence whose
cumulative probative force supports a reasonable inference that [the] discharge was
discriminatory.’” Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1017 (quoting Lawrence v. Mars, Inc., 955 F.2d 902, 905–
06 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 823 (1992)).
Plaintiff identifies no statement or action by Defendants that, considered separately or
together, directly reflect a desire or intent to treat her differently due to her religion and bore on
the decision to terminate her employment. See Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th Cir.
1995), abrogated on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101–102 (2003)
(explaining direct evidence of discrimination as “evidence of conduct or statements that both
reflect directly the alleged discriminatory attitude and that bear directly on the contested
employment decision.”). Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Ackles and Ms. Swanson were the “decision
makers” responsible for terminating her employment. (ECF No. 28 at p. 20.) But Ms. Swanson
testified at deposition that Plaintiff was fired for failure to submit proof of her vaccination by the
terms of her accommodation request. (ECF No. 26-28, Swanson Deposition Tr. 36:16–37:2.)
Correspondence from Mr. Ackles and from Acadia (through other Acadia employees) repeatedly
warned Plaintiff that failure to comply with Acadia’s vaccination policy, as accommodated to meet

14

her concerns, would result in her termination. (ECF Nos. 26-23, 26-27.) Plaintiff fails to generate
a genuine dispute of material fact as to this issue.
Without direct evidence, Plaintiff’s remaining option to establish a prima facie case of
religious discrimination is under a burden-shifting scheme similar to the one articulated by the
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
This might consist of evidence that the employer treated the
employee more harshly than other employees of a different religion,
or no religion, who had engaged in similar conduct. If the employee
presents such evidence, the burden shifts to the employer to
articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions
towards the employee. The employee is then required to show that
the employer's proffered reason is pretextual, and that the
employer's conduct towards her was actually motivated by illegal
considerations. At all times, the ultimate burden of persuasion lies
with the employee.
Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1017–18 (citations omitted).
Acadia’s vaccination policy applied equally to all employees.
COVID-19 Mandatory Vaccination Policy.)

(ECF 26-12, Acadia

Plaintiff alleges that Acadia’s response letters to

other employees’ exemption requests show disparate treatment disfavoring her (based on her
religion), but Plaintiff fails to consider (or acknowledge) that the employees in question sought
exemption from receiving the vaccine in the first place. (ECF No. 26-29.) Plaintiff sought an
exemption from disclosing what she viewed as private information about her vaccination status
based on her religious beliefs and convictions; and had previously expressly, clearly, and over no
objection advised Acadia that she was, in fact, vaccinated against COVID-19. As such, Plaintiff
was not similarly situated to employees who objected to the vaccine mandate on grounds that
vaccination ran counter to their religious beliefs or practices.
One other Acadia employee made a similar objection to reporting her vaccination status.
(ECF No. 26-28, Swanson Deposition Tr. 27:6–16.) Acadia offered that employee the same
15

accommodation offered to Plaintiff, specifically to provide proof of vaccination directly to a thirdparty verification company to shield the information the employee (like Plaintiff) asserted was
private per her religious practice. Id. When the other employee declined to avail herself of the
accommodation, and did not comply with the Policy (per the accommodation or otherwise), Acadia
terminated her employment as well. Id.
Plaintiff fails to identify a relevant comparator and provides no evidence on which a
reasonable factfinder could conclude that she was treated more harshly than others similarly
situated based on religion. See Barnett, 125 F.4th at 472 (finding plaintiff had “sufficiently alleged
facts supporting a reasonable inference of discriminatory intent” when plaintiff alleged defendantemployer “decided to pick winners and losers from among the employees making exemption
requests, based upon whether the [Exemption Committee] found an employee’s religious beliefs
were legitimate” and “chose to exempt employees who came from more prominent religions or
held to more conventional beliefs related to religious exemption to vaccines, but denied
exemptions to employees [] who held less well-known or respected religious beliefs”).
ii. Failure to Accommodate
The court notes, at the outset, that Plaintiff appears to bring her Title VII religious
discrimination claim under a disparate treatment theory; she does not allege in the Complaint that
Acadia failed to provide reasonable accommodation. See ECF No. 1, Complaint ¶ 50 (“[t]he
discrimination was because of her religious beliefs after she was required by Defendants’ policies
to submit a religious exemption declaration explaining her faith in order to receive an
accommodation from the experimental COVID-19 vaccination.”). Nonetheless, under Title VII,
an employer has a “statutory obligation to make reasonable accommodation for the religious
observances of its employees, short of incurring an undue hardship.” E.E.O.C. v. Firestone Fibers

16

& Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 312 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63, 75 (1977)). The court will therefore consider whether this liability theory presents a
trial issue based on the undisputed facts presented.
“To state a prima facie failure-to-accommodate claim, an employee must allege that: ‘(1)
he or she has a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) he or
she informed the employer of this belief; [and] (3) he or she was disciplined for failure to comply
with the conflicting employment requirement.’” Brennan v. Deluxe Corp., 361 F. Supp. 3d 494,
509 (D. Md. 2019) (quoting U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Consol Energy, Inc., 860
F.3d 131, 141 (4th Cir. 2017)). “If the employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden then
shifts to the employer to show that it could not [reasonably] accommodate the plaintiff's religious
needs without undue hardship.” Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d at 312 (quoting
Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1019).
To assess whether Plaintiff states a prima facie case for failure to accommodate, the court
must identify the alleged conflicting belief. Plaintiff avers: “[i]t is . . . a material dispute of fact
that Plaintiff objected to both the COVID-19 vaccination and the medical privacy waivers required
for reporting on vaccination status.” (ECF No. 28 at p. 12.) But, for the reasons set forth above,
Plaintiff cannot base a failure to accommodate prima facie case on the former, because she failed
to communicate a religious-based objection to the COVID-19 vaccination to Defendants. In fact,
as explained, it is undisputed that she confirmed she was vaccinated without complaint. As for the
second basis, even assuming Plaintiff could demonstrate that objection to medical privacy waivers
was part of her sincerely held religious belief, Defendants provided a reasonable accommodation
of same; but Plaintiff declined to conform and act accordingly.

17

Plaintiff’s accommodation request letter states: “I cannot comply with Acadia’s policy on
the Covid-19 vaccination, or on any medical procedure for that matter” because “[o]ur Constitution
protects my God-given freedoms, including my right to medical privacy.” (ECF No. 26-14.) In
the Religious COVID-19 Vaccination Exemption Accommodation Worksheet provided by
Acadia, Plaintiff answered the question “[i]ndicate whether you are opposed to all immunizations,
and if not, the religious basis that prohibits particular immunizations” with “I am not willing to
waive my right to medical privacy.” (ECF No. 26-15.) Plaintiff submitted her accommodation
requests after indicating to her employer that she had received the vaccine. (ECF No. 26-10.) See
ECF No. 26-13, Stafford Deposition Tr. 74:16–25 (“It says that you were fully vaccinated on April
12th, 2021, correct? A. Yes. Q. It says: ‘Fully vaccinated date (shot date).’ Do you see that? A.
Yes. Q. Okay. Did you complete that? A. Yes.”). As Defendants proceeded to gather information
regarding Plaintiff’s accommodation request, they offered her numerous occasions to clarify the
nature of her request. See ECF Nos. 26-25; 26-27; 28 at p. 11 (describing Zoom call with Mr.
Ackles and Ms. Swanson). In her response to the Motion, Plaintiff fails to identify record support,
even in her own deposition, demonstrating she informed her employer that her objection was to
receiving the COVID-19 vaccine. See Robinson, 70 F.4th at 780 (providing that “plaintiffs need
to present more than their own unsupported speculation and conclusory allegations to survive”
summary judgment). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie failure to accommodate
claim based on her alleged religious objection to the COVID-19 vaccine.
Plaintiff’s second alleged religious belief in conflict with Acadia’s Policy is her objection
to waiving her medical privacy by reporting her vaccination status to Acadia.

Plaintiff

communicated this objection to Defendants through her religious exemption requests. (ECF Nos.
26-14, 26-15.) Upon consideration of her requests, Defendants offered her an accommodation:

18

“rather than directly providing the Company with a photocopy of your vaccine card or other
healthcare forms documenting your vaccine status,” Plaintiff could provide “a valid COVID-19
Vaccination QR Code, submitted directly to our third-party agency, HireRight, in order to verify
you vaccination status.” (ECF No. 26-23.) With this accommodation, “Acadia [would] not be
apprised of any of the specific information [Plaintiff] object[s] to disclosing – it will only know
that you are confirmed as fully vaccinated.” Id. Inasmuch as Plaintiff had, months earlier,
expressly told Acadia she was vaccinated (over no religious-based or other objection), Acadia’s
accommodation (that Plaintiff provide a vaccine QR code to verify her vaccinated status) met
Plaintiff’s stated objection regarding disclosure of what she considered private medical
information protected by her religious beliefs: disclosure of the name of the healthcare provider
who administered the vaccine, and the type and date(s) of vaccine doses received.
Even if Plaintiff established a prima facie case of failure to accommodate her religiousbased objection to waiving claimed medical privacy, as said above, Acadia has demonstrated
undisputed facts that, as a matter of law, amount to provision of reasonable accommodation. “To
satisfy its burden, the employer must demonstrate either (1) that it provided the plaintiff with a
reasonable accommodation for his or her religious observances or (2) that such accommodation
was not provided because it would have caused an undue hardship—that is, it would have
‘result[ed] in more than a de minimis cost to the employer.’”). Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co.,
515 F.3d at 312 (quoting Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68 (1986)). “Notably,
‘[e]ither one of these conditions is sufficient[]’ and, ‘if an employer has provided a reasonable
accommodation, [the court] need not examine whether alternative accommodations not offered
would have resulted in undue hardship.’” Brennan v. Deluxe Corp., No. CV ELH-18-2119, 2021
WL 2155004, at *12 (D. Md. May 27, 2021) (quoting Reed v. Fairfax Cty., Virginia, No. 1:18-

19

CV-1454, 2020 WL 252992, at *5 (E.D. Va. Jan. 15, 2020)), and Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co.,
515 F.3d at 312).
In the accommodation letter, Defendants clarified that “consistent with Company policy
and out of consideration for your fellow workers and others with whom you interact in your work
for Acadia, we cannot eliminate the verification component completely.” (ECF No. 26-23.) See
Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d at 314–15 (quoting Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1018 and
Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 479 U.S. at 70) (explaining “while an employer must ‘actively attempt to
accommodate an employee's religious expression or conduct,’ it is not required to do so ‘at all
costs.’”). Plaintiff does not allege, nor does the record suggest or allow a reasonable conclusion,
that she informed Defendants that the offered accommodation was insufficient or not reasonable.
See Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d at 316 (noting “the importance of ‘bilateral
cooperation’ between an employer and employee in their search for a reasonable accommodation.
(quoting Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 69)). Rather, the undisputed fact is that she simply declined to act
accordingly.
Accordingly, based on the undisputed facts and applicable law, Defendants are entitled to
judgment in their favor on Plaintiffs’ claims of Title VII violation under both disparate treatment
and failure to accommodate theories of religious discrimination.
C. Title VII Retaliation
“Title VII prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for complaining
about prior discrimination.” Roberts v. Glenn Indus. Grp., Inc., 998 F.3d 111, 122 (4th Cir. 2021)
(citing Foster, 787 F.3d at 249). A plaintiff may prove a Title VII retaliation claim through either
direct evidence of retaliatory animus or the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Id.
(citing McDonell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. 792). Plaintiff does not proceed on a direct evidence

20

basis; rather, she proceeds under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See ECF
No. 28 at p. 24 (“when we review the [McDonnell Douglas] test, each element proves Ms. Stafford
was retaliated against”).
To establish a prima facie claim for retaliation, Plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she
engaged in a protected activity; (2) her employer took an adverse employment action against her;
and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.
Roberts, 998 F.3d at 122. Here, it is undisputed Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action—
termination—therefore, the court’s analysis will focus on the first and third elements. See Id.
(providing that “‘[d]ischarge’ from employment is one form of adverse employment action.”).
Plaintiff alleges she was terminated in retaliation for submitting her religious exemption
request. (ECF No. 28 at p. 23.) “But for her submission of her religious exemption from the
COVID-19 vaccination, Ms. Stafford would not have been suspended from and then terminated
from her job with Defendants.” Id. at p. 24. See also ECF No. 1, Complaint ¶ 60 (“The retaliation
was because of her religious beliefs after she was required by Defendants’ policies to submit a
religious exemption declaration explaining her faith in order to receive an accommodation from
the experimental COVID-19 vaccination.”). Here, Plaintiff mistakenly “conflate[s] requests for
accommodation by way of exemption with opposition to allegedly unlawful denial of such
accommodation requests . . . ‘merely requesting a religious accommodation is not the same as
opposing the allegedly unlawful denial of a religious accommodation.’” Menk v. MITRE Corp.,
713 F. Supp. 3d 113, 152 (D. Md. 2024) (quoting Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. N. Mem’l
Health Care, 908 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir. 2018)). This court further explained the distinction in
Perlman v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore:
Section 3(a) of Title VII, which addresses retaliation claims,
references “oppos[ition] to any practice,” or “participation in any
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manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” to explain what
constitutes a protected activity. Id. In considering whether a
plaintiff's action constitutes “opposition activity” that would be
protected, the Fourth Circuit has stated that “[o]pposition activity
encompasses utilizing informal grievance procedures as well as
staging informal protests and voicing one's opinions in order to bring
attention to an employer's discriminatory activities.” Laughlin v.
Metro Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 1998); see
also id. (“Whether an employee has engaged in protected opposition
activity, turns upon balancing 'the purpose of the Act to protect
persons engaging reasonably in activities opposing...discrimination,
against Congress's equally manifest desire not to tie the hands of
employers in the objective selection and control of personnel.'”)
(ellipsis in original).
.

.

.

[M]aking a religious accommodation request is not protected
activity. The making of such a request neither “oppos[es] any
practice” of the [defendant], nor constitutes “participation in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing” to do with any Title VII
violations committed by the [defendant].
No. CV-SAG-15-1620, 2016 WL 640772, at *5–6 (D. Md. Feb. 18, 2016).
Even if Plaintiff’s accommodation request constituted a protected activity, she has not
generated triable issue regarding the causal connection between her exemption request and
termination. See Kline v. Certainteed Corp., 205 F. Supp. 2d 468, 474 (D. Md. 2002) (instructing
“[t]o survive summary judgment . . . [plaintiff] must have evidence from which a reasonable
factfinder could conclude that a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the
adverse action.” (quoting Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653,
657 (4th Cir. 1998)). As explained above, Ms. Swanson testified at deposition that Plaintiff was
fired because she failed to submit proof of her vaccination by the terms of her accommodation.
(ECF No. 26-28 Tr. 36:16–37:2.) Correspondence from Mr. Ackles and from Acadia (through
other Acadia employees) repeatedly warned Plaintiff that failure to comply with its vaccination

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policy, as accommodated per Plaintiff’s request, would result in her termination. (ECF Nos. 2623, 26-27.)
Plaintiff offers no record evidence on which to rest her claims that she was fired or
otherwise retaliated against because she submitted a religious exemption request. In short, she
provides nothing on which a reasonable factfinder could rely to conclude that she was fired because
she sought a religious-based exemption. Therefore, even accepting for sake of argument that an
exemption request is protected activity, Plaintiff fails to generate a dispute of fact as to the reason
or basis for, or even motivating factor contributing to, her termination. Accordingly, there is no
triable issue as to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
D. MFEPA Claims
Defendants argue that if the court grants summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on
Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim (Count III), summary judgment is appropriate under the same
analysis on Plaintiff’s MFEPA retaliation claim (Count V). Similarly, Defendants assert, if the
court grants summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on Plaintiff’s Title VII religious
discrimination claims (Count II), summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiff’s MFEPA aiding
and abetting religious discrimination claim (Count IV). Plaintiff mounts no challenge to (indeed,
does not address) Defendants’ arguments regarding Counts IV and V. Accordingly, Plaintiff
waives opposition to summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on these counts. See Johnson v.
United States, 861 F. Supp. 2d 629, 634 (D. Md. 2012) (finding “[f]ailure to raise issues in
opposition to summary judgment functions as a waiver.” (citation omitted)); Letke, 2015 WL
6163517, at *1 n.2 (noting court may grant summary judgment in favor of defendant on grounds
that plaintiff failed to identify any facts or portions of submitted documents that could create a
dispute of material fact alone).

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Even if Plaintiff had not waived opposition to Defendants’ arguments regarding the state
law counts, judgment as a matter of law on Counts IV and V is still warranted. MFEPA is the state
analogue to federal employment discrimination statutes. Ensor v. Jenkins, No.CV ELH-20-1266,
2021 WL 1139760, at *18 (D. Md. Mar. 25, 2021). “Courts judge discrimination and retaliation
claims brought under MFEPA by the same standards as those same claims brought under Title
VII.” Lowman v. Maryland Aviation Admin., No.CV JKB-18-1146, 2019 WL 133267, at *4 (D.
Md. Jan. 8, 2019) (citing Hawkins v. Leggett, 955 F. Supp. 2d 474, 496–97 (D. Md. 2013)).
Accordingly, the court’s above analysis of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim under Title VII applies
equally to her claim under MFEPA. See Ensor, 2021 WL 1139760, at *18 (analyzing plaintiff’s
MFEPA claim under the Title VII standard); see also Churchill v. Prince George’s Cnty. Pub.
Schs., No. PWG-17-980, 2017 WL 5970718, at *5 n.6 (D. Md. Dec. 1, 2017) (analyzing Title VII
and MFEPA claims together).
In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants aided and abetted religious discrimination in
violation of Maryland law. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-801. Under § 20-801, “[a] person
may not: (1) aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce any person to commit a discriminatory act; (2)
attempt, directly or indirectly, alone or in concert with others, to commit a discriminatory act”
where discriminatory act is defined, as relevant here, as an act prohibited under MFEPA. Id. § 20801, 20-101(d)(4). For the reasons set forth above, based on the undisputed material facts,
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s claim under § 20-801 of
MFEPA.
E. Defendant Ackles’ Liability
Defendants move for summary judgment in favor of Mr. Ackles as to Plaintiff’s Title VII
claims (Counts I, II, III). It is undisputed that Mr. Ackles served as Plaintiff’s supervisor at Acadia.

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See Complaint, ECF No. 1 ¶ 4; Answer, ECF No. 11 ¶ 4. Supervisors are not liable in their
individual capacities for Title VII violations. Lissau, 159 F.3d at 180; see, e.g., Lewis v. Senior
Lifestyle, No. CV GLR-23-43, 2023 WL 8478901, at *1 n.3 (D. Md. Dec. 7, 2023) (noting plaintiff
“asserts Title VII claims, and the only proper defendant in a Title VII case is the employer . . . not
its individual employees.”). “Only an employer may be held liable for Title VII violations because
individual liability under Title VII ‘would improperly expand the remedial scheme crafted by
Congress.’” Ensor, 2021 WL 1139760, at *18 (quoting Lissau, 159 F.3d at 181). “Moreover,
because the [M]FEPA analysis tracks that of Title VII, there is no individual liability under
[M]FEPA.” Id.; see Brown v. Baltimore Police Dep’t, RDB-11-00136, 2011 WL 6415366, at *14
(D. Md. Dec. 21, 2011) (explaining “[b]ecause supervisors cannot be liable in their individual
capacities under Title VII. . . supervisors cannot be liable under . . . [M]FEPA.”). Accordingly, as
Plaintiff’s supervisor, Defendant Ackles is entitled to judgment in his favor on all counts.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, by separate order, Defendants’ Motion (ECF No. 26) will

be granted.

/S/
March 10, 2025

____________________
Julie R. Rubin
United States District Judge

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