James-Meyers v. Quaynar

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Paula Xinis on 3/5/2025. (c/m p 3/5/25 ols, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
ANTHONY JAMES-MEYERS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No.: PX-23-3355

OFC. QUAYNAR,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Anthony James-Meyers, an inmate at the Maryland Correctional Training Center
(“MCTC”) in Hagerstown, Maryland, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Defendant Officer Quaynar. ECF No. 1. Officer Quaynar moves to dismiss the Complaint or
alternatively for summary judgment to be granted in his favor. ECF No. 14. Upon review of the
record, no hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2023). For the reasons stated below,
Officer Quaynar’s motion, construed one for summary judgment, will be granted. 1
I.

Background
James-Meyers sues Officer Quaynar for allegedly using excessive force against him during

medication rounds. ECF No. 1. Specifically, James-Meyers alleges that on August 25, 2023
“around 6:45 p.m. – 6:50 p.m.,” Officer Quaynar “began to kick & [sic] punch my left hand as
well as try to slam close [sic] the slot on me multiple times.” ECF No. 1-1 at 4. Video footage of
the incident, ECF No. 14-4, corroborates that on this date and time, Officer Quaynar and Nurse
After the Court advised James-Meyers of his right to respond to the dispositive motion, see Roseboro v. Garrison,
528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), James-Meyers filed an interlocutory appeal with the Fourth Circuit. ECF No. 16. The
Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that James-Meyers erroneously noted his appeal in lieu of
responding to the Defendant’s motion. ECF No. 20-2 at 2. After the appellate court mandate issued, James-Meyers
filed his response to the pending motion. ECF No. 22. Even though technically the response is untimely, clearly
James-Meyers did not understand the procedural posture of the case. To give him the opportunity to be heard on the
merits, the Court will consider his response. See Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 96 (4th Cir.1989) (citing Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
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Wallace approached James-Meyers’ cell door to administer medication. ECF No. 14-4. The video
also captures the following six-minute exchange. Id.
After Officer Quaynar unlocked the cell-door slot, Nurse Wallace placed medication in the
slot. James-Meyers extended his arm and appeared to exchange words with Officer Quaynar.
Officer Quaynar next raised his foot to tap James-Meyers’ extended arm while the nurse continued
down the tier. Also, in an apparent effort to get James-Meyers to withdraw his arm from the slot,
Officer Quaynar touched, tapped, and held James-Meyers’ outstretched arm for about a minute.
Officer Quaynar next walked away from James-Meyers’ outstretched left arm and
summoned other officers. As two other officers got within a few inches of James-Meyers’
outstretched arm, James-Meyers pulled his arm back into the cell. Shortly after, Officer Quaynar
joined the two officers. For about ten seconds, Officer Quaynar’s body partially blocked the
camera’s view of the cell door slot; but during that time, no officer made any sudden or violent
movements.
Officer Quaynar next walked away, and James-Meyers extended both arms through the
door slot and began talking with the two remaining officers, gesticulating with his hands. 2 Shortly
after, James-Meyers withdrew his arms, and one officer closed the slot without incident.
A photograph taken of James-Meyers’ left hand the next day showed no injury, save for a
dime-sized area where an old abrasion appeared to be healing. ECF No. 14-3 at 23. Records also
reflect that James-Meyers had been treated for pain to his right arm, wrist, and shoulder. ECF No.
14-5 at 2-10. This includes a medical visit that took place on August 30, 2023, in which James-

James-Meyers asserts, without support, that other video cameras would have captured the incident from other angles.
ECF No. 22 at 2. The submitted video footage captures the entirety of the tier and no other cameras are visible. ECF
No. 14-4.

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Meyers complained of a “staff assault” where his “right hand” was “slammed at the door” and he
was treated for a right-hand cut. Id. at 2-3.
II.

Standard of Review
Officer Quaynar moves to dismiss the claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) or for summary judgment to be granted in his favor. The Court retains broad discretion
under Rule 12(d) to treat such a motion as one brought pursuant to Rule 56. See Kensington Vol. Fire
Dep’t., Inc. v. Montgomery Cty., 788 F. Supp. 2d 431, 436-37 (D. Md. 2011), aff’d, 684 F.3d 462 (4th
Cir. 2012). Wells-Bey v. Kopp, No. ELH-12-2319, 2013 WL 1700927, at *5 (D. Md. Apr. 16, 2013)
(quoting 5C Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1366, at 159 (3d ed. 2004, 2012 Supp.)).
The motion includes evidence beyond the Complaint, placing James-Meyers on notice that the Court
could convert the motion to one for summary judgment. ECF No 15. Accordingly, the Court will
reach the propriety of summary judgment. See, e.g., Moret v. Harvey, 381 F. Supp. 2d 458, 464 (D.
Md. 2005).
Under Rule 56(d) summary judgment is proper where “no genuine dispute of material fact
exists” on any element of the claim such that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
When reviewing for summary judgment, the Court must construe the record “in the light most
favorable to . . . the nonmovant, and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor without weighing the
evidence or assessing the witnesses’ credibility.” Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290
F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir. 2002). “The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties
will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that
there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48
(1986) (emphasis in original). “A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment
‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings,’ but rather must ‘set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). A dispute

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of material fact is only “genuine” if sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party exists for the
trier of fact to return a verdict for that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
With his standard in mind, the Court turns to Officer Quaynar’s motion. 3

III.

Discussion
The Constitution’s Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment

“protects inmates from inhumane treatment and conditions while imprisoned.” Williams v.
Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). An officer violates an inmate’s Eighth Amendment
rights when he subjects the inmate to “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). The
excessive force inquiry has two components. The first, “objective component asks whether the
force applied was sufficiently serious to establish a cause of action.” Alexander v. Connor, 105
F.4th 174, 182 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Brooks v. Johnson, 924 F.3d 104, 112 (4th Cir. 2019)).
Whether force was objectively reasonable turns on “the nature of the force used rather than the
extent of any injuries suffered by the plaintiff and requires only a nontrivial use of force.” Id.
citing Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 34, 39 (2010) (per curiam) (internal quotations omitted).
The second, subjective component requires the inmate show that the officer acted
“maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm” rather than “in a good faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (quoting
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986)). Whether an officer “acted with wantonness”
depends on “(1) the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between the need and the

Officer Quaynar asserts, without support, that James-Meyers sues him in his “official capacity,” and so he is entitled
to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. ECF No. 14-1 at 6. See Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); see also Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989). But clearly, JamesMeyers sues Officer Quaynar for acts taken in the officer’s individual capacity, ECF No. 1. Because officials are not
immune from suit for acts taken in their individual capacities, see Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 22 (1991), the claim
will not be resolved on immunity grounds.

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amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of any reasonably perceived threat that the application
of force was intended to quell; and (4) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful
response.” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 239 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
When viewing the record most favorably to James-Meyers, no rational trier of fact could
conclude that Officer Quaynar applied “sufficiently serious” force to establish the first component
of the Eighth Amendment analysis. Alexander, 105 F.4th at 182 (quoting Brooks, 924 F.3d at
112). At worst, Officer Quaynar gingerly raised his foot once to tap James-Meyers’ outstretched
arm. Officer Quaynar did not “kick” James-Meyers or the cell door slot at any point. When JamesMeyers did not withdraw his arm, Officer Quaynar also touched, tapped and held James-Meyers’
arm with his hand. Indeed, the force applied was so minimal that James-Meyers’ arm barely
moved in response. The contemporaneous photograph of Meyers’ left hand showed no signs of
recent or serious injury.
Moreover, medical records do not support any claimed force to James-Meyers’ left hand
or arm. The video footage indisputably shows that Officer Quaynar touched James-Meyers’ left
arm.

The only contemporaneous medical records show that the next day, James-Meyers

complained during a scheduled sick call of right hand numbness, which appears to have been a
pre-existing problem. ECF No. 14-5 at 6 (documenting James-Meyers complaint “I feel numb to
my r hand I was on baclofen on the old jail, since I got here I have to seen a doctor”). See also id.
at 8-10 (August 1, 2023, encounter stemming from previous “alleged altercation” pain in right
hand, shoulder and wrist). No records memorialize any medical visits associated with injury to
James-Meyers’ left hand or arm.

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In sum, the entirety of the evidence, viewed most favorably to James-Meyers, cannot
support an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. Although using one’s foot to tap an inmate’s
outstretched arm is likely not advisable, no rational juror could conclude that Officer Quaynar’s
encounter with James-Meyers constitutes an objectively serious use of force such that it amounts
to cruel and unusual punishment. Summary judgment is thus granted in Officer Quaynar’s favor. 4
IV.

Conclusion
For the above stated reasons, Officer Quaynar’s Motion to Dismiss or for Summary

Judgment, construed as a motion for summary judgment, is GRANTED.
A separate Order follows.
/S/

3/5/25
Date

Paula Xinis
United States District Judge

Because the claim will not proceed, the Court denies as moot James-Meyers’ request for appointment of counsel.
ECF No. 22 at 2.
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